



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

Bought from D. Lows 142/520.



*Sir John Francis Davis*  
*Baronet.*

270







*W Davis.*

*1822.*







# **OBSERVATIONS**

**ON THE**

**OPINIONS OF SEVERAL WRITERS**

**ON VARIOUS**

***HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND METAPHYSICAL***

**QUESTIONS.**

---

**By GAVIN YOUNG,**

**LIEUTENANT IN THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S  
SERVICE.**

---

**Calcutta:**

**PRINTED BY PHILIP PEREIRA, AT THE HINDOOSTANEE-PRESS.**

---

**1817.**



**TO HIS EXCELLENCY**

**THE MOST NOBLE**

**FRANCIS, MARQUIS OF HASTINGS, K. G.**

*Governor-General and Commander-in-*

*Chief of British India; &c. &c. &c.*

**THESE ESSAYS**

**ARE RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED**

**BY HIS LORDSHIP'S**

**MOST OBEDIENT AND**

**MOST HUMBLE SERVANT,**

**G. YOUNG.**





## PREFACE.

---

**T**HE following essays are the fruit of the abundant leisure I have enjoyed in this country. In each of them an attempt is made to decide some controverted question or questions of permanent interest. With respect to my manner of treating the several subjects, I request the reader's attention to the opening of Mr. Burke's Fourth Letter on a Regicide Peace. "I am not sure," says that incomparable writer, "that the best way of discussing any subject, except those that concern the abstract sciences, is not somewhat in the way of dialogue. To this mode, however, there are two objections; the first, that it happens, as in the puppet-show, one man speaks for all the personages. An unnatural uniformity of tone is in a manner unavoidable. The other, and more serious objection is, that as the author (if not an absolute sceptick) must have some opinion of his own to enforce, he will be continually tempted to enervate the arguments he puts into the mouth of his adversary, or to place them in a point of view most commodious for

“ their refutation. There is, however, a sort of  
“ dialogue not quite so liable to these objections,  
“ because it approaches more nearly to truth and  
“ nature: it is called **CONTROVERSY**. Here the  
“ parties speak for themselves. If the writer,  
“ who attacks another’s notions, does not deal  
“ fairly with his adversary, the diligent reader has  
“ it always in his power, by resorting to the work  
“ examined, to do justice to the original author  
“ and to himself.” To be sure of doing justice  
to the statement of my adversary’s opinions, and  
to adhere more closely to the nature of dialogue,  
I believe I have, on every occasion, quoted his  
own words.

The restoration of the balance of power in  
Europe after the second expulsion of Bonaparte,  
appeared to me to confer a new interest on the  
facts and principles contained in the *Politique de  
tous les Cabinets*. While the fairest portion of  
the world continued to be vexed and oppressed  
under the domination of a man who had a heart  
to conceive, a head to contrive, and millions of  
hands to execute every deed of mischief; and  
even during the long dawn which ushered in the  
splendour of a happier day than any which pre-  
ceded the late reign of gloom and terror; all ideas  
of balance—freedom—and independence, could  
only refer to ardent and just hopes, the rewards  
of a righteous cause; not to substantial realities  
and actual enjoyments.

My observations on the above mentioned work were printed before I discovered that Mr. Brougham had incorporated into his work on *Colonial Policy* the substance of the article which he wrote on the same subject for the *Edinburgh Review*. Besides the opposite view which Mr. Brougham takes of the merits of the Austrian alliance of 1756, I observe that he differs from M. Segur on another topic; *viz.* the part which France took in the American war; which he ventures to pronounce "*an acknowledged blunder.*"\* I shall here content myself with saying that I apprehend it would be no less difficult to procure a majority of French Politicians to subscribe to his opinions on the latter subject than on the former.

Notwithstanding the superabundant strength of the argument in favour of the Conceptualist system, there is a passage in the *Edinburgh Review* (Vol. XIII. P. 44.) which would lead me to conclude that the doctrine of the Nominalists is predominant among those who hold any opinions on that seemingly abstruse subject. "It is *demonstrated*," says the Reviewer, "that there can be no such thing as an abstract idea; and if any one is unacquainted with the *demonstration*, let

---

\* *Colonial Policy*, Vol. II. P. 295.

“ him read the elegant and philosophical reason-  
“ ings of Mr. Stewart in his Chapter on Abstrac-  
“ tion :”—and then, as if to exclude the possibility  
of further hesitation, the statement is backed by a  
notable piece of Horne Tooke’s etymology: “ As  
“ every existence is an individual, so, every con-  
“ ception in the mind must be of an individual;  
“ and nothing is general but language. Thus  
“ *speech* is a general or abstract term; but is there  
“ any abstract idea corresponding to it? No such  
“ thing. It is the *past* [passive] participle of an  
“ old Anglo-Saxon verb, signifying to speak; and  
“ means *something spoken!*”

The article on the Funding System was written before I had seen Dr. Hamilton’s masterly and conclusive work. Science can do no more to enforce the impolicy of that system than he has done: but so many difficulties surround us at this advanced stage of our progress, that we know not whether to proceed at all hazards, or to retrace our steps. On one hand there is a cry for present relief, as if from a crew exhausted with labour at the chain-pumps; on the other, it is necessary to lighten the vessel that she may be able to withstand the buffetings of future tempests. Whichever course we adopt we must atone for our folly. “ At other  
“ times,” says Sir James Stewart, “ we see states-  
“ men presenting the allurements of present ease,  
“ precisely at the time when people’s minds are

“ best disposed to receive a burden ; I mean when  
“ war threatens, and when the mind is healed with  
“ a resentment of injuries. Is it not wonderful  
“ at such a time as this, to increase taxes only in  
“ proportion to the interest of money wanted?  
“ does not this imply a short-sightedness, or at  
“ least an indifference as to what is to come? Is  
“ it not more natural that a people should consent  
“ to come under burdens to gratify revenge, than  
“ submit to repay a large debt when their minds  
“ are in a state of tranquillity?” (Vol. I. P. 14.)

A people galled by the pressure of an enormous debt in time of peace, are not only indisposed to make adequate exertions to reduce or extinguish it, but, in their impatience, they clamour against the most trifling and reasonable expences whether required to renumerate public service, or for objects of public utility and magnificence.

The finances of Ireland are now in such a state that actual bankruptcy, which is only averted by her connexion with Great Britain, could not demonstrate more clearly the improvidence of the plan on which they have been conducted. If it had been intended to bring the matter to the test of experiment, the result could not have been more decisive. At the time of the union the exchequers of the two countries were kept separate, because the British debt, in proportion to the British revenue, was so much greater than the Irish. Ireland was

therefore exempted from bearing any part of the weight of the antecedent debt of Great Britain ; but so zealously did she, under our superintendence, emulate our financial policy, that the *interest* of her present debt *exceeds* the utmost revenue she can scrape together ; and *now* we are glad to receive our poor sister for better for worse, with all her incumbrances, and to hide the proofs of our mismanagement by blending all pecuniary transactions.

It will be evident to the Oriental student that the merit of Dr. Lumsden's Persian and Arabic Grammars, as far as they illustrate the structure of those languages, is quite independent of the success, or failure, of my criticism on some of his opinions on questions of universal grammar. Of the excellence of these elaborate works *as Persian and Arabic Grammars*, I am incompetent to judge, and therefore not entitled even to say that I concur in the unanimous opinion of Orientalists that they are the best that have hitherto been given to the world. I can only say that I am not in the least inclined to question the justness of that opinion.

The *Vindiciæ Alphabeticæ* was published anonymously in 1812. In 1814 Dr. Marshman published his *Clavis Sinica* : but as he has chosen to leave his dissertation without any defence, as if it were invulnerable ; as the *Quarterly Review* may have encouraged him in this opinion by omitting

to detect any one of his errors; and as the advantages of the Alphabet still deserve to be displayed by being contrasted with that which is most alien and abhorrent to its nature; he cannot complain if I venture to re-appear, *meo periculo*, without my mask, as the champion of the daughters of Cadmus. The Quarterly Reviewer expressly says: "We are inclined therefore to agree with Mr. Marsh-  
 " man in supposing the Chinese characters much  
 " easier to acquire than the Sanscrit Alphabet,  
 " which has more than 600 combinations of syllabic characters perfectly distinct; and we think  
 " it probable that a Chinese youth thoroughly  
 " acquainted with the 214 elementary characters  
 " stands on much higher ground, with respect to  
 " a farther acquaintance with the language, than  
 " an English one who has mastered the syllables  
 " bla, ble, bli, which Dyche has collected to the  
 " number of at least 2000, and *which*, though  
 " destitute of meaning, ARE *in reality the* ELE-  
 " MENTS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE." He also says that "the Chinese Alphabet would suffice to express even the most tremendous of the more  
 " than sesquipedalian compounds which occur in  
 " the Sanscrit." A service to which it is plainly inadequate for want of the letters, *b, d, g, r*, and *j*, or *z*. I have subjoined a few observations on the *Clavis Sinica* in a postscript to the V. A.

It will be observed that on several occasions I

have discovered a certain degree of scepticism with respect to the value of Oriental literature. My scepticism is founded on the amazing disproportion between whatever has been fairly submitted to our inspection, and the vauntings of some Orientalists respecting the merit of these things, and still more of those which yet remain as sealed books to Occidentalists. In no instance has there been any reasonable proportion between the promise and the performance. But notwithstanding the condemnation passed on the specimens which have hitherto appeared, many Orientalists refuse to lower their tone; but continue, like the Cumean Sybil, to set the same price upon the volumes that have not been produced that they did upon the whole original number.

Sir William Jones was an amiable man, an accomplished Scholar, and a friend to the best interests of mankind; but the strain of panegyric in which he generally indulges when passing judgment on Eastern writers, is not to be paralleled for its extravagance and unmeritedness by any thing extant in criticism. On this subject his memorable character of *Ibn Khalikan*, an Arabian biographer, ought to be held decisive. Here it is. "*Porro scriptoris EBN-I-KHALICAN opus historicum non magis verborum elegantia et ubertate commendatur, quam illustriorum poetarum versibus, quibus conspergitur. Ac nescio*



*can hic omnis vitæ scriptonibus sit antepo-  
-mendus. Est certe copiosior NEROTÆ, elegantior  
-PLUTARCHO, LATRIVIO; jucundior, et dignus est  
-profecto liber, qui in omnes Europæ linguas  
-conversus prodeat.*" Now what is the biography  
of *Ibn Khalikan*? In the space of 1266 Pages it  
contains 826 lives, together with a conspersion of  
verses from the works of the most eminent poets.  
What room is there, therefore, for copiousness?  
And "as to jucundity, elegance, and such other  
" pleasing epithets ascribed to it by Sir William,  
" I fear," says Captain Lockett, "we must at-  
" tribute them rather to the partiality than can-  
" dour of the learned Orientalist." "The life  
" of an Arabian worthy indeed, is frequently  
" dispatched in a line, and is seldom more enter-  
" taining or instructive than a *hic jacet*, or a  
" village epitaph. His name, his years," with a  
" *ruḥṣeullaho anho*. (May God be satisfied with  
" him,) or a 'holy text' from the Qoḥran, supply  
" the place "of fame and elegy," and constitute  
" the brief memorials of a literary career."

But the Arabians, we are told, put forth all their  
strength in metaphysical studies, especially in  
grammar and rhetoric. Dr. Lumsden does not  
hesitate to give them a decided superiority over  
Western writers, ancient and modern, in these

---

\* See THE MIJUT AMIL, &c. a work on Arabic Syntax,  
P. 46; and preface, P. XVIII.

sciences. And even Captain Lockett says: "in the minute cultivation of many sciences, particularly grammar and rhetoric, it may be doubted whether they have been surpassed by the learned of any other nation." Lieutenant Francis Irvine goes as far as Dr. Lumsden. In a letter to me, he says: "The Orientals cultivate the abstract sciences, and are far our superiors in metaphysics, logic, grammar, and rhetoric in certain of its branches." Now, until the Orientalists shall give us "the ocular proof" upon this subject by enriching Europe with some of these surpassing works; I shall abide by what Captain Lockett says of their achievements in their favourite departments of grammar and rhetoric. He says\* that the *Miut Amil* is "almost entirely free from those little verbal quibbles and philological fopperies, which tend more or less to disgrace every work on Arabic grammar." He speaks of "the great Arabian desert of metaphysical refinement, where subtilities

"Swarm populous, un-numbered as the sand,

"Of Barca, or Cyrene's torrid soil:"

"their *superlunar* speculations;" and "the whole host of fallacies and fictions, with which they perplex and embarrass the most simple subjects of literature." He says: "Through this commentary" (of Moolla Jamee on a gram-

---

\* Preface to the *Miut Amil*.

matical treatise termed the *Kafess*;) "this *Xatma*  
 " *judya* of Syntax, or some other of equally 'crude  
 " 'consistenced,' every student is obliged to 'swim,  
 " 'or sink, or wade, or creep, or fly,' who would  
 " aspire to any thing like literary distinction.  
 " Moolla Jamee is indeed the Priscian of the East,  
 " and his comment is considered the very *ne plus*  
 " *ultra* of grammatical knowledge. Not to have  
 " read it argues absolute ignorance; read it, and  
 " you are dubbed at once a Moolla, and a man of  
 " learning: such is the wonder-working efficacy  
 " of Arabic grammar. It supercedes in a great  
 " degree the knowledge of every other art, and  
 " every other science, being in fact, if we may  
 " credit some of the learned Arabian doctors, the  
 " very essence of all the arts and sciences." It  
 would be singular if much real profundity, and  
 perspicacity, and invention, should co-exist with  
 so much strenuous idleness, and elaborate fustery.  
 It would require the purest metal to redeem so  
 many worthless incrustations: but when we have  
 extracted the little lump from its heap of scoria,  
 we find that the Arabians were indebted for it all  
 to the Greeks! \* This mighty Leviathan, "sailing  
 " with supreme dominion" among the inferior  
 inhabitants of the Eastern ocean, is still but a

---

\* Warton's Hist. of Eng. Poetry. Enfield's Hist. of  
 Philosophy. Gibbon, Vol. X. P. 11.

creature. "His ribs, his fins, his whalebone, his  
 "blubber, the very spiracles through which he  
 "spouts a torrent of brim against his origin, and  
 "covers me all over with the spray;—every thing  
 "of him and about him is from" the Greeks. Is  
 it for *him* to question the superiority of Western  
 genius? Is it for the little *Triton* of the School-  
 men to magnify itself against the splendour of  
 European light, and the majesty of European  
 science?

The extremely artificial structure of the Arabic  
 language; the precise etymology, which runs  
 through it, and ties together its numerous families  
 of words; and the almost total absence of adjectives;  
 add less (if they add any thing) to its potential  
 perspicuity, than they detract from its energy,  
 elasticity, grace, and freedom. The want of adjectives  
 is supplied by the use of substantives, which  
 are designated by Dr. Lumsden, as a distinct  
 species of attributives, under the name of *epithets*.  
 The effect of this peculiarity in the Arabic and  
 cognate languages, is thus illustrated by Dr.  
 Lumsden. *Fool* is an epithet, applicable to men  
 and women: *foolish* is an adjective, applicable to  
 men, women, and things. The relation signified  
 by the epithet is always *one*, viz. the existence of  
 a quality in the object to which it is applied; as of  
 folly in a man. Other relations may be denoted  
 by the adjective; as the indication of folly in the

agent of a foolish action. If all our adjectives were to be converted into epithets, it would be necessary that the former should lose all those senses by which they do not specify the existence of the quality they denote in the object with which they are grammatically connected: and then, like the Arabs, we should cease to speak of "a wise law;" "an angry observation;" "a gay scene;" "a cruel deed;" "treacherous counsel;" &c. The Arabic, Hebrew, and Persian languages having no adjectives corresponding to the above, it is needless to insist on the difficulties, frequently unsurmountable, which must embarrass a translation of English into these languages; nor on the value of the resources from which those who write and speak in them are excluded. How much does this single circumstance clip the wings of their imagination! that power by which they have been supposed to soar to an empyrean of their own, inaccessible to Western writers "in prose or in numerous verse." And for this discovery we shall be chiefly indebted to Dr. Lumsden. My attention was first attracted to this subject by Mr. Irvine, who says, in the letter already spoken of: "The more I know of the languages, characters, and literature, of the Orientals and Occidentals; the more I see the futility of the trite observation, that the former excel in imagination, the latter in judgment. Were we to reverse it we

" should be nearer the truth."—"The Orientals  
 " are generally speaking sedate. Far from hav-  
 " ing languages rich in metaphor they can scarce-  
 " ly be brought to understand *our* metaphors,  
 " which, if translated into their tongues would  
 " appear no better than nonsense. Prosopopœia  
 " appears nearly unknown to them. Were one  
 " to attempt to translate into Persian Pope's lines,  
 " 'Love light as air,' &c he would find it imprac-  
 " ticable."—"People will soon discover that the  
 " Asiatics have a routine of images, but not  
 " sprightly, creative imaginations."—"I have no  
 " intention," says Dr. Lumsden,\* "to defend,  
 " broadly, the general purity of Persian meta-  
 " phors, many of which are certainly absurd and  
 " remote in the highest degree; &c." It appears  
 then that the Asiatics, instead of being intoxicated  
 with imagination, are rather in the predicament of  
 men who had fed upon the vapours of Trophonius'  
 cave. The ready-made figures which they possess  
 are to those which the spontaneous energy of  
 eloquence throws out, what grimace is to the true  
 expression of gaiety or kindness; they are dis-  
 agreeable in themselves, and betray a want of that  
 quality for the natural indications of which they  
 are substituted.

After all, the fault may be more in the writers  
 than in their language. What the language is

---

\* Persian Grammar, Vol. II. P. 497.

capable of, we may judge from those sublime passages written in a kindred tongue from the inspiration of that Power which "touched Isaiah's hallowed lips with fire." But even there, though the figures are exceedingly bold, and the thoughts of the most awful grandeur, we do not discover that endless variety, and boundless capacity, which belong to our own tongue. The more the readers of Shakespeare, Milton, and Burke, examine the stores of other languages, the stronger will be their conviction, that for strength, richness, flexibility, and precision,—for all the purposes of eloquence and of poetry,—the English language surpasses every other, whether dead or living.

\* \* The reader is requested to excuse a slight want of typographical uniformity. The printing of the two first articles in a smaller type, was owing to particular circumstances which it is not necessary to explain.

---

Page 367, line 26. *For Παιδομαθὺς read Παιδομαθῆς.*

May 19, 1817.





## CONTENTS.

ART.	PAGE.
I. Notes on Politique de tous les Cabinets de L'Europe, pendant les regnes de Louis XV. & de Louis XVI. &c. ....	1
II. Observations on some passages in Voltaire's Essay on Universal History. ....	11
III. <i>Horæ Romanæ</i> . No. I. Observations on A History of the Roman Government, &c. By A. Brodie. ....	70
No. II. Observations on An Historical Review of the Monarchy and Republic of Rome, &c. By R. Patton. ....	94
No. III. On the Anomalies in the Roman Government. ....	109
No. IV. Observations on Considerations sur les causes de la Grandeur des Romains, & de leur decadence. Par Montesquieu. ....	129
IV. On a Defence of the Funding System, contained in the Edinburgh Review, No. IX. Art. VIII. ....	161
V. Synopsis of the British Finances, during twenty years, from 1793 to 1812. ....	184
VI. On the Distinction between Productive and Unproductive Labour. ....	187
VII. On the Nominalism of Berkeley, Hume, Campbell, Burke, and Stewart. ....	191
VIII. On Dramatic Illusion. ....	220

ART.	PAGE.
IX. On Perfectibility.....	236
X. On Definitions of Civil Liberty.....	251
XI. A View of the theories of Particles, and of some opinions on Questions of General Grammar, contained in Dr. Lumsden's Persian Grammar; and in Tooke's Diver- sions of Purley.....	267
XII. <i>Vindiciæ Alphabeticæ</i> ; or observations on A Dissertation on the Chinese Language. By J. Marshman.....	314

# OBSERVATIONS, &c

---

## ART. I. *Notes on 'Politique de Tous les Cabinets de l'Europe,' &c.*

**T**HE first edition of this valuable work, which appeared in 1793, contained chiefly the animadversions of the Count de Broglie and Favier, on the system of foreign policy pursued by the Ministers of Louis XV. the substance of which had been from time to time secretly communicated to that weak and dissolute Prince. This occult cabinet, whose plans, covered with the paltry veil that fraud delights in, were never executed, had its origin soon after the death of Cardinal Fleury in 1743. Its first manager, the Prince de Conti, was established by the King's mistress, Madame de Chateauroux; its second, the Count de Broglie, was banished to his estate in the country, and the inferior agents sent to the bastille, by Madame du Barry. The intermediate mistress, Madame de Pompadour, an enemy of the Prince de Conti, (by whose mother she had been introduced at court,) and not in the secret of his correspondence with the King, contrived, in concert with the Abbé de Bernis, a scheme of foreign relations the reverse of that recommended by the secret cabinet, and of which the famous treaty of alliance with Austria, signed at Versailles, 1st May, 1756, laid the foundation. A view of the circumstances under which it was entered into, will show that a more politic step could not have been taken. The war with England had commenced; Prussia was united

A

with that power; so that while the mutual interests of Austria and France impelled them to a coalition, it enabled the latter, by affording such slender aid to her ally as would hold in check Prussia, to devote the rest of her means to a maritime and colonial war against England. But fortunately for England, *personal* hostility to the Great Frederick, excited partly by his satirical epigrams on Madame de Pompadour, betrayed the French into a fatal error which neutralized the advantages presented by the treaty of Versailles, and led to all the losses and disgraces that attended their arms in every part of the world. Instead of reserving their main strength to be employed against England, a secret treaty was concluded with Austria, 30th December 1758, engaging to assist her with an army of 100,000 men, and pecuniary subsidies. This error was the more gross, because even the success of these efforts in weakening the counterpoise which Prussia affords against Russia and Austria, would have been no less disadvantageous to France than the loss of credit which she actually suffered by their failure: inasmuch, that it has been said that the good genius of France lost her the battle of Rosbach. Thus was Lord Chatham enabled to conquer Canada in Germany. But though France, from causes wholly extraneous to the merits of the treaty of 1756, did not reap all the benefits which it was calculated to afford, she was yet indebted to it for a continental peace of thirty-two years, and for the ease with which she struck so effectually at the power of England during the American war. It was indeed, as Kaunitz maintained, more advantageous to France than to Austria, since while it relieved the latter from only one of her enemies, it assured to the former the friendship of the only power that could annoy her on the continent; which is well illustrated by the fact that during the long continental peace which France enjoyed from 1763 to 1792, Austria waged two wars, one with Prussia, the other with Turkey.

When *Barier's* declamations against the Austrian alliance

issued from the press in 1793, they were received with rapture corresponding to the delirium that then possessed the public mind. To men inflamed not merely with national resentment, but with the malignity of personal rancour;—to men predisposed to receive with applause every philippic against government, by a long course of mal-administration, the misfortunes of the seven years' war, the partition of Poland, and the growing importance of the unprivileged orders; how irresistible would seem the *proof*, how invincible the conviction, that the interests of France had been sacrificed to Austria! Vain would have been any attempt for several years to stem the 'overmatching waves' of prejudice; and Segur did not publish his conclusive refutation of Favier's heresies till 1801, when reason had resumed her influence. Favier can only be considered in the light of an advocate hired to establish a given proposition *per fas et nefas*; and notwithstanding his skill, he falls into several inconsistencies, and absurdities, which render him an easy prey to his commentator. He admits that the treaty of 1756 gave France a right to demand every thing from the Court of Vienna; (*nous avoit mis dans la cas d'exiger tout de cette cour*); upon which place Segur observes: 'Ici Favier dit la vérité toute entière; et ces deux lignes seules suffisent pour refuter tout ce qu'on voit de trop systématique dans son ouvrage. *Le traité de 1756 nous donnoit le droit de tout exiger de la cour de Vienne. J'ajoute que la position des pays bas Autrichiens nous en donnoit moyens.*' (vol. ii. p. 351.) In enumerating the enemies by whom Austria might be attacked, when, from the occurrence of the *casus fœderis*, she would demand the stipulated succours, (13,000 infantry, and 6,000 cavalry, or a pecuniary commutation,) he does not scruple to reckon the Electors of Bavaria and Saxony, and the Kings of Sardinia and Naples, though he could not seriously apprehend aggression from such puny opponents. (vol. iii. p. 294, 297.) Because Austria has no navy, he con-

tends that her union with England during the seven years' war would not have been hurtful to France. Now if during that contest the French were defeated, because they fought ill, how much more must they have suffered if the Austrians had co-operated *against* them? and if by the exertion of greater courage and better generalship their arms had been successful, how much more victorious would they have been, united against one enemy, than when divided against two? 'Il faut avouer cette vérité, ou nier celle des axiomes de l'arithmétique.' (vol. iii, p. 269.)

The feelings of disappointment expressed by Mr. Keith, the British Ambassador at Vienna,\* when, addressing Maria Theresa, he said, 'will you, the Empress and Archduchess, so far humble yourself as to throw yourself into the arms of France?' amply testify the opinion he entertained of the advantages secured to the latter country by the treaty of 1756. The gain to France must be commensurate with the loss to England, whose primary object, and chief interest, it must always be, to direct the sword of Austria in conjunction with her own trident against the ceaseless renovation of the power of France. This sentiment the great and good Earl of Stair solemnly expressed in a memorial which he delivered to George the Second after the battle of Dettingen; 'I shall leave it to your Majesty as my political testament, never to separate yourself from the house of Austria. If ever you do, France will treat you as she did Queen Anne, and all the courts that were guided by her councils.†

But as in the field of politics there is room for much variety of opinion, so there are men,—at least there is one man,—who thinks Favier a better politician than Segur. In the *Edinburgh Review*, (vol. i. p. 376, et seq.) we find the following passages: 'The singular alliance of 1756, the chief

---

\* Cox's *Austria*, vol. ii. p. 387.

† Dalrymple's *Memoirs*, part, iii. book i. p. 38.

‘ d’œuvre of Kaunitz, and, according to the French politicians, the greatest error France ever committed.’ What French politicians?—a few obscure, and *irresponsible* speculatists: not the Duke de Choiseul, nor the Duke D’Aiguillon, nor M. de Verginnes, nor M. de Montmorin, who were successively at the head of the foreign department for upwards of thirty years. ‘ Favier adopting the opinion *since universally received*, attributes to the treaty of 1756, and the consequent military operations of France,’ &c. &c.—‘ It appears to us (although we cannot afford room for the discussion,) that the doctrine of Favier, with a few limitations, is by far the soundest.’—‘ By whom but Austria or England could she be annoyed? If by the former, of course the defensive treaty was absurd: if by the latter, clearly, Austria could never assist her; since the British forces would only attack by sea, or by a littoral warfare, or in the American and East Indian colonies.’ If France be assailable by Austria, a treaty binding the two states to live on terms of reciprocal amity, is, of course, *absurd!* If by England, she derives no advantage from the neutrality of Austria!

Equally mistaken does the Reviewer appear to me, when he accuses Segur of attributing too much influence on the fate of nations to the characters of individual Kings, Statesmen, and Generals; and too little to the permanent principles of their relative strength or interests. ‘ But we must observe that the notes of Segur, (the only new part of the publication,) are from beginning to end a statement of the principles above refuted, viz. that in this branch of politics *all* must be ascribed to the particular characters and fortunes of individuals.’—‘ We object also to the general spirit of Segur’s reasonings. He *always* denies the possibility of drawing certain conclusions upon such matters; and in the true spirit of an old diplomatist and courtier, he advises us to look more to the peculiarities of human character,

‘and personal or accidental circumstances, than to the criteria more philosophically appealed to by Favier.’ When Favier insists on the importance to Austria of her connexion, by means of marriages, with some of the petty states of Italy, Segur shows that their interest *plus fort que tous les noeuds du mariage*, led them to seek the protection of France and Spain against the ambition of Joseph II. (vol. iii, p. 23.) Speaking of Spain, Segur says: ‘Confined on the continent within her natural limits, and unable to cope with France, the only source of anxiety that remains to her is the maritime ambition of England: it is this common interest that binds her to France.’ (vol. iii, p. 363.) ‘We have seen,’ says Segur, ‘Louis XIV. connected with Charles II. the Austrians and Prussians united to dismember Poland, and combat the French revolution; finally Paul I., the Turk, and the Pope associated to attack France: but these were momentary coalitions. Such political phenomena are of too rare occurrence to affect ordinary calculation.’ (vol. i, 272.) Is this the language of a man who maintains that ‘all must be ascribed to the particular characters and fortunes of individuals?’ On the other hand, the reviewer admits, that ‘what may be called the chapter of accidents perpetually sets all the inferences and calculations of the other parts at defiance.’ Who can estimate the influence on the history of Europe that should be attributed to the characters of Louis XIV., the Duke of Marlborough, Queen Anne, Frederick the Great, Bonaparte, and Wellington? How much blood, how many tears, did one man cause to be shed! No minion of royalty, that was swaddled in purple, and dandled into a despot was ever more insatiable of dominion:

‘*Estuat infelix angusto limite mundi.*’

It was necessary to put in motion a million of armed men, to ‘take a bond of fate’ for the tranquillity of Europe, by the excision from its bosom of one ‘pestilent fellow!’ And now France is comparatively harmless:

‘*Jacet ingens littore truncus.*’



It must be a source of bitter and unavailing regret to Bonaparte, that he was inaccessible to all the lessons of moderation, and proof against all the denunciations of retributive justice, that are contained in the writings of his counsellor Segur. The doctrines he inculcates, notwithstanding their anti-anglican spirit, are favourable to the repose of the world, and to the reign of peaceful industry. He dissuades from the extension of conquests on the continent, because such a system wastes the public resources, and commits the public interests to the mercy of fortune: because it substitutes short and feverish truces for durable peace; condemning the wretched nation that pursues it to the bootless labour of Sisyphus: and because, however successful, it still leaves England in possession of her commercial wealth, and able to shake the remotest shores of the earth with her naval thunder. The same admonitions are conveyed with still more energy and eloquence in Talleyrand's admirable essay on colonies. 'France,' says he, 'may add Italy and Germany to her dominions with less detriment to England, than would follow from her acquisition of a navy and the extension of her trade. Whatever gives colonies to France, supplies her with ships and sailors; manufactures and husbandmen. Victories by land can only give her mutinous subjects; who instead of augmenting the national strength, by their riches or numbers, contribute only to disperse and enfeeble that force; but the growth of colonies supplies her with zealous citizens; and the increase of real wealth, and effective numbers is the certain consequence. What could Germany, Italy, Spain and France, combining their strength, perform against England? They might assemble in millions on the shores of the channel, but there would be the limit of their enmity.'—'While the greatest of French Kings had near half a million of soldiers in his service; of men fed, clothed, housed, and equipped, for the purpose of extending his empire, a few English fugitives

‘ were building up a mighty nation in America. Without provisions or furniture, in hardships and poverty, they were busied in securing the rapid population of one fourth of the globe. All the schemes of the French King were defeated. His own people were impoverished and famished; his neighbours overwhelmed with the same evils; his territories narrowed and his pride subdued.’ ‘ These miracles are not wrought by the sword. It was not wars and victories that have added five millions of civilized men to the human race and to the English name: These may rob millions of their happiness and independence; millions they may easily destroy; but they cannot call into existence; they cannot compel men to change their language, manners, or religion.’

It is essentially requisite in the adjustment of the balance of power, that every state of the first order shall be satisfied with her position. This principle might be thought to be violated with respect to France, by the distribution of territories consequent on the expulsion of Bonaparte, if we admitted the unjust pretensions maintained in Hauterive’s *Etat de la France*, and founded on a pretence, that, previously to the revolution, France had not only fallen from her high and palmy state, but had lost her *just* rank among the nations of Europe, in consequence of the growth of two new powers, Russia and Prussia; and of the maritime preponderance of England. These opinions cannot survive the tumultuous agitations that gave them birth: and though Segur professes a respect for the sentiments of M. Hauterive, yet that he did not concur in them is proved by the tenor of his whole commentary, and especially by the following passage: ‘ I doubt whether the French monarchy was *ever more respected* than it was from 1783 to 1787, that is to say from the peace that terminated the American war to the revolution in Holland.’ (vol. ii. p. 97.)

On the subject of Russia, we have the following note by Segur. ‘ It would be madness to attack the Russian colos-

‘sus without the (*voluntary*) co-operation of the Turks, the  
 ‘Swedes, and the Prussians: and even if the result should be  
 ‘fortunate, what would it profit us? The conqueror of Rus-  
 ‘sia would excite new apprehensions for the independence  
 ‘of Europe. The true interest of France is to apply her in-  
 ‘fluence and her force to preserve to every state its present  
 ‘possessions and prevent it from disturbing its neighbours.’  
 (vol. i. p. 142.)

As Favier, to impugn the Austrian alliance, draws an ille-  
 gitimate inference from the mismanagement of the seven  
 years’ war, so he applies the same fallacious test to the fami-  
 ly compact, which took place towards the conclusion of that  
 war; and though the discussion be less important he is  
 equally blinded by prejudice or party spirit. ‘L’Avis de  
 ‘M. Pitt de declarer aussittot la guerre à l’Espagne, fut  
 ‘justifié meme apres sa demission, par la rupture inevitable  
 ‘entre l’Espagne et l’Angleterre, mais que produisit elle  
 ‘pour la France? Un fardeau de plus dans la guerre, & un  
 ‘surcroit d’embarras dans la negotiation,’ &c. &c. upon  
 which his commentator remarks: ‘Favier blames the alliance  
 ‘with Spain, because it was productive of no victory to us,  
 ‘and was even the cause of fresh triumphs to the British  
 ‘arms. But it is not the less certain that we benefited greatly  
 ‘by that union, and ought to bestow our applause on the  
 ‘minister that effected it. The accession of the Spanish fleets  
 ‘by drawing upon themselves the attacks of the British,  
 ‘prevented the entire destruction of our navy. The English,  
 ‘occupied with expeditions against the Spanish possessions,  
 ‘no longer assailed our’s; their expences and their debt en-  
 ‘creased; the losses sustained by the Spaniards allayed  
 ‘their hereditary antipathy to us, and excited a lasting re-  
 ‘sentment against Great Britain. From that moment France  
 ‘and Spain had one common object in view, and were en-  
 ‘abled, some years afterwards, with their combined forces, to  
 ‘inflict a severe wound on England. Thus the treaty which

B

' is censured by Favier, obtained for us an important diversion at the time, and incalculable future advantages.' (vol. ii. p. 243.) Let us think of this when the old connexion between France and Spain shall revive, as it assuredly will. We have always been too eager to pick a quarrel with Spain, from the time of the unjust and impolitic war for Jenkins's ear, down to Mr. Pitt's war in 1805; though the inevitable tendency is to cement her union with France, increase our expences, distract our attention, and divert our arms from their true object. If it be the interest of France to interpose Spain between herself and the 'rebuffs and insults of fortune,'\* it cannot be ours to second her views by such a misapplication of our means.

' The division of Germany and Italy into petty states has always been the true cause of the greatness of France:' &c.. (vol. ii. p. 396.) The fusion of these states into a certain number of respectable nations, is a desideratum of not altogether hopeless accomplishment.

I shall make no comment on the following extract. (vol. iii. p. 65.) 'Le ministre Britannique veut être le tyran des mers; et comme il craint la rivalité, les richesses et la puissance des Français, il veut les appauvrir par des guerres fréquentes, qui les empêchent de porter leurs efforts et leur activité sur l'océan. D'après ce système il excitera, tant qu'il le pourra, des troubles sur le continent, et soldera, toutes les fois qu'il en trouvera le moyen, des gladiateurs couronnés pour ensanglanter la terre, et rendre sa domination sur la mer plus paisible.'

The Temple of Janus is at last shut. May the dawning season of peace, justice, and universal prosperity, equal in duration that which has closed of violence, rapine, and carnage!

---

\* See Spirit of Laws, book ix. chap. x.

ART. II. *Observations on some Passages in Voltaire's Essay on Universal History.* Nugent's Translation. 4 Vols. 1782.

VOLUME FIRST.

Pages 10, 11. **H**E represents the empire of China as having subsisted "*in splendour 4000 years;*" and as Fohi, the first sole monarch of its "*15 kingdoms,*" reigned 25 centuries, at least, before our vulgar era, China must have been, "*long before that time, very populous, civilized, and divided into many sovereignties.*" The facility with which Voltaire admitted any fable respecting China, and the baseless fabricks he reared upon them, contrast strongly with the uniform suspicion with which he looked upon, and rejected, the most authentic proofs of holy writ. Let a Chinese or Japanese priest, with a name that might convert one to the Shandean fancies, carry back his annals *ad libitum*; let him spurn the bounded reign of truth and reason, heaping one extravagance upon another; let him lay the treasure at the feet of Voltaire, and he will be delighted with the present: on the other hand, let certain books of European history be presented to him, and he will wax exceeding wroth, and be more clamorous against their reception than Cassandra was against the reception of the wooden horse. The Anti-Christian, and even Anti-European, zeal which he betrays on such occasions, and which entitled Mr. Gibbon to call him "a bigot, an intolerant bigot," are perhaps more remarkable than the historical errors of which he has been guilty; and yet what excuse is there for them, since M. De Guignes published his translation of the *Chouking*, with a preface and notes, at Paris, in 1770, and Voltaire died in 1778? Mr. Gibbon did not confine his scepticism to the history of christianity, but carried it with better success into every other enquiry, displaying the utmost assiduity, fidelity, and discrimination in the veri-

fication of facts; on the subject of the early history of China, accordingly, he consulted the above work, and many others referred to by him, (iv. 358.) and the result is, that "the *historical period* of China does not ascend above the Greek *Olympiads*;" that is, it commences in the *eighth* century before Christ; and that though, by a probable tradition it may ascend 40 centuries, yet in those early times, instead of there being "a very splendid, populous and civilized empire" — "Under the two first dynasties, the principal town was still a moveable camp; the villages were thinly scattered; more land was employed in pasture than in tillage; the exercise of hunting was ordained to clear the country from wild beasts; Petcheli (where Pekin stands) was a desert; and the southern provinces were peopled with Indian savages. The dynasty of the *Han* (before Christ 206) gave the empire its actual form and extent." Having gratuitously peopled the country at such an early period, he finds, in the slowness with which mankind multiply, a further proof of its antiquity: "The calculators of the propagation of the human species have observed that there must be *favourable circumstances* for a nation to encrease a twentieth part in the space of a hundred years." Now, without favourable circumstances, a nation may double its members in a hundred years; and his friend Dr. Franklin might have told him that in some parts of North America the population doubled in 15 years, and in other parts in 25 years.

Page 38. "Some people have imagined, from an equivocal passage in the Koran, that Mahomet could neither write nor read; which would still add to the prodigies of his success. But it is *not probable* that a man who had been long a merchant, should be ignorant of what is so necessary to trade," &c. Is the mere assumption of an improbability to refute the most positive testimony? That would subvert the very foundations of historical truth, and confound all experience respecting the credibility of human

testimony. How many (supposed) improbable facts might be expunged, and replaced by what might appear more likely fabrications? The authorities on this subject are, as usual drawn up by Mr. Gibbon, (ix. 257.) with irresistible force. "Those who believe," says Mr. G. "that Mahomet could read or write, are incapable of reading what is written, with another pen, in the Surats, or Chapters of the Koran vii. xxix. xcv. These texts, and the tradition of the Souna, are admitted without doubt, by Abulfeda (in vit. c. vii.), Gagnier (Not. ad Abulfed. p. 15), Pocock (Specimen, p. 151), Reland (de Religione Mohammedicâ, p. 236), and Sale (Preliminary discourse, p. 42.)" I refer the reader to the rest of the note, which is equally satisfactory.\*

Page 188. "*Historians inform us*, that this excommunication (of Robert, King of France, A. D. 998.) had such an effect in France, that the King was abandoned by all his courtiers, and even by his own domestics; and that there staid with him only two servants, who threw into the fire what he left at his meals, from the horror they felt at what had been touched by an excommunicated person. Degraded as human nature was at that time, yet *there is no probability that the absurdity could be carried so far*. The first author who mentions this stupidity of the court of France, is Cardinal Peter Damien, who did not write his account till sixty-four years after: And he relates, that as a punishment of this pretended incest, (the King having married his cousin Bertha) the Queen was brought to bed of a monster; but there is nothing monstrous in this whole affair, except the assurance of the Pope, and the weakness of the King who separated from his wife." Here again he applies his arbitrary scale of probability to set aside the information of the writers of those times, respecting a circumstance, highly characteristic of the prevailing

---

\* See Note x. to Dr. Robertson's view of the State of Europe.

superstition, and which has been admitted, I believe, by all subsequent authors.\* It would be a strange rule that should direct us to admit some, and reject other, effects of superstition in any given period, according to a pretended evaluation of its influence over the human mind at that period, instead of regulating our conceptions of the strength of that influence by observing the effects it actually produced. Neither the moral, nor physical world ought to be contracted "ad angustias intellectus, sed expandendus intellectus & laxandus, ad mundi, imaginem recipiendam qualis invenitur." (Bacon's works, iv. 392.) The assurance of the Pope, and the weakness of the King, would be monstrous now-a-days, but they were scarcely strange then. Roberts' two servants not only threw into the fire what he left at his meals, but purified by fire the vessels in which he had been served. And as to the monstrous birth, is such a thing incredible? "Croirat-on," says St. Foix (œuv. T. iii. p. 51.) "que, par le plus abominable complot, dans l'idée d'obliger ce prince à se soumettre, & pour fortifier en même temps parmi le peuple, la terreur qu'inspiroient les excommunications, on substitua ce monstre à la place du véritable enfant? Il est plus naturel de penser, qu'une masse de chair d'une figure bizarre à pu se former au sein d'une femme dévorée de chagrin pendant sa grossesse, & dont l'imagination & la conscience étoient troublées par les menaces du pape." Was it *probable* that (in 1077) an Emperor of Germany should stand three days, bare-footed, at the gate of the Pope's Castle, imploring pardon?

Page 208. "He (William the Conqueror) is also reproached with having destroyed all the villages within the compass of fifteen leagues, to make a forest, in which he might enjoy the pleasure of hunting. *Such an action is too absurd to be probable.* Historians do not consider,

---

\* Russell, in his history of modern Europe (vol. i. p. 153.) considers the whole story authentic, except the monstrous birth.



“ that a new plantation would require at least twenty years  
 “ to render it a forest fit for hunting,” &c. This conjectural emendation is equally *bold*, and unsuccessful with the former. Whether the action were tyrannical, or absurd, is one question, and whether it be true is another. Hume and Russell have given their sanction to its authenticity; but Mr. Stewart Rose, in his translation of *Parthenopex de Blois*, will satisfy every reader that we *are indebted* to William the Conqueror for the new forest in Hampshire.

Page 272. “ It is not true, though we find it mentioned  
 “ by several historians, that Philip, on the very day he gained  
 “ the battle of Bonvines, received also the news of another  
 “ victory obtained by his son Lewis VIII. over King John.  
 “ On the contrary, John had some success in Poitou; but,  
 “ being abandoned by his allies, he concluded a truce with  
 “ Philip.” The particular day on which Philip received the news is nothing to the purpose, as we may say *de minimis non curat lex*. Several historians inform us of the success of Lewis against John, in Poitou, in 1214, but VOLTAIRE says “ it is not true!” According to Hume (ii. 56.) “ He  
 “ (John) besieged a castle near Angiers; but the approach  
 “ of Prince Lewis, Philip’s son, obliged him to raise the  
 “ siege with such precipitation, that he left his tents, machines, and baggage, behind him; and he returned to England with disgrace. *About the same time* he heard of the  
 “ great and decisive victory gained by the King of France  
 “ at Bovines,” &c.\*

VOLUME SECOND.

Page 7. “ Philip the Long took care to have it declared,  
 “ at a meeting of some barons, prelates, and burghers of  
 “ Paris, that the females ought to be excluded from the  
 “ crown of France.” This is a correct statement, except

---

\* “ *Infra unius mensis spatium, filius in Pictoniâ de rege anglie & Pictonibus sine conflictu; pater in Flandriâ de Othone & Flandrensibus triumphavit.*” Rigord. Guilm. Brit. Lib. i.

that the heads of the university of Paris attended at this assembly, which was held the 2d February, 1317; (Papirius Masson.) It is therefore a mistake in Hume to say, (vol. ii. p. 273.) that "the *states of the kingdom*, by a solemn and "deliberate decree," &c. An anonymous French writer, having mentioned the composition of this assembly, asks, "mais cette assemblée étoit-elle légale, générale, et bien "convoquée?" It certainly was not; but its proceedings answered the immediate purpose, and, perhaps, carried with them as much shew of legislative authority, as any proceedings could do in a country that never had a constitution, and where the "higher matters of estate" have ever been as sacredly preserved from the inspection and controul of states, or parliaments, as our James I. could have desired.

Page 26. "Charles V. sent a Knight and a Judge of "Toulouse to summon the Black Prince to appear before "him in the Court of Peers, in order to account for his conduct. This was behaving as lord paramount to the conqueror of his father and grand-father, who was possessed "of Guyenne, and the neighbouring parts in full sovereignty, by right of conquest, as well as by solemn treaty. He "was not only cited as a subject, but an arret of Parliament "was likewise issued out, by which Guyenne was confiscated, together with every thing in France belonging to the "house of England." By an article in the treaty of Calais, which confirmed and amended that of Bretigni, it was agreed that each party should retain all claims of sovereignty and territory against the other, until they had mutually exchanged their renunciations; but as, by the consent of all historians, the renunciations had not been made at the period in question, it is plain that the Black Prince did *not* possess Guyenne in full sovereignty, and that Charles V. *was* his lord paramount. Hume says (ii. 334.) that as the failure in exchanging the renunciations had proceeded from France, the pretence of Charles was contrary to treaty. The renuncia-

tions ought to have been made on a certain day, but still each party was to retain his original claims *until* they had been mutually exchanged; "*jusqu'à ce que* notre dit frere " Edward," &c. From whichever side the delay proceeded, therefore, it was in conformity to the treaty that, while the article respecting the renunciations remained unexecuted, each party should make use of his original claims. On the other hand, I think it is clearly made out by St. Foix, that the non-observance of the treaty of Calais proceeded from Edward III. who was not unlikely, on this occasion, to be more affected by considerations of personal interest than of good faith, since he was accustomed to make *secret* protests, rendering null and void the engagements he had entered into, with his own parliament, as well as with foreign powers, and reserving to himself a right to disavow and retract them, whenever he should find it convenient. (Hume, vol. ii. 288. Rapin, Tom. iii. p. 159.) The transactions between France and England in the reigns of our Henries and Edwards are examined with more minuteness and sagacity by St. Foix than by any other historian, French or English: and though his representations of many important facts are materially different from those generally received, he so carefully authenticates every step by references to Rymer's *acta publica*, to contemporary annalists, &c. that I cannot hesitate, on every disputed point, to concur in his conclusions. It appears surprizing that Hume did not avail himself of the new light thrown upon this part of history to correct his own statements, or shew upon what grounds he still adhered to them. He must have been acquainted with the writings of St. Foix his contemporary, for they both died in the same year, and on the same day, 25th August, 1776. To return to the treaty of Calais: it was agreed that the mutual cessions of territory should be made between 24th October, 1360, and all-saint's day, 1361; that each party should reduce all rebellious subjects, and deliver over at his own expence the

C.

territories he was bound to cede; and that, after these cessations, deputies from the two Kings should meet in the Church of the Augustins at Bruges on St. Andrew's day, 1361, and exchange the renunciations of sovereignty. Rapia (Tom. 3, p. 229.) admits that King John fulfilled his engagements faithfully, and that the English Commissioners were put in possession of the ceded provinces, with the exception of two disputed districts, reserved for arbitration. Edward, on the contrary, secretly encouraged the resistance of the governors and garrisons of the places he should have ceded, and all the disorders of the *companies*, instead of reducing them at his own expence. (Du Tillet. *Recueil des Traites*.) The French deputies appeared at Bruges on St. Andrew's day, with patents to make the necessary renunciations, but Edward sent neither deputies, nor renunciations. (John De Montreuil, & Jean Juvenal des Ursins). Charles V. did not proceed hastily against his vassal, the Prince of Wales; he consulted the principal universities of Spain, Germany, and Italy: at last he held a bed of justice in January, 1368, where the whole matter underwent a full discussion, and the Prince was summoned to answer before the Court of Peers. He not only resisted the summons, as was to be expected, but imprisoned the two accredited agents who presented it. (St. Foix, T. v. p. 136—147). With respect to the treaty of Calais, therefore, it appears, that Hume is by no means justified in saying, "there seldom has been a treaty of so great importance, so faithfully executed by both parties;" and further, that if, on the loss of Guyenne, Edward had executed his threat of putting to death all the French hostages that remained in his hands, it would not have been "un-generous revenge," but cruel injustice.

Page 35. "This great invasion, however, reunited all parties against the English; even the Duke of Burgundy, though he had already been privately treating with the King of England, sent 500 men in armour, with some

“ cross-bow men to the assistance of his country.” Hume also says, that Henry V. landed in France 21st August, 1415, “ without establishing any concert with the Duke.”

Page 37. “ The young Dauphin, who was at that time governed by Tanguy du Chastel at length concerted that “ unhappy interview with the Duke of Burgundy, on the “ bridge of Montereau. Each of them met attended with “ ten knights; and Tanguy du Chastel slew the Duke of “ Burgundy in the presence of the Dauphin. Thus the “ murder of the Duke of Orleans was at length revenged by “ another murder; so much the more detestable as it was “ blended with the violation of public faith. One would be “ almost tempted to think, that this murder was not premeditated, so ill had they concerted their measures for supporting the consequences of it.” This is undoubtedly conformable to the account of all the early writers, except J. J. des Ursins, and of all the later, except St. Foix; it relates to a very intricate portion of history, which the latter has alone successfully developed, bringing order out of confusion, and separating truth from accumulated misrepresentation. Without attempting to give an abstract of his proofs and arguments, or to quote his authorities, which could not be done in a small space, I shall merely notice that he has established the following points. (*Œuvres*. Tom. v. p. 168—239.) 1. Henry V. did not enter France in 1415, without having concluded a treaty with the Duke of Burgundy. Before sailing, he even said, that he would only have to fight against one half of France, and that the other half would make a diversion in his favour. 2. This treaty was renewed, and signed by the Duke of Burgundy, and his son, at Calais, in October, 1416. 3. The Dauphin Lewis died 18th December, 1415; the Dauphin John died 3d April, 1417, and was succeeded by his brother Charles, who was fifteen years of age. 4. The D. of B. paid a visit to the Dauphin John at Valen-ciennes, in November, 1416. and pretended great attachment

to him. 5. The seizure of the Queen's treasures, and the cruel death of Boisbourdon, rendered her inveterately hostile to her son Charles, and the Armagnacs, and at the same time, reconciled her to the D. of B. who with 1500 chosen horsemen, liberated her from her confinement at Tours, and conducted her to Troyes, where she assumed the title, authority, and functions of Regent. 6. Deputies were named by the Queen and D. of B. and by the Dauphin in the name of the King, who drew up a treaty; but the Constable D'Armagnac and the Chancellor De Marle prevented the latter from signing it, *being fully acquainted with the treaty of Calais*. 7. May 29, 1418, Lisle Adam, a partizan of the D. of B. carried off the King from Paris: the Dauphin escaped. 8. The D. of B. kept his treaty with Henry strictly secret: If he had not, great part of the towns that adhered to him, would have left him, and declared for the Dauphin. He published manifestos full of patriotic cant; and having the Queen on his side, and the King in his power, was the better able to deceive the people. 9. The Queen and D. of B. never were sincere in their negotiations, with the Dauphin: Henry's proposals to him were equally deceitful. Henry never was in any danger from a coalition between these two parties. The differences at the interview of Meulan were only pretended: the advances towards a reconciliation, which the Duke afterwards made to the Dauphin, *were there concerted*, under the expectation that they would either result in bringing the Dauphin into the power of the Queen and Duke, or in setting appearances against him, if a reconciliation could not be effected, and that the civil war would go on with greater fury. 10. *The death of the Duke of Burgundy at Montereau was NOT PREMEDITATED; and Tannegui du Chatel did not commit the homicide*. 11. The Duke of B. was killed 10th September, 1419: The treaty of Troyes was made 21st May, 1420. On the 23d December, following an arret is published condemning the Dauphin as guilty of high treason; and

the 10th April, 1421, the depositions of the survivors of the ten who had accompanied the Duke are taken; though it is proved that these witnesses were in Paris in December, 1420. Thus, the Dauphin was first condemned and then tried.

Pages 110—116. "Here I think it incumbent upon me to combat a vulgar error, that the Turks live under an absurd kind of government, called *despotic*; that the people are all slaves to the Sultan;" &c. "The Turks ARE NOT ONLY FREE, but they have no distinction of nobility among them: they know no other superiority but that of employments."—"There is no great body established in this country to render the laws respectable, and the Sovereign's person sacred: no barrier of the constitution against the unjust encroachments of the Vizir. Hence there is very little remedy for the subject, when he is oppressed, or for the master when a conspiracy is formed against his life. The Grand Seignior, though considered as the most potent Sovereign in the world, is, at the same time, the least settled on the throne; he is deposed on one day's insurrection." "The fear of being dethroned is a greater check to the Turkish Emperors than all the laws of the Koran. Though he is absolute master in his seraglio; master of the lives of his officers by means of the *Mufti's felfas*, yet he has not the same power over the customs of the empire. He cannot increase the taxes, nor meddle with the public money; even his private treasure is separated from that of the public." "The Sultans have only the externals of despotism; they are not absolute, except when they know how to exert that lust for arbitrary power which seems to be innate in all mankind." Is it credible that this can be written to shew that "the Turks are free," and that they do not live under a despotism? Does it not rather shew that from the throne down to the lowest of the multitude, there is no security for persons or property? The institution, in the frame of this government that chiefly upholds its

freedom, is the periodical murder of the Sultan by the Janizaries! and, on the same principle, the Romans under their Emperors were free, while the sanguinary licentiousness of the Pratorian bands continued in full vigour and activity! The natural tendency of the existence of a permanent body of regicides, responsible to no authority for the just execution of their *trust*, (*quis enim custodit ipsos custodes?*) must be to produce a constant state of distrust and war between this body and the Sultan. The principal victims of a tyrant are those of whom, from whatever cause, he is afraid: the suspicions of a Sultan would be employed in finding out, and destroying, agitators among the Janizaries; he must keep them under, *if* “*he know how to exert that lust for arbitrary power, which seems to be innate in all mankind,*” or be strangled, and be succeeded by another Ottoman, “*an infant, or an idiot,*” or worse. The Sultan, it is acknowledged, is master of the lives of his *officers*, and consequently of the lives of *every other body*, since, if the prerogative were confined to his officers; he might previously qualify any person he wished to take off, by giving him a commission; besides, if that were not the case, what would become of the “*superiority of employments,*” the only one allowed to subsist? or how could those undignified by employments pretend to an immunity from accidents to which their superiors were liable? They know no other superiority—but that which depends upon the breath of the Sultan; no man has any advantage of rank or consideration, or the means of ever acquiring any independently of him; before him the whole nation is as nothing, and he alone promotes, degrades, and gives them their several *denominations*. “*They have no distinction of nobility among them:*” that is to say, they have no body of sufficient weight and authority to resist the pressure of the Sultan upon the people, or that of the people upon him. “*A monarchy, where there is no nobility at all,*” says Bacon, “*is ever a pure and absolute tyranny; as that*



“ of the Turks; for nobility attempts sovereignty:” it also allows “ the insolency of inferiors to be broken upon them, “ before it come on too fast upon the majesty of Kings.” In considering nobility as a barrier between the King and the people, a material distinction should be attended to. Our English Barons obtained all their chartered rights, not as *Barons*, but as great landed proprietors.\* They were equally powerful when the term *noble* signified only *rich*, and when the titles, that afterwards became hereditary, were only official designations. Without property in land, titles would be idle feathers, absolutely worthless and insignificant; the splendour of families would be too transient to admit of their being hereditary, so that they could only be personal badges of servility, and upstart greatness, as at the Courts of Asia. In European monarchies, the various orders of men, like the different orders of metals, have their intrinsic value very little affected by passing through the royal mint: in Asiatic monarchies, on the contrary, the want of individual property in land denying the possibility of men having any intrinsic value, the whole population resembles leaden counters, and the Sultan may compell any piece to be received, protempore, at any rate he chooses. The European nobles were indebted to their titles for no part of their power, but they assumed their fathers’ titles on succeeding to their estates, and transmitted them to their heirs and successors, in consequence of their power: their titles were no wise a *cause* of power; for, in the free states of antiquity, by far the greatest share of power was in the hands of the *untitled* great proprietors; but, as they were ornamental trappings, and helped to distinguish and ascertain genealogies, they were a very natural *effect* of power. In the early period of our history, when the foundations of our incomparable

---

\* The effects of property on society and government by Captain C. Paton.

constitution were laid, the mass of property was exclusively possessed by the nobles, who by themselves constituted the Parliament, and established those fundamental securities, without which, upon their declension the Commons could not have undertaken and completed the work; but, from various causes, the Peers are now inconsiderable in point of numbers, and infinitely outbalanced in property, and consequently in political weight, by the Commons. The policy of the crown in promoting the subdivision of estates; the succession of titles per stirpes, and not per capita; the improvement of the arts which invited the nobility to give favourable leases, to mortgage, and alienate their estates, that they might spend their revenues in personal conveniences and luxuries, and not in feeding and attaching troops of retainers; the diffusion of knowledge, and the extension of commerce gradually produced this change. Henry VII. and Henry VIII. probably never suspected that when, by the unfettering of entails, the alienation of abbey land, the statutes of uses, and of wills, they were providing for their immediate interests, in opening so many channels into which a part of the excessive wealth of their nobility might freely discharge itself, they were, at the same time, preparing for their successors a contest with a mighty and invincible opponent. The source of power by which the prerogative had formerly been checked, was not annihilated; it was multiplied and propagated over the whole body of the state, and was ultimately employed by the commons in procuring just laws, and general freedom. The reigns of the Tudors occupied the whole of that critical period which intervened between the decline of the Peers and the rise of the commons; a period which the constitution could never have survived, if it had not previously struck its roots so widely and deeply into a congenial soil. The fall of the nobility in France was not followed by the rise of the commonalty, because the former in the days of their strength had not found it necessary to combine

with each other, and with the people, for the purpose of obtaining charters of general rights; their separate wars with the King were concluded by treaties of peace in which only the contracting parties were concerned; being themselves in a great measure exempt from the payment of taxes, they allowed the King to levy perpetual taxes from the people; and having, from their disunion, from the resources they had thus abandoned to the King's disposal, and from causes that operated all over Europe, become reduced nearly to a level with the rest of the nation, they found the King competent to exercise over themselves all those prerogatives which had never excited their jealousy while they were little Kings in their own provinces: thus, having made no conditions with him when they had it in their power, they at last found themselves subject to him unconditionally. The proportional share which the commons possess in the English government, has been increasing from the reign of James I. to the present moment; and *now*, the Lords are not, as they were formally, a barrier to the people against the usurpations of the Crown, but a barrier *to the* Crown against the encroachments of the people.

The Turks not only have no nobility, but from the want of individual property in land, they are incapable of having such an institution. Among them there never were landed proprietors, great or small, titled or untitled, from the diversity of whose several interests a constitution might have been formed. The following is a portrait of them, from the hand of Lord Bacon.—“So that if things be rightly weighed, the empire of the Turks may be truly affirmed to be more barbarous than any of these. A cruel tyranny, bathed in the blood of their Emperors upon every succession; a heap of vassals and slaves; no nobles; no gentlemen, no freemen; no inheritance of land; no stirp or ancient families:” “A nation without morality, without letters, arts, or sciences; that can scarce measure an acre

D

“ of land, or an hour of the day : base and stultish in Builde  
 “ ings, diet, and the like ; and in a word, a very reproach  
 “ of human society : and yet this nation hath made the gar-  
 “ den of the world a wilderness : for that, as it is truly said  
 “ concerning the Turks, where Ottoman's horse sets his  
 “ foot, people will come up very thin.” Lord Bacon puts  
 the above into the mouth of an interlocutor in a dialogue,  
 who supports the character of a military man, and therefore,  
 it may be a more highly coloured invective that he would have  
 given in his own name. Yet the main points, the principal  
 features, are exactly what we find them in other parts of his  
 writings ; so that, making slight allowances for the colour-  
 ing, it is a just and eloquent description.

Voltaire constantly labours under a singular confusion of  
 ideas, by supposing that the Sultan's liability to be deposed  
 and murdered; and the uncertainty of his controul over the  
 distant Bashaws, is a regular restraint on his authority. As  
 well may it be said that the liability to be struck by light-  
 ning is a restraint. How can that be said to regulate the  
 motion of a body, which, in the moment of its application,  
 annihilates the body ? That the Turks find no relief by hav-  
 ing the intervals in the successions filled up by the anarchy  
 or despotism of the Janizaries, Voltaire himself declares. (Vol.  
 iii. 292.) “ The empire was oftentimes, as Count Marsigli  
 “ says, a military democracy, that is, a government *still*  
 “ *worse than absolute monarchy.*” (Vol. iii. 308.) “ Though  
 “ the government be represented so arbitrary and despotic,  
 “ yet it seems to have never deserved that character, except  
 “ under Mahomet II. Soliman, and Selim, who made every  
 “ thing bend to their will.” P. 317. “ Shah Jahan, who had  
 “ rebelled against his father, lived to see his own sons fol-  
 “ low his example. It is difficult to comprehend, how so-  
 “ vereigns, who could not hinder their own children from  
 “ taking up arms, should be so absolute as some would make  
 “ us believe.” Page 321. “ Let us not therefore imagine that

“ in India the product of every man’s labour belongs only to the sovereign. We may observe of India in general, that it is governed, like a conquered country, by thirty tyrants, who acknowledge an Emperor, sunk, like themselves into effeminacy and ease, and who devour the substance of the people. The Indians have none of these great courts, the permanent depositories of laws, which protect the weak against the strong.” I have quoted enough to shew the inharmonious, tessellated character of his views and reasoning on this subject; but the following extract is pre-eminent by its *galimatias*. Vol. iii. 323. “ Travellers imagine, that the Mogul is essentially invested with arbitrary power, because Aurungzeb made every thing yield to his will. But they did not consider, that this power, being entirely founded on force, lasts no longer than a Prince is at the head of an army;” [What is to prevent the Prince from always being at the head of an army? Is he not in fact always so?] “ and that this despotism, which destroys every thing, is at length self destroyed.” [When was the hydra despotism destroyed in Asia, whether by itself, or by some beneficent demi-god? When did it ever cease to exist? Can it be meant to insinuate that the despot at length “ shuffles off this mortal coil,” and *dies*? Verily, we are all mortal; on which point there wanteth not abundance of texts that are incontrovertible. But the evil does not die with him: it obeys the law of the metempsychosis, and animates the bodies of his heirs and successors for ever.] “ It is not a form of government, but a subversion of all government: it admits of caprice as the only rule: it does not rely upon laws to secure its duration; therefore the Colossus tumbles down to the ground, when it ceases to lift up its arm.” [Why should it cease to lift up its arm? It has only to do that, and it will not tumble.] “ Out of its ruins several petty tyrants arise;” [So, after all, despotism is immortal.] “ And the state does not resume a settled form, till it

"is governed by laws." That is to say, the government continues lawless, until (do not ask *how*, or *whence*,) it is regulated by laws : it becomes free, when it acquires freedom !

Notwithstanding Voltaire's aversion to admit that arbitrary power in the Prince is the essential characteristic of an Asiatic monarchy, it will not be doubted that the best periods of such a state are those, when the Monarch, after having by imprisonment, mutilation, and death, disposed of his nearest relations, is able to make every thing bend to his will, and beat down every attempt at resistance. Such a steady compressive force is the grand *desideratum* ; wherever it is withdrawn, rebellion lifts her crimsoned banner, and pours her desolating flood over the land. Such a state, to use the language of the Cartesians, *abhors a vacuum of tyranny* ; and whatever districts are not pervaded by that of the Prince, must be occupied by *vortices* of inferior tyrants. The number of these, and their several dimensions and bearings with respect to each other, contained at any time within the geographical limits of a particular country, are in perpetual fluctuation ; contracting or extending their circumferences, till the whole are swallowed up in one imperial vortex. The civil and political welfare of the country is in the inverse ratio of their number, and in the direct ratio of their magnitude. This fluctuation, with respect to their number and sizes, affords the only variety that can occur in Asiatic history. In Europe, government, laws, manners, science, every kind of moral and physical improvement, have been in a constant state of progression from one century to another : in Asia, the progress of society has not been in a straight line the extremity of which, like the horizon, still flies our approach, but in a circle, of which it has repeatedly visited the several signs ; and, though the period of its revolutions be reducible to no law, it may be in its perihelium, and in its aphelion, in the space of half a century. The most unequitable constitutions of Europe, such for instance as for,

merly obtained in Poland and Venice, were at least calculated for the advantage of one division of the inhabitants ; in both these states the *nobles* were free, and while their private life was embellished with every thing that is excellent in art or science, their public life often displayed those elevated virtues of the patriot and statesman, of which liberty alone is the parent. In Poland, indeed, the people were depressed as low as humanity could be ; in Venice they could aspire to every thing, except a share in the legislature. But in Asia, there is no permanent body of men that, like the Polish or Venetian nobles, can boast of the infinite blessings of freedom ; but, while all are sunk in fear and ignorance, the gorgeous barbarian himself trembles on his throne.

Page 194. "His (Lewis XII.) famous *edict* of 1499, " should never be omitted by our historians, as it has rendered his memory dear to all those who administer, and " who seek for justice. By this *edict*, he ordains, that the law " shall always be observed, notwithstanding any contrary orders, which by the importunity of courtiers may be extorted from the Monarch. Our general plan of studying history, admits but of few details ; but particulars like these, " which form the happiness of states, and afford instruction " to good Princes, merit our special attention." This is too ridiculous. Who is to vouch for the voucher ? What security was there, that this absolute Monarch should not, the next day, or at any time, revoke his *edict* ? May not every former act be abrogated by a subsequent one ? And of what sort and value was this law, that was thus rendered inviolable ? The personal character of Lewis XII. was the only security ; and that died with him. If a courtier thought that, in consequence of the *edict*, any contrary order would be invalid, why should he importune the Monarch for such an order ? Such a proceeding would evidently be absurd on both sides ; and courtiers are not such fools as to accept of a bond that was, on the face of it, absolutely void and of no

effect. The French might wish that this anecdote could be expunged from their annals, and consigned to the Arabian tales, for it must be considered, not as one of those things "which form the happiness of states," but as one of the most preposterous farces that ever insulted poor human nature.

Page 369. "Had it not been for Vasco de Gama's voyage, this republic (Venice) would soon have become *the principal power in Europe*; but the navigation round the Cape of Good Hope diverted the source of her wealth." The opinion of Dr. Robertson is very different; for he thinks, with the Abbé Raynal, that, not Venice, but Turkey would have become, not the principal, but the only independent power in Europe, but for the discovery of the passage to India round the Cape of Good Hope. To that event, he says, "Europe has been indebted for its preservation from the most illiberal and humiliating *servitude* that ever oppressed polished nations." (Dis. con. India.) I shall not pretend to say which of these opinions is least founded on solid principles. They both imply that the discovery of the passage round the Cape was an accident; because, if it were not an accident, but an effect of those causes which had been propelling Europe in the career of improvement, which subjected America, and a great part of Asia to the dominion of Europeans, and which prevented the inhabitants of any of those regions from visiting her shores, whether with friendly or hostile intentions, then, it must be owing to those causes, and not to any single effect of them, that Europe has been preserved from the Turk, and that Bashaws have not been permitted to pollute the soil,—

"Where lawns extend that scorn Arcadian pride,

"And brighter streams than famed Hydaspes' glide.\*

The source of these causes has been, if not discovered,\*

---

\* The Pattonian doctrine was known to Bernier, who says, with admirable sagacity,—"*Ces trois états, Turquie, Perse, & l' Hindostan,*



exclusively unfolded and illustrated in the writings of Capt. C. and Mr. R. Patton, and I am of opinion that there is not in all philosophy a more important, a more ingenious, or a better founded speculation, than that which traces them to the individual proprietorship of land. But, if it be not a new opinion that the sense of property is the first necessary step in the progress of man from the savage state, that system which ascertains the principles, and the degrees, by which the natural equality of mankind is modified by the unequal distribution of property, and which gives a rule for the classification of the members of a state in the mixed ratio of *property*, and of *persons* independent of property, graduating the political pyramid from the base to the apex, may claim the merit of perfect originality. We are not, however, precluded from ascending beyond this, and asking how it has happened that the nations of Asia have never been blessed with this, apparently, so attainable source of all that is good and fair in the world. Whence has it proceeded that, though individual property in land has subsisted in Europe, from a date anterior to the Greek Olympiads, uninterruptedly to the present times, it has *never* been known in any other quarter of the globe; (of course, leaving out of the question the *Grecian* colonies in lesser Asia;) under any circumstances of soil or climate; under the frigid, temperate, or torrid zone; in fertile or in barren, in level or in mountainous countries; in maritime, or in inland states; among those living in contact with nations where such a state of property was established, connected with them by relations of peace and war; or even among those who have long held such na-

- 
- “ comme ils ont tous oté ce *mien*, et *tien* à l' égard des fonds de terre, et de la propriété des possessions, *qui est le fondement de tout ce qu'il y a de beau et de bon dans le monde*, ne peuvent qu' ils ne se ressemblent de bien pres.” Suite des mem. sur l'emp. du G. Mogol, l. ii. 189.

Bacon, too, considers the want of “ inheritance of land,” as a principal mark of barbarism. See Moyle's works, and Harrington's Oceana.

tions in subjection? If there be no natural causes adequate to account for such a phenomenon, and I know of none, we must recur to the opinion of Lord Kames, and of Mr. Hume, that there are different races of men;—that there are original constitutional differences which distinguish separate varieties of the human species. It may not be possible, and it is not necessary, to solve this question :\* it is sufficient for us that, from the different states of property in land peculiar to Europe and Asia, we can with certainty deduce the differences in their civil and political institutions, and in the whole of their moral condition. How far the former of these surpasses the latter in whatever can shed comfort, elegance, dignity, and happiness, over human life, it were need less to insist; and perhaps no views of the subject could come up to the conceptions which a well constituted mind must spontaneously form. Turn over the leaves of a voluminous biographical dictionary of European worthies, and say, how many men has Asia produced that may be compared with the least of these, who in a thousand ways have merited to transmit their memory and their example to posterity;—*qui sui memores alios fecere merendo*? But it may be said that all this superiority of civilization might not have availed against the physical force of the Turks, reinforced by the wealth which would have accrued from a command of the Indian trade. “A few years after the first appearance of the Portuguese in India,” says Dr. Robertson, “the dominion of the Mamalukes was overturned by the irresistible power of the Turkish arms, and Egypt and Syria were annexed as provinces to the Ottoman empire. If after this event the commercial intercourse with India had continued to be carried on in its ancient channels, the Turkish Sultans, by being masters of Egypt and Syria, must have possessed the absolute command of it, whether the produc-

---

\* See an article on this subject in No. III. of the American review.

"tions of the East were conveyed by the Red Sea to Alexandria, or were transported by land-carriage from the Persian Gulf to Constantinople, and the ports of the Mediterranean." 1. Selim, notwithstanding his advantages over the Mamalukes, did not overturn their dominion, nor reduce Egypt to the condition of a province of his empire. He concluded a treaty with the Circassians or Mamalukes of Egypt, and left them in possession of arms, riches, and power. They produce the great charter of their liberties, the treaty of Selim the first with the republic; and the Othman Emperor still accepts a slight acknowledgement of tribute and subjection. Their throne, however *shaken* (not overturned) reposed on the two pillars of discipline and valour; their sway extended over Egypt, Nubia, Arabia, and Syria,\* &c. Thus, his command of the trade must have been very slight and precarious. 2. It could only be a *command* of the trade, such as that possessed by the King of Denmark over the Baltic trade in its passage through the Sound; a trade of much greater value than any that ever entered the Red Sea. The commodities of the East were imported by the merchants of Alexandria into that port; but thence they were disseminated by the *Venetians* to the countries bordering the Mediterranean, and to the towns of the Hanseatic league; while the objects of European produce and manufacture for which they were exchanged, were brought to Alexandria principally by them. Selim confirmed "their ancient privileges in Egypt and Syria;" and they continued to enjoy the monopoly of this trade, until its current was entirely diverted into the new channel. Thus, nine tenths of the benefits of this trade were possessed by the Venetians, while the other tenth was to be disputed between the Turks and Mamalukes: what-

---

\* Gibbon, hist. vol. xi. p. 161. 165. and the authorities referred to, A. D. 1250—1517.

ever advantages, therefore, could be derived to any state from the commercial wealth and naval resources produced by the Indian trade before De Gama's voyage, Voltaire is right in ascribing such advantages to the Venetians, and not to the Turks. 3. If the Turkish marine had ever been of a kind to occasion apprehension to Europe, why was it never seen beyond the pillars of Hercules? why did it not try for an uninterrupted passage to India, round the Cape of Good Hope? The exercise of this trade has always been a symptom, rather than a cause of naval superiority; and the share which a particular nation has, at any time, held in it, will afford a pretty just measure of her comparative rank in this respect. With great labour, and with the assistance of the Venetians, "twelve ships of war were built at Suez, on board  
 " of which a body of Mamalukes were ordered to serve, under the command of an officer of merit," for the purpose of attacking the Portuguese in the Red Sea; but "with undaunted courage, and after some conflicts, they entirely  
 " ruined the squadron, and remained masters of the Indian ocean." (His. Dis. Sec. iii.) Solyman the magnificent, "more enlightened than any Monarch of the Ottoman race," fitted out, in 1538, "a formidable fleet in the Red Sea, under the conduct of a confidential officer, with such a body  
 " of Janizaries on board of it, as he deemed sufficient not only to drive the Portuguese out of all their new settlements in India, but to take possession of some commodi-  
 " ous station in that country, and to erect his standard there;" but the Portuguese "repulsed this powerful armament in every enterprize it undertook, and compelled  
 " the shattered remains of the Turkish fleet and army to return with ignominy to the harbours from which they had  
 " taken their departure, with the most sanguine hopes of terminating the expedition in a very different manner." (His. Dis. Sec. iv.) Was a nation that was thus handled,—in the time of its most enlightened and magnificent Monarch,

—at its very doors,—by the troops of one of the minor powers of Europe,—likely to reduce *all Europe* to a humiliating servitude? 4. Granting that the authors of the sixteenth century were fully justified in representing the Turks as far superior to the Christians, both in the knowledge and in the practice of the art of war;\* yet it is to be remembered, that at that time standing armies had begun to be introduced into the European system, and that, while *their* military institutions partook of the general progressive improvement, those of the Turks stood still, or retrograded. The Greeks and Romans surpassed all other nations as much in the occupations of war, as in those of peace; but in modern times, the advantages on the side of the more civilized people are still more decided. The invention of gun-powder has enabled the art of war to derive assistance from the sciences of mathematics, chymistry, and mechanics; and if an army of barbarians be inferior in discipline, in skill, in personal intelligence, how much more in these sciences, which are acquired, not in the field, but in the closet; not in the hurly-burly of war, but in the bosom of peace? Judging from the present ignorance of the Turks,† they must have been totally unacquainted with these sciences, and even with their names, in the sixteenth century; and yet, with a military establishment greatly outnumbering that which any Christian state could then command, and with all the superiority in “discipline and military improvements of every kind,” that Busbequins contends for, whom have they subdued in Europe, except the degenerate Greeks, and the effeminate inhabitants of some adjacent provinces? In the middle of the sixteenth century, how miserably did they suffer at the famous siege of Malta! Six years later, their whole navy was destroyed at the equally famous battle of Lepanto. In the

---

\* Dr. Robertson, Charles V. vol. i. pp. 229. 476.

† Eton's Survey of the Tur. Epp. Mem. of the Baron de Tott.

middle of the succeeding century they took Candia, by capitulation, after a 20 years siege, occasionally interrupted. Poland and Hungary have still been preserved from their yoke. In 1683 Tekeli, a Hungarian Nobleman, excited a revolt, and went over to Mahomet IV, who declared him King of upper Hungary. To avenge Tekeli's cause, the Turks advanced through Hungary with an army of 140,000 men, exclusive of 30,000 Crim Tartars, up to the gates of Vienna, which they laid siege to: but though the town was weakly garrisoned, and indifferently fortified, this powerful army remained before it till John Sobieski King of Poland, (who had defeated them before, at the battle of Chokzim in 1674,) came and chased them away, with the loss of their baggage and effects. In short, Europe has never wanted, and never will want, a John of Austria, a John De la Valette, a Sobieski, a Montecuculi, a Eugene, a Suwarrow, to repel their arms, or turn the tide of war upon their own territory.

With respect to the future we are safe: but *if* ever, in times past the light of European civilization was saved from utter extinction, it was in 451, when Ætius and Theodoric defeated Attila at Chalons: in 732, when Charles Martel scattered the host of Saracens between Tours and Poitiers; and again, when Henry the Fowler, in 934, and Otho the Great, in 955, for ever broke the power of the Hungarians.\*

“ Had it not been for the voyage of Vasco de Gama, Venice would soon have become *the* principal power in Europe!” When one considers the unwarlike character of the Italians, which, since the beginning of the sixteenth century, has made them a prey to the nations of the North and West; that during a long antecedent period Italy had been divided into a number of independent states, of various interior constitutions, whose quarrels were decided, when the war of negotiation failed, by the parade of mercenary armies,

---

\* Gibbon's *hist.* vol. x. p. 23—25. p. 212—218. Pinkerton's *Diss.* on the Goths, p. 196.

whose mock battles were truly "sine cæde, sine sanguine, sine dimicatione;" that the universal impotence prevented any of these states from considerably disturbing the general balance; that no sooner had a King of France found himself at liberty to undertake such an expedition, than Charles VIII,\* at the head of 20,000 men, marched through the heart of the country, and quietly took possession of the kingdom of Naples, having had the way opened before him by the mere terror of his arms; that when a combination of nearly all the states of Italy, assisted by the Emperor Maximilian and Ferdinand King of Aragon, attempted with an army of 30,000 men to intercept his return, he cut his way through, and gained a signal victory with only 8000 men; and that the whole of Italy, in the days of her greatest relative importance, was thus at the mercy of France, as it were in her maiden enterprize; it will be allowed that a prognostication, which assigns, but for the Portuguese discoveries, a preponderation of power to one of the Italian states over all the nations of Europe, is one of the wildest that ever was thrown out. The question formerly put, applies here; if the Venetians had had "*that within*," them, which fitted them to take a distinguished station among the powers of Europe, why did they not, since they owed every thing to their naval and commercial greatness, follow in the track which Vasco De Gama had pointed out, and divide with the Portuguese, if they could not exclusively occupy, a commerce on which the welfare and consequence of their state so intimately depended? But instead of contending for superiority in the Persian Gulf, they soon saw their own Adriatic ploughed by bolder prows than theirs. If the continuance of this gainful commerce was to exalt Venice to such pre-eminence in the European system, it will be granted that, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, before the

---

\* A. D. 1494.

Portuguese had reaped the full fruits of their discoveries, and while part of the Indian, and all the other branches of her trade, were prosecuted with vigour, rendering her the most opulent state in Europe, she must have attained to her *maximum* of relative power, and from its nature and extent at that time, as evinced by historical facts, we may judge what would have been the consequence if De Gama's voyage had been postponed. The proposition of Voltaire implies that riches are the sinews of war, but never was that maxim more signally refuted than at the period, and at the expence of the very state, to which he refers. Their great wealth, which "was viewed with envy by the greatest Monarchs," and with fear by their Italian neighbours, occasioned the league of Combray,\* which, with a force much disproportioned to its object, quickly stripped them of all their continental dependencies, and drove them within the walls of their capital. It did not require a series of wars, nor even a series of campaigns; one campaign, one battle shattered their hollow greatness and exposed their real weakness. Yet, at this time, Voltaire tells us, Venice was as rich as all the confederated powers together, and on his principles should have been able to meet their united strength on equal terms: but all their curious arms, and gold, and silver, and silks, and camblets, and looking-glasses, could not save them from those who made a better use of iron. Why should their foreign mercenaries sacrifice themselves in defence of property, privileges, dignities, in which they nowise participated? Such soldiers can be of no real service to a state, either for offensive, or defensive, operations, for this plain reason, that if they *were* capable of preserving the independence of the state against all its enemies, they could no longer remain servants, but must become masters of the state; let their employers "entrench themselves in parchment up to the

---

\* League of Combray, A. D. 1509. De Gama's Voyage, A. D. 1498.



“teeth, the sword would find a passage to the vitals of their “constitution;” not only the government, but all public and private property would be at their disposal; and they would then defend *their own* rights and acquisitions against all the world. But if Venice has ever been, from the maxims of her civil policy, and the character of her people, disqualified for having any other than an inefficient army of mercenaries, it follows irresistibly that she has ever been completely disqualified for becoming a principal power of Europe, and that, in fact, she has only existed by the jealous collisions of other powers. On this subject, Dr. Robertson is as reasonable, as he was not so in this speculation on Turkish Supremacy: “The Venetian nobles distrusted “their own subjects, and were afraid of allowing them the “use of arms.” “The military force of the republic consisted entirely of foreign mercenaries. The command of “these was never entrusted to noble Venetians, lest they “should acquire such influence over the army as might endanger the public liberty.” “A common wealth, with “such civil and military constitutions, was not formed to “make conquests. While its subjects were disarmed, and “its nobles excluded from military command, it carried on “its warlike enterprizes with *great disadvantage*.” [Is that all?] “This ought to have taught the Venetians to rest “satisfied with making *self-preservation*, and the enjoyment “of domestic security, the objects of their policy. But republics are apt to be seduced by the spirit of ambition, as well as Kings. When the Venetians so far forgot the inferior defects in their government as to aim at extensive conquests, the fatal blow, which they received in the war “excited by the league of Combray, convinced them of the “imprudence and danger of making violent efforts, in opposition to the genius and tendency of their constitution.”\*

---

\* Charles V. vol. i. p. 160—161.

Compared with these defects, the disadvantage of a circumscribed territory, and even that of their constitution, which prevented incorporative unions with their conquests, scarcely deserve to be noticed.

Page 374. He thinks that the Japanese, in abstaining from animal food, "seem to act rather from a principle of temperance than of superstition."

Page 379. Surely nobody has carried the corporal and mental precocity of the inhabitants of tropical climates to such extent: he leaves no interval between childhood and manhood. "In the Southern parts of India, they are marriageable at seven or eight years of age: and such sort of marriages are very common. *Those very children beget others, and enjoy their full proportion of reason at a time when ours scarce begins to dawn.*"

Pages 380—422—426. He assumes a singular license in sporting with the testimony of travellers, admitting whatever suits, and rejecting whatever does not suit his hypotheses: in his closet at Ferney, he fashions out the most distant parts of the earth according to preconceived images in his own mind, instead of disposing his mind *ad mundi imaginem recipiendam, qualis invenitur*. He will not believe that in Asia, the immediate, as well as ultimate, property of the soil is vested in the Prince, but determines that this is no more the case than in Europe under the feudal system: and yet Montesquien condescended to believe it; "*Les lois des Indes, qui donnent les terres aux Princes, et otent aux particuliers l'esprit des propriétés augment les mauvais effets du climat, c'est à dire, la Paresse naturelle.*" (Esp. deslois.) This is one of the most curious, interesting, and important subjects that can occupy our attention; and I cannot do better than at once refer the reader to Patton's principles of Asiatic Monarchies; a work "from which we have all learned our lessons, if we have learned any good ones; and from whose materials those gentlemen who have least ac-

“**known**ed it, have yet spoken as from a brief.”\* We may, however, glance at the way in which he sets aside the authority of eye-witnesses. “**Authors** who have lived in India, *pretend*, that nobody is possessed of any [landed] property in the territories of the Great Mogul: which is still more against nature. Those very writers assure us, that they have traded with Indians, who were worth a great many millions of livres. These two assertions seem to contradict one another.” Surely men may have plenty of personal, without having any real, property. In most countries in Europe Jews are incapable of holding landed property, and yet in those very countries some of them are worth a great many millions of livres. “We should have ever present to our minds, that the Northern Conquerors extended the customs of *fendal tenures* from Lombardy as far as India.” A monstrous assertion. Tamerlane first instituted *Jagheers*; they are fiefs binding the holder to serve in war with a body of troops, but on the footing of the beneficia of Charlemagne, that is, personal and not hereditary; and the Emperors took care that they bore *no proportion* to the *Khalsa* or exchequer lands. Even if the whole country, therefore, instead of so trifling a fraction of it, had been divided into such allotments, it would not have amounted to an establishment of the fendal tenures. Who ever heard, in India, of aids, reliefs, primer seisins, wardships, marriages, escheats, and fines for alienation; of free-hold, copy-hold, knights service, escuage, dower, assise, corruption of blood, &c. who ever heard of Indian vassals deliberating what aid, scutages, subsidies, benevolences, they should give to the King, making laws, and regulating the jurisdiction of courts of justice? of diets, cortes, parliaments, or states general? of Indian Knights serving forty days? of stealing Indian

---

\* There is a glaring want of acknowledgment in the *Edin. Review*, No. xxx. Art. Voyage aux Indes, &c.

heiresses?—in short, of any of the thousand peculiarities in laws and manners belonging to that system? “We cannot too often explode the shocking notion, that there are countries where millions incessantly toil for one.”—Whether such notion be true, or false!

Page 397. He talks of the thirty *vassals* of the Emperor of Mexico, at the time of Cortez invasion.

Page 422. “Bernier is a philosopher; but he does not employ his philosophy in acquiring a thorough knowledge of the government. He says, like the rest, that all the lands belong to the Emperor. This has need of an *explanation*. To give away lands, and to have the property of them are two very different things. The Kings of Europe, who give away all the Church livings, are not the proprietors of those livings. The Emperor who has a right to confer all the fiefs of Germany and Italy, when they become vacant, does not receive the revenues of those lands.” He *assumes* that the Kings of Asia *give away* the lands of their dominions, as a King of Europe gives away Church livings: this supposition refutes itself, for it would be acting like King Lear, and giving away their kingdoms: but if such a case were possible, as it plainly is not, that a King of Asia could alienate the revenues of all the lands of his kingdom, and still be King, still this would not assimilate the state of Asiatic tenures in land to that which prevails in Europe. A King of Europe does not give away any of the lands of his kingdom. The lands appropriated to Church livings do not belong to him; they are never given away in full property; their rents are official salaries, and the King may have the nomination to these offices.

“In India, says Bernier, there are none but great Lords and poor wretches. How is this to be reconciled with the opulence of those merchants, who, as Tavernier says, are worth so many millions of livres?” There are a few rich merchants in Poland; nevertheless it may be truly

said that the Polish notion consists of great Lords and poor wretches. By "great Lords," Bernier means, the great officers Civil and Military of the Crown, and not a permanent body of men, who are great Lords independently of the Crown, for of these there are none; but his observation is liable to misconstruction: in India there are only very rich and very poor men; the former, who bear no proportion to the latter, consist of those who hold lucrative offices, and of a few bankers and merchants; they can pretend to no superiority but the greater plenitude of their purses, for with respect to independence, authority, privileges, immunities, except what appertains to the *offices* they execute, they are on a level with the multitude; with respect to these things, there is but *one* man, the Prince Regnant, and all the rest are poor indeed.

"Bernier did not imagine, that his words would be misconstrued so far, as to think, that all the Indians manure, build, and toil for a Tartar." On the contrary, Bernier, having acquired a thorough and philosophical knowledge of the government, and having shewn that the Indians do manure, build, &c. did not imagine that his testimony would be misconstrued into to the very reverse of what it imported; and that all his experience would be set aside, and explained away, in the manner we have seen. "Besides, this Tartar is absolute over the subjects belonging to his own domain; but has very little authority over the "Viceroys, who are so powerful as to disobey him." Force and fraud, not law, being the instruments of government, it is very natural that a Viceroy should rebel, and in that case, it is most true that "this Tartar" will have "very little authority over him:" but what does this prove? If the Viceroy can permanently withhold the rents of his viceroyalty, he becomes, ipso facto, King himself; and, as such, the lands and their rents belong to him: the original proposition, therefore, against which Voltaire has been con-

tending, remains undisturbed ;—that in no case do the lands belong to the subjects of an Asiatic monarchy.

Page 383. “ Our Western nations have, through all these discoveries, greatly excelled the orientals in genius and courage. We have made settlements in there country, and sometimes against their will. We have learnt their languages, and taught them some of our arts. *Still nature hath given them one advantage OVER US, EQUAL TO ALL OURS; it is, that they do not want us, but we want them.*” ! !

Page 432—3. “ The Christian merchants were enriched by this commerce; (with Turkey) *but at the expence of Christendom.*” !

“ The Christian nations trade with the Ottoman empire, as with all the Continent of Asia. We go to these people, who never come to us; *an evident proof of our wants.* The sea-ports of the Levant are full of our merchants. All the trading nations of Christendom have consuls who reside there. Most of them maintain Ambassadors in ordinary at the Ottoman Port, while none are sent from thence to reside with us. The *Turks* look upon these perpetual embassies, as an homage which the necessities of Christian states offer up to their power.” [Has not Voltaire avowed the same opinion?] “ They have often treated those Ministers with such indignity, as would produce a quarrel among European Princes, who have always overlooked such treatment from the Ottoman empire. William III, King of England, used to say, *that there is no honour in regard to Turks.* This is the expression of a merchant, who wants to dispose of his goods, but does not become a King, jealous of what we call glory.” It appears to me that this expression would become the most chivalrous King: it implies that the Turks are incapable of conferring honour, or dishonour, on Europeans. The refinements of the point of honour apply exclusively

to the transactions of Europeans with one another, as they cannot be observed where there is no conformity of opinions and prejudices between the parties: there must also be a certain degree of equality in point of rank; a gentleman is not dishonoured by a blow from a roturier; he may punish the aggressor, but he cannot have a *quarrel* with him; he has sustained an injury, but not an insult. In the same manner, the Turks can inflict injuries by personal violence, but not imaginary indignities, dependent on the European standard of the point of honour. The envoy of a petty German Prince would not submit to any part of that treatment, from a European power to which the French Ambassador at Constantinople submits, without the smallest sacrifice of his dignity. The ceremonies of his reception are by no means agreeable; they are barbarous, and disgusting. When the Ambassador and his suite, mounted on horses furnished by the Sultan, arrive before the outer gate of the seraglio, they must dismount and proceed forward; the outer and inner gates are then shut, and information is sent to the Divan, that an infidel Ambassador is without, who wishes to throw himself at the feet of the Great Sultan. On the opening of the inner gate, a grotesque spectacle presents itself; a great number of dishes are strewed on the ground, and at a signal given, a troop of Janozaries run in and carry them off in the nimblest manner. Being now permitted to cross an outer court of the seraglio, they arrive at an anti-chamber of the Divan, near the door of which are displayed the presents brought by the Ambassador to do "homage" to the Turks: here the credentials are presented to the Vizir who sends them to the Sultan, to know his pleasure. In due time an order is received from the Sultan, amidst shouts of "long live the " King of Kings," and various demonstrations of the most humble respect, to feed, wash, and clothe the infidels, and then admit them to his presence. They are now fed; *they must eat*, like mendicants, grateful for the Turks bounty; they must

dabble with their fingers in the dishes, and tear the meat in pieces, for want of knives and forks. After this part of the farce, a more tedious one usually takes place, which is, to see the Janozaries paid: a number of leathern purses are strewed on the ground, supposed to contain the pay of one company: upon receiving the word from the commanding officer, the men run forward, snatch up the purses, and carry them off to divide them in some other quarter; this is repeated over and over, insomuch that it may continue several *hours*.\* After this severe trial of patience, the following precautions are taken to *prevent outrage* in the sublime presence: the infidels are clothed in large pelisses, which confine the arms; they are deprived of their swords; only fourteen can be admitted at one time; and a couple of hideous eunuchs take post on each side of each person, laying a hand on each shoulder, both for the above purpose, and to signify when he must bend before the King of Kings. In this manner they are marched through the second court, and are ushered into the presence. The Sultan does not deign to look upon them; and though conscious that the scimitar hangs suspended by a hair over his head, nothing must now discompose the serenity of his dignity. The speech of the Ambassador is translated by the Dragoman of the Porte to the Vizir, and by him to the Sultan; the reply is spoken to the Vizir, who passes it to the British Company's Dragoman, who translates it to the Ambassador. The audience being finished, they are marched back in the same humiliating condition, like criminals.†

Page 404. "After sailing along the coast for above 300 leagues, they (Diego Dalmagro, and Francis Pizarro) get intelligence, that, towards the equinoctial line, and under the other tropic, there is an immense country, where gold and silver, and precious stones, *are as cheap as dirt*;" and

---

\* After witnessing this foolery some hours, Lord Elgin declared, that if it were not immediately concluded, he would return home.

† Macgill's travels in Turkey, Italy, and Russia, in 1803, &c.



“ that the country is governed by as despotic a King as  
 “ Montezuma: for, all the world over, despotism is the con-  
 “ sequence of riches.” How could the King be enriched by  
 the possession of minerals that were as cheap as dirt? but,  
 leaving this difficulty out of the question, there is no abso-  
 lute connection between riches and despotism, or between  
 riches and liberty: a poor, as well as a rich country may be  
 free, or they may be enslaved; but, *cæteris paribus*, the freest  
 country will be the richest; witness the present state of En-  
 gland. Formerly, the Dutch yielded only to the English, in  
 liberty and riches. *Fuerunt Troes.*

Page 405. “ And to judge of their *magnificence*, it is suf-  
 “ ficient to mention, that the King (of Peru) was carried,  
 “ in his progress through the country, on a throne of gold,  
 “ weighing 25,000 ducats, and that the litter of gold plate,  
 “ on which stood the throne, was supported by the princi-  
 “ pal persons of the state.” He forgets, that from the cheap-  
 ness of the metal, this is such a description of magnificence,  
 as it would be, to say that a King of Sweden was carried  
 about in a chair of fir, ornamented with iron studs. As to  
 the circumstance of the King’s being *carried* by the *principal*  
*persons of the state*, it is by no means associated in my mind  
 with ideas of magnificence.

Page 412. “ It is a very great problem, *whether Europe has*  
 “ *benefited by the discovery of America.* There is no doubt  
 “ but the Spaniards at first drew immense riches from thence;  
 “ but their country has been depopulated;” [Its population  
 has been encreasing, ever since the discovery of America. It is  
 surprizing how the world has been deceived on this subject,  
 till the late publication of the *Questiones Criticas* of Camp-  
 many. The deception has probably been occasioned by mis-  
 taking a relative political depression, for an absolute decline in  
 wealth and population; and this from the incurious, inactive  
 character of the people, and the want of publicity with res-  
 pect to statistical, and all other documents.] “ And this trea-

“ sure being shared at length among other nations, the ancient equality is again restored. The price of provisions has every where increased : so that in reality nobody has been a gainer.” [Have gold and silver no intrinsic value? Is their exchangeable value merely conventional and fictitious? On the contrary, the value of these metals is as real, as that of iron, or silk, or corn ; and he is as much a gainer, who by his labour acquires a certain quantity of the former, as he who by the same means acquires an equivalent portion of any of the latter. The Spaniards therefore not only have been, but still continue to be, enriched by the produce of their mines ; and if any nation be equally rich, as some are much richer, that nation has not attained to this equality by receiving a gratuitous *share* of their treasure, but by cultivating other sources of wealth. Gold and silver are undoubtedly much cheaper than they would be if America had not been discovered, and, though the advantage be trifling, every body is a gainer by the reduced value of the useful and ornamental articles of which they are the materials ; but though their value, like that of every thing else, may be higher or lower, the Spaniards can never cease to be gainers to the full amount of all that their annual importations may be exchanged for : these have been at the rate of about £. 4,000,000 for\* upward of three centuries, but such is the demand for the precious metals, owing to the progress of industry and population, and so great is the expence of working the mines, that there has been little difference in their value during all that period. The rise in prices has not been so great as is commonly supposed, except in the period immediately succeeding the conquest South America ; and it is generally an effect of taxation, and various other causes, and not of a fall in the value of money. By saying that *nobody* has been a gainer, Voltaire supposes that gold and

---

\* Humboldt. *Essai Pol. sur la nouv. Espagne.*

silver are of no real value; but in other places he discovers the more common error of considering them the most valuable of all things. At page 392 he says, "the gold and silver mines were of no use at first, but to the Kings of Spain, and the merchants. *Every body else was impoverished, &c.*" He then shews how other people became enriched by the *treasures*, which Charles V. and Philip II. dispensed among them (he does not say, for value received,) in the course of their wars and travels. At vol. iii. p. 199, he says "for it is *this metal* (gold, or silver) *alone*, that constitutes power, since man has made it the universal representative." (Page 238.) "England had not all these advantages in the reign of Charles II.: she was *tributary* to the industry of France, who every year *drew* above 8,000,000 of livres *from her*, upon the balance of trade." Thus France received a tribute from England, because she received hard money, and *only* gave in exchange wine, linen, glass, copper, paper, lace, &c.!] "The question therefore is, whether cochineal and the bark are of such considerable value, as to compensate the loss of so many thousands of men." If this be put, not as a question of humanity, but of politics, it may be answered that the destruction of so many thousands of men is no loss at all. What is to compensate the loss of the multitudes of men, whom war and disease are every day carrying off? But this compendious view of the subject excludes the most important consideration that belongs to it,—the advantages of colonization. What can be a more grateful subject of contemplation, than that vast tracts of wilderness have been reclaimed, and overspread with busy farms; that flourishing cities exist where formerly wild beasts prowled for prey; or were hunted by the savage; that a new nation has been created to emulate whatever is excellent in the most improved state of society, to be a memorable example of the good effects of freedom embodied in an equitable government, to cultivate the resources of an immense conti-

ment, and multiply the objects that minister to human wants? The unparalleled rapidity with which the North American states grew to such prosperity as to be able to trade with England to an extent equal to the aggregate of that which she carried on with all the rest of the world, was a theme fit to be embellished by the first of orators: but other nations have had some share in the commerce with North and South America; and it must become a great problem, whether commerce be a benefit, before it can be questioned whether Europe has benefited by the discovery of America. But the advantages that flow from the original plantation, and gradual progress of colonies, are not inferior to those derivable from them when in a state of maturity. They excite and reward a spirit of enterprize in the inhabitants of the mother country; and while they afford a salutary outlet for the excess of its population, they ultimately increase it by opening new markets for the productions of its industry. It is well known that an excessive population generates private vice and misery: and also, that when other causes concur it gives additional violence to popular commotions. How often were the patricians of Rome obliged to feed the plebeians, when, exasperated by a dearth of corn, instead of "striking at heaven with their staves, they lifted them against the Roman state?"\* At the breaking out of the French revolution, a degree of scarcity, which would have been little felt in England, produced in France, owing to the state of its population, such distress, alarm, and irritation, aggravated by the pernicious remedies of Necker, as contributed considerably to help forward that tremendous convulsion.† The whole kingdom was afterwards taxed to enable the government to supply the Parisians with bread at        of the price for which it sold in the provinces; and though they still demand-

---

\* Shakespeare.

† See Young's tour in France.

ed both bread and blood, there can be little doubt that if they had had less of the former, they must have had more of the latter. When, in the year 1358, France was desolated with more atrocious cruelties than can be paralleled in the history of any other nation, Hume says "the wild state of nature seemed to be renewed: every man was thrown loose and independent of his fellows: and the *populousness* of the country, derived from the preceding police of civil society, served only to *increase* the horror and confusion of the scene." The tendency of population to outrun the means of subsistence, and the inconveniences attending it were not unobserved by Lord Bacon: in his considerations on the plantation of Ireland, he says that a long peace must in the end produce a surcharge or overflow of the people more than the territory can well maintain; which, many times, insinuating a general necessity and want of means into all estates, doth turn external peace into internal troubles and seditions. Now what an excellent diversion of this inconvenience is ministered, by God's providence, to your Majesty in this plantation of Ireland? wherein so many families may receive sustentation of fortunes, and the discharge of them also out of England and Scotland may prevent many seeds of future perturbations." So shall your Majesty have a double commodity, in the avoidance of people here, and in making use of them there." If it were desirable to expel what might possibly be the seeds of future mischief, *a fortiori* it must have been so to get rid of the mischief itself, when its noxious and contagious qualities have been fully ascertained: if what might eventually have turned into heresy and schism should be allowed to flow off, surely heretics and schismatics should not be prevented from expatriating themselves. It seems, therefore, inconsistent in the noble author to say, in his advice to Villiers, that "no known heretic or schismatic should be suffered to go into those coun-

“ tries ; or, if they do creep in there, not to be harboured, fed or continued : else, the place would receive them naught, and return them into England upon all occasions, worse.” The propriety of this recommendation rests upon the probability of their returning into the mother country ; but I find nothing to support such a supposition. The same motives that carried them abroad, would continue them there : if an aversion to the civil and ecclesiastical institutions of their country induced them to seek settlements where they might establish both these upon their own principles ; where they might exclude from their community as heretics those from whom they had seceded ; where they might enjoy not only freedom, but power, it is not probable that they would think of exchanging such a situation, for a country where they must be despised, or persecuted. Thus, in the succeeding reign, the puritans were eager to emigrate to America, and those who succeeded in their purpose remained there, their zeal enabling them to struggle against the greatest physical difficulties ; but it was one of the fatuities in Charles I.’s conduct, that, instead of favouring their egress, he forcibly restrained it, and actually threw back into the commonwealth those very persons who were soon the most powerful of his opponents, and perhaps the masters of his fate ; Pym, Hampden, Hazelrig, and Cromwel. This policy was dictated by a blind wish to thwart their inclinations ; for, before the spirit of emigration had seized them, laws had been passed to compel them to abjure the kingdom, and though this species of oppression be more severe, it is also more reasonable than the other. If, before the revocation of the edict of Nantz, Louis XIV. had found a similar spirit of emigration prevalent among the protestants, it is not to be doubted that he would have congratulated himself upon it, and forwarded it by every means, as being a mode of effecting his own purpose greatly preferable to that which he adopted of dragging them out of their country. Louis

took a violent precaution against a remote and contingent danger, by removing the combustible matter. Charles prevented a present danger from passing away, heaped fuel on the fire that had broken out, and did not allow it to take a direction where it might safely spend its fury. Louis expelled a multitude of the most peaceable, industrious, and enlightened of his subjects, and compelled them to enrich his enemies with their arts, their industry, and their knowledge: Charles obstructed the departure of those whom he considered most disaffected, seditious, and inflammatory, though they wished to establish themselves in his own colonies, and to form what was afterwards said to be the brightest jewel of the British Crown.

The use of colonies in purging the state from restless and dissatisfied spirits in times of internal agitation, has been well displayed by M. Talleyrand, in a discourse on colonies, published in the transactions of the National Institute, and illustrated by a reference to the circumstances under which North America received the bulk of its first settlers; and it was this consideration, together with the wish to acquire some territory fit for the cultivation of sugar, coffee, &c. that induced the French government to send an expedition to Egypt in 1798: but the want of maritime power leaves all their colonial projects and possessions at the mercy of England: a country occupied by the warlike Mamalukes, subject to incursions from the Turks, and to the decisive visits of the English, seemed more calculated to give employment to their useful armies, than to their useless intriguers; being already stocked with inhabitants, there was little elbow-room for the new comers; while the disagreeableness and unwholesomeness of the climate were not the least of those inconveniences which rendered the enterprize fruitless and impracticable.

Page 417. "Upon the whole, the spirit of order and moderation, a love for the sciences, the cultivation of the several arts useful to life, and a prodigious number of in-

"ventions to facilitate the acquirement of those arts, constituted the Chinese wisdom. It is this that polished the Tartar conquerors, and incorporated them with the nation. This is an advantage the Greeks have not been able to acquire over the Turks." Without enquiring whether the polish of the Chinese Tartars be superior to that of the Turks, it appears that if the Greeks could not preserve their country from subjection under the latter, the expectation of polishing them was desperate indeed. If their ancestors had lost the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Platæa, their conquerors would still have continued Persians. But the Turks "are free," (p. 110) and that is better than being polished; that alone outweighs all the advantages of civilization, according to our author's doctrine at page 92: "All Tartary, except that called Chinese, contains no more than wretched hordes or clans, who would be extremely fortunate in being conquered in their turn, *were it not far preferable to be free than civilized.*" A wild Tartar is free; a Frenchman is not: the consequence is obvious; unless not to be conquered deserve the name of freedom.\*

Page 430. He thinks the Mamalukes are not slaves: he thinks it is only a "figurative manner of speaking," and "a denomination that attached them more nearly to the person of the sovereign."—The fact of their being purchased as slaves, I believe was never doubted before: Volney says they cost 100 Louis a head.

Page 418. "The chief of these abuses, (in the Chinese Government) not remedied *till lately*, was the custom of exposing their children, in hopes they would be taken care of by the opulent. Thus a great number of subjects were lost:"—"The Tartar conquerors might have furnished subsistence to those deserted children, and raised colonies of them to people the wilds of Tartary. But they *never*

---

\* Written in 1810.



“*thought of it*; and even in our western world, which stood  
 “more in need of a reparation of the human species, we  
 “have not yet applied a remedy to *this evil* though it *did us*  
 “*more mischief*. There was not a foundling hospital in Lon-  
 “don till within these few years. *It requires a vast many*  
 “*ages to PERFECT HUMAN NATURE.*” Reason and experi-  
 ence have shewn that foundling hospitals are pernicious in  
 situations, and not one of those steps towards the perfection  
 of human nature, which it requires a vast many ages to bring  
 about. How many of these houses would it be necessary to  
 build and to endow in China, for the reception of the multi-  
 tudes of children that continue to be exposed? and from  
 what resources could the Government maintain them? The  
 revenue consisting of the rents of all the land of the empire,  
 and of certain fixed customs, no new taxes can be imposed;  
 nor could they be levied upon those very parents whose  
 wretched poverty, coupled with the want of criminality at-  
 tending it, had forced them to expose those very children for  
 whom their contributions were demanded. If they could not  
 feed them at home, much less could they do it when attended  
 with the expences and malversations of an imperial establish-  
 ment.

Page 421. “This conqueror (Akber) did more good in  
 “India than Alexander had had time to do. His public  
 “works were prodigious: among others, we *still* admire the  
 “great road, bordered with trees, 150 leagues in length from  
 “Agra as far as Lahore; a magnificent monument of this  
 “conqueror, which was further embellished by his son Ju-  
 “hangeer.” Akber was by far the best prince that ever  
 reigned in Hindoostan; and this road *was* a monument of his  
 wisdom and benevolence. A border of trees will add much  
 to the beauty of a road, but even with that addition, can  
 such a work be called magnificent, and prodigious? The  
 appearance and reality of great expence are necessary ingre-  
 dients in the magnificent; but roads are universally construct-

ed at the public expence, by trifling and imperceptible contributions; they are one of the greatest, and certainly the cheapest of all conveniences; (unless when made thorough uninhabited tracts of country;) so that while the want of them is a proof of great poverty and misgovernment, the having them will scarcely amount to magnificence; and the almost total absence of art or science in their construction excludes them from any claim to be classed with the prodigious. They do not display the powers of intellect; and yet,

“ Mind, mind alone, bear witness Earth and Heaven!

“ The living fountains in itself contains

“ Of beauteous and sublime.”

The power of the Deity is equally displayed in all his works; as much in the production of a rose, as in that of a human being, or in the revolution of the solar system; but the superaddition of vastness will impress a more awful sense of his ineffable greatness. In the works of man, vastness is out of the question; the greatest of them cannot be compared with those of nature; and he evinces his power, not only unequally, but more in the least than in the most considerable of his works; more for instance, in the *Principia* of Newton, or in the *Allegro* and *Penseroso* of Milton, than in the proudest monuments that ever were made with hands; in the construction of a watch, or of a steam engine, more than in the building of the walls of Babylon, or of the great wall of China. Nevertheless such extensive works are highly creditable to a nation; they are among the most conspicuous marks of high civilization; and will be found to be in proportion to the abundance of the surer tests of social improvement. As the two first nations of antiquity were unrivalled in the elegance and magnificence of their works of art; so in modern times, those nations who have been most eminent in letters and arms, have also excelled in whatever renders life comfortable and splendid. Some writers have censured the liberality with which Louis XIV. forwarded this branch of civil admi-

nistration : an anonymous writer in a respectable Journal\* says ; " The nation itself, by identifying its glory with that of its monarch, fostered the *delusion* ; and thus he felt no " check in following his most *ruinous propensities*." Now, as the different works at Trianon, Marli, Versailles, and Paris, the canal of Languedoc the highways, and the fortified towns and harbours, though they were ordered, or approved of upon the suggestion of counsellors, by Louis, were defraided from the resources of French industry ; were planned and executed by means of French genius and skill ; and still exist for the benefit of Frenchmen, and many of them to the admiration of foreigners ; the nation had a right to consider that its glory was identified with that of its monarch, or rather, that he was indebted to them for the greater part of his glory ; for, if he had been King of Spain, and not of France, the history of his reign would have been composed of very different materials. But whether the sentiments of some people accord with those of the French or not, as far as their own satisfaction was concerned their consciousness of their national glory could be no " *delusion* ;" they could not be mistaken with respect to the reality of their own sensations. Neither was it a ruinous propensity that fortified the kingdom in such a manner as to save it from being ruined by the Duke of Marlborough ; nor that fixed and accumulated labour, that might have been employed in procuring transitory and consumable superfluities, in imperishable objects of utility and magnificence. No ; this was wise and magnanimous ; a lesson to all other governments ; an example that never can be sufficiently emulated. The heir of a great estate will not blame the propensities of his ancestors, who moderated their expenditure in equipage, dress, and ostentatious hospitality, and were thereby enabled to leave him a princely mansion, delightful pleasure grounds,

---

\* Athenæum, Vol. II. p. 560.

rich services of plate, elegant furniture, a gallery of paintings, and an ample library. The English have received an incomparable inheritance from their ancestors, and will transmit it improved to their posterity; but among *them* the most considerable public works are carried on by combinations of local interests, under powers granted by private acts of parliament, and undoubtedly much more will be effected in this way, and more judiciously, than when every thing is left to the government; but there are cases when such interposition is necessary, and the averseness of the House of Commons to originate such measures, and the backwardness of their constituents to petition them to that effect, appear unaccountable when it is considered how much might be done with the mere difference between a war and a peace establishment for one year.

Roads require continual raparation, and the laws of England have never wanted a power to enforce that, through every corner of the kingdom. Not to speak of late improvements by various statutes, so far back as the times of the Saxons, every man's estate was subject to the *trinoda necessitas*; *expeditio contra hostem, arcium constructio, et pontium reparatio*; in the last of which the keeping of roads in repair was included, as in the Roman law, ad instructiones reparationesque itinerum et pontium, nullum genus hominum nulliusque dignitatis ac venerationis meritis, cessare oportet.\* The country is intersected in every direction, to the extent of several thousand miles, with the best roads in the world, being like gravel walks; whereas the best roads in France are paved. Voltaire tells us that on whichever side you leave Paris, you travel on a spacious road, bordered with trees for 50 or 60 leagues: he does not say that this was prodigious, and yet three of these roads were equal in extent to that of Akber. But in Hindoostan there was no permanent court of

---

\* Blackstone, Com. Vol. I. 357.

justices to record the rescripts of any of the Emperors concerning the high ways, much less to enforce their observance; and the continual recurrence of civil wars, rebellions, and anarchy soon blotted out what had been effected during an interval of peace and order. The bridges upon this great road, if I may judge from the specimens I have seen, were of a very defective construction. The arches I believe, are never more than 24 feet in the span, and are semi-circular; that is, they are never segments of a larger circle than one whose diameter is equal to the extent of the span; and the thickness of the pier exceeds half the extent of the span. And whereas rain-fed torrents with shallow beds require to be carefully embanked on one or both sides, from want of this attention, the stream has, in some places, been allowed to desert the bridge which was originally thrown over it, fairly to turn its flank, and leave it high and dry like a stranded ship at low water; and passengers ford, or are ferried over, within a hundred yards of the circumvented bridge. Elliptical arches, as at Black Friars'-bridge, are generally considered to be handsomer than circular: the span of the center arch of that bridge is 100 feet, and the thickness of the piers 17.

A still larger arch, is that of the celebrated bridge on the river Taaſſ in Wales, called Pont y tu Pridd, and by the English New Bridge. It is the segment of a circle whose chord at the surface of the water is 147 feet: but its lightness and beauty are not less extraordinary; being perforated breadthwise by several circular openings, whose diameters decrease as they are nearer to the key stone. It was built by William Edward, then a common mason, who died in 1789: and it does not less deserve to be called *sans pareil* than that between Calais and Ardres, which is built where two canals intersect each other at right angles. A cast-iron bridge over the Thames in place of the present London bridge will present the still more prodigious sight of a river 300 yards

in breadth being embraced by a single arch. I will venture to say that there is no sufficient reason for the execution of this grand work being deferred: its practicability has been demonstrated by the ablest mathematicians and engineers in Britain: and though the magnitude of the expence would in some other countries be an insuperable bar, yet *there* it would not only be trifling, but absolutely imperceptible, for it might be defrayed, as was done for St. Paul's cathedral in much poorer times, by a slight temporary tax upon some articles of the customs or excise. An effort of art, directed by science, equally wonderful and admirable is the roof of the halle aùbled, or corn market, at Paris. The span of the arch of the bridge over the Allier, near the city of Brioude in Avergne, is 195 feet. In Mr. Coxe's travels into Russia, we are told that "a Russian peasant has projected the sublime plan of throwing a wooden bridge of a single arch across the river, (Neva) which in its narrowest part is 980 feet in breadth. The artist has executed a model 98 feet in length, which I examined with great attention, as he explained its proportion and mechanism. The bridge is upon the same principle with that of Schaff-hausen," &c. &c. Major By, R. E. has laid before the Board of Ordnance models of a bridge on new principles on which an arch of 1000 feet span, rising 100 feet above the level of the water, can be erected in a few months for £ 50,000.

Compared with any of these structures, the pyramids of Egypt, a theme of wonder and thoughtless praise to all ages, are but monuments of imbecility and folly. Nay, without subjecting them to such comparison, and considering only their form and use, what is there to excite our wonder, but that the earth should be loaded with such heaps of stones to receive the dust of nameless kings? Their plan and object are equally contemptible: no ennobling ideas are associated with the latter; and there is nothing in the former beyond the capacity of the lowest workman employed in their con-

struction, for it was only laying a shorter course of stones over a longer, so that they could not tumble for want of perpendicularity, and in this way they might go on as long as stones and onions lasted. Thus did they

——“ Toil vast fabrics to produce

“ Alike devoid of elegance or use;

“ Enormous piles where labour, wealth, and waste,

“ Strove to supply the want of sense and taste ;

“ Where barbarous strength perpetuated shame,

“ And sumptuous folly damn'd to endless fame.”\*

VOLUME THIRD.

Page 67. “ The States General were held at Orleans, and afterwards at Blois ; states ever memorable by the separation they made between the sword and the long robe.” “ The States of Orleans being convinced that the nobility could hardly confine themselves to study the laws, deprived them of the administration of justice, and settled it entirely on their deputies of the long robe ; so that they who, by their institution, had been always judges, ceased to have that jurisdiction.

“ The celebrated chancellor de l'Hopital had the principal share in this *revolution*. It was made at a time when the kingdom was weakest, and it has since contributed to the strength of the sovereign, by dividing two professions, which in conjunction might have balanced the power of the ministry. It has been since thought, that the nobility were not able to preserve the deposit of the laws. They who were of this opinion did not reflect, that in England the upper house, consisting properly of the nobility of the kingdom, is a court of judicature that enacts laws, and administers justice. When we observe such revolutions in the constitution of a country, and find that our neighbours have not undergone the like change under the same

---

\* The Progress of Civil Society, by R. P. Knight.

"circumstances, it is evident that their genius and manners must differ greatly from ours."

We have here a ridiculous comment on an imaginary *revolution* that escaped the penetrating researches of Mably. That union of civil and military functions which obtained among the Greeks and Romans, has never been exemplified in modern times. The French parliaments were composed of nobility and lawyers; but there, as in the British House of Lords, the decision on questions of law, we may presume, was left entirely to the latter.

Page 180. "Rodolph succeeded his father Maximilian, and surpassed him in the weakness of his administration. He was Emperor, and King of Bohemia and Hungary at the same time; yet he had no sort of influence either in Bohemia, Hungary, or Germany; much less in Italy. Rodolph's reign seems to prove, that there is no such thing as a general rule in politics."

"This prince was reckoned far more incapable of governing than Henry III. King of France: Yet the conduct of the latter cost him his life, and was very near being the ruin of the kingdom; while the behaviour of the former, though a great deal more weak, occasioned no disturbance in Germany." The reign of Rodolph II. was full of disturbance and civil war: his weakness cost him his crown and his life, for he died of chagrin and dejection.\* Every thing is followed by its natural consequence; and yet this very reign shows that "there is no general rule in politics!"

Page 221. "At length, Fairfax, Cromwel, the independents, and the presbyterians, thought the king's death necessary for their purpose of establishing a republic." Fairfax did every thing in his power to prevent the murder of the King. And after the exhibition of Colonel Pride's purge, the presbyterians were guiltless of whatever crimes were committed.

---

\* Coxe's Austria, Vol. i. p. 728.



Page 228. Cromwel "summoned parliaments which were  
 " *entirely at his disposal*, and he dissolved them whenever he  
 " pleased. He discovered every plot that was made against  
 " him, and prevented insurrections. *No peer ever sat in any*  
 " *of his parliaments*. He had the address to engage one of  
 " those parliaments to offer him the title of King, *that he*  
 " *might have the opportunity of refusing it*, and be able to  
 " preserve his real power." 1. Cromwel's parliaments were  
 so thoroughly refractory and unmanageable that he was com-  
 pelled to dissolve them. Notwithstanding the compliment  
 Tacitus pays to Nerva, liberty and despotism are utterly ir-  
 reconcilable. 2. Some peers of Cromwel's creation did sit in  
 the lower house, and two of his daughters were married to  
 peers; viz. Lord Rich, grandson of the Earl of Harwich, and  
 Viscount Fauconberg. 3. Cromwel desired nothing so ardent-  
 ly as to substitute a kingly crown for his laurel chaplet.

Page 324. Of China he says ——— " *mankind cannot*  
 " *possibly form a better government*" ——— " it is impos-  
 " sible the Emperor should exercise any arbitrary power"  
 ——— " and if the sovereign sometimes *abuseth his power*  
 " against the few *who venture to come near him*, he cannot  
 " abuse it against the multitude, who know him not, and  
 " who live under the protection of the laws." ——— " the  
 " Chinese have perfected no polite art or science, *except mo-*  
 " *rality*: but their enjoyments were proportioned to their  
 " knowledge: In short they were happy as far as human  
 " nature is capable of happiness." ——— " Why, this is  
 " lunatics!"

VOLUME FOURTH.

Page. — " Another almost insuperable obstacle [to the pro-  
 " pagation of christianity in India] *is the structure of our*  
 " *organs*, which occasions so very bad a pronunciation of  
 " the Asiatic languages; but the greatest is, the difference  
 " of opinion among the several missionaries." " Each set-  
 " ting up against all to promote the truth, and charging

"others with lies, these simple quiet people are surprised to see men coming from the western extremities of the earth; to tear each other to pieces on the banks of the Ganges." See how his anti-christian zeal outstrips his discretion. He adduces a circumstance to account for the non-establishment of christianity, which presupposes its establishment. The natives of India, it is evident, would not listen a moment to polemical subjects unless they understood them, and took an interest in them. Controversy must ever prevail in proportion to the abundance of religious knowledge and zeal.

Page 95. "So that, to imagine Edward ever intended to hang six creditable persons, [burgesses of Calais] for their courage in defence of their country, is doing him great injustice." Notwithstanding Hume's scepticism on this subject, there is not the smallest reason to question Froissart's accuracy in imputing to Edward a determination to put the burgesses to death. Such a proceeding would not have been repugnant to the law of nations of those days, or even for a considerable period later. See Ward's Enquiry, I. 244—320. After Edward's naval victory in 1340, he hanged the French Admiral Bahuchet at the main-mast of his ship. St. Foix, v. 92. "The day after the battle of Creci," says Hume, the English "erected on the eminences some French standards which had been taken in battle; and all who were allured by this false signal were put to the sword, and no quarter given them." In 1418 Henry V. made it an article in the capitulation of Rouen, that three burgesses should be delivered to him to be dealt with as he thought proper. Two of them ransomed their lives, and one was beheaded. St. Foix, v. 191—4. The same Henry sent a message to the Governor of Montereau, threatening to put to death eighteen gentlemen whom he had taken prisoners, if the Governor did not surrender; and upon the Governor's refusal he carried his threat into execution.—Ibid.

Page 108. "It is very remarkable that Mahomet II. em-

“ployed on this enterprize, a world of christian renegadoes.” “Never have Mahometans been known to forsake their religion, and serve in christian armies. What can be the cause of such a difference? Is it that a religion which costs its professors a part of themselves, by a very painful operation; and is sealed with their own blood, does thereby become dearer to them? Is it because the conquerors of Asia acquired greater respect than the European potentates? Or is it that in those times of ignorance, God was thought to favor the arms of the Mussulmen more than those of the christians, and thence they concluded the victorious cause to be the best?” Mr. Voltaire seems determined to search “impossible places” for a reason that was staring him in the face. Was not the reason because christian renegadoes make their fortune among Mussulmen; whereas Mussulmen cannot make their fortune among christians?

Page 119. “Marital games began in Italy about the reign of Theodoric, who, in the fifth century put an end to the Gladiators, not by a prohibitory edict, but by reproaching the Romans with such a barbarous practice, to the end that they might learn politeness and humanity from a Goth.” Gladiatorial combats were forever abolished by the Emperor Honorius in the year 404, about fifty years before Theodoric the Goth appears on the stage. Gibbin, v. 207.

Page 146. “It was in the year 1535 that he (Francis I.) caused some Lutherans to be burnt at Paris.”—“Charles V. behaved otherwise: Though the Lutherans were his declared enemies; so far was he from imprisoning christians, and giving up heretics to executioners, that, at Tunis, he set free 18,000 christian slaves, both protestants and catholics.” Now Charles was by far the greater bigot and more sanguinary persecutor of the two! Francis burnt

some Lutherans, and Charles put to death thousands and tens of thousands. See Grotius.

Page 202. "If any thing can give an idea of this colony [that of the Jesuits in Paraguay] *it is the ancient government of Lacedemon*. In the country of the missions every thing is in common: though neighbours to Peru they (i. e. the natives) know nothing of gold and silver. The essential requisite of a Spartan, was obedience to Lycurgus's laws; and the essential quality of a Paraguayan, is sub-mission to the laws of the Jesuits. Every thing corresponds, except only that the Paraguayans, having no slaves to sow their lands and sell wood, as among the Spartans, *they are slaves to the Jesuits!*" It would be insulting the reader's understanding to show at length that these two cases, instead of being parallel, are as strongly contrasted as it is possible for two states of human society to be.

Page 238. "Such has been the *depopulation* of Spain, that the celebrated Usstaris, who wrote in 1723, makes the number of its inhabitants to be only about seven millions, which is one third of what France contains;" &c. At the time of the Armada the population was 5,000,000; in 1723 it was 7,000,000; in 1816 it is 11,000,000. "*Such has been the (progress of the) depopulation of Spain.*"

The preceding observations will have sufficiently evinced, and I hope justified the opinion which I hold, in common with many competent judges both French and English, that Voltaire is the most inaccurate, and consequently the most worthless of historians. As a poet Frenchmen cannot choose but place him in the first rank; but this is small praise from one who thinks that there is nothing within the whole compass of French poetry, except Fontaine's Fables, that deserves to be rescued from perdition. His scholarship was extremely slender; and, as to his expositions of the Newtonian philosophy, he was no more fit to be a coadjutor of

Newton, than he was to be a coadjutor of Atlas. In what character then has he claims to celebrity? As a wit. Wits may give him their suffrage as a philosopher and historian; but philosophers and historians will only acknowledge him as a wit.

An Edinburgh Reviewer (No. 32. p. 362.) taking offence at Dr. Clarke's bestowing upon Voltaire's histories the epithet "*drivellings*," speaks of him as "a great man," and of his "wonderful powers." But in No. 34. p. 300, we have the following elaborate laudateo: "As a philosophical historian, Voltaire must always be placed in the first rank; and, of all who belong to that class, from Tacitus to Gibbon inclusive, there is perhaps but *one* author [Hume?] who deserves to be placed above him. His *Philosophie de Newton* is a popular, but by no means a superficial treatise: It is remarkable for the luminous and *general* views which it contains, and particularly for a correct and logical statement of the evidence on which the theory of gravitation is founded. The man who could do all this, and who was a wit, a scholar, and a poet at the same time, was not, as Mr. Walpole insinuates, going out of his line when he *meddled with philosophy*. He was indeed giving an instance of variety and extent of talent, of which he remains yet, and will probably long remain, a solitary example in the world." — "For extent and variety of genius he is quite unrivalled; and to hold an opposite opinion is the strongest proof of ignorance or prejudice." In Vol. v. p. 291, we have the following passage. The excellence of historical composition is stated to consist in "unity of subject, skilful connexion of parts, and accuracy and depth in the occasional reflexions. If this description be erroneous or imperfect, we refer our readers to the sources from which the rules for historical composition have been derived; to the works of Herodotus, Thucydides, and

"Livy; or the compositions of Voltaire, Robertson, and Hume."

Dr. Blair pronounces the following judgment on the Essay on universal history. "Though, in some dates and facts, it may *perhaps*, be inaccurate; and is tinged with those particularities which unhappily distinguish Voltaire's manner of thinking on religious subjects, yet it contains so many enlarged and instructive views, as justly to merit the attention of all who either read or write the history of those ages." Lectures on Rhetoric III. 53. The last person whom I shall present throwing incense on the altar of the idol, is Dr. Robertson, who says: "I have often, however, followed him [Voltaire in his *Essai sur l'histoire generale*] as my guide in these researches; and he has not only pointed out the facts with respect to which it was of importance to enquire, but the conclusions which it was proper to draw from them. If he had at the same time mentioned the books which relate these particulars, a great part of my labour would have been unnecessary, and many of his readers who now consider him only as an entertaining and lively writer, would find that he is a learned and well-informed historian." Hist. Charles V. vol. I. p. 477.

I shall conclude with referring to a few *opposite* estimates, for there is no medium in men's opinions on this subject; so that Voltaire, as an historian, must either stand in the highest rank or in the lowest. The Quarterly Review, No. 16, in reporting the opinion of Mr. Barrente, author of *Tableau de la litterature Française pendant le 18<sup>me</sup>. siecle*, says: "Vacuity of impression and absence of reflexion form nearly the exact converse of the qualities most essential to the historical character; and a writer so perversely gifted for the office which he assumes, must naturally in the same proportion that he amuses fail to instruct." If the word *amusement* were not of a very vague and versatile import, I

should say that those readers only could be "amused," who were incapable of perceiving that their author was destitute of the qualities requisite for the task he had undertaken. "Primum ego *me* illorum—excerpam numero," whose taste does not repudiate such amusement.

Mr. Coxe, speaking of his history of Peter the Great, says: "But the well-informed Russians, although this work idolizes their hero Peter I. do not scruple to confess that it is a very inaccurate performance; a panegyric rather than a history, in which many facts are disguised or omitted; where every defect in the principal character is softened, and every virtue exaggerated."—"The picture, accordingly, which he has drawn of Peter I. is almost as devoid of animation as of resemblance;" *Travels into Russia*, &c. III. 299. In the *Scottish (Quarterly) Review*, for April, 1814, the Reviewer expresses himself as follows: "Political economy and law two cardinal points with an historian, on which he should always be at home, were very imperfectly known by Voltaire. He reasons on those topics, if reasoning it may be called, in a manner at once shallow and puerile, and very often cheats us out of the instruction which history should afford by some brilliant *jeu d'esprit*, or misplaced stroke of irony. His learning was not profound; and when he misses his mark at the first hit, he can never make a second effort to gain his object. That steadily directed sagacity and perseverance, which every kind of scientific excellence indisputably demands, constituted no part of his intellectual character."

ART. III. *Horæ Romanæ. No. I. Observations on*  
*" A History of the Roman Government; from the*  
*" commencement of the state, till the final subversion*  
*" of liberty, by the successful usurpation of Cæsar*  
*" Augustus, in the year of Rome 724. By Alexan-*  
*" der Brodie. Edinburgh: 1810."*

IN passing a judgment on this work our attention is arrested on the threshold, by the view the author takes, in his preface, of the state in which preceding writers had left the subject he intended to discuss. He there says: "Having long been accustomed to reflect on the nature and tendency of the Roman Government, it appeared to me *that both have hitherto been misunderstood*, and have, by that means, been the foundation of many false political conclusions:—that the ancient historians, misled by the appearances of their own times, often ascribed to merely concomitant circumstances the most important events:—and that of the moderns, Hooke, and the author of *Thoughts on Public Trusts*, are the *only* writers, as far as I know, who have *at all understood the principles*, or entered into the spirit of the Roman institutions; but that, *as the former has, in many instances, been betrayed into errors*, and as the latter has confined himself to a very short view, a work was still wanting which, while it traced the government through its various stages, should present a clear and steady picture of its effects, the consequences of every change, and the tendency to produce others, with the influence of government on the public morals, and the re-action of morals on the public



“ institutions. *Induced by this consideration, I conceived the idea of supplying this desideratum in political knowledge.*” Upon this statement two questions are suggested; *first*, whether the proposed work was “still wanting:” and, *secondly*, whether Mr. Brodie was qualified to supply the want. I must answer both these questions in the negative: the *first*, because Mr. Brodie has wholly overlooked two writers who not only thoroughly “understood the principles” of the Roman institutions, but have given such masterly expositions of their tendencies as scarcely leave any thing to be desired; I allude to DE LOLOME, in his great, and ill-requited, work, “The Constitution of England;” and to PATTON, in his “Historical Review,” &c. the *second* because Mr. Brodie throws *no new light* whatever, and even reflects little of that afforded by his more successful predecessors, on the constitutional history of Rome; and is, in short, a mere transcriber of Hooke, except where he deserts that most accurate of all the Roman historians, to gather errors peculiar to himself. But, if Mr. Brodie had been entirely free from positive mistakes, yet the want of system in his politics, of any leading philosophical doctrine to give unity and consistency to his views, of any tinge of originality or depth in his commentary, would have left his book without any merit that could redeem it from speedy oblivion. He has given many more details of the military history than were requisite; but especially he has swelled his work by transcribing almost all the speeches that occur in Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy, divested, indeed, of that oratorical spirit which they possess in the originals, and in Hooke’s translations, by being given in the third

person every sentence beginning with a "*that*;" and in this manner he has filled upwards of 600 heavy pages, without rewarding his reader with so much information as may be derived from ten pages of *Dé Lolme* or *Patton*.

The following two or three specimens will show the usual inferiority of a copy to an original.—**HOOKER:** (I. 355. 4to.) "He no sooner perceived their base design, but setting his back against a rock, that he might not be attacked behind, he received them with a courage that struck terror into the boldest of them. Calling up all his ancient valour, he slew several of the assailants, and wounded others: and now not one of them durst venture near him: they stood at a distance and threw their darts at him. But as even this did not effect their purpose, the villains climbed up to the top of the rock, and thence knocked him on the head with stones." **BRONIE:** (p. 231.) "he no sooner perceived the designs of the party, than placing his back against a rock, as a protection behind he gave them a reception, which struck terror in the boldest. Having slain several and wounded others, the remainder were afraid to approach him; they stood at a distance, and assailed him with missile weapons, and some having mounted the rock against which he stood, knocked him on the head with stones." **HOOKER:** (I. 554.) Appius Claudius "was an able lawyer, and an oracle among the Romans in all knotty points of law, but a lover of innovations, taking great delight in overturning the most sacred institutions, and in setting up for a Legislator." **BRONIE:** (p. 453.) "He is said to have been an able lawyer, and to have been considered an

" oracle in all *the* knotty points of law; but so desir-  
 " ous of being esteemed a *founder*, that he took great  
 " delight in overturning the most ancient institutions,  
 " merely to have an opportunity of introducing plans  
 " of his own." HOOKS: (II. 298.)—"they all burst  
 " into tears, except Hannibal, who at their weeping  
 " burst into laughter. This gave great offence; and  
 " Asdrubal Hædus reproved him for it. What! does  
 " it become *you* to laugh? *You* to insult us on the  
 " miseries you have brought upon us? To which Han-  
 " nibal made this answer: Could you look into my  
 " heart, you would see, that my laughter, far from  
 " being the effect of mirth, proceeds from a mind al-  
 " most distempered with grief: Neither is it so un-  
 " reasonable and absurd as your tears. *Then* you  
 " should have wept, when our arms were taken from  
 " us, our ships burnt, and war forbidden us even in  
 " Africa. *That* was the wound by which we fell," &c.  
 BRODIE: (p. 500.)—"They all burst into tears, except  
 " the great Hannibal, who gave way to an *immoderate*  
 " burst of laughter. For this he was reproved by  
 " Asdrubal Hædus, who asked him if it became him  
 " to laugh or to insult them on the miseries which he  
 " had brought on them. Hannibal replied, that could  
 " they look into his heart, they would perceive that  
 " his laughter, so far from proceeding from mirth,  
 " was caused by his mind being almost distempered  
 " with grief: but that it was not so unreasonable as  
 " their tears. That they had indeed cause to weep  
 " when their arms were taken from them, their fleets  
 " burned, and themselves interdicted from war, for  
 " that was their death blow," &c. HOOKS: (II. 528.)  
 " Hereupon Nasica, flaming with wrath, turned to

K

“ the Senators, and said, since the chief magistrate  
“ betrays and abandons the republic, let those, who  
“ have any regard for the laws, follow me. At the  
“ same time he gathered up his robe, and, with the  
“ Senate at his heels, together with that multitude of  
“ clients and slaves, who, armed with clubs had held  
“ themselves ready for action, ran furious to the ca-  
“ pital. Few among the people had the boldness to  
“ withstand the venerable rage of the conscript fa-  
“ thers; who, snatching up the feet and other pieces  
“ of benches, broken by the croud in their hasty flight,  
“ and dealing blows to the right and left, pushed on  
“ towards Tiberius.” BRODIE: (p. 523.) “Turning  
“ in fury to those senators with whose dispositions  
“ he was well acquainted, he said, that since the con-  
“ sul, out of a scrupulous regard to forms, refused to  
“ save the common wealth; those would follow him  
“ who regarded the laws. Then tucking up his robe,  
“ he rushed from the temple, and calling on the mul-  
“ titude of clients and slaves, who were prepared to  
“ obey the orders of their patrons and masters, he  
“ pressed into the assembly. The generality of the  
“ people made way for the nominal fathers of the state;  
“ while the few, who, aware of their intentions, ven-  
“ tured to oppose them, being unprepared for the  
“ contest, were quickly beaten down or dispersed.  
“ HOOKER. (II. 557.) “Opimius pretended ignorance  
“ and surprize; and, with all the senators, went out  
“ to see what the matter was. The body being set  
“ down in the midst of them, they began to mourn  
“ and wail, as for some public and terrible calamity:  
“ A low, wretched farce, that could not but excite  
“ hatred and detestation of the actors. They had,

“ with premeditated malice, murdered, even in the  
 “ capital, and when Tribune, that excellent citizen  
 “ Tiberius Gracchus, and had thrown his dead body  
 “ into the river; yet when the corpse of a hireling  
 “ lictor (who, if he had not merited his fate, had, at  
 “ least, brought it upon himself by his imprudence)  
 “ was exposed in the Forum, the Roman Senate, those  
 “ venerable fathers, stood round the bier, lamenting  
 “ the loss of so precious a life, and doing honour, by  
 “ a solemnity of sorrow, to the dear, departed tip-  
 “ staff: And this merely with a view to destroy the  
 “ only protector of the Roman people.” BRODIE:  
 “ (p. 558.) “Opimius setting the example, most of  
 “ (all) the senators ran out, and having ordered the  
 “ bearers to set down the corpse, they lamented the  
 “ loss of the lictor, *condoled with* the miserable dead,  
 “ and represented his murder as a base and barbarous  
 “ action. So far, however, were the people from en-  
 “ tering into their affected feelings, that their indig-  
 “ nation was roused against a detestable faction, who  
 “ could whine for the loss of a mean lictor, while they  
 “ had, without remorse, butchered Tiberius Grac-  
 “ chus, with three hundred of his associates, had  
 “ thrown their bodies into the Tiber, and had refused  
 “ to Caius Gracchus permission to perform his bro-  
 “ ther’s funeral rites.”

The two most important and influential events in  
 the history of the Roman Government are the institu-  
 tion of the *Comitia Centuriata*, and that of *Consuls* on  
 the subversion of the monarchy; since to them may be  
 traced the patrician tyranny, the tribunatian struggles  
 for power, the anarchy, and despotism, by which it is  
 successively characterized: and from the reflexions

that occur to the historian or philosopher on these occasions we may at once ascertain, not merely to which of the two great interests that agitated Rome he inclines, but whether his political principles be just or mistaken, profound or superficial. A very common error in treating of the above two events has been to represent the *first* as giving to property no more than a salutary preponderance in the state; and the *second* as only altering the form of the monarchical estate, not removing it altogether from the constitution.\*

With respect to the institution of the *comitia centuriata*, Mr. Brodie runs into the opposite extreme of supposing that the rich had a sufficient share of power before the reign of Servius Tullius, and that their votes should be of no more value than those of the poor; which, considering their inferiority in numbers, would leave them at the mercy of the latter. His opinions on this subject, however, are so faintly expressed, that no very definite meaning can be fastened upon him. "On the principle of equity those who are most subject to injuries ought to have the strongest means of protection." (P. 10.) Now though wealth be naturally the chief source of power in every state, yet it

---

\* For instance, Dr. Blackwell in his *Memoirs of the Court of Augustus* says, "It is true this" (the institution of consuls) "was a most material branch of it; and the alterations made in it prevented the abuse of power, secured the public liberty, and tended mightily to the aggrandizing the nation; but what I would insinuate is, that the general plan of the government by a King, nobles, and commons, was not dissolved; only the execution of the regal part put into other hands, with the restrictions mentioned above: but as for the authority and jurisdiction of the senate, and the power and privilege of the people, which their early free spirit had happily procured to them from their first Kings, they found no present necessity, and had little time either to increase or alter them." (Vol. i. p. 57.)

is also an object of envy and spoliation, and requires protection by giving to its possessors a degree of power, not in proportion to their numbers, but to their numbers multiplied by their property; so that equal quantities of property, among however many persons divided, should send equal numbers of representatives to the legislative assembly; or possess equal numbers of votes in all political deliberations, whether laws, or candidates for office, be the objects of election.\* The poor, or the class of persons, therefore, who are strong in their numbers, should have a *sufficient* "means of protection," which will be afforded if, collectively, they possess the same number of votes with the rich, or the class of property: so that in the general distribution of power the proportions allotted to individuals shall be very different, while the aggregate is the same in both classes. Says Mr. Brodie, "as the rich paid the principal share of all the taxes, and as a part of the poor were to pay none, he pretended to think it reasonable that the former should have the greater influence in all public elections and enacting of laws." (P. 11.) And, at p. 270, he says, that on the subversion of the decemviral tyranny, the plebeians might easily have abolished the distinction of patricians and plebeians, and have re-established the original mode of voting by *curiæ* at all elections, which would have restored the equilibrium of the state, and have ensured a share of all future conquests." To have reverted, at this period when the community was divided into the classes of property and persons, to a form of government which was only adapted to

---

\* See Patton's "Effects of Property upon Society and Government."

the original equality of the Roman shepherds and robbers, would not have restored equilibrium, but have given a fatal ascendancy to the class of persons, and introduced a degree of conflict and confusion more destructive of the general happiness than what actually resulted from the excessive preponderance which the constitution of the centuries gave to the class of property. The following reflection of Mr. Patton is the only just one that applies to the conduct of Servius Tullius.

“ The society was now divided; their interests took  
“ opposite directions; and it became apparent by the  
“ constitution which subsisted, that in the assemblies  
“ of the people, *persons* must carry every point against  
“ *property*, whilst the decision was made by equal suffrages. The wisdom of Servius suggested a remedy,  
“ which was founded on just principles, but carried  
“ by him to the opposite extreme: he made property  
“ the rule for voting in the general assemblies of the  
“ people; but with a bias altogether in its favour,  
“ which was afterwards productive of the grossest  
“ abuses of tyranny and oppression. These consequences, however, ought principally to be imputed  
“ to another important event (the regifuge) which  
“ took place, and enabled the class of *property* to engross the whole powers of the state; and, if the  
“ senators and the *patricians* had not before the exclusive right to this designation, their measures  
“ soon pre-eminently entitled them to it.” (P. 172.)

The superiority of weight assigned to the rich is not only that which they ought to have for their protection, but that into which they would spontaneously settle, if the coercive effects of all positive institutions were removed. The channels in which power is thus



taught to flow, are those which it would naturally scoop for itself. But the rich man, placed on an eminence by the legislator, could not maintain his station if he did not inspire the majority of the inferior orders with awe and admiration, while by the depraved minority he is regarded with envy and hatred. The final cause of the respect instinctively paid to riches strongly attests the benevolence of the Deity: this propensity, which is sometimes excessive and misdirected, constitutes the most effectual and pleasing tie by which society is bound together; it is at the bottom of that connection between patron and client which prevails in a certain degree in every country, and in all ages; and which tends to diffuse through a whole nation the delightful sympathies which reign in a family. No error, therefore, can be of more dangerous import than that contained in the following sentence: "Inclined, as the plebeians were, to abuse the patricians in their absence, they never failed to treat them with respect when present: so great is the respect which the vulgar *unhappily* pay to birth and rank; and so much more apt are men to degenerate into servility than to break out into licentiousness." (P. 358.)

Mr. Brodie takes no notice of the intention ascribed to Servius Tullius of resigning the crown; though the effect that this abdication would have had on the balance of the government, and which was a few years later produced by the regifuge, presented, next to the arrangement of the *centuries*, the most important feature in the Roman constitution. But from some incidental observations we may infer that his view of the change effected by the abolition of the monarchy,

corresponded with that of Hooke, and most other writers, who look upon it as improving the condition by adding to the freedom enjoyed by the Romans. Thus Brutus is stiled "a hero who proved the deliverer of his country:" (P. 17) and by the "heroic act" of passing sentence of death on his two sons, he intimated to others what they had reason to expect for treason, from a consul who shewed that he preferred the welfare of his country to the lives of "his own children." (P. 27.) Mr. Brodie was not aware that the "welfare" ensured by this "heroic act" was that very state of aristocratical tyranny, which he justly condemns throughout his work, and which could only be checked by the mediation of a monarch: and his eulogy on the first Brutus is little consistent with the following passage. "The injustice of the senate, the head of the aristocracy, was not counteracted, under the consular government, by the chief magistrates. The Kings having been elected for life, naturally attracted the envy of the senate, and both being anxious to extend their authority, the Kings usually courted the people, whose favour they conciliated by assisting them in opposing the aristocratical views of the senate." (P. 98.) An hereditary monarchy would have prevented the tyranny, distractions, anarchy, and despotism, through which the republic was doomed to pass: it would have counteracted that state of things which two Roman historians thus describe: "*Ita quod in adversis rebus optaverant, otium, postquam adepti sunt, asperius acerbiusque fait. Namque cæpere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem in lubidinem vertere; sibi quisque ducere, trahere, rapere. Ita*

"omnia in duas partes abstracta sunt; respública,  
 "quæ media fuerat, dilacerata." Sallust. Jug. 41.  
 "Dum tribuni consulesque ad se quisque omnia  
 "trahant nihil relictum esse virium in medio."  
 Liv. II. 57.

Mr. Brodie being thus defective and erroneous in the main branch of his subject, it would nothing avail him to plead the utmost accuracy in touching on subordinate topics.

————— Faber *imus et ungues*  
 Exprimet, et molles imitabitur ære capillos,  
 Infelix operis summa,—

Nevertheless we shall find that Mr. Brodie is equally *infelix* in the detail as he has been in the plan of his work.

Pages 8,—17,—16. He adopts the vulgar chronology in spite of the unanswerable arguments of Sir Isaac Newton, corroborated by the masterly observations of Hooke; and finds no difficulty in believing that Numa Pompilius reigned forty-three years, and that Tarquin fought on horseback at the battle of Regillus in the *ninetieth* year of his age.

Page 102. "What befel Coriolanus is not certain, "but the *most general account is*, that he was killed "by a faction raised against him by Attius Tullius, on "a charge of having betrayed the Volscians, by not "fulfilling his instructions in attempting to capture "Rome." Fabius, whom Livy styles by far the most ancient of the Latin historians, says that Coriolanus lived to a great age, and was often heard to say that exile, always grievous, was much more so in old age. Hooke, vol. I p. 229.

Page 201. Of the canvassing for the second election

L

of decemvirs, he says: "and as the elections were likely to be much disputed, and consequently to be decided by the votes of the centuries of the inferior classes, they solicited with great earnestness the votes of the plebeians, of whom these classes were composed." Elections never depended on the votes of the inferior classes, and very little on the superior classes; they chiefly depended on *the first* class, of which a considerable portion were plebeians; and it was necessarily the plebeians of the *higher* classes that Appius Claudius courted.

Pages 207—209. The bad policy of Appius Claudius in throwing off the mask before he had taken any steps to secure himself in the Decemvirate; and still more in attempting to subdue both plebeians and patricians by the assistance of a *few* of the *latter*; instead of continuing to be the patron and champion of the plebeians and lower orders, so as by their means to dispossess the patricians of all their privileges, and new-model a despotism in which he might distribute the principal offices among his own creatures; is displayed by Machiavel with his usual shrewdness. Never was so inviting an opportunity of invading the liberties of a people turned to so little account; never did ambitious demagogue proceed with less art and system. To Mr. Brodie, however, his conduct appears to have been prudent, and well adapted to his purposes: "He had formed a design to make his power perpetual, and the natural harshness and ferocity of his temper were then *better adapted to his purpose* than the unnatural affability by which he had deceived the electors."—"All ranks were at first equally afraid, but in a short period Appius, partly from natural

“ inclination, *and partly from policy*, directed the  
 “ tyranny of uncontrouled power chiefly against the  
 “ plebeians.”——“ In this the leader of the decem-  
 “ virs judged *so well*, that he gave great satisfac-  
 “ tion to *many* of the richest patricians: *they dis-*  
 “ *liked the decemvirs*, but still more the plebeians; and  
 “ so far from being inclined to assist the oppress-  
 “ ed, they were gratified at the thoughts of their be-  
 “ ing oppressed, and often heaped injuries on them,  
 “ *that from disgust at the decemviral form of government,*  
 “ *they might earnestly long for the consular, without the*  
 “ *tribunes.* *Many* of the most moderate and respecta-  
 “ ble of the senators, and other wealthy citizens, re-  
 “ tired from the city; and it would appear that, even  
 “ of those who at first were pleased at the oppression  
 “ to which the plebeians were subjected, *many* became  
 “ disgusted and followed their example.” Thus in  
 the same sentence we are told that the decemvir  
 “ judged so well” as to undermine his own authori-  
 ty, and pave the way for his being supplanted by the  
 re-establishment of the consuls!

Page 256. “ It may appear unreasonable, that the  
 “ patricians should be bound by laws which they had  
 “ no share in enacting. But it is to be remembered  
 “ that the great body of the people were excluded  
 “ from the centuries;”——“ The establishment of  
 “ the *comitia tributa*” (in which the plebeians enacted  
 laws binding on the patricians) “ *was the only proper*  
 “ *correction of this evil.*” This reasonable arrange-  
 ment, this best of all remedies,—the most remarkable  
 of all the anomalies in the Roman government,—was  
 what De Lolme stigmatizes as constituting *imperium*  
*in imperio* (p. 322.) and of which Patton says “ so that

“ each of the classes (*property and persons*) had its  
 “ distinct and separate legislature, which could enact  
 “ laws binding upon its opponent, and which they ex-  
 “ ercised with hostile intentions against one another,  
 “ like the batteries of modern armies.” (P. 348.)

Page 312. “ Two plebeian tribunes, Mæcilius and  
 “ Mætilius Spurius, brothers, in the 339th of Rome,  
 “ &c.” One would suppose that *Spurius* was the  
*nomen*, and the other two names *prænomena*; but the  
 reverse was the case. Spurius Mætilius and Spurius  
 Mætilius were not brothers.

Page 308. “ As guardians of the public morals they  
 “ (the censors) very naturally assumed the privi-  
 “ lege of making choice of candidates whom they  
 “ might propose to supply vacancies in the senate.  
 “ In addition to these extensive powers they collect-  
 “ ed the public revenue which they delivered to the  
 “ quæstors, and took cognizance of all disputes con-  
 “ cerning houses and landed property.” The *first*  
 function here assigned to the censors will be discussed  
 under page 454. The *second* belonged wholly to the  
 quæstors. The censors, by order of the senate, let the  
 public lands, contracted for the construction of public  
 works, and proposed to the senate the sums that should  
 be levied for them. The *third* belonged to the Prætor’s  
 court. The censors only took care that private indi-  
 viduals should not *crib* portions of the public lands.  
 This is what Livy means by “ *publicorum jus, priva-  
 torumque locorum.*” (IV. 8.)

Page 317. “ As plebiscita were binding on the whole  
 “ community, it is surprising that the plebeian tri-  
 “ bunes did not avail themselves of it, in order to  
 “ procure the passing of the law for sending a colony

“ to Volæ. *The only reason which can be assigned for*  
 “ *their omitting to do so, was their aversion to civil com-*  
 “ *motions, and a conviction that the plebeians would*  
 “ *rather endure wrongs, than engage in any measure*  
 “ *which was likely to occasion a civil war.”* The  
 aversion of the tribunes to civil commotions! Let us  
 hear Patton. “It generally happened, however, at  
 “ this advanced period of the republic, that the tri-  
 “ bunes themselves (who were wealthy *plebeians*) were  
 “ very insincere in their pretended attempts to esta-  
 “ blish the agrarian law, which would have affected  
 “ themselves in common with the other possessors of  
 “ property.” (P. 302.) And De Lolme. “As their  
 “ (the tribune’s) influence put them, in a great mea-  
 “ sure, upon a level with those who were invested with  
 “ the executive authority, they cared little to restrain  
 “ oppressions out of the reach of which they saw them-  
 “ selves placed. Nay, they feared they should there-  
 “ by lessen a power which they knew was one day to  
 “ be their own; if they had not even already an actual  
 “ share in it.” (P. 266) See also p. 344 )

Page 333. “Many of those who were sufficiently rich  
 “ to be enrolled among the equites, might not be able  
 “ to maintain horses at their own private charges; but  
 “ others from ostentation would provide horses, that  
 “ they might serve in the most honourable stations.  
 “ When, therefore, Livy says that they promised to  
 “ support their horses at their own expence, he pro-  
 “ bably intended to convey no other idea than that,  
 “ as an order of citizens, they did what had formerly  
 “ been confined to individuals.” 1. The equiters were  
 not required to keep their horses at their own expence.  
 They received pay for that purpose from the time of

Servius Tullius. 2. None who were not of the equestrian order could, from ostentation, serve in the cavalry. 3. Livy does not say that those who volunteered to provide horses for themselves, and serve at the siege of Veii, "promised to support their horses at their own expence:" he only says that then, for the first time, the equites provided their own horses ("tum primum equis [suis] merere equites cæperunt." V. 7.) for which they were remunerated by an increase of pay: viz. instead of getting a horse and 2000 *asses* yearly, they now received 3000 *asses* yearly. See a dissertation by Mr. Bowyer, prefixed to an English translation of Montesquieu's *Grandeur et Decadence*.

Page 408. "The voting by centuries had in a great measure produced this in the Roman state, and as the *plebeians* of the lower orders had been much depressed by poverty and the contraction of debts, the *patricians* might have acquired an ascendancy which might ultimately have reduced the plebeians to a state of vassalage."—"The great body of the people were almost all oppressed with a load of debts, and their *only* chance of relief depended on some fortunate event which might place a *plebeian* at the helm of affairs." The depression of the lowest *plebeians* gave the *patricians* little advantage over the whole body of the former; for the battles between them depended on the proportion of each that the *first class* contained. The growing wealth of the *plebeians* gradually opened to them all public offices; but the nullity of the poor remained the same as before. Mr. Brodie does not consider that, throughout the whole history, the contention is of *property* against *persons*, rather than of *patricians* against *plebeians*.



Page 418. " — it is certainly astonishing that the plebeians as a body, should have been averse to having consuls from their own rank." The generality of the plebeians had no interest in the communication of the consulate to their order; it interested only the rich.

Page 420. "It is the duty of every magistrate or representative to obey the orders, and to follow the principles of the majority of his constituents, but it would be unreasonable to elect any individual to pursue plans contrary to his own notions of propriety or of equity." And so relinquish the peculiar advantage of the representative system. See De Lolme. Book ii. ch. vi. vii. viii.

Pages 454,—5. It is the opinion of Mr. Brodie that censors, dictators, and consuls had not the power of choosing senators, but only of *proposing candidates* to the people. When Appius Claudius, one of the censors in the year 441, introduced several *libertini* into the senate, he says: "By means of the respect which the people entertained for his character, *he prevailed on them to elect certain persons into the senate, who are said to have been libertini, the sons of men made free.*"—"It is also probable that the people were not aware of the new senators, being *libertini.*" When the consuls of the next year, C. Junius Bubulcus Brutus and Q. Æmilius Barbula expelled the whole of them, he says: "and the people seem tacitly to have agreed to the measure." This is also the opinion of Dr. Middleton, (treatise on the Roman Senate, p. 72) but it is contrary to the clear text of Livy, and to the sentiments of the generality of writers. The colleague of Appius, C. Plautius Venox, resigned his

office being indignant at the disgrace that *Appius* had brought upon the senate; and there is not any hint in *Livy* of the people being required to sanction the expulsion of the *libertini* directed by the consuls of the succeeding year: "*negaverunt eam lectionem se, quæ sine recti pravique discrimine ad gratiam ac libidinem facta esset, observaturos: et senatum extemplo citaverunt eo ordine, qui ante censores Ap. Claudium & C. Plautium fuerat.*" (IX. 30.)

Page 458. When *Appius Claudius* was disappointed in his schemes by the ejection of his *libertini* from the senate, he distributed them through the country tribes, and by their votes obtained great influence in the *comitia*. The expressions of *Livy* respecting these two measures of *Appius*, are—"senatum inquinaverat," and "forum et campum corripit." (IX. 46.) "By what means they corrupted the people is not certain, though in all probability it was by their ready eloquence; *Appius* having selected them for this talent, and afterwards instructed them in arguments"! In the same spirit he says, when *Q. Fabius Maximus*, the censor, reincorporated these *libertini* into the four city tribes: "They had little influence by their numbers, and it usually happens, that in a great city, accustomed to have popular assemblies, there are numerous petty orators continually contending for superiority; so that the same persons who might have had great sway among *rustics*, little accustomed to interfere in political affairs, would in a great measure be lost in a city." Nothing can be more erroneous than this view of the transaction. The country-tribes were not composed of illiterate "*rustics*," but of the most opulent and intelligent of the Romans,

in whose hands the whole management of political affairs was in fact vested; a tribe being no longer *pars urbis*, but *civitatis*: the influence therefore of the freedmen had nothing to do with their supposed "eloquence," but with their individual votes; and their insignificance in the city-tribes was not occasioned by their having to deal with persons of more skill in politics, but by their votes being confined to *four* tribes, whereas before they were receivable in the other *thirty-one* tribes. The preponderance of the rich by their distribution into the *thirty-one* country-tribes, corresponded to the effect produced by their distribution into the 98 centuries of the first class, and gave them a decisive superiority over the poor, who under the former arrangement composed only *four* tribes, and under the latter 95 centuries.

Page 470. "As a general, he (Pyrrhus) was considered by Hanibal the greatest who had ever appeared." Plutarch in his life of Pyrrhus makes Hanibal give the first place to Pyrrhus, and in his life of Flaminius, to Alexander; and Livy (xxxv. 14.) following C. Acilius, makes him give the first place to Scipio Africanus, the second to Alexander, the third to Pyrrhus, the fourth to himself.

Page 478. He ascribes the employment of foreign mercenaries by the Carthaginians to the jealousy which the aristocracy entertained of the lower orders. It would rather seem ascribable to the same cause which produced the same effect in Holland, *viz.* a great part of the native population being employed in trade, and in the mercantile and republican navy. The territory of Carthage was circumscribed by the nature of the soil and climate, and the uncivilized character of the sur-

rounding nations; and did not admit of that indefinite extension by means of colonization, and of the incorporation of powerful allies, that led to the aggrandizement of Rome. The circumstances of the former occasioned greater financial means than could be expended on a *native* army; and thence the employment of foreigners: the situation of the latter produced an increasing population which provided subsistence for itself by continually extending the limits of their empire through a fertile soil and temperate climate. With respect to the Carthaginian aristocracy, Polybius represents the encroachment of the people on the functions of the senate as one of the chief causes of their ruin.

Page 495. When, in the year 537, M. Fabius Buteo was nominated dictator for the purpose of filling up the vacancies made in the senate by the losses sustained in the first three years of the second punic war, Mr. Brodie endeavours to shew that the *choice* did not depend on the dictator but on the people. "Livy's careless mention of all elections, leaves us often in the greatest doubt as to the manner in which they were conducted: but it is to be remembered that Dionysius of Halicarnassus says expressly that senators were elected by the people, and the same thing is said in one of the speeches which Livy attributes to a tribune." What Livy puts into the mouth of the tribune Canuleius (IV. 4.) refers to the election of the 100 conscript senators admitted on the expulsion of Tarquin, (a transaction analogous to the admission of many of the Venetian commoners into the grand council in the year 1297, which laid the foundation of their aristocracy; when just as many were admitted as ena-

bled them to shut the door against the rest and their posterity;) but is quite inapplicable to any posterior period of the Roman history. Having related the conduct of the dictator, he says: "So far it would appear that the dictator had made the elections without the participation of the people; but the expression which follows shows that the inclinations of the people had at least been consulted." "Cum ingenti approbatione hominum." The people were much pleased with the selection made by the dictator; they were not, therefore, themselves the electors.

Page 540. "After much fruitless labour, they," (the triumvirs appointed to execute the agrarian law of Tiberius Gracchus in the year 624) "were deprived of their power by the senate, who at the instance of the second Scipio Africanus, pretended to consider them biassed, and appointed in their stead Sempromius Tuditanus, the consul, *sole commissioner*." Sempromius Tuditanus was appointed to take cognizance of the disputes respecting the boundaries of estates, and the titles of the possessors; an authority which originally belonged to the triumvirs; but the power of distributing the public lands was not delegated to Sempromius, who was, therefore, not *sole commissioner*, nor a commissioner at all. Hooke, vol. ii. p. 546.

Page 505. "On the whole no measure is so well calculated to prevent undue influence as the voting by ballot."—"Is it not surprising that the persons who allow its expediency in the affairs of a club, deny it to be necessary in the important concerns of a great nation! When objections can be urged against any opinion or measure, men cannot be blamed for their sentiments, since there is a possibility of their

“ erring *from judgment*; but when there are palpable  
 “ reasons for, *and none against a measure*, no excuse  
 “ can be urged; the person errs either from a con-  
 “ temptibly weak mind, or what is worse from a de-  
 “ sire to favour corruption.”\*

As Alexander the Great with his long sword cut the gordian knot, to prove his right to the sovereignty of Asia; so Alexander Brodie, or the Little, with his short enthymeme cuts this no less knotty ballot question, affording an equally decisive proof of his superiority in the field of politics. And as Alexander the pig, being in his cholers, and his moods, and his displeasures, and his indignations, and also being a little intoxicates in his prains, did, in his ales and his angers look you, kill his pest friend, Clytus: so also Alèxander the —, being in his right wits and his goot judgments, (such as they are,) flings a charge of weakness, or corruption, against the reputation of Dr. Ferguson.

Truly the affairs of a club, and the affairs of a great nation, are very different. The interests they affect, the passions they excite, the responsibility they involve, are of quite another kind of importance and intensity. In black-balling, or white-balling a club candidate, there is no reason to suppose the existence of bad motives; concealment cannot, therefore, be a cover for guilt, but it is useful to avoid giving

---

\* Dr. Ferguson calls it “ a dangerous form of proceeding in constitutions tending to popular license, and where justice is more likely to suffer from the unawed passions of the lower people, than from any improper influence of superior rank; and where the authority of the wise, and the sense of public shame, were so much required, as principle supports of Government.”

See spirit of laws, Book II. ch. II,

pain to those among whom we live in habits of social intercourse. In great political contests, the magnitude of the objects at stake, and the numbers engaged in the struggle, preclude the refinements of mere delicacy, and the motives from which men act must be plainly *honest*, or *dishonest*. If the former, concealment deprives them of the credit they deserve, and the world of the benefit of their example: if the latter, concealment deprives them of the check upon their consciences that publicity would afford, and shields them against the penalty it would inflict. This might be said on the supposition that the ballot attained its avowed purposes, concealment and independence. But it does not; it cannot. There is no proof that it tended in any degree to mitigate the spirit of civil discord, or to retard the dissolution of morals, and final extinction of freedom, that resulted from the fundamental vices in the Roman constitution. It could not even ensure the purity of the courts of justice. Hortensius "contrived to furnish the judges " with tablets of different colours, that so when these " were taken out of the box, he might see with his " own eyes, whether the judges, by him bribed, had " kept faith with him, or not." Hooke, III. 210. Cicero speaks *in favour* of the ballot, 2 Agrar. c. 2. pro Plancio c. 6. pro Cornel, and *against* it, de Amicit. c. 12. de Leg. 1. 3. c. 16. pro Sext. c. 48.

Page 586. The rivalry and hatred between Marius and Sylla are dated from the close of the Jugurthine war, and attributed to Sylla's wearing a seal engraved with a representation of the delivery of Jugurtha into his hands. But Hooke has clearly shown that all who have followed Plutarch in adopting this story

are mistaken. Marius chose Sylla for his lieutenant in his second consulship, two years after the conclusion of the Jugurthine war. Hooke, III. 76.

Page 590. "And a clause was added, that the senate should within five days, appear in the forum, and swear before the assembly, not to oppose *any measure for which the people should be inclined to vote.*" The clause was that the senate should ratify, not "any measure, &c." but that particular law of Saturninus for the distribution of certain lands, in the year of Rome 653. Hooke, III. 91.

Page 622. "To his (J. Cæsar's) credit it must be said that he was a merciful conqueror, *or at least a skilful politician, knowing the advantages of lenity,* to reconcile a free people to arbitrary government," &c. What wretched, paltering stuff is this! Cæsar was the most clement, the most magnanimous of men. Henry the Fourth of France is the only person in all history that can be compared with him.

---

*Horæ Romanæ. No. II. Observations on "An Historical Review of the Monarchy and Republic of Rome, upon the principles derived from the effects of property on Society and Government. By Robert Patton, Esq. London: 1797."*

**T**HIS is the best philosophical commentary on the Roman history. The principles derived from the effects of property on society and government, so ingeniously developed, and incontrovertibly established, by Captain Charles Patton, are here applied with equal ingenuity and success, to explain the political pheno-



mena successively exhibited in the constitutional history of that wonderful people. Undazzled by the effulgence of their martial glory, unawed by the noise of the applause echoed from writer to writer on their energy and fortitude, Mr. Patton lays bare the unsound parts of their system, and traces, with a master's hand, the "young disease," that growing with their growth finally subdued them.

The imperfections of this work are light indeed when weighed against its general excellence; and are reducible to three heads. In the *first* place he somewhat exaggerates the evils of the Roman constitution, and is rather niggardly in his estimate of that measure of freedom, virtue, and happiness which they enjoyed during more than two centuries. In the *second* place he unjustly represents Hooke as deviating no less on one side from an impartial medium, than Dr. Ferguson does on the other. In the *third* place he commits from negligence some anachronisms, and other mistakes, which, as they in no degree affect the justness of his speculations, are mere blemishes in a work that deserved to be exempt from any.

I. "The civil government of Rome has been cried up as a model of perfection, because it produced a warlike people, who by their conquests became so- vereigns of the world. If the excellence of civil government consist in aggression against other states, and success in offensive war, Rome was certainly a model of perfection; but if domestic tranquillity, the preservation of personal liberty, and the security of property, constitute its excellence, the Roman republic was *one of the worst governments the world ever produced*: foreign war was absolutely

" necessary to its existence, without which it must,  
 " in a very short time, have destroyed itself; for it  
 " necessarily and unavoidably produced a perpetual  
 " scene of contest and warfare between the classes of  
 " *property* and *persons*, because there was no regulat-  
 " ing power in the constitution to balance or controul  
 " them; and the only remedy for internal discord was  
 " foreign hostility. The great eulogium of this go-  
 " vernment is its production of celebrated characters.  
 " Perpetual warfare must always have this effect; and  
 " perhaps civil war should be more productive of dis-  
 " tinguished characters than any other; for the whole  
 " community being engaged, whatever abilities it con-  
 " tains must come forward. But for this reason would  
 " these learned gentlemen prefer a state of civil war  
 " to a settled and well regulated government whose  
 " object was not foreign conquest and dominion, but  
 " domestic tranquillity?" (P. 158.)

The judgment pronounced in the above passage is  
 substantially just, and the result of sagacious and  
 profound views into Roman affairs: but several con-  
 siderations may be adduced to qualify its harshness.  
 Perpetual war was not peculiar to the Romans; the  
 other nations of antiquity were engaged in it with lit-  
 tle intermission. Man is naturally pugnacious; but  
 when, as in those days, successful war was a source,  
 not of heavy expence, but of sure gain to individuals  
 and to the state; when, in consequence of the existence  
 of *slavery*, and of the limited and precarious maritime  
 intercourse among nations, conquest, not industry, was  
 the road to wealth; we need not wonder if war should  
 be prosecuted with proportionate ardour and persever-  
 ance. In modern times every thing favours the reign

of peace; the partition of Europe into nations of nearly equal civilization, invincibly attached to their own languages, manners, and institutions; the balance of power thence resulting; the enormous expenses, "the "monumental debt" incurred by war; and yet we find that one half of every century is consumed in war. But it *was* peculiar to the Romans to be—often defeated in battle, always victorious in war. Whence that ceaseless energy of purpose; that wise adaptation, that persevering application of means to the ends they pursued? Such results imply the existence of an adequate fund of moral health and vigour. Many despotic governments have for a season been "fanned by conquest's "crimson wing;" have enjoyed short-lived torrents of success; but it is the prerogative of free states alone to produce such a succession of statesmen and warriors as will ensure a permanent stream of victory. And among them the presence of discord, oppression and misgovernment at home, is always accompanied by a corresponding failure in their efforts abroad; inasmuch that external respectability may generally be assumed as a fair criterion of internal harmony and prosperity. Thus though the class of *property* incessantly recurred to war to relieve themselves from the tribunitian struggles for a participation in their privileges, yet this remedy could not be administered, or proved unavailing, whenever the affections of the class of *persons* were altogether alienated by injustice; levies could not be made, or the armies, sullen and mutinous, were either beaten or permitted the enemy to retire unmolested. In the year of Rome 258 when many had suffered by the severity of the laws against debtors, a tumult was excited by the appearance of one man who had been im-

N

prisoned and cruelly whipt by his creditor. The senate assembled to consider what was to be done, when news was brought that the *Volsci* were approaching the city. "Quæ audita," says Livy (II. 24) "(adeo duas ex una civitate discordia fecerat) longe aliter patres, ac plebem affecere. Exultare gaudio plebes; ultores superbiam patrum adesse dicere deos; alius alium confirmare, ne nomina darent: cum omnibus potius quam solos perituros: patres militarent, patres arma caperent, ut penes eosdem pericula belli, penes quos præmia, essent." The consul Servilius having published a satisfactory edict, good humour was restored, and an army instantly formed. In the year 372 an army dispatched against the *Veientes* under the consul Cæso Fabius, being determined that their commander should earn no glory by their exertions, not only refused to pursue the enemy who had been broken by the cavalry, but struck their tents and returned to Rome. The consul returned with them. "Nec huic tam pestilenti exemplo remedia ulla ab imperatore quæsitæ sunt; adeo excellentibus ingeniis citius defuerit ars quâ civem regant, quam qua hostem superent." (Liv. II. 43.) In the year 304 during the decemviral tyranny the Romans were beaten by the Sabines and the *Æqui*. "Nihilo militiæ, quam domi, melius respublica administrata est. Illa modo in ducibus culpa, quod, ut in odio essent civibus, fecerant: alia omnis penes milites noxia erat; qui ne quid ductu, atque auspicio decemvirorum prospere usquam gereretur, vinci se per suum atque illorum dedecus patiebantur." (Liv. III. 42.) In the year 307 there were strong dissensions between the patricians and the plebeians in consequence of the in-

sulting behaviour of the former: "ad quarum primum strepitum, velut signo accepto, arma cepere. Æqui ac Volsci." The consul Quintius harangued the people. "Non illi vestram ignaviam contempere, nec suæ virtuti confisi sunt: quippe toties fusi fugatique, castris exuti, agro mulctati, sub jugum missi, et se & vos novere. Discordia ordinum est venenum urbis hujus, patrum ac plebis certamina. Dum nec nobis imperii nec vobis libertatis modus est; dum tædet vos patriciorum, nos plebeiorum magistratum; sustulere illi animos." (Liv. III. 67.) But when the principal artificial barrier between *patricians* and *plebeians* had been thrown down by the passing of the Licinian laws in the year 387, which threw open the consulate to the latter, the levies were no longer obstructed either by the interference of the tribunes, or by the resistance of the people; and their warlike successes were commensurate with the improvement of their civil government. This happiest period of Roman virtue lasted upwards of 230 years; for with the murder of Tiberius Gracchus in 620, began that series of fiercer agitations of an unbalanced polity, which could only be composed by the absolute dominion of an Emperor.

With respect to the "preservation of personal liberty and the security of property," as far as these depended on penal laws, it must be confessed that the error was rather on the side of laxity than of severity, both in the laws and in the forms of judicial procedure; and that flagitious villany, especially in the latter days of the republic, too often escaped with impunity. The mildness of their laws may be advantageously contrasted with the incredible barbarity

of the English. Robbery, theft, and uttering counterfeit coins were not there punished with death; much less was it a capital crime to break down the head of a fishpond, to kill or wound cattle, to cut down trees,\* and a hundred and fifty other things. We may therefore conclude that few murders were committed by the cold-blooded administration of a sanguinary code. The trial was not begun and concluded at one sitting, but with a more merciful tendency resembled an *impeachment* in being protracted through many days. "Vobismet ipsis, Pontifices, et vestris liberis, cæterisque civibus, pro vestra auctoritate, & sapientia consulere debetis. Nam cum tam moderata judicia populi sint a majoribus constituta: primum ut ne pæna capitis cum pecunia conjungatur: deinde ne, nisi pro dicta die, quis accusetur: ut ter ante magistratus accuset, intermissa die, quam multam irroget, aut judicet: quarta sit accusatio trinum nundinam pro dicta die, qua die judicium sit futurum: tam multa etiam ad placandum, atque ad misericordiam reis concessa sunt; deinde exorabilis populus, facilis suffragatio pro salute; denique etiam si qua res illum diem aut auspiciis, aut excusatione sustulit: tota causa judiciumque sublatum est." (Cic. pro Dom. 17.) If every other resource failed, a voluntary exile rescued the criminal from the ultimate punishment. A state of society might be conceived wherein the restraints over the evil propensities of our nature, contained in such a system of criminal jurisprudence, would not be ineffectual; but they presented no adequate checks to the careers of such offenders as Verres, Clodius, Cataline, &c. &c.

---

\* See 9 Geo. I. c. 22 commonly called the Waltham Black Act.

It would be easier to prove that "perpetual warfare" does not "*always*" cause the "production of celebrated characters," than to analyze the circumstances that contributed to this effect among the Romans. Much may be ascribed to innate character, much to their statistical condition, but more to the *electiveness*, and *rotation* of offices, and to the *limitations with respect to age* in the candidates. The inevitable tendency of this arrangement was, not only to make office the reward of personal qualifications, and not of birth or other less worthy considerations, but to *produce* those personal qualifications which illustrate the individual and promote the glory of the state. The prizes being due to all who possessed the requisite acquirements, *all* were animated with the ennobling ambition to deserve them; and *all* devoted themselves with unremitting ardour to the cultivation of those talents, and to the exercise of those labours, which constituted the only titles to the attainment of present honor and wealth, and posthumous celebrity. The age required for the different offices, *viz.* Quæstor 30 years, Cursule Ædile 37, Prætor 40, Consul 43. increased the chance of success to the several candidates, without excluding any from the hope of successively gaining each step of official dignity; and the necessity of serving until the prime of life in inferior stations ensured the appropriation to those stations of a greater quantity of talent; invigorated the faculties by a salutary discipline; and prevented those disappointments which are sometimes experienced from the non-fulfilment of the promises of intellectual precocity. These observations apply to the best times of the republic: at a later period, though the harvest of ener-

gy and talent was abundant, the growth of vice and crime was equally rank and luxuriant. Thus it was that the Macedonians had *one* Alexander, the Romans *many*. “Romani multi fuissent Alexandro vel gloria, vel rerum magnitudine pares: quorum suus quisque fato, sine publico discrimine, viveret, more, returque.” (Liv. ix. 18.)

II. It is to me unaccountable how Mr. Patton could so far misunderstand Mr. Hooke, as to represent him as an *equally unfair* partizan of the plebeians, as Dr. Ferguson is of the patricians. “Each,” says he, “styles the division of the state which he favours the legal government, and stigmatises the opposite party with the appellation of a faction. The language of abuse, which is applied by the one to the popular party, is often expressed in the very same terms by the other against the senate and aristocracy.” (P. 446.) How does Mr. Patton support this singular judgment? He adduces *many* instances of gross partiality on the part of Dr. Ferguson, but on the part of Hooke *not one*. Nay his own opinions differ from those of Hooke only when he is misled by Vertot; and he himself does not favour the popular party in a material degree less than Hooke! The same admiration of the Gracchi, the same apologies for Cæsar, are to be found in both. “There is a sort of generosity,” (says Hooke in his preface) “in taking the part of the poor Commons, who, in almost all their endeavours to free themselves from oppression, have been usually represented, as an unreasonable, head-strong multitude, insolent, seditious, and rebellious. And he can truly say, that how partial soever to the plebeians he may seem, he is not conscious of having passed over any material



“ fact, reported by the ancients to the disadvantage of  
“ the plebeian cause, or its advocates; notwithstanding  
“ ing his own incredulity with regard to several pre-  
“ tended facts of this kind.” Hooke never passes over  
a murder without bestowing on the act its right name:  
the cruelty of Marius he displays without the slightest  
extenuation or palliation. On the other hand, let us  
advert to a few of Dr. Ferguson’s moral decisions, and  
see whether they do not rather resemble the bigotry of  
an interested contemporary, than the honest judgments  
of a modern historian on the transactions of antiquity.  
Having related the murder of Tiberius Gracchus and  
his friends, he says: “ His body *as being that of a*  
“ *tyrant*, together with the killed of the party, amount-  
“ ing to about three hundred, *as accomplices in a trea-*  
“ *sonable design against the republic*, were denied the  
“ honours of burial and thrown into the river.” (Vol.  
i. p. 298) Of the still bloodier catastrophe of Caius Grac-  
chus, he says: “ by this *exertion of vigour*, the senate  
“ and ordinary magistrates recovered their former au-  
“ thority; affairs returned to their usual channel, and  
“ the most perfect order seemed to arise from the late  
“ confusions.” He represents, says Mr. Patton, the judi-  
cial proceedings against the senators accused of being  
bribed by Jugurtha as “ an oppressive measure, insti-  
“ tuted for the gratification of popular resentment  
“ against the nobility; yet he admits that individuals  
“ had been corrupt. Does he mean that the crime it-  
“ self was venial, and ought not to have been prose-  
“ cuted or punished?” (P. 400. Ferguson i. 343.)  
“ It is curious to remark,” says Mr. Patton, “ the dif-  
“ ferent colouring in which this action [one of Sylla’s  
massacres] “ is represented by different writers in res-

"pect to the people who suffered; *to me* it appears  
 "sufficient that they were *men*." (P. 423.) Can any  
 thing be more perverse and unfair than to suppose that  
 Hooke represents these atrocities in their *just* colours,  
 and speaks of them with unaffected horror, *not* because  
 the sufferers were *men*, but because they were the  
 enemies of the aristocrate Sylla? Is it "curious"  
 that Hooke should reprobate these things as much as  
 Mr. Patton? And is it merely "curious" that Dr. Fer-  
 guson should speak of a massacre of prisoners, of whom  
 3000 had surrendered themselves upon promise of  
 their lives, in the following manner: "About *six or eight*  
 "*thousand* of those who were supposed to be the vilest  
 "instruments of the late usurpations and murders,  
 "being taken prisoners in the war, or surprised in the  
 "city, were, by his direction, shut up in the Circus,  
 "and instantly *put to death*." (I. 444.) What shall we  
 say of the tone assumed by Dr. Middleton and the Abbé  
 de St. Real in characterising Sylla? "Sylla had one  
 "felicity peculiar to himself, of being the only man  
 "in history, in whom the *odium of the most barbarous*  
 "*cruelties was extinguished by the glory of his great*  
 "acts." (P. 50.)—"Changement prodigieux, qui rendit  
 "dés ce jour Sylla l'idole des Romains. *On oublia*  
 "*tout le sang de la proscription; pour ne se ressouvenir*  
 "*que de la liberté rendue; on vit en lui l'exemple*  
 "d'un usurpateur le plus violent, le plus sangui-  
 "naire, mort paisiblement dans son lit, *aimé, adoré*  
 "*de tous les citoyens*." (Tome 3. p. 61.) After the  
 usurpation of Sylla, which demonstrated that despotism  
 was within reach of any hand strong enough to seize and  
 wield it; and after the establishment, by him, of an  
 oligarchy which his creature Pompey overturned, "the

“republic is treated by the historian (Dr Ferguson) as if actually, existing in full vigour and perfection, that he might impute the whole guilt of its subversion to Cæsar.” (Patton, 447.) Finally Mr. Patton convicts Dr. Ferguson of calumniating Cæsar, in saying “that, having sufficiently provided for the reputation of clemency, he now made a freer use of his sword,” and “he dipped his hand with less scruple in the blood of his enemies.” (Patton, 444. Ferguson, III. 3.) Not only is there nothing in Hooke parallel,—nothing equidistant from truth and equity, but (if human frailty admit of such praise) he is not chargeable with one deflection from those cardinal virtues of an historian. There was therefore no excuse for saying that, with reference to Hooke and Ferguson, “both opinions are nearly in the same degree erroneous, and that truth and justice lie in the middle state between them.” (P. 446.)

III. Page 177. The vulgar reckoning of 244 years for the duration of the regal period cannot be admitted. According to Sir I. Newton, it only lasted 119 years.

Page 178. He omits, with Vertot, to notice the admission of the *conscripti* to fill up the vacancies in the senate, on the expulsion of Tarquin; the policy of that measure in conciliating the principal equestrian families must have been essential to the establishment of the republic. “Id mirum quantum profuit ad concordiam civitatis, iungendosque patribus plebis animos.” (Liv. II. 1.)

Page 181. Valerius “instituted an appeal to the assembly of the people from the judgments of the consuls, or the ordinances of the senate.”—“Did Valerius’s law vest in the people a power to adopt and

"establish *laws* independent of, and without the concurrence of the senate?" The appeal was not from "ordinances of the senate," but only (*adversus magistratus*, Liv. II. 8) from the judgments of magistrates in the exercise of their judicial functions. Neither did the law of Valerius enable the people to legislate without the concurrence of the senate. It was not till the year 414, when Q. Publilius Philo was dictator, that a law passed binding the senate to ratify *beforehand* whatever the centuries should enact. (Liv. VIII. 12.)

Page 189. The number of followers who emigrated with the first Appius Claudius from Regillum to Rome in the year 249, being five thousand families, is said to be "a pattern of the munificence of those days." We may judge more accurately of the absolute, and relative wealth of those days, from the amount of the grants of land made on the occasion, *viz.* 25 acres to Appius, and 2 to each of his followers. In the year 387 the maximum of land that any Roman was permitted to possess by the Licinian law was 500 jugera, or 350 acres.

Page 205. "Bellutus and Brutus were themselves chosen (tribunes) with the addition of three others." So Dionysius. According to Livy C. Licinius and L. Albinus were elected, and they chose themselves three colleagues. (II. 32.) But the account of Piso (quoted by Livy II. 58.) seems more probable that there were only two tribunes until the passing of Volero's law for the election of tribunes in comitia by tribes in the year 282, when they were increased to five.

Page 216. I think Hooke has succeeded in showing that Dionysius was mistaken in supposing that Coriolanus was tried in an assembly by *tribes*, and not by *centuries*. (Hooke, I. 230—247 369—372)

Pages 221—222. Mr. Patton prefers, what appears to me the erroneous account given by Vertot of the supposed crimes, trial, and punishment of Spurius Cassius Viscellinus, to Hooke's masterly refutation of it. (I. 255—261.) He also adopts Vertot's objection to the agrarian law moved by Cassius: "it must be acknowledged that abuses on this head had been flagrant and notorious; but upon such a subject, at an after period; to establish a general law, when the rights of possession had been acknowledged and acted upon, and property had passed by succession, alienation, and fair purchase, from one person to another, was at once to unhinge the security of all property." But Hooke replies to this objection in a manner equally satisfactory. (I. 288.) It is admitted by Livy (II. 23.) that the usurpations of public lands by the patricians did not *begin* till after the death of Tarquin in the year 257, only *ten* years before Cassius proposed his agrarian law; so that the plea of "long prescription" which was never urged by the opponents of the law, is wholly gratuitous.

Page 226. "The matter was at last accommodated by the senate agreeing to allow the tribunes, on the part of the people, *to name* one of the consuls, whilst the other should be chosen *by the senate*, so that the election became only matter of form." Anno 271. Still both consuls were formally, as usual, *elected by the centuries*.

Page 258. The recall of Q. Cæso from banishment, and the banishment of Volscius, are facts of doubtful authenticity. (Hooke, I. 314.)

Page 262. "The urns were opened, and the billets, or tablets, distributed." So Dionysius and Vertot.

Anno 298. But the method of voting by ballot at making, or repealing laws, did not take place till 622. (Hooke, II. 511.)

Page 299. "The subject of the agrarian law was more seriously agitated *in the following year* by Micilius and Metilius," i. e. in the year after that in which C Sempronius ex-consul, was fined. But more than three years intervened between these two events; the first being in 333, the second in 337. (Hooke, I. 408—9. Liv. IV. 48.)

Page 304. "In this view they were successful in establishing the election of Quæstors to be made in the assembly *by tribes*," &c. Anno 344. No authority for this in Livy. (IV. 54.)

Page 309. "Among the military tribunes chosen was found a person of plebeian rank," &c. Anno 353. They were *all* plebeians except one. (Hooke, I. 424.)

Pages 311—312. The circumstances connected with the voluntary exile of Camillus are not related with chronological accuracy. The tenth of the spoil was paid to Apollo in the year 357: the value of the tenth of the territory in 358: the law for removing half the senate and people to Veii was proposed in 358, and rejected by a majority of one tribe in 360, *in which year* 7 acres of the lands were assigned to each freeman. Camillus was cited before the people in 362. (Hooke, I. 430—6.)

Page 314. "They (the senate) joyfully concurred in the adoption of Camillus, whom they invested with the supreme appointment of dictator." "Le lenat & les soldats, qui representoient le peuple, le declarerent tous d'une voix dictateur." (Vertot. II. 235.) The senate passed a senatus-consultum, authorizing the

Romans at Veii to assemble in comitia curiata for the purpose of investing Camillus with the authority of dictator. (Liv. V. 46.) The story of Camillus's speech to Brennus, and of the Gauls being exterminated, is fabulous. (Hooke, I. 447.)

Page 322. Mr. Patton has not given due weight to Hooke's objections to the common account of the trial and death of M. Manlius Capitolinus. (I. 462—471.)

Page 332. It is certain that the opposition of some of the tribunes was not withdrawn, but disregarded by Sextius and Licinius. (Liv. VI. 38.)

Pages 388—9. It is clear from Livy (VI. 39. 42.) that the three Licinian laws were passed *at the same time* during the dictatorship of Camillus, in the year 386.

Page 385. The quaestorship of Caius Gracchus was posterior to the events spoken of in page 390. Tuditanus was consul in the year 624: Caius was quaestor 627; tribune 630—631; murdered 632.

*Horæ Romanæ. No. III: On the Anomalies in the Roman Government.*

**T**HE more we study the Roman history the more we are surprised and puzzled by the anomalies with which it abounds. No doubt there are many in the British constitution, and in all free governments; for they cannot occur in a despotism, which is "simplex duntaxat et unum." In all these cases there is a centripetal force which preserves the wandering body in its orbit; but surely the eccentricities of the Roman polity exceed those of any other system. Pope says:

"Nature explained, no prodigies remain;  
"Comets are regular, and Wharton plain."

Now Comets are regular; but the plainness of Wharton can only be understood by considering how fearfully and wonderfully we are made; what an infinite diversity of good and evil, strength and weakness, is crowded into the little span of human existence. So it is in the instance before us. The Romans were *men*, and as they were elevated by genius and virtues, so they were debased by superstitions and vices, which show the more conspicuous for being allied to so much spirit and ingenuity. What can be more extraordinary than that such a people should associate the chance or fraud of augury with their most solemn legislative and judicial proceedings, and with the conduct of military affairs? that each half of the state should pass laws binding upon the whole? and that the advantages of *representation* should never be suggested by the increasing evils of personal suffrage? But my purpose is only to collect into one view the principal anomalies that present themselves in the duties and conduct of the several magistrates.

1. THE DICTATOR was absolute and irresponsible for what he had done in office. An order given by the senate to the consuls *to defend the state*, armed them with similar powers. This resource was sometimes justly called into action as when the tribune Saturninus was destroyed; and sometimes unjustly as when Sp. Mælius and C. Gracchus were murdered, and when the equitable demands of the people were suppressed or evaded. A dictator was frequently created for the sole purpose of taking the command of an army: as Hooke says, sub anno 435. "The Romans had now got such a habit of suffering none but *dictators* to command their armies, that though the famous Papirius Cursor and



“ Publius Philo were chosen consuls for the following year, we find Q. Fabius Maximus, who had been formerly general of the horse to Papirius, and ever since his implacable enemy, raised at this time to the dictatorship, and commissioned to carry on the siege of Saticula.” This was during the healthy period of the republic; for afterwards, when fiercer intestine dissensions more urgently required an adequate coercive force, the mode of providing it that had been anciently used was found so dangerous that it could not voluntarily be resorted to, since it would amount, not to a suspension, but to an extinction of the national liberties. The equilibrium of the vessel was so much disturbed, she was so ill-trimmed, that if once she healed towards a dictatorship she could never be righted. The weapon which formerly was brandished for a time and then laid aside, was now so formidable that if once conferred it could not be resumed. Accordingly during 120 years, from 551 to 671, when the monster Sylla waded to that bad eminence, no dictator was appointed: and from the time of Sylla there was but a feverish interval of contest and collusion to the establishment of the imperial sovereignty.

The British constitution acknowledges no where a power to dispense with the existing laws; but in the Roman state there was unavoidably at all times such a power, for want of a due separation between the executive and legislative authorities. There was nothing to restrain the senate or comitia from instituting a proceeding, or electing a magistrate, in violation of their own laws, since whatever the people decreed last was law: an axiom which was needlessly recorded, among the laws of the twelve tables. Thus the Vale-

rian law of 304, forbidding the creation of any magistrate from whose judgments there lay no appeal to the people, and permitting any person to kill the man who should attempt it, had no influence whatever in abridging the number of dictatorships. Superadded to the instability resulting from an uncontrollable dispensing power, was the irregular exercise of this power by an authority inferior to that which had enacted the law: as when the senate suspended, not a *senatus-consultum*, but a law passed by the people in *comitia*. C. Cornélius, tribune for the year 686, attempted to reform this by publishing a law, "to prohibit any man's being  
 " absolved from the obligation of the laws, except by  
 " the authority of the people; which part of the old  
 " constitution had long been usurped by the senate,  
 " who dispensed with the laws by their own decrees,  
 " and those often made clandestinely, when a few only  
 " were privy to them. The senate being resolved not  
 " to part with so valuable a privilege, prevailed with  
 " another tribune to inhibit the publication of it when  
 " it came to be read; upon which Cornelius took the  
 " book from the clerk and read it himself. This was  
 " irregular, and much inveighed against as a violation  
 " of the rights of the tribunate; so that Cornelius was  
 " once more forced to compound the matter by a milder law, forbidding the senate to pass any such  
 " decrees, unless when two hundred senators were  
 " present." (Hooke, III. 283.) The dictator was absolute and irresponsible. Nevertheless, in the year 319, the dictator Mamercus Æmilius having proposed a law which was carried, reducing the duration of the office of censor from five years to one and-a-half, the then censors C. Turius and M. Geganius struck his name out of the roll of his tribe, deprived him of

the right of voting, and increased his share of taxes eightfold.

In the year 384, the dictator Camillus having in vain endeavoured to interrupt the proceedings of the comitia tributa, abdicated his magistracy, either on pretence of some defect in the auspices, or in consequence of a plebiscitum which had been passed to this effect, "That if M. Furius Camillus made use of his dictatorial power to obstruct the enacting of the laws in dispute, he should pay a fine of 500,000 asses of brass."

In the year 386, "Plutarch reports, that one day when the dictator (Camillus) was sitting on his tribunal in the forum, dispatching public business, an officer, sent by the tribunes, commanded him to rise and follow him, laying his hand upon him at the same time, as if he meant to drag him away by force. Never was a greater tumult or uproar in the forum than on this occasion; the patricians who surrounded Camillus driving back the officer, and the multitude from below bawling out; pull him down; pull him down! Camillus, though greatly at a loss what to do in this exigence, yet would not resign his authority: Guarded by the senators, he retired with them to the senate-house; but, before he entered it, turned towards the capitol, and besought the Gods to put an end to these commotions, vowing to build a temple to concord if union might be restored among his fellow citizens." (Hooke, vol. I. p. 484.)

In the year 550, P. Sulpitius was created dictator merely for the purpose of recalling the consul Servilius Cæpio, who had crossed over from Italy into Sicily with the intention of following Hannibal into Africa. This

P

was usually done by the prætor's letters, written by order of the senate.

Cicero was banished in the year 695, for having put some of Catiline's accomplices to death in the year 690, though he therein acted with dictatorial power by authority of the senate.

2. **THE CONSULS.** The instances that we meet with of inconveniences arising from the co-ordinate powers of the two consuls, or from their disobedience to the senate, are much fewer than might be reasonably expected. It is true they had generally separate armies committed to their charge.

Sp. Cassius Viscellinus, consul for the year 267, when the famous agrarian law was agitated for the first time; with the view of strengthening his party "sent privately for a great number of Latines and Hernici to come and give their suffrages for the ratification of the law proposed in their favour. Crowds of these new citizens immediately flocked to Rome; which (his colleague) Proculus Virginius observing, published an edict, commanding all persons who were not settled inhabitants to depart from the city without delay. Cassius opposed this edict by another, which required all persons, who were enrolled citizens, to remain in Rome till the question of the law was decided." (Hooke, I. 251.)

T. Quinctius Pennus and C. Julius Mento, consuls for the year 322, and generals of approved reputation, having from mutual jealousy been unsuccessful in the field, were ordered by the senate to nominate a dictator; but though disagreeing in all other respects, they were equally determined to resist the senate on this point; and at last complied only on the interposition

of the tribunes, who threatened to send them to prison if they persisted in their disobedience.

L. Virginius and M. Sergius, two of the six military tribunes chosen for the year 350, commanded at the siege of Veii. "The jealousy, so common between persons in equal authority, had set them at variance: each had a set of troops under his command, and had as it were a separate camp. The Capenates and Falisci attacked that of Sergius on one side, at the same time that the besieged made a sally and attacked it on the other. The Roman soldiers thinking they had all the forces of Etruria to deal with, were dismayed, fought faintly, and rather to defend their own lives, than with hopes to vanquish the enemy. It was not long before they gave ground, fell into disorder, and ran away. Virginius could have saved his colleague's troops; his own were ranged in order of battle: but the animosity between the two generals was so great, that Sergius chose rather to perish than to ask the assistance of Virginius; and Virginius on the other hand would not give him any succour unless he would send and beg it. The enemy profited by this division; Sergius's army fled in disorder to Rome, which was but six leagues distant from the camp, and the general went thither himself, not so much to justify his own conduct, as to set forth the baseness of that of his colleague." (Hooke, I. 421.) After an acrimonious contest, they were no otherwise punished than by a decree of the senate that all the military tribunes of that year should resign their magistracies, and the people immediately proceed to a new election.

If war cannot succeed under the joint command of able leaders, what must be the consequence if the

command devolve on alternate days to men of opposite characters and systems; the one bold and venturous, the other prudent and cautious; the one confident in the numbers and courage of his troops, the other thinking that nothing can save the state but cunctation? Let the memorable field of *Cannæ* tell! That battle was fought in the year 537, when it was the turn of C. Terentius Varro to command, and in spite of the remonstrances of his colleague L. Æmilius Paulus. For other instances see Hooke, III. 74 636.

In the year 542, Capua surrendered to the Roman pro-consuls Q. Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius Pulcher; and the punishment of its senators and garrison for their defection to Hannibal, was left to their discretion. "Appius inclined to clemency, Fulvius to severity; and the dispute grew warm between them. The former, to put an end to it, wrote to the senate, and referred the matter to them; but his colleague, without waiting for the senate's decree, went with two thousand horse, first to Teanum, whither twenty-eight of the Capuan senators had been transported, and caused them to be beaten with rods, and then beheaded by the lictors. Thence he hastened to Gales, and treated with the same rigour the twenty-five senators who had been conveyed thither, though he might well have spared them, having just before the execution received letters from Rome, with orders to suspend it; but he put the letters in his bosom, and would not read them till all was over. Nor did the republic ever blame him for this instance of severity, being doubtless pleased to have revenge, without incurring the odium of inhumanity among her allies. This charge fell upon Fulvius." (Hooke, II. 213.)

In the year 580, "M. Popillius Lænas, the consul, without any provocation, led an army against the Statelliates, a people of Liguria, and came to battle with them before the gates of their town, called Cærystum. He slew 10,000 of the enemy, and took 700 prisoners, with the loss of 3000 of his men."—"He not only plundered the town, but demolished it, and sold the inhabitants for slaves. Of this proceeding he sent an account to the conscript fathers; who, being highly offended with it, decreed, that, returning the money to the purchasers, he should restore to the captives their liberty and effects; and then quit the province. Popillius would not obey; but having put his army into winter quarters at Pisa, came home in as great wrath, says Livy, with the fathers, as he had expressed (exercised) against the Ligurians." (Hooke, II. 398. In his speech in the senate he demanded not only the revocation of the decree, but that a thanksgiving should be ordered for his victory. Both demands were rejected; and after personally sustaining as severe animadversions from several senators, as had been passed on his conduct during his absence, he returned to his province where he acted as pro-consul during the succeeding consulship of P. Ælius Ligus and C. Popillius Lænas. The senate wished to *renew* the decree in favour of the Ligurians, and Ælius made a motion on the subject, but being thwarted by his colleague (the pro-consul's brother) he desisted from his purpose; and the senate represented their conduct by refusing them any command in the war about to be declared against Macedon, and by intrusting the levy of troops to the prætor Cn. Sicinius Nepos. Liguria was the province assigned to

the consuls; but they could not be induced to depart for it until they had been threatened with a prosecution and fine by the tribunes M. Martius Sermo and Q. Martius Seylla. In the mean time the pro-consul sent dispatches, acquainting the senate that he had *again* attacked the Ligurians, and killed another 10,000 of them. Upon this additional provocation, the tribune Martius obtained a plebiscitum, directing that the senate should, upon oath, appoint an inquisitor to try the delinquent; and the senate nominated the other prætor C. Licinius. The pro-consul, however, dreading the enmity of the senate, and the still greater enmity of the people, refused to appear; and the tribunes met this fresh instance of contumacy by the menace of proposing a resolution, that if he did not attend before the ides of November, he should be proceeded against as if present. He then appeared; but on the third day of the trial, Licinius, to ingratiate himself with the Popillian family, adjourned the court to the ides of March, on which day the new magistrates would enter on office, and the defendant, as being then a private person, would not be amenable to his jurisdiction. By this artifice he escaped. "*Ita rogatio de Liguribus arte fallaci elusa est.*" (Livy, XLII. 22.) Though several thousand Ligurians were restored to liberty, and settled in lands on the left bank of the Po, yet it does not appear that complete restitution was made, for on the appearance of C. Popillius in the senate, he was assailed with angry interrogations, why he had not released the victims of his brother's tyranny? (Livy, XLII. 28.)

C. Julius Cæsar and L. Calpurnius Bibulus, men of opposite characters, principles, and interests, were consuls for the year 694. Cæsar had prepared a very



extensive agrarian law, which his colleague was determined to resist by every means. "He had seven of the tribunes on his side in this contest. Bibulus mustered all his forces, and came down to the forum full of courage and resolution, guarded by three of the tribunes and the greater part of the senate; and as often as Cæsar attempted to recommend the law, he as often interrupted him, and declared that it should never pass in his year. Cæsar asked him (when they were both in the rostra) whether he found any thing exceptionable in the law? To which Bibulus made this answer only, that he would oppose all *innovations*." He soon after quitted the assembly, and Pompey and Crassus harangued the people in favour of the law. "Bibulus, now despairing of success by any other method of opposition; had recourse to the stratagem of proclaiming every day a holiday for the remaining part of the year, thereby to hinder all transacting of business with the people. Cæsar laughed at his colleague's edict, and named a particular day for the people to give their suffrages upon the law. While Cæsar, on the day appointed, was speaking to the people, Bibulus arrived, interrupted him, and once more repeated his declaration, that the law should never pass while he was consul. From words the two parties soon came to blows: Bibulus was roughly treated, his three tribunes wounded, and his whole faction driven out of the forum by the tribune Vatinius, at the head of the triumvir's faction: so that the law passed upon the spot without any further contradiction. Bibulus made his complaint the next day, in the senate, of the violence offered to his person; but.

“ finding that nobody cared to enter into the affair, or  
 “ to move any thing about it, he retired to his house in  
 “ despair, and there shut himself up during all the re-  
 “ maining part of his consulship, that is to say, for eight  
 “ months entire, exercising no one function of his of-  
 “ fice, except that, whenever Cæsar undertook any  
 “ thing new, he republished his ordinance, by which  
 “ he had converted every day of the year into a holi-  
 “ day.” (Hooke, III. 406.) Though this case occurred  
 during the breaking up of the republic, yet, taken by  
 itself, it is scarcely more aggravated than some that  
 belong to a much earlier period.

3. THE CENSORS were first instituted in the year 310, for the purpose of taking an account of the names and estates of the several orders of citizens: a duty which had been quinquennially performed under the kings and consuls from the time of Servius Tullius. But they soon extended their authority by the addition of other duties, especially the formidable one of creating and degrading senators and knights, constituting themselves the guardians of public manners; and thereby assuming powers of which, as De Lolme justly observes, the people ought to be the legal, as they are necessarily the virtual depository.

We have seen the unjust exercise of the censorial power towards Mamercus Æmilius, which took place so early as the year 319; and it is evident that they had for some time reached the pinnacle of their dignity since Æmilius adduces the *grievousness* of being subject to the authority of the same persons for five years, as a reason for abridging its duration.

Though the concurrence of both the censors was necessary to effect the expulsion of a senator, it frequently

happening that some were retained by one who had been stigmatized by the other; yet we find Appius Claudius Cæcus, censor for the year 441, introducing the sons of freedmen into the senate, against the opinion of his colleague C. Plautius Venox, who thereupon resigned, leaving Appius sole censor. The libertini thus introduced were expelled by the consuls of the succeeding year. But what is still more singular, the same Appius determined to remain in office five years, in spite of the Æmilian law of 319, impudently alleging that the law in question, which had been conformed to during more than a century, was only intended to affect the censors of the year in which it passed; and though seven of the tribunes wished to send him to prison, yet, for want of unanimity among them, he actually succeeded in accomplishing his determination.

In the year 549, we have the strange spectacle of one censor stigmatizing the other; and of all the thirty-five tribes being disfranchised, except one! The following are Hooke's words: (II. 277.) "While the consuls  
 " were thus employed abroad, the two censors at Rome;  
 " M. Livius Salinator, and C. Claudius Nero, drew a  
 " contempt on themselves by a most ridiculous behaviour. Though their quarrels with each other had  
 " formerly been very great, yet the distress of the republic during their consulship, had reconciled them  
 " in appearance for some time; but now their mutual  
 " hatred broke out afresh. It was customary for the  
 " senators just before leaving their office, to draw up  
 " a list of the senators, review the Roman knights,  
 " assemble the tribes, and set a mark of infamy on  
 " such persons as deserved it. As to the first, Livius  
 " and Nero were equitable in their proceedings; but

Q

“ when they came to review the knights, of which body  
 “ they both were, Nero ordered his colleague’s name  
 “ to be struck out of the list, on pretence that he had  
 “ been formerly condemned by the people for a mis-  
 “ demeanour. And Livius, when Nero’s name was  
 “ called over, passed the like sentence against him:  
 “ My reasons, said he, are, that he has borne false wit-  
 “ ness against me; and that his reconciliation with  
 “ me was not sincere. Their passion and folly appear-  
 “ ed yet more extravagant, when they came to take an  
 “ account of the tribes. Nero ranked his colleague  
 “ among those whom he declared *Ærarii*, i. e. persons  
 “ deprived of the rights of Roman citizenship, but still  
 “ obliged to pay the public taxes. And Livius not only  
 “ did as much for Nero, but disfranchised all the thirty-  
 “ five tribes, except the *Mæcian*, (which was the only  
 “ one that had formerly voted for him upon his trial,)  
 “ for, said he, it must be owned they acted unjustly  
 “ either *once* when they condemned me, or *twice* when  
 “ they conferred upon me the consulship and censor-  
 “ ship.” Livy speaks rather inconsistently of the con-  
 test between the censors, as “*sedum certamen*,” and  
 “*parvum certamen*,” and thinks that the reprehensi-  
 on of the inconstancy of the people, by Livius, was  
 worthy of the moderation and integrity of those times.  
 They were both impeached by the tribune Cn. Bæbius,  
 but the policy of the fathers interposed to suppress  
 the proceeding.

Notwithstanding these instances of disfranchisement,  
 yet, when T. Sempronius Gracchus, censor for the year  
 584, wished to deprive the greatest part of the freed-  
 men (who had been confined to the four city tribes) of  
 their right of suffrage, his colleague, C. Claudius Pul-

cher, insisted that it would be illegal; and that though he might remove a man from one tribe to another, (which was the true meaning of *tribu movere*,) he could not remove an individual, much less a whole order of men from all the thirty-five tribes. Without coming to any decision on this point, it was agreed that they should be incorporated in one of the city tribes to be determined by lot. (Livy, XLV. 15.)

The law required that if one of the censors died, the other should abdicate. On the death of Livius Drusus, in the year 644, M. Æmilius Scaurus refused to comply with the law, until some of the tribunes threatened to send him to prison if he did not obey. (Hooke, II. 37.)

4. THE TRIBUNES: instituted in the year 260. The anomalies connected with this part of the administration, exceed both in number and quality, any that have yet been submitted. The tribuneship was intended as a popular counterpoise to the aristocracy, and was vested with co-ordinate powers, since its concurrence was indispensable to the validity of every legislative and magisterial proceeding: but these was in its original constitution a vice essentially at variance with these purposes; which neutralized its energy, and frustrated its efforts. This was the *unanimity* requisite in the discharge of all their duties; the power that a single tribune possessed of counteracting the resolutions of the whole college. The consequence was that, like a loose bundle of sticks, the strength of the whole was no greater than that of each individual: and the more numerous they were, the greater the probability of their adversaries finding means to gain one of them. It was therefore the interest of the *patricians* to maintain this fancied prerogative; just as it was the interest of Catharine II.

to support the *liberum veto* of the Poles, that most fantastic and mischievous folly that ever anarchy invented.

It is somewhat ludicrous to observe Appius Claudius introduced by Livy, in the year 272, as revealing to the senators the secret of this advantage, and thereby extricating them from the perplexity into which they were thrown by the opposition made by Sp. Icilius to the levy of an army. "*Perturbatis iterum patribus, Ap. Claudius victam tribunitiam potestatem dicere priore anno, in præsentia re ipsa, exemplo in perpetuum: quando inventum sit, suis ipsam viribus dissolvi.*" &c. "*Præceptis Appii moniti patres,*" &c. It was necessary to repeat this admonition to the fathers in the year 296, when they were "cudgelling" their brains" on the demand made by the tribunes that their number might be encreased from five to ten. According to Livy, the urgency of circumstances internal and external, extorted from the senate this concession: but Dionysius assigns to L. Quinctius Cincinnatus the merit of discovering that it would be easier to sow division among ten tribunes than among five; and ascribes the acquiescence of the senate to the prevalence of his advice.

We have seen that the tribunes frequently threatened to send the consuls to prison; and instances of their being actually imprisoned may be found in Livy, epit. 48. 55. Hooke, III. 10. Nevertheless, Servilius Ahala, military tribune in the year 351, denied its legality when the tribunes threw out the same threat against two of his refractory colleagues: "*Quod ad vos attinet, tribuni plebis, minasque vestras, næ ego libenter experirer, quam non plus in his juris, quam in vobis animi esset.*" The obstinacy of his two colleagues,

L. Virginius and M. Sergius, was subdued by his threatening to nominate a dictator.

In the year 360, we have an example of two ex-tribunes, A. Virginius and Q. Pomponius, being punished for having, in the preceding year, interposed their *veto* on a question strenuously supported by the other tribunes, and very acceptable to the plebeians, for removing half of the people and of the senate to Veii. Being cited before the *comitia tributa*, they were fined 10,000 asses of brass. Camillus loudly inveighed against the *blindness* of the commons for invading a right so useful to *himself and his party*:—*quæ* (plebs) *jam in suos versa, non intelligeret, se pravo judicio de tribunis intercessionem sustulisse*:—"Si tribunitia vis *tribunitio auxilio* repelli nequeat, aliud tælum patres inventuros esse." (Livy, V. 29.)

As the Licinian laws embraced objects that most powerfully interest the strongest passions of our nature;—riches and honours,—so the struggle they excited was proportionably long and arduous; yet unstained with a single drop of blood. Having gained a majority, of the tribunes, the senate contrived to protract the contest from the year 377 to the year 386; during the first half of which period the minority retaliated by preventing the election of *curule* magistrates; and this innocuous anarchy was only terminated by the approach of an enemy from without. During the latter half of the period three dictatorships occur, two of which were held by Camillus: the treatment he experienced has been already mentioned.

In the year 450, the consul L. Posthumius Megellus having been refused the honour of a triumph by the senate, obtained it from the people; aided by three tri-

bunes, and *in spite of the opposition* of the other seven.

In the year 620, Tiberius Gracchus, tribune, revived the agrarian law of Licinius Stolo, passed in the year 386, which limited each person's share of the public lands to 500 Roman acres. He "published an edict, "suspending all magistrates from the exercise of their "functions, till the law should be either passed or re- "jected by the people; and subjecting to large fines "those who should disobey this edict. And, that the "quæstors might not have access to the public money, "he shut up the temple of Saturn where it was kept, "and put his own seal upon the door." (Hooke, II. 524.) He was supported by all his colleagues except one, M. Octavius Cæcina. To remove this stumbling-block, and relieve his constituents from the check imposed by the preposterous constitution of the tribunitian office, Tiberius resorted to a new, but reasonable, expedient. In an assembly by tribes, he moved, and carried a resolution that Octavius should be deposed. This precedent was followed, in the year 686, by the tribune A. Gabinius, when his colleague L. Trebellius opposed the passing of a decree for committing to Pompey the conduct of the piratic war, with exorbitant powers, tending to subvert the remains of the constitution. Cicero highly applauds the conduct of Gabinius, who would not suffer "*plus unius collegæ sui, "quam universæ civitatis*, (though the senate were against the law) *vocem valere et voluntatem*:" (Pro Cornel. 1.) but that of Tiberius he styles *seditions*, and declares that his murderers filled the world with the glory of their exploit. (Pro Mil. 27.)

Atinius Labeo, tribune for the year 623, "to revenge "himself on the censor Metellus Macedonicus, who



“ (according to Pliny) had expelled him the senate,  
 “ made a most outrageous attempt upon his life. As  
 “ the censor was returning home from the Campus  
 “ Martius at noon-day, the streets of Rome empty of  
 “ people, the tribune caused him to be seized, and was  
 “ dragging him away, to throw him headlong from the  
 “ Tarpeian rock, when another of the tribunes, at the  
 “ request of Metellus’s son, came and rescued him.  
 “ Atinius nevertheless consecrated to Ceres the estate  
 “ of Metellus, and thereby reduced him to live upon  
 “ the bounty of others.” (Hooke, II. 544.)

In the year 642, Jugurtha, king of Numidia, appeared  
 at Rome, upon the public faith, to give evidence against  
 several men of distinction who were accused by the  
 tribune Memmius of having been bribed by him to be-  
 tray the honour and interests of the state. In an as-  
 sembly of the people, when Memmius had ended his  
 speech, and all were anxious and attentive to hear what  
 the king would answer, “ Bæbius, another of the tri-  
 “ bunes, instantly called out, forbidding the king to  
 “ speak. The multitude expressed their indignation  
 “ by clamour, menacing looks and gestures, and, in  
 “ short all the ways by which violent anger is used to  
 “ express itself, in order to deter him from his purpose.  
 “ Nevertheless, as he had received an ample bribe,  
 “ impudence carried it. The people, thus fool’d, broke  
 “ up the assembly, and separated.” (Hooke, III. 28.)

Sex. Titius, one of the tribunes for the year 654,  
 “ proposed a law for dividing some lands amongst the  
 “ people, and on this occasion had no regard to the  
 “ *intercession* of his colleagues: nevertheless he was  
 “ obliged to desist from his enterprise, because two  
 “ crows flying over the comitia, had fought with their

“ beaks and claws; and the Augurs had thereupon declared that the law must be dropt, and sacrifices be offered to Apello. This Titius, when out of his office, was prosecuted before the Roman knights, and condemned to banishment for having in his house a picture of Saturninus; an act of rigour justified by Cicero. Furius likewise, who had opposed Metellus’s return, was, after the expiration of his office, accused of treason by Canuleius and Decianus, two of the tribunes. The enraged people, without so much as hearing his defence, tore him in pieces. And because Decianus, in a speech on that occasion, lamented the death of Saturninus, he was next year brought to a trial and banished, though a very worthy man, according to Valerius Maximus.” (Hooke, III. 95.)

5. THE TRIUMPH, though cruel and insulting towards the vanquished, powerfully contributed to stimulate those warlike virtues which gave to the Romans the empire of the world. It was generally awarded by the senate, and sometimes, on their refusal, by the people. It is essential to the value of such an honour that, though cheap with respect to the nation that bestows it, the utmost possible price, in sweat and blood should be paid by the candidate; and therefore nothing can be more incongruous and absurd than that he should be allowed to appreciate his own services, and to decree himself this supreme reward.\* And yet there are many examples of this in the best days of the republic. The theatre on which these sham triumphs were celebrated

---

\* Cicero thought *himself* entitled to and did obtain, a triumph. Ep. Fam. II. 10. II. XVI. 11. “Cicero—vir nihil minus quam ad bella natus.” Livy, Epit. III.

was the Alban-hill; and the expence of the show was defrayed by the hero himself. The first that occurred was that of C. Papirius Maso, consul for the year 522. "The senate, dissatisfied with him for some reason unknown, refused him a triumph. This provoked him to take a method entirely new to do himself honour. At the head of his army he marched to the temple of Jupiter Latialis on the hill of Alba; with all the pomp with which triumphant victors were wont to march to the capitol; he made no alteration in the ceremony, except that, instead of a crown of laurel, he wore a crown of myrtle, on account of his having defeated the Corsicans in a place where was a grove of myrtles." (Hooke, II. 88.) Other examples are mentioned: Livy, XXVI. 21. XXXIII. 23. XLII. 21. Hooke, II. 503. In the year 572, the senate decreed a triumph to P. Cornelius Cethegus and M. Bæbius Tamphilus, to whom the Ligures had submitted unconditionally without fighting. *Hi omnium primi nullo bello gesto triumpharunt.*" (Livy, XL. 38.)

*Horæ Romanæ. No. IV. Observations on "Considerations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains & de leur decadence. Par Montesquieu."*

NO work on the same subject seems to enjoy a reputation equal to this of Montesquieu: and yet I am disposed to think that a careful review of its contents would lead to a conviction that it abounds with errors of fact and of principle, which are but partially redeemed by the occasional intervention of a sound political

R

maxim—"late qui splendeat unus et alter."—The author is deficient in point of order and system; he dances from one smart observation to another, connecting effects with disproportionate or imaginary causes; and is particularly negligent in the citation of his authorities. His mistakes on the subject of the variation in the value of the Roman coins, and in the pay of their troops, have been ably exposed by Mr. Bowyer; one or two signal blunders have been detected by Mr. Malthus; and a multitude of errors connected with the irruptions of the Goths, Huns, &c. &c. are corrigible by a reference to the works of Gibbon and Pinkerton. Still there remains employment for the critic in this "unweeded garden."

Among the various causes that contributed to the greatness of Rome, Montesquieu ascribes *the greatest* influence to *each* of *two* practices, neither of which appears to be entitled to such a distinction. The first is that of triumphing: "Romulus & ses successeurs furent presque toujours en guerre avec leurs voisins, pour avoir des citoyens, des femmes, ou des terres: ils revenaient dans la ville avec les dépouilles des peuples vaincus; c'étoient des gerbes de blé & des troupeaux: cela y causoit une grande joie. *Voilà l'origine des triomphes, qui furent dans la suite la principale cause des grandeurs où cette ville parvint.*"

Chap. 1. As the honours of the peerage conferred on victorious admirals have not been the principal cause of the maritime preponderance of Britain; so neither were the honours of the triumph the principal cause of the military glories, and irresistible superiority of the Romans. The origin, too, of these triumphs, with its rustic simplicity, is surely the offspring of the author's

imagination. Nothing can be better defined than the account of the *first* triumph ever celebrated in Rome. Romulus having defeated the Cœninenses, and slain their king Acron, of whose armour he had previously vowed to erect a *trophy* to Jupiter, entered the city accompanied by his troops, carrying the spoils of Acron on the trunk of a small oak, and proceeded to the hill Saturnius, afterwards called Capitulinus, where he consecrated them as *spolia opima* to *Jupiter Feretrius*, for whom he at the same time marked out the foundation of a temple. The people went forth to meet the victors, and spread tables for their refreshment; but the procession had a military and religious character, and was not the rejoicing of a gang of robbers, with droves of cattle and sacks of corn. In fact such a description of a Roman triumph, even in its infancy, is as far from the truth as the ludicrous one in *Hudibras*:

“ As the Aldermen of Rome,  
 “ For foes at wrestling overcome,  
 “ Well mounted in their best array  
 “ Upon a car, and who but they!  
 “ And followed by a world of tall lads  
 “ That merry ditties sung and ballads,  
 “ Did ride, with many a good morrow,  
 “ Crying, Hey for our town, through the borough.”

The second *principal* cause is noticed on the occasion of Romulus adopting the long shield of the Sabines:—  
 “ et on doit remarquer que *ce qui a le plus contribué* à  
 “ rendre les Romains les maîtres du monde, c’est qu  
 “ ’ayant combattu successivement contre tous les peu-  
 “ ples, ils ont toujours renoncé à leurs usages, sitôt  
 “ qu’ils en ont trouvé de meilleurs.” Chap. 1. They  
 borrowed the ensigns of magistracy from Etruria, and  
 some laws from Greece; but no nation could supply them

with models of those institutions, civil and military, which really made them masters of the world.

Another cause of the Roman greatness is said to have been the equal distribution of landed property: "Les Fondateurs des anciennes Republiques avaient également partagé les terres: *cela seul faisait un peuple puissant, c'est-à-dire, une société bien réglée; cela faisait aussi une bonne armée, chacun ayant un égal intérêt, et très-grand, à défendre sa patrie.*"—"Ce fut le partage égal des terres qui rendit Rome capable de sortir d'abord de son abaissement: & cela se sentit bien quand elle fut corrompue." Chap. 3. "Les anciens mœurs, un certain usage de la pauvreté, rendaient à Rome les fortunes à peu près égales; mais à Carthage, des particuliers avaient les richesses des Rois." Chap. 4. Now, not only had this equality of property ceased to exist even before the refuge; but it was an opposite circumstance, the *inequality* of property, the want of coincidence between the division of power and the gradations of property, and the effect of external wars in suspending the contests thence arising, that most strongly and steadily propelled the Romans in the career of conquest. "Seditio domestica bellum externum excivit: bello deinde civiles discordiæ intermissæ," says Livy, II. 42. See II. 28. And this Montesquieu himself acknowledges, when he says: the consuls "engageaient le sénat à proposer au peuple la guerre, & lui montraient tous les jours de nouveaux ennemis. Ce corps y était déjà assez porté de lui-même: car étant fatigué sans cesse par les plaintes & les demandes du peuple, il cherchait à le distraire de ses inquiétudes, et à l'occuper au dehors." Chap. I. Mistakes

on this subject are radical, and effectually incapacitate an author from accurately stating, and satisfactorily accounting for the political phenomena that present themselves in ancient and modern history. There is an indissoluble connexion between property and power, and an unequal distribution of both is the natural state of every society; which will be best regulated when there is such a balance between *property* and *persons* as shall afford to each the fullest protection. Mr. Windham compared the alternate precession of French principles and French dominion, to the flight of a chain-shot, of which whatever end went foremost the other was sure to follow. So it is with property and power: and the final cause of this natural union is obvious; for when they are separated, the one is without protection, and the other without authority. Equality, by excluding *subordination*, that silent restraint on human passions and infirmities, that source of politeness and the highest graces of civilization, would be essentially hostile to the improvement and happiness of society. Least of all is the absence of subordination compatible with the efficiency of a military force. Men having an equal stake in their country, equal interests, and consequently equal pretensions to command, will never constitute “une bonne armée.”

“Comme Henri VII. Roi d’Angleterre, augmenta le pouvoir des Communes pour avilir les grands, Servius Tullius, avant lui, avait étendu les privilèges du peuple pour abaisser le sénat. Mais le peuple devenu d’abord plus hardi, renversa l’une & l’autre monarchie.” Chap. I. This account of the conduct of Servius Tullius is taken from Dionysius: but that Servius was in truth supported by the *senate*

at his accession to the throne, and established *their* power by depressing that of the people, is proved by the express declaration of Livy, and especially by his institution of the Census, and the comitia centuriata, whereby he created that strong aristocratic bias which prevailed in the Roman Republic. See also Hooke's Remarks on the history of the seven Roman Kings.

“ Mais Rome, faisant toujours des efforts, et trou-  
 “ yant toujours des obstacles, faisait sentir sa puis-  
 “ sance sans pouvoir l'étendre, et dans une circonférence  
 “ très-petite, elle s'exerçait à des vertus qui devaient  
 “ être si fatales à l'univers.” Chap. 1. And after  
 speaking of Caligula, Nero, Commodus, and Caracalla,  
 he says: “ C'est ici qu' il faut se donner le spectacle  
 “ des choses humaines. Qu' on voie, dans l'histoire  
 “ de Rome, tant de guerres entreprises, tant de sang  
 “ repandu, tant de peuples détruits, tant de grandes  
 “ actions, tant de triomphes, tant de politique, de sa-  
 “ gesse, de prudence, de constance, de courage; ce  
 “ projet d'envahir tout, si bien formé, si bien soutenu,  
 “ si bien fini: à quoi aboutit-il, qu' à assouvir le bonheur  
 “ de cinq ou six monstres ?” Chap. 15. Those were not  
 “ fatal” virtues, which by “ a series of civilizing con-  
 “ quests\*” spread the knowledge of property, laws,  
 and arts over Europe: and prepared the soil on which  
 was destined to grow and flourish that Gothic tree  
 which now rears its leafy arms to heaven. The exten-  
 sion of the Roman language and government prepared  
 the way for the introduction of christianity. The Ro-  
 man worthies did not live in vain, because such mons-  
 ters as Caligula came after them, and fretted their hour  
 upon the stage. In fine, the benefits and evils of their

---

\* Burke.



dominion were parts of that scheme of things which existed in the counsels of an over-ruling Providence before the foundation of the world.

“ Depuis l'établissement de la paie, le sénat ne distribua plus aux soldats les terres des peuples vaincus: il imposa d'autres conditions; il les obligea par exemple de fournir à l'armée une solde pendant un certain tems, de lui donner du bled & des habits.”

Chap. 1. The Roman infantry first received pay in the year 347; and the above passage imports that *before* this time they were paid in land; and that *after* this time conquered nations were never deprived of a part of their lands: assertions which are undoubtedly unfounded. Before 347, their wars were but incursions of a few days continuance; the soldiers being men who had some estate served at their own expence; colonies were composed of the poorest citizens, and of those who had served their time: and after 347, many are the instances of lands being confiscated, and colonies planted in territory acquired by conquest. Livy, VIII. 22. Epit. 11. XXVI. 16. XXXV. 9. 40. XXXVII. 57. XL. 38. 41. XLII. 4. Epit. 55. 61. 71. Hooke, II. 484.

“ Ils suppléèrent à la faiblesse de leur cavalerie, d'abord en otant les brides des chevaux, pour que l'impétuosité n'en pût être arrêtée; ensuite en y mêlant des velites.” Chap. 2. Is it possible that Montesquieu could imagine that *unbridled* cavalry are more formidable than bridled? or that such a practice ever existed? I know but *one* instance of its alleged occurrence, (Livy, IV. 33.) and, in a note on the place, Le Clerc treats it as a ridiculous fable. In the year 327, Mamercus Æmilius, dictator, attacked the Veientes and Fidenates, having previously detached a party

under his lieutenant T. Quintius Pennus to occupy a hill in their rear. During the battle a number of men armed with *torches*, and dressed like furies, issued from the town of Eidenæ, *attacked*, and threw into confusion the Roman left wing. The dictator upbraided his men with cowardice: "What," said he, "are you as much afraid of smoke as a swarm of bees? Make use of your swords to wrest these torches out of the enemy's hands, and then go and fire their town with them." The troops recovered from their panic; and A. Cornelius Cossus, general of the horse, having ordered his men to take the bridles from their horses, a mode of fighting hitherto unattempted, ("*novat pugnam equestrem*") made a vigorous and successful charge, the glare of the torches which had so much alarmed the men, having no effect on the horses! The enemy were now attacked in the rear by Quintius, and their retreat being cut off in other directions by the cavalry who had been run away with by their ungovernable horses ("*et equitem passim liberi frenis dispulissent equi*") they were almost to a man killed, drowned, or taken prisoners. This is the notable story on which Montesquieu builds such a comment. Livy asserts that the Numidian cavalry were without bridles, (XXXV. 11.) but I cannot believe him.

Such a fashion of riding, or driving, would be an improvement on the error of supposing that a horse will go faster for having the reins laid on his neck: a notion which eloquence, in prose and verse, seems peculiarly to cherish. Thus Virgil:

- "Jungit equos curru genitor, spumantiaque addit,
- "Fræna feris, manibusque omnes effundit habenas." *Æn.* V. 818.
- "Terribilis, sævam nullo discrimine cædem,
- "Suscitat, irarumque omnes effundit habenas." *Æn.* XII. 599.

Burke: "It would have been natural that, rising in the fulness of their might, insulted majesty, despised dignity, violated justice, rejected supplication, patience goaded into fury, *would have poured out all the length of the reins* upon all the wrath which they had so long restrained." (Works, VIII. 291.)

And Milton: "With these the invincible warrior, Zeal, *shaking loosely the slack reins*, drives over the heads of scarlet prelates, and such as are insolent to maintain traditions, bruising their stiff necks under his flaming wheels." (Apology for Smectymnus.)

Ovid gives a different representation:

"Vidi Ego nuper equum contra sua vincula tenacem,

"Ore reluctanti fulminis ire modo:

"Constitit ut primum concessas sensit habenas,

"Frœnaque in effusâ laxa jacere juba."

(Am. lib. IV. El. IV. v. 13.)

Neither do I think much better of the plan of strengthening cavalry by the admixture of Velites. They were first introduced at the siege of Capua in the year 542. (Livy, XXVI. 4.) But the Roman cavalry having *no stirrups*, never could be very serviceable.

"Elle était une petite république, lorsque les Latins ayant refusé le secours de troupes qu'ils s'étaient obligés de donner, on leva sur le champ dix légions *dans la ville*." Chap. 3. He refers to Livy, VII. 25. where it is said, "*non urbana tantum, sed etiam agresti juventute decem legiones scriptæ dicuntur.*"

"Dans le fort de la seconde guerre Punique, Rome fut toujours sur pied de vingt-deux à vingt-quatre légions; cependant il paraît par Tite-Live que le cens n'était pour lors que d'environ *cent trente sept mille citoyens*."

“ Carthage employait plus de force pour attaquer,  
 “ que Rome pour se défendre: celle-ci, comme on  
 “ vient de dire, arma un nombre d’hommes prodigeux  
 “ contre les Gallois & Annibal qui l’attaquaient, et  
 “ elle n’envoya que deux légions contre les plus grands  
 “ rois; ce qui rendit ses forces éternelles.” Chap. 4.  
 It appears from Livy that the number of Roman citi-  
 zens fit to bear arms, in the year 473, that is to say, 16-  
 years before the first Punic war, was 283,000. Epit.  
 XI. And even at the expulsion of Tarquin, it was  
 130,000 according to Dionysius. B. 5. p. 293. At the  
 battle of Cannæ the Romans had 8 legions; next year,  
 12; next, 18; and in the seventh year, 23.

It must be remembered that the *two* legions, of five  
 or six thousand men each, which they sent to carry on  
 offensive war, were *exclusive* of an *equal* number fur-  
 nished by the Latine allies; that they were always  
 assisted by Grecian or Asiatic allies; and that the sub-  
 jects of “ les plus grands rois,” were cowardly slaves,  
 against some of whom, “ the victors were themselves  
 “ ashamed of having drawn their swords.” (Hooke,  
 III. 240.) The army of L. Æmilius Paullus exceeded  
 in numbers that of Perses, king of Macedon. (Livy,  
 XLIV. 20. 21.) Plut. life of Æmil.

“ Les Romains eurent bien des guerres avec les  
 “ Gaulois. L’amour de la gloire, le mépris de la mort,  
 “ l’obstination pour vaincre; étaient les mêmes dans les  
 “ deux peuples; mais les armes étaient différentes. Le  
 “ bouclier des Gaulois était petit, & leur épée mau-  
 “ vaise: aussi furent-ils traités à peu près comme, dans  
 “ les derniers siècles, les Mexicains l’ont été par les Es-  
 “ pagnoles. Et ce qu’il y a de surprenant, c’est que ces  
 “ peuples que les Romains rencontrèrent dans presque

" tous les lieux, et dans presque tous les tems, se lais-  
 " serent détruire les uns après les autres, sans jamais  
 " connaître, chercher, ni prévenir la cause de leurs  
 " malheurs." Chap. 4. The Romans were civilized;  
 the Gauls were barbarians: and though civilization  
 does not improve courage, it improves intellect, which  
 improves all the arts, and consequently the art of  
 war. Will not this account for their superiority in  
 the long run, even without laying much stress on  
 the formation of their legions—"divinitatis instinet,  
 "tu constitutas?" (Veg. II. 21.) No, it would look  
 prettier to simplify the whole matter into the shape of  
 a sword and buckler, and to say, "Voilà la cause de  
 "leur malheurs." The Gauls were, by their own con-  
 fession, the most formidable enemy that ever the Ro-  
 mans encountered; and what enabled the latter to  
 overcome them; and if them, all the world? A long  
 shield, and a short sword! What! "tant de grandes  
 "actions, tant de triomphes, tant de politique, de  
 "sagesse, de prudence, de constance, de courage; ce  
 "projet d'envahir tout, si bien formé si bien soutenu, si  
 "bien fini;" does all this resolve itself into an ini-  
 mitably devised sword and shield? Could all this have  
 been counteracted,—could so mighty a flood, swelled  
 like the Nile with all its congregated waters, have been  
 stopped by the labour of a blacksmith in shortening a  
 sword and lengthening a shield? It is certain, and not  
 at all surprising, that Cæsar, during his *ten* years strug-  
 gle in their country, never hints at the nature of their  
 arms as influencing the fortune of the war. He does  
 not thence draw any argument to encourage his troops  
 when they were shy of encountering the Germans un-  
 der Ariovistus; nor to account for the advantages that

the Germans had obtained over the Gauls. And in the speech that Livy, (XXXVIII. 17.) puts into the mouth of the consul Cn. Manlius Vulso, previous to an engagement with the Gallo-Greeks, (or Galatians,) their *large* shields are mentioned as a thing that ought to be considered indifferent: "procera corpora, pro-missæ et rutilatæ comæ, *vasta scuta*, prælongi "gladii:" &c.

To say that the Romans treated the Gauls nearly as the Spaniards did the Mexicans, is a license beyond what can be permitted even to the vivacity of a Frenchman. If this were so why did the Romans think it necessary, in the year 527, to raise "*sept cent mille* "hommes de pied, et *soixante et dix mille* de cheval, "pour opposer aux *Gaulois*?" Chap. 4. How did the Gauls contrive to take Rome, in the year 363, keep it seven months, and then return home without being molested? (Hooke, I. 447.) And why was a Gallicus tumultus generally considered an exigency that demanded the appointment of a dictator? The *majority* of Hannibal's infantry, with which he beat the Romans, though more than double his numbers in every battle during *sixteen* years, consisted of *Gauls*.\* So that whenever the Gauls were defeated they might say, as the Irish said after the battle of the Boyne, "Let us exchange generals, and we'll fight it over again." Mr. Pinkerton has shown that all the Gauls who gave any trouble to the Romans, as well as the Germans, were Goths. At various times they destroyed many Roman

---

\* At the battle of Cannæ: 8,000 Africans.  
8,000 Spaniards.  
24,000 Gauls.

---

Total 40,000 Foot.

armies. The party under Ambiorix that cut to pieces a Roman legion under Cæsar's lieutenants, Q. Titurius Sabinus, and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, did not surpass their opponents in numbers. Cæsar would not have required eight legions, and ten years, to subdue Gaul; nor would his achievements have acquired for him a glory which eclipses that of all competitors, if the Gauls had not been a respectable enemy. Nor would Sallust have made the following decisive acknowledgement: "*Oum cæteris gentibus à populo Romano de imperio tantum fuisse dimicatum; cum Gallis de singulorum hominum salute.*" Bel. Jug. ad fin.

"On dit encore qu' Annibal fit une grande faute de mener son armée à Capoue où elle s'amollit: mais l'on ne considère point que l'on ne remonte pas à la vraie cause. Les soldats de cette armée, devenus riches après tant de victoires, n'auraient-ils pas trouvé partout Capoue?" Chap. 4. He adds that Hannibal could not imitate Alexander in setting fire to the baggage of his army, because it was composed of mercenaries. But Montesquieu, by adopting the fable of the effminacy introduced into Hannibal's army by the luxuries of Capua, has himself missed the true cause of the change in the character of the war after the battle of Cannæ. "It does not appear (says Hooke, II. 180.) by their after-behaviour that they had lost much of their martial ardour. The principal cause of the decline of Hannibal's affairs in Italy after the battle of Cannæ, seems to have been his not receiving supplies from his own country. He had not men enough to oppose so many armies as the Romans sent against him, and at the same time to garrison the towns, and protect the countries, that had submitted to him.

“ And that his residence at Capua had abated nothing  
 “ of his wonted activity, seems plain from Livy him-  
 “ self, who informs us that as soon as the rigour of  
 “ the season began to soften, he renewed the siege of  
 “ Casilinum, and this in the sight of an army which  
 “ without reckoning the allies, amounted to 25,000  
 “ men.” Next year “ they besieged him as it were  
 “ with armies,” &c. P. 186.

“ De tous les rois que les Romains attaquèrent, Mi-  
 “ thridate seul se défendit avec courage, *et les mit en*  
 “ *peril.*” “ Rien n’avait plus perdu la plupart des  
 “ rois, que le desir manifeste qu’ils témoignaient de la  
 “ paix; ils avaient détourné par là tous les autres  
 “ peuples de partager avec eux un peril dont ils vou-  
 “ laient tant sortir eux-mêmes. Mais Mithridate fit  
 “ d’abord sentir à toute la terre qu’il était ennemi des  
 “ Romains, & qu’ il le serait toujours.” Cette dispo-  
 “ sition des choses produisit *trois grandes guerres* qui  
 “ forment un des beaux morceaux de l’Histoire Ro-  
 “ maine;” &c.

“ Ce prince, après avoir battu les *Generaux Romains*,  
 “ et fait la conquête de l’Asie, de la Macedoine, &  
 “ de la Grece, ayant été vaincu à son tour par Sylla;  
 “ réduit par un traité à ses anciens limites; fatigués  
 “ par les *Generaux Romains*; devenu encore une fois  
 “ leur vainqueur & le conquerant de l’Asie;” &c.

“ Dans l’abyme où il était, il forma le dessein de  
 “ porter la guerre en *Italie*, et d’aller a Rome avec les  
 “ *mêmes nations qui l’asservirent quelques siècles après*,  
 “ *et par le même chemin qu’elles tinrent.*” (Chap. 7.)

Montesquieu has here scattered his speciosa miracula  
 with a liberal hand; which, however, must dissolve  
 under the touch of truth, like the beautiful shapes of



hour-frost when smitten by the morning sun. 1. Mithridates was undoubtedly a very extraordinary person for energy, talents, and perseverance, but he never brought the Romans into the smallest danger; because while he only *thrice* defeated detachments of their armies, he was himself repeatedly routed by Sylla, Lucullus and Pompey, deprived of all his resources, and driven to suicide through despair. The first advantage he obtained over the Romans was in 665, when his general Neoptolemus defeated M. Aquilius; the other two in 686, when the army of Lucullus was in a state of mutiny, and of two divisions of it under Fabius Adrianus, and Triarius, the first was defeated, the second nearly destroyed by Mithridates in person. In 672 he fought a drawn battle with Murena. 2 Supposing it to have been his intention, by the massacre of 80,000 Romans, to signify to all the world his constant hostility, and determination to prosecute what Dr. Middleton chooses to call an "inexpiable war" against the republic; yet when Sylla, after one campaign, (in 667,) dictated to him an ignominious peace, "he soon forfeited all the benefit he could possibly have promised himself from such a declaration." (Hooker, III. 149.) 3. There were *three* Mithridatic wars, but the *last* only could be called a *great war*. The first began in 665, and ended in 668; but there was no fighting in 666, and only one battle in 665, when Aquilius was defeated. The second began in 669, or 670, and ended in 672; Murena, who conducted it, meeting with no opposition except in one drawn battle. The third began in 679, and ended in 690. 4. With respect to Mithridate's intention of marching 2000 miles from the Nieper to Rome, "at the head of those nati-

“ons who enslaved it some centuries later, and by the  
 “same way they then took;” I shall borrow the words  
 of Hooke: (III. 266.) “I know not whether by these  
 “last words the judicious author intended to intimate  
 “that because the Roman state was, some hundreds  
 “of years after this time, enslaved by the nations he  
 “refers to, it would now have been endangered by an  
 “invasion from the same nations. If he did, he must  
 “surely have forgotten for a moment, that Rome was  
 “now almost in the highest degree of strength she ever  
 “attained to; and that she was fallen into extreme  
 “weakness, and broken all to pieces, when those na-  
 “tions succeeded in their attempt upon her.”

Montesquieu takes no notice of Viriatus, the Lusitanian, a more destructive enemy of the Romans than Mithridates, except in a note (Chap. 6.) where he speaks of a negotiation, mentioned in a fragment of Dio Cassius, which Hooke has proved to be utterly destitute of foundation. (II. 508.)

“Les patriciens furent forcés de lui accorder (i. e.  
 “to the plebeians) tout ce qu’ il demanda: car dans  
 “une ville où la pauvreté était la vertu publique, où  
 “les richesses, cette voie sourde pour acquérir la puis-  
 “sance, *étaient méprisées*, la naissance & les dignités  
 “ne pouvaient pas donner de grands avantages. La  
 “puissance devait donc revenir au plus grand nombre,  
 “& l’aristocratie se changer peu à peu en un état  
 “populaire.”

“On jugea qu’ il valait mieux créer une  
 “magistrature (the tribunes) qui pût empêcher les  
 “injustices faites à un plébéien. *Mais par une mala-*  
 “*die éternelle des hommes*, les plébéiens qui avaient  
 “obtenu des tribuns pour se défendre, s’en servirent

“ pour attaquer ; ils enleverent peu à peu toutes les  
 “ prerogatives des patriciens : cela produisit des con-  
 “ testations continuelles.”

“ Le senat se defendait par sa sagesse, sa justice &  
 “ l’amour qu’ il inspirait pour la patrie ;” &c. &c.  
 “ enfin par une condescendance paternelle à accorder  
 “ au peuple une partie de ses demandes, pour lui faire  
 “ abandonner les autres, et cette maxime constante de  
 “ préférer la conservation de la république aux pré-  
 “ rogatives de quelque ordre ou de quelque magistra-  
 “ ture que ce fût.”

“ Mais comme les mœurs anciennes n’ étaient plus,  
 “ que des particuliers avaient des richesses immenses,  
 “ & qu’ il est impossible que les richesses ne donnent  
 “ du pouvoir, les Nobles résisterent avec plus de force  
 “ que les patriciens n’ avaient fait ; ce qui fut cause de  
 “ la mort des *Gracches*, et de plusieurs de ceux qui  
 “ travaillèrent sur leur plan. (*Comme Saturninus et*  
 “ *Glaucias.*)” (Chap. 8 )

The *malady* imputed to the plebeians was the very same, by the operation of which the people of England obtained, first their great charter, and successively every other bulwark of their constitution ;—a determination to possess their just rights. Was it a just prerogative of the patricians that they should form a *cast* in the republic, whose birthright it should be to hold all the highest offices in the state to the exclusion of the rest of their fellow-citizens ? And the *paternal condescension* and *justice* of the patricians, were evinced by their monopoly of the public lands, and their murder of Spurius Cassius for attempting to infringe it ; by a nine year’s resistance that they opposed to the Terentillian law, the object of which was to procure the laws

T

of the twelve tables; and a *ten* year's resistance to the Licinian laws which opened the consulate to the plebeians. Aristocracy had always the ascendant until the time of Marius, when anarchy broke in. To say that Saturninus and Glancia acted on the same plan as the Gracchi, is nearly as fair as it would be to say that Robespierre followed the plans of Turgot.

“ *Il y a bien de la différence* entre les lois bonnes et les lois convenables; celles qui font qu' un peuple se rend maître des autres, et celles qui maintiennent sa puissance lorsqu' il l'a acquise.” Chap. 9. Nevertheless I would ask, *what* is the difference between good laws, and suitable laws?

“ Il y a à présent dans le monde une république que personne ne connaît, (*Le Canton de Berne!*) et qui dans le secret & le silence augmente ses forces chaque jour. Il est certain que si elle parvient jamais à l'état de *grandeur* où sa sagesse la destine, elle changera nécessairement ses lois; & ce ne sera pas l'ouvrage d'un législateur, mais celui de la corruption même.” Chap. 9. It is unnecessary to say that Bern has long ceased to be *unknown*; and that it has never made any approaches to that greatness to which it appeared to Montesquieu to be destined.

In an English translation of this work I find here a note, which is not in the French edition I am using, but which is evidently Montesquieu's: “ The Roman government has been thought defective by some, because it was an intermixture of *monarchy*, aristocracy, and popular authority. But the perfection of a government does not consist in its conformity to any particular plan to be found in the writings of politicians; but in its correspondence to the views every

"legislator ought to entertain for the grandeur and  
 "felicity of a people. Was not the government of  
 "Sparta composed of three branches?" The defect  
 of the Roman government was, not the existence, but  
 the non-existence of monarchy as a component part.

"Sylla fit des lois très-propres à ôter la cause des dés-  
 "ordres que l'on avait vus : elles augmentaient l'au-  
 "torité du sénat, temperaient le pouvoir du peuple,  
 "réglaient celui des tribuns. La fantaisie qui lui  
 "fit quitter la dictature, sembla rendre la vie à la  
 "republique; mais dans la fureur de ses succès il  
 "avait fait des choses qui mirent Rome dans l'impossi-  
 "bilité de conserver sa liberté." Chap. 11. Sylla reme-  
 died the disorders in the state by the terrors of a san-  
 guinary despotism, and by exterminating thousands of  
 his enemies.

"Il avait donné des établissemens à quarante sept.  
 "legions (twenty-three, Hooke, III. 173.) dans divers  
 "endroits d'Italie." Chap. 11.

"Claude acheva de perdre les anciens ordres, en  
 "donnant à ses officiers le droit de rendre la justice.  
 "Les guerres de Marius et de Sylla ne se faisaient que  
 "pour savoir qui aurait ce droit, des sénateurs ou des che-  
 "liers; une fantaisie d'un imbécille l'ota aux uns & aux  
 "autres: étrange succès d'une dispute qui avait mis  
 "en combustion tout l'univers!" Chap. 15. Marius  
 never proposed, nor procured the proposal, of any law  
 regulating the election of judges. The rivalry be-  
 tween Marius and Sylla originated in their being the  
 children and champions of the contending parties that  
 tore the bosom of their country,—the people and the  
 nobles; or in the Pattonian language, persons and pro-  
 perty: and the immediate cause of its breaking out

into civil war, was a contest for the conduct of the Mithridatic war in the year 665. Even if there had been any previous dispute with respect to the right of jurisdiction, yet the prize they contended for was a mastery, not over one branch, but over every branch of administration. The result of the war between Marius and Sylla, was, first, the dictatorship of Sylla; then the first triumvirate of Crassus, Pompey and Cæsar; then, the dictatorship of Cæsar; then, the second triumvirate of Antony, Lepidus and Augustus, and finally the accession of Augustus to the Imperial throne. But Montesquieu, disdaining the restraints of time and reason, picks out a trifling regulation of Claudius, which only affected the provinces, (for at Rome the panel of judges continued to be struck by a prætor, Suet. Claud. 16.) and passed fifty years after the faintest murmurs of popular dissention had subsided; states *that* as the result of Sylla's triumph over the Marians, and exclaims, "wonderful issue of a contest that had set the world in flames!"

"Cæsar pardonna à tout le monde; mais il me semble que la modération que l'on montre après que l'on a tout usurpé, ne mérite pas de grandes louanges." Chap. 11. To me the only difficulty appears to be, how to bestow an adequate tribute of praise on a man, who, under the most trying circumstances, discovered a heroic, an unparalleled freedom from the impulses of revenge, and the anxieties of fear. And this portion of the Roman story shines with the brighter lustre for being interposed between periods incarnadined with the atrocities of Marius and Sylla, Antony and Augustus.

"Elles (the correspondence of Cicero and his friends) sont le chef d'œuvre de la naïveté de gens unis par

“ une douleur commune, et d’un siècle ou la fausse.  
 “ politesse n’avait pas mis le mensonge partout:  
 “ enfin, on n’y voit point, comme dans la plupart de  
 “ nos lettres modernes, des gens qui veulent se trom-  
 “ per, mais des amis malheureux qui cherchent à se  
 “ tout dire.” Chap. 11. No modern letters can display  
 more finished specimens of polite simulation and dissimulation, not to speak of downright falsehoods in matters of fact, than these of Cicero and his friends. If insincere and derisive compliments, if profuse expressions of admiration, esteem, and regard, towards the very same correspondent, of whom in other letters he speaks with reproach, aversion and contempt; be tokens of “ fausse politesse,” there is no lack of them in the letters in question. But the reader shall judge from a specimen or two. Cicero succeeded Appius Pulcher in the government of Cilicia. In a letter to Atticus. (VI. 1.) he speaks of his predecessor as follows: “ And.  
 “ no wonder that he is displeased with my manner; for what can be more unlike than his administration and mine? Under him the province was  
 “ drained by expences and exactions; under me not  
 “ a penny levied for public or private use: What shall  
 “ I say of his præfects, attendants, lieutenants? Of  
 “ their plunders, rapines, injuries?” On his return to Rome, Appius was impeached on charges founded on the above-mentioned practices, and for bribery and corruption in his suit for the consulship, by P. Cornelius Dolabella, whom Cicero, *at this time*, wished and expected to have for a son-in-law, which he became in the same year (703) by marrying his daughter Tullia. Cicero neither advised, nor wished success to the impeachment, on which subject the sincerity of his pro-

fessions to Appius cannot be questioned : not so with respect to his admiration of the conduct and character of Appius, and his ignorance of the projected alliance with Dolabella. To Appius he writes (Ep. Fam. III. 10. Melm. VI. 1.) "As for myself be well assured (and " I call every God to witness the sincerity of what I " promise,) that I will exert my utmost interest in " support, I will not say of your person, which I hope " is in no danger, but of your *dignities* and *honour*." " I am sorry you should have an opportunity of experiencing, by an incident so little agreeable to you, " the rank you bear in my affection, the esteem which " I entertain for Pompey, whom I justly value above " all men, and the measure of my unfeigned regard for " Brutus: circumstances I should hope of which our " daily intercourse had rendered you sufficiently sensible." " I had received an account from our friend " Cœlius, before your letter reached my hand of the " idle and ridiculous report he has propagated," (respecting the match between Dolabella and Tullia, which Cœlius had been commissioned by Cicero to promote,) " and on which you so largely expatiate. " There is so little ground however for what he asserts, " that be assured I would much sooner break off all " former friendship with a man who had thus declared " himself your enemy, than he prevailed upon to engage with him in any new connexions." After the acquittal of Appius, he writes to him thus: " My information was by this means" (i. e. having received an account of it from Appius himself) " not only more " full than what I had learned from common fame, but " it brought you nearer to my imagination, and rendered you in some sort present to those sentiments



" of joy which arose upon this occasion in my heart.  
 " Accordingly I embraced you in my thoughts, and  
 " kissed the letter that gave me so much reason to re-  
 " joice upon my own account as well as upon yours.  
 " I say, upon my own account, because I look upon  
 " those honours which are thus paid by the general  
 " voice of my country to *VIRTUE, industry, and genius,*  
 " as paid to myself; being too much disposed, perhaps,  
 " to imagine that these are qualities to which my own  
 " character is no stranger." Ep. Fam. III. 11. Melm.  
 VI. 5. Cicero laughs with Cœlius at his treatment of  
 Appius. He writes to the former: "What would you  
 " have said had you seen the letter I wrote to Appius  
 " (Ep. Fam. III. 10.) after my receiving yours upon  
 " that subject?" (the alliance with Dolabella.) "But  
 " what can a man of the world do?" "Quid si meam  
 " (sc. epistolam) legas quam ego tum ex tuis literis  
 " misi ad Appium? sed quid agas? sic vivitur." Ep.  
 Fam. VIII. 6. "Mr. Bayle observes," (says Hooke,  
 III. 583,) "that Cœlius letter to Cicero, concerning  
 " Dolabella, (whom Cœlius knew to be a rake and a  
 " spend-thrift) is exactly in the style of compliment  
 " that would now be used in the like case. "On ex-  
 " cuserait le passé sur la jeunesse; et si l'on n'osait  
 " pas assurer que toutes les imperfections de cet age  
 " fussent corrigées, on dirait que le mariage avec  
 " une personne si accomplie, avec la fille d'un si ex-  
 " cellent pere, acheverait la guerison." (Art. Tullie.)  
 "The letter runs thus:

"MARCUS CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

" I congratulate you on your alliance with so wor-  
 " thy a man as Dolabella: for such I sincerely think  
 " him. His former conduct, it is true, has not been

“ altogether for his own advantage. But time has now  
 “ worn out those little indiscretions of his youth: At  
 “ least, if any of them should still remain the autho-  
 “ rity and advantage of your advice and friendship,  
 “ together with the good sense of Tullia, will soon,  
 “ I am confident, reclaim him. He is by no means,  
 “ indeed, obstinate: And it is not from any incapa-  
 “ city of discerning better, whenever he deviates from  
 “ the right path. To say all in one word, I infinitely  
 “ love him.” (Melm. VI. 8.)

Of Pompey, the hero of Cicero's unbounded panegyric in his oration pro lege Manilia, and whom, as we have seen above, “he valued above all men;” he writes to Atticus, (I. 13.) “Nihil come, nihil simplex, nihil  
 “ *εν τοις πολιτικοις* honestum, nihil forte, nihil liberum.”  
 Again (I. 20.) “Is vir nihil habet amplum, nihil excelsum, nihil non summisum, et populare.” When Pompey failed to protect Cicero against the violence of Clodius, Dr. Middleton says: (P. 344.) “it was  
 “ Pompey's conduct which shocked Cicero the most:  
 “ not for its being contrary to *his oaths*, which the ambitions can easily dispense with, but *to his interest*,  
 “ which they never neglect, but through weakness.  
 “ The consideration of what was *useful* to Pompey  
 “ made him depend on his assistance.” Of the same Pompey Cicero says, (in a letter to Atticus after the death of Pompey,) “I knew him to be an honest, grave,  
 “ and worthy man:” and the same Dr. Middleton adds: “*This* was the short and true character of the  
 “ man from one who perfectly knew him.” (Life of Cic. II. 132.)

Cicero, unbosoming himself to Atticus, (III. 15.) speaks with shame and regret of his not having opposed

force to the violence of Clodius: "Si quisquam fuisset  
 " qui me, Pompeii minus liberali responso perterri-  
 " tum, a *turpissimo consilio* revocaret; aut occubuis-  
 " sem honeste; aut victores hodie viveremus." And  
 yet in his speech for Sextius (C. 20.) he invokes hea-  
 ven and earth to witness that he submitted to a volun-  
 tary exile, in order to spare the blood of his fellow  
 citizens, and preserve the public tranquility: "Te, te,  
 " patria, testor, et vos penates, patriique Dii, me ves-  
 " trarum sedum templorumque causa, me propter sa-  
 " lutem meorum civium, quæ mihi semper fuit mea  
 " carior vita, dimicationem cædemque fugisse."

An accident only prevented Cicero from being the  
 advocate of Catiline on his trial (in 689) for "hack-  
 " ing to pieces Marius Gratidianus, the orator's near  
 " kinsman, and carrying the bloody head, plenum  
 " animæ et spiritus, through the streets, to make a  
 " present of it to Sylla." (Hooke, III. 316.—329.)

In the year 699, Cicero writes to M. Licinius Cras-  
 sus: "It was my ambition, from the first moment I  
 " entered the forum, to be ranked in the number of  
 " your friends. And I have the satisfaction to reflect,  
 " that I have never from that time to this hour, failed  
 " in the highest sentiments of esteem for you: As I  
 " doubt not you have always retained the same af-  
 " fectionate regard for me." "Let me desire you to  
 " consider this letter, not as a strain of unmeaning  
 " compliment, but as a sacred and solemn covenant of  
 " friendship, which I shall most sincerely and religi-  
 " ously observe." (Ep. Fam. V. 8. Melm. II. 7.) And  
 soon after he writes to Atticus, respecting the same  
 Crassus: (IV. 13.) "Our friend Crassus, they say, did  
 " not set out from Rome in his general's robe, with

“ so much dignity as Paullus Æmillius heretofore,  
 “ though, like him, a second time consul. *Oh the*  
*“ worthless man!”* “ O hominem nequam!”

Cicero, who addressed to Cæsar his speech for Marcellus, was ready, at that moment, to applaud any assassin who would have laid him dead at his feet. If on that day he had seen him pierced with three and twenty wounds, and had apprehended no danger, he would have exclaimed: “ Quæ enim res (pro sancte Jupiter!) non modo in hac urbe, sed in omnibus terris est gesta major? quæ gloriosior? quæ commendatior hominum memoriæ sempiternæ? (II. In M. Anton. 13.”) Are these the ingenuous effusions of *naïveté*? Are these indications of impeccability with respect to *mensonge*?

Cicero, and Lord Bacon, were men who with peculiar propriety might have assumed for their motto: *video meliora, proboque; deteriora sequor*: With too much ambition to be satisfied with literary glory; and too little energy, constancy, and fortitude to acquire political eminence without a total abandonment of their independence. If they had lived in our days, they might have succeeded with *less* sacrifice of honour, and *less* violation of duty.

“ Il n’y a point de gens qui craignent si fort les  
 “ malheurs, que ceux que la misère de leur condition  
 “ pourrait rassurer, et qui devraient dire, avec Andromaque: *Plût à Dieu que je craignisse!*” Chap. 14.  
 How is this to be reconciled with the following? “ Le  
 “ peuple voyant sans peine dépouiller toutes les  
 “ grandes familles, il jouissait des fruits de la tyrannie, et il en jouissait surement, car il trouvait sa sûreté  
 “ dans sa bassesse.” Chap. 15.

“ Caracalla augmenta la paye des soldats: Macrin  
 “ écrivit au sénat que cette augmentation alloit à  
 “ soixante et dix millions de drachmes. Il y a ap-  
 “ parence que ce prince enflait les choses: et si l’on  
 “ compare la dépense de la paye de nos soldats d’au-  
 “ jourd’hui avec le reste des dépenses publiques, &  
 “ qu’ou suive la même proportion pour les Romains,  
 “ on verra que cette somme eût été énorme.” Chap.  
 16. What is the meaning of “cette augmentation?”  
 Does it mean the amount of the increased pay, *exclusive*  
 or *inclusive* of the old pay? The truth is that the pas-  
 sage referred to in Dion Cassius, speaks of neither one  
 nor the other, but of annual *gifts* independent of pay,  
 of 70,000,000 of drachmæ, or denarii, which, at 8 pence  
 each, amount to £ 2,333,333 0 8. Compared with  
 its object such a sum appears excessive; but considered  
 (as Montesquieu considered it) as the amount of the  
 increase of pay to the army of so extensive an empire,  
 it ought not to appear excessive *in our times*, though,  
 no doubt, it did to the Romans. See Gibbon’s his-  
 tory, Vol. I. p. 220.

“ Toutes ces nations qui entouraient l’empire en  
 “ Europe et en Asie, absorberent peu à peu les rich-  
 “ esses des Romains; et comme ils s’étaient agrandis  
 “ parceque l’or & l’argent de tous les rois étaient portés  
 “ chez eux, ils s’affaiblirent parceque leur or et leur  
 “ argent furent portés chez les autres.” Chap. 18. There  
 never was a plainer mistake of effects for causes than  
 we have here; and nobody has more frequently insisted  
 on the inefficacy of riches, and on the positive advan-  
 tages of poverty, than Montesquieu. “ Carthage, qui  
 “ faisait la guerre avec son opulence contre la pauvreté  
 “ Romaine, avait par cela même du désavantage: l’or &

“ l'argent s'épuise; mais la vertu, la constance, la force, & la pauvreté ne s'épuisent jamais.” Chap. 4.

“ En Orient on a de tout tems multiplié l'usage des femmes, pour leur ôter l'ascendant prodigieux qu'elles ont sur nous dans ces climats: mais à Constantinople, la loi d'une seule femme donna à ce sexe l'empire: ce qui mit quelquefois de la faiblesse dans le gouvernement.” Chap. 20. An epicure does not cover his table with a profusion of delicacies in order to diminish his relish for each particular dish. The character of Sardanapalus is more frequent in Asia than in Europe. Polygamy did not preserve Masinissa from the ascendancy that Sophonisba gained over him; nor David from Bathsheba; nor Ahasuerus from Esther; nor Mahomet II. from Irene; nor Solyman the magnificent from Roxalana. If Alexander fired the palace of Persepolis, it was not at the instigation of his wife. If Antony lost the world, it was not for love of his wife: They could not blame monogamy for the influence that Thais and Cleopatra possessed, and which would have been just the same if the Macedonian and the Roman had been lords of populous seraglios.

“ Comme les anciens Romains fortifierent leur Empire, en y laissant toute sorte de culte; dans la suite on le reduisit à rien, en coupant, l'une après l'autre, les sectes qui ne dominaient pas.” Chap. 20. Before the christian era there was so much uniformity in the paganism of Italy, that the Romans could give few proofs of tolerance or intolerance. If there had existed different sects in Rome, all equally favoured by the state, and participating equally in political privileges; if among contemporaneous consuls and prætors we had found variable proportions of orthodoxy and he-

terodoxy, we might justly admire the extent of Roman toleration. But no such phenomena are recorded in their history. On the other hand, there are a few indications of intolerance. In the year 325 the city and country were afflicted with a drought and pestilence, which were ascribed to the prevalence of foreign rites, and modes of propitiating the Gods. "Datum inde negotium ædilibus, ut animadverterent, *ne qui, nisi Romani Dii*, neu quo alio more, quam patrio, colerentur." (Livy, IV. 30.) In the year 540, great indignation was excited among the good by the adulteration of the established religion; and the prætor was directed to read to the assembled people a decree of the senate, and his own edict, "which commanded all persons who had books of divination or prayers, or containing instructions about the rites of sacrifices, to bring them to him before the 1st of April; and forbade all persons to offer sacrifice in public, or in any sacred place whatsoever, according to any new or foreign ceremonies." (Hooke, II. 203. Livy, XXV. 1.) The suppression of the Bacchanalians in 567, cannot be cited as an instance of intolerance, as they were a monstrous society of practical anti-nomians. (Livy, XXXIX. 8—19.) I conclude with the following extract from chapter 16, which is altogether unobjectionable, and at the same time quite irreconcilable with the character of universal toleration ascribed to the Romans in chapter 20. "On sait que les Romains reçurent dans leur ville les Dieux des autres pays. Ils les reçurent en conquérans, ils les faisaient porter dans les triomphes:" [They were admitted into the calendar by public authority:] "mais lorsque les étrangers vinrent eux-mêmes les établir, on les reprima

“ d’abord. On sait de plus, que les Romains avaient  
 “ contume de donner aux divinités étrangères les noms  
 “ de celles des leurs qui y avaient le plus de rapport ;  
 “ mais lorsque les prêtres des autres pays voulurent  
 “ faire adorer à Rome leurs divinités sous leurs pro-  
 “ pres noms, *ils ne furent pas soufferts*, ET CE FUT UN  
 “ DES GRANDS OBSTACLES QUE TROUVA LA RELIGION  
 “ CHRETIENNE.”\*

“ *Voici une étrange contradiction de l’esprit humain.*  
 “ Les ministres de la religion chez les premiers Ro-  
 “ mains n’étant pas exclus des charges & de la société  
 “ civile, s’embarrassèrent peu de *ses affaires*. Lorsque  
 “ la religion chrétienne fut établie, les Ecclesiastiques  
 “ qui étaient plus séparés des affaires du monde, s’en  
 “ mêlèrent avec modération : mais lorsque, dans la de-  
 “ cadence de l’empire, les Moines furent le seul clergé,  
 “ ces gens destinés par une profession plus particulière

---

\* See Lardner’s credibility, and Warburton’s Divine legation of Moses.  
 With the exception of what is said about the rites of Bacchus, the follow-  
 ing extemporaneous passage is worthy of Burke. “ The honourable  
 “ gentleman, speaking of the Heathens, certainly could not mean to re-  
 “ commend any thing, that is derived from that impure source. But he  
 “ has praised the tolerating spirit of the Heathens. Well! but the ho-  
 “ nourable gentleman will recollect that Heathens, that Polytheists, must  
 “ permit a number of Divinities. It is the very essence of its constitution.  
 “ But was it ever heard that Polytheism tolerated a dissent from a Poly-  
 “ theistic establishment? the belief of one God only? Never, never! Sir,  
 “ they constantly carried on persecution against that doctrine. I will not  
 “ give Heathens the glory of a doctrine, which I consider the best part of  
 “ christianity. The honourable gentleman must recollect the Roman law,  
 “ that was clearly against the introduction of any foreign rites in matters  
 “ of religion. You have it at large in Livy how they persecuted in the  
 “ first introduction of the rites of Bacchus: and even before Christ, to say  
 “ nothing of their subsequent persecutions, they persecuted the Druids  
 “ and others. Heathenism, therefore, as in other respects erroneous, was  
 “ erroneous in point of persecution.” (Works, X. 32.)



“ à fuir & à craindre les affaires, embrassèrent toutes les occasions qui purent leur y donner part; ils ne cessèrent de faire du bruit partout, & d'agiter ce monde qu'ils avaient quitté.” If by “ses affaires” he meant civil and military appointments, it is certainly an unfounded assertion to say that the ministers of religion were less ambitious of possessing them than others. The most successful and powerful men in the state had always the best offices in the colleges of priests and augurs. See the contests for the office of Pontifex Maximus, mentioned in Livy, XXV. 5. XL. 42. Julius Cæsar was Pontifex Maximus, so was Lepidus, so was Augustus. Where then is the “surprising contradiction in human nature?” Where is there an example of men despising power and wealth when not too far removed from their means and hopes?

---

Subjoined to the English translation there is a dialogue between Sylla and Eucrates, in which it is preposterously attempted to throw around the character of Sylla the splendour,—not of military glory, not of daring guilt, and fearless ambition,—but of patriotism and a love of liberty. Among other things equally reasonable Sylla is made to say: “When I entered Rome with my troops, *I breathed neither rage nor revenge*. I passed sentence without hatred, but also without pity, on astonished Romans. You were free, said I; and you want to live slaves. *No die; and you will have the advantage of dying citizens of a free city.*” But whatever sentiments Montesquieu might choose to attribute to Sylla, he should not have put into his mouth a prophecy which in point of fact was not fulfilled. “My laws,” says Sylla, “are murdered at in secret; they can never be effaced but by

“ floods of Roman blood.” Now, they were effaced without the effusion of a drop of blood, eleven years after being promulgated, or in the first consulship of Pompey, in the year 683. Still more should he have avoided the following egregious anachronisms. Sylla: “ While I left that Roman (*Marius*) to enjoy his power over the populace, I multiplied his mortifications, and forced him to go every day to the capitol to return thanks to the Gods for successes which drove him to distraction.” “ At last Mithridates sued for peace;—Mithridates was struck motionless, and *Marius trembled in the midst of Rome.*” *Marius* was banished in 665, returned in 666, and died *January 13, 667.* Sylla passed into Greece in 666, but did not take Athens till *1st March, 667.* He made peace with Mithridates in 668. Again. “ Chance, or perhaps a more powerful destiny, made me spare him, (C. *Julius Cæsar.*) *My eyes are ever on him, I study his soul where he hides deep purposes.* But if he dare to form the design of commanding men whom I have made my equals, I swear by the Gods, I will punish his insolence.” The dialogue is supposed to take place a few days after the abdication of Sylla, or in the end of the year 674. Next year Sylla died. In 671, Cæsar, then in the 17th year of his age, and having been in great danger of being proscribed, passed into Asia, to serve under Minucius Thermus, and did not return to Rome till after the death of Sylla, in 675.

ART. IV. *Observations on a Defence of the Funding System, contained in the Edinburgh Review, No. IX.*

Art. VIII.

**I**F the funding system be defensible upon principles of political economy, it might be expected that the writer of the above article could not fail in the execution of the task he had undertaken: if, on the other hand, it be indefensible, no familiarity with the principles of the science, no command of its technical language, no dexterity of argumentation, can ultimately protect it against a resolute and sedulous application of truths drawn from the same store-houses that he himself has resorted to; and which all who would qualify themselves, and be worthy, to enter into such discussions, must visit before they venture to step into the arena. The main proposition which the Reviewer had to establish was, that the funding system afforded the most advantageous mode of providing for the extraordinary expences of war: but he has appended that proposition to another, *viz.* that the extraordinary expenditure occasioned by war is in itself *a good*, a check to the excessive accumulation of wealth equally salutary with the checks that reduce a redundant population. He accordingly draws a parallel between wealth and population in the ratios and consequences of their increase; and asserts that "what the increase of wealth has produced in Holland, the increase of population has produced in China." "But the evils of increasing capital, like the evils of increasing population, are felt long before the case has become extreme; and a nation it may be observed, is much more likely,

" (at least in the present state of commercial policy,) to suffer from increasing wealth than from increasing numbers of people." He then enumerates the checks which there was reason, *a priori*, to suppose would be provided by nature; luxurious living, private profusion of every kind; but, above all, the expenses of war.

The corollary that one would naturally expect from the *original* doctrine above stated would be, that the best mode of providing for a war expenditure is that which opens the widest channel for carrying off redundant capital, and saves us most effectually from the misery of wallowing in excessive opulence. But no; he escapes *per saltum* from that perilous ground, and assumes as the basis of his defence of the funding system, that it is the only mode in which a nation can raise extraordinary supplies without touching the capitals of individuals; and "that it directly throws the expenses of the emergency upon the surplus revenue of the community; first, by the yearly interest paid for the use of the money borrowed, and then by the provisions for gradual repayment, which a wise nation will always make a part of its funding system." The system, it is contended, has this farther advantage, that as war absorbs the men thrown out of employment by the obstructions which it opposes to trade and manufactures, so it also absorbs the capitals which the same obstructions deprive of their accustomed means of profitable investment. "Hence the public funds afford a sort of entrepôt for capital, a deposit, where it is naturally collected in a useful employment;" (inasmuch as wars are necessary evils,) ready at the same time for other services, and capable of being

"transferred in a moment to fill those blanks which accident may occasion."

Now, I shall endeavour to prove, in the first place, that no analogy subsists between the effects of increasing wealth and increasing population: *secondly*, that the funding system is the most wasteful and pernicious that could be adopted: *thirdly*, that the public funds afford no such deposit or receptacle for capital, whence it can be withdrawn at will, as the Reviewer imagines.

1. To speak of excessive wealth is as absurd as to speak of excessive virtue, or excessive happiness. Can we recede too far from poverty and vice; or possess too many sources of enjoyment? If great wealth be a curse, poverty must be a blessing; and if the Dutch suffer from super-abundant riches, the poor Chinese, and poorer Patagonian, must lead very comfortable lives. The paradox may be traced to an abuse of the words *wealth* and *riches*, and seems to be akin to that of Lord Lauderdale, who defined individual riches to "consist of all that man desires as useful or delightful to him; *which exists in a degree of scarcity*:" whence it followed that the poorest of all conditions was that in which there was *no* scarcity, but a superfluity of all that man desires as useful or delightful! The Reviewer has entangled himself in all this inconsistency by ascribing to the increase of wealth what was solely the effect of the increase of population; and by deducing as parallel or analogous effects from two separate causes, what flowed from one and the same cause. Thus, if Holland has reached the utmost limit of advancement, and has become stationary, it is because her brimful population has occupied every source of revenue; because neither industry, skill, nor economy

could extract more from her narrow territory, and from commerce with surrounding nations. Holland is stationary from the *same cause* that China is stationary: for though Holland be rich and China poor, it does not follow that they are not both examples of plenitude of population. There has been something in the laws and political institutions of Europe, (which philosophers have investigated with more or less felicity, but in which much must be referred to an idio-syncrasy inscrutable to human apprehensions, and) which has promoted such a subdivision of society, and such a diffusion of property through its several ranks, as are most favourable to civilization and happiness. The same circumstances, combined with the empire of opinion, preserve its ranks in their respective places, and prevent them from subsiding into the uniform poverty of China, by multiplying to the utmost extent that a supply of mere animal wants will permit. When Britain shall have arrived at the boundary of her progress, (from which she is far distant,) she will not begin to sink into poverty by dividing diminishing portions among increasing numbers: the rich will continue to maintain the same political preponderance, the same refinement in their manners, the same graceful magnificence in their establishments; the Corinthian capital will still crown the shaft; the pyramid will still be graduated from the base to the apex; while science and the arts will never fail to receive a munificent recompence. As these attributes of European civilization would not be endangered by the progress of population, so neither has the want of them in China, nor her squalid poverty, been occasioned by the complete occupation of her immense territory by innumerable rice-

eating swarms. China was never in a much better condition, in these respects, than she is at this day; and has, in every period of her history, afforded an example of the truth of the following observation of Mr. Malthus: "If a country were never to be over-run  
" by a people more advanced in arts, but left to its own  
" natural progress in civilization; from the time that  
" its produce might be considered as an unit, to the  
" time that it might be considered as a million, during  
" the lapse of many thousand years, there would not  
" be a single period when the mass of the people could  
" be said to be free from distress, either directly or  
" indirectly, from want of food."

The checks to wealth and the checks to population, instead of co-operating, according to the analogy traced by the Reviewer, counteract each other. Thus the grand check of *war*, which the Reviewer looks on as giving a double relief, by taking off at once the super-abundant wealth and population, might, we may conceive, make the diminution of the one so keep pace with the diminution of the other that the remaining quantities should bear the same proportion to each other, that they did before the self-counteracting remedy was applied. The most powerful of the positive checks to population, pestilence and epidemics, only aggravate the evils of super-abundant wealth, for which the most obvious specific check, to be brought in aid of luxurious living and profuse expenditure of every kind, would be to consume by fire, or throw into the sea, *quant. suf.* of the superfluity: a remedy of such easy application, and such infallible efficacy, that, if it was never resorted to even by the Dutch, we may justly suspect that the disease to which it refers, ought

to be expunged from every political nosology. That prudent people, in spite of every evidence of the alarming accumulation of their wealth, never exceeded their incomes in the purchase of luxurious indulgences; they contracted public debts under the delusive belief, that it was the cheapest mode of defraying the expences of war; and if we have heard of their destroying part of the produce of their spice harvests, it was assuredly not with the view of reducing their profits by a single stiver. Political expences, instead of being a check to the pretended evil of progressive wealth, *analogous to the checks to the progress of population*, are *directly* referable to the principle of population, as a preventive check. They abridge the present comforts of a nation, and remove to a somewhat greater distance the period when, in the long lapse of time, some future generation would find, that they had replenished their territory, till it could maintain no more without reducing the general scale of individual enjoyments. That this consideration never influenced the counsels of a Cabinet, and was never contemplated as an ultimate object of national policy, will readily be granted; but whether, in the calm retrospection of the closet, it affords matter for satisfaction, or for regret, is a question on which different opinions may be held. It may be observed that the preventive check from great political expenditure is more violent in its operation than the case requires, or than the legitimate one of moral restraint would furnish: the former prevents the growth of a population, for which there would otherwise be room; the latter prevents the growth of one, for which there would not be room: the former diminishes the supply by restraining the natural expansion of the de-



mand; the latter regulates the supply according to an unrestrained increase of the demand. This would be the effect of profuse public expenditure, considered as unaccompanied by the waste of lives that war occasions; for the tendency of these two kinds of consumption, namely, of wealth and of lives, is to counteract each other, and the demand for fresh hands will be inversely as the former, and directly as the latter. But it was proper to consider the effect of an excessive consumption of wealth abstractedly, to shew that it was rather itself an evil, than the check to one. Now let us hear the Reviewer: "In a wealthy state of society, there is much less mischief to be apprehended from the conversion of a certain portion of capital into revenue, while the accumulation is going on, than men have generally been disposed to believe. Let us suppose that the nature of man were not warlike; that no such expences had been necessary as Great Britain has been forced to incur during the course of the last century, and that, consequently, she had contracted no public debts. It is not easy to calculate the amount of the capital she would have accumulated during that period. The sum of five hundred millions is evidently not enough: every pound of that enormous sum would have been laid out at compound interest, and have accumulated so as perhaps to double in the period to which we have alluded, even allowing for a vast augmentation of yearly expence, occasioned by a more rapid increase of population. With perhaps half as many more inhabitants—a thing no ways desirable on any account, she would have possessed twice as much fixed and realized stock—a thing to be deprecated on

"many accounts. We know how difficult it is, in the  
 "present state of her wealth, to find vent for capital.  
 "How could double the amount be invested with  
 "profit?" In the *first* place, if the expences incurred  
 by the wars of the last century had been defrayed by  
 supplies raised within the year, "five hundred millions"  
 might be considered the sum they had cost; but, as,  
 in addition to the loans composing the above sum, an  
 equal amount was paid for interest in the course of  
 every twenty years, the expenditure occasioned by wars  
 during the last century cannot be estimated at less than  
 a thousand millions. *Secondly*, "every pound of this  
 "enormous sum would have been laid out at compound  
 "interest."—The whole of the expenditure in questi-  
 on was taken from the private incomes of individuals;  
 capital is never converted into revenue for the purpose  
 of paying taxes; and as perhaps nine tenths of it, if left  
 to the disposal of individuals, would have been con-  
 sumed in the ordinary articles of private expenditure,  
 the addition of one tenth to the capital would have  
 given a rate of accumulation very different from "com-  
 "pound interest." It is impossible for capital to ac-  
 cumulate indefinitely at compound interest; but, what-  
 ever the increase might have been, it certainly would  
 not have been diminished by the absolute increase of  
 expence consequent on the progress of population; and  
 therefore no allowance whatever should have been  
 made "for a vast augmentation of yearly expence,"  
 "occasioned by a more rapid increase of population,"  
 since this last implies an increase of industry, and of  
 the produce of the land and labour of the country.  
*Thirdly*, "with perhaps half as many more inhabitants"  
 "—a thing no ways desirable on any account,"—

It is rather an extravagant estimate of the force of the preventive check occasioned by the deductions made from private incomes by the war expences of last century, to suppose that, but for them, Great Britain would now contain five millions of inhabitants more than her present numbers. But whatever the increase might have been, the means of subsistence having kept pace with it, such increase would have been desirable on many accounts. With an absolutely greater population, Great Britain would not have been relatively more populous, nor more over-peopled than at present: but she would have possessed more political strength; more useful and magnificent public works; and in short, the means of life and enjoyment for a greater number of rational beings. If these things be not desirable, then we are every day advancing to decay; and if we could go backwards to the comparatively scanty population in the days of good Queen Bess, it were a renovation devoutly to be wished. *Fourthly*, "she would now have possessed twice as much fixed "and realized stock—a thing to be deprecated on many "accounts."—When stock cannot be invested with profit, it is a proof that the country has its full complement of inhabitants, and cannot reward more labour than is already employed in every department. The owner of such stock does not suffer from its excess, (for if that were the case he might destroy *quant. suf.*) but from a deficiency of the fund for the maintenance of labour compared with the demands upon it. If his moneyed wealth cannot yield him a revenue, it resembles the wealth of Midas, and savours of downright poverty. If, in consequence of a shower of diamonds, these stones were to lose all their exchangeable value,

and men were to consider them no more precious than the cock did in the fable, those who had possessed diamonds immediately before the shower would find their fortunes diminished by the amount of all that they had paid for them, but we could not say that this loss was occasioned by an excess of *wealth*. The capital which has little value in an over-peopled country, because, every source of revenue being occupied, there is no demand for the produce of the manufacturing labour it could employ, and the sums expended in the maintenance of such labour would not be returned, much less returned with a profit, has a tendency to emigrate to an under-peopled country, where the labour it could employ would be abundantly rewarded.

There is a passage in Hume's Essay on Commerce, by which it appears that, while he would not speak of an excess of wealth, which must always be absurd *ex vi termini*, he did not advert to the limited fund for the maintenance of the labour that might be employed in providing articles of use or ornament, and supposes that population may go on so long as raw materials can be found whereon men may exercise their labour and skill. He is speaking of the diversion of industry occasioned by the shutting of a foreign market: "The same hands will turn themselves towards some refinement in other commodities which may be wanted at home, and there must always be materials for them to work upon; till every person in the state who possesses riches, enjoys as great plenty of home commodities, and those in as great perfection as he desires; which can never possibly happen." If men will not regulate their desires, yet Nature will regulate their numbers and possessions with an irresistible arm;

for more men cannot be employed in manufactures than can be subsisted by that portion of the limited quantity of surplus food in the world which is not consumed by all other non-agricultural classes, churchmen, soldiers, play-wrights, fiddlers, statesmen, and buffoons, all of whom must find a provision, and enact their parts in the great drama of life.

II. If profuse political expenditure is to be considered a check to the evil of excessive wealth, the legitimate inference seems to be, that the duty of repressing this growing mischief should constantly be before the eyes of a Financier, and that he should anxiously meditate the following question: How shall I contrive to open the widest outlet for this pestilent commodity? But the Rewiewer himself abandons and condemns this doctrine by giving the preference to the funding system, *because*, according to him, it is the mode of raising extraordinary supplies *least injurious* to national opulence; and is even the only way in which the expences of war can be defrayed without encroaching on the capitals of individuals. This is the main question in debate; and I contend that the proposition whereon he founds the superiority of the funding system, is as distant from the truth as the North is distant from the South. Let us suppose that "a nation which expends 10 millions a year in its government and public works during peace, will be forced at once to spend 30 millions, perhaps, in one year of war. How shall this sudden augmentation of expence be provided for?" He decides that the safest, the easiest, and most advantageous plan will be to borrow the additional sums required, and to raise the interest within the year, which at 5 per cent. is but one twentieth part of the principal.

He does not advance a step beyond this inviting threshold; otherwise he must have been deterred by the following inevitable consequences: The nation in question is supposed to spend 10 millions in time of peace, and 30 millions in time of war. If it abstain from the funding system, these sums will defray the national expences, respectively in peace and war, *for ever*: since the argument is not at all affected by the consideration that these expences may increase with increasing national resources. But it is assumed that the nation cannot afford to raise within the year much more than the peace establishment of 10 millions, and therefore 20 millions are annually borrowed in time of war. Let us further suppose that there is to be an alternate succession of ten years of war, and ten of peace. In the last year of the *first* period of war, and during the succeeding interval of peace, it will be necessary to raise within the year 20 millions, that is, double the sum actually required for "its government and public works." In the last year of the *second* period of war, and during the succeeding interval of peace, it will be necessary to raise within the year 30 millions. The incomes of individuals would then be as heavily incumbered during peace, as they would have been during war, if the nation had not adopted the funding system. I need not follow the calculation farther: I have only traced the system to the thirtieth year from its commencement, (including ten years of peace during which it was suspended,) and it is manifest that, without a very unusual measure of longevity, a man might live to witness the "national ruin" with which it is pregnant, and be compelled from sad experience to confess the folly in which it originated.

If nothing interposed to interrupt the progress of the system, the power of contribution of the nation would at last be exhausted, and the public service, whether of peace or war, left wholly unprovided for.

With respect to the relief which may be derived from the sinking fund, "which a wise nation will always make a part of its funding system;" I reply that this modification of the system only implies the expiatory sacrifices by which the nation may redeem its past improvidence. It is the wisdom of atoning for error. It is the wisdom of a man who determines to liberate the estate which his extravagance had encumbered, by alienating for several years, to his creditors, one half of his revenue, and contenting himself with the other half. It is the wisdom of a physician who should prescribe a morbid regimen, and comfort his patient by assuring him that he would at the same time administer such nauseous antidotes as would at length expel the disease which he had induced. A wise nation will never think that system innocuous, of which a painful curative process is a necessary concomitant. If the sums levied for the purpose of feeding the sinking fund bear a small proportion to the loans, such as one per cent. the debt accumulated by successive wars will for some time so far outstrip the slow pace at which the redemption will be going on, that it will require a very long cycle for such a sinking fund to extinguish the debt: and if at last the debt should be paid off, it will be found, 1st, that the *maximum* of annual contribution would have been greater than under the non-funding system; 2d, that the sum total levied by taxes and paid into the Exchequer during the whole period, would have exceeded the sum total paid during the same period under

the non-funding system, by the amount of *all the interest* that the public creditors had received; which excess divided over the whole period would give a heavier average annual contribution than under the non-funding system. These results, which are conclusive with respect to the comparative merits of the two systems, would follow in a less degree, according as the sum levied for the purpose of feeding the sinking fund bore a higher proportion to the loans, and thereby redeemed the debt within a smaller cycle. If at any time a temporary relief should be sought by a diversion of the sinking fund, the effect of such diversion will be equivalent to borrowing at compound instead of simple interest; it will aggravate the inherent evil of the system by turning against the resources of the nation, with respect to all loans so provided for, the same accelerating force which the sinking fund employs to liberate the public revenue. The compound interest received by the Commissioners of the sinking fund, and applied to the accelerated liquidation of the national debt, results from our paying into their hands all the interest disengaged by the progressive reduction of the debt, and is gained on the principle that a penny saved is a penny gained; the saving is, therefore, in proportion to the celerity with which the sinking fund effects its object; but how much more advantageous is the non-funding system, in which not one penny is paid for interest; in which *no part* of this expence is incurred *to reduce which* constitutes the sole merit of the sinking fund, "which a wise nation will always make a part of its funding system!"

The Reviewer does not urge a syllable in anticipation of, or in reply to, these unconquerable difficulties,



which appear to demonstrate that the funding system is essentially pernicious, and is less so exactly in proportion as it approximates to the system of raising the whole of the supplies within the year. Whence this dilemma is unavoidable: either he was ignorant of the very cardinal points in the subject of his discussion, notwithstanding the practical admonitions afforded by the state of the British finances at the time of his writing; or he expected to satisfy his reader by presenting to him only *one side* of the account, namely, that which contained the burthens imposed by the non-funding system. He thinks his argument goes smoothly on while he dwells on the *intolerable* weight of these burthens; and yet recommends a system which would impose much heavier burthens! A nation which defrays the expences of war by proportionate additions to its yearly contributions, acts like the wise slave whose lessons childhood is wont to sip, who chose the heaviest burthen with the certainty of getting rid of it in a few days; but a nation which provides for them by loans, more foolish than his companions, chooses a burthen, lighter indeed at first, but which is every year growing heavier, and soon exceeds that which it before shrunk from encountering. But while he nearly suppresses the inconveniences on one side, he does not even give a fair statement of those on the other; the obliquity of the beam is doubly affected by his putting too little into one scale, and too much into the other. What individuals can afford to contribute for the public service out of their private incomes, ought to be considered as just a measure of the extent to which the public expenditure may be carried, as the remaining portion is of the quantity of personal comforts or luxuries which

they can command. And as an individual who has encumbered his private estate, entails future suffering and sacrifices on himself and his family; so a nation that has encumbered its public revenue, entails suffering and sacrifices on itself, whether it preserve good faith with the public creditors or not. In both cases, if resources be anticipated, future enjoyments must be abridged; and in a still greater degree, inasmuch as the price of the anticipated enjoyment is enhanced by the amount of all the interest that accumulates until the uttermost farthing of the principal, or *original price*, be paid off. It is therefore, no more an excuse for a nation to say, that such and such establishments could not have been kept up, nor such and such subsidies advanced, without contracting debt, than it is for an individual of two hundred a year to say that he could not keep his carriage without running in debt. If the income was inadequate to these expences, the only conclusion is that they should never have been incurred: the former being fixed, the latter must be adjusted to it. To apply these considerations to the case stated by the Reviewer. If a nation which expends 10 millions in time of peace, cannot, without touching the capitals of individuals, advance 80 millions for the expences of war, these expences may be proportionably reduced: and whatever *necessity* is brought to justify such additions to the expenditure as could not be met without borrowing, would justify such deductions from capital, or such contributions in kind, as a resolute and high spirited people would cheerfully pay to the utmost extent of their means. This last mode of meeting the emergency would ensure one supreme advantage, that such extraordinary exertions would never be demand-

ed but when the necessity was real and acknowledged; and not, as is too often the case when loans are resorted to, for imaginary necessities, and to enable Kings and Ministers to play their "fantastic tricks before high Heaven." But I can by no means assent to the arguments of the Reviewer against the practicability of tripling the ordinary taxes in the case supposed. "The bulk of the community, the middle orders, on whom the chief weight of all taxes must ultimately fall, are peculiarly unable to increase their contributions on any sudden emergency. The man who could *hardly* pay fifty pounds last year, would have nothing to live upon, were you to take from him one hundred and fifty or two hundred pounds this year. He must either leave the country, hide his property, or encroach on his capital, or run in debt with a *Jew*. If he encroaches on his capital, he is less able to pay taxes next year, even to the ordinary amount; and no prudent government would listen to a scheme which should make *the whole individuals of the community run in debt*, on their separate individual accounts, admitting that they could *all* give such security as would induce money-holders to trust them." And truly if they cannot give such security there is little danger of their running in debt; but if *all* are to be borrowers, *who* are to be the lenders? A more egregious bull never set the table on a roar. But "the chief weight of all taxes" does *not* "ultimately fall" on the "middle," but on the higher orders; partly by their payment of direct taxes on luxuries beyond the reach of the middle orders, but chiefly by their reimbursing, in a great measure, by means of an advance in the wages of labour, and in the prices of all commo-

dities, the sums indirectly advanced by the inferior orders in their consumption of articles subject to duties of customs and excise. The public revenue might be tripled without making a three-fold deduction from the incomes of the middle and lower orders, by means of direct and indirect impositions that would chiefly affect the higher orders. To triple the light taxes requisite for a peace establishment, when there is supposed to be no national debt, could not occasion any inconvenience. We have seen very great augmentations made to the taxes in the middle of a war, after the sums levied during peace had been more than tripled. Besides, it is quite a gratuitous supposition that the man who pays "fifty pounds" in a year of peace could "hardly pay" that sum; he pays it with ease, and could pay three or four times as much with little inconvenience: for the contribution of fifty pounds in time of peace, and when there is no public debt, implies an income of eight hundred a year. In 1803, Mr. Colquhoun estimated the income of Great Britain at 222 millions; the taxes, including poor rates at 40 millions, being 18 per cent.; and divided in the proportion of 28 per cent. on the first or highest class in the community, 20 on the second, 16 on the third, and 9 on the labouring or lowest. The weight of taxation adjusts itself, with little aid from the financier according to the various capacities of individuals; and while all retain their relative places in society, the abridgment of physical superfluities is little felt. For it is not the *absolute*, but the *relative*, wealth of individuals that regulates their ranks in society; and riches are not desirable, because they enable a man to fare sumptuously every day, but for the sympathy they attract, the personal consideration and pow-

er which they confer: and poverty is dreaded, not so much because it retrenches comforts and conveniences, as because it "is despised and makes men contemptible: it exposes a man to the insolence of evil persons, and leaves a man defenceless: it is always suspected: its stories are accounted lies, and all its counsels fol-  
 "lies: it puts a man from all employments: it makes  
 "a man's discourse tedious and his society trouble-  
 "some."\* Now this is the fate of the relatively poor man, but extraordinary contributions to the public service do not bring a man nearer to this state; he continues to hold the same distance from those above and below him that he did before.

III. It remains to examine the solidity of the third part of the Reviewer's speculation: *viz.* that, independently of its economizing national wealth, an established funding system possesses the peculiar advantage of affording an ever accessible investment for capital.  
 "The immediate effect of every war, civil or external,  
 "and, in a less degree, of all those other emergencies  
 "which happen to a nation, is to obstruct the ordinary  
 "employment of capital; to throw a quantity of stock  
 "formerly profitably invested, out of its place, and to  
 "prevent the new accumulations of stock from finding  
 "new channels of investment. A great mass of capital  
 "is thus collected in the hands both of the mercantile  
 "and manufacturing parts of the community, shifting  
 "and floating about, ready for any speculation, or any  
 "profitable use whatever. This is, in our opinion,  
 "the part of the national stock which naturally seeks  
 "the service of the public: it can be employed in no

---

\* Bishop Taylor,

“ other way, and should be used by the State.” But in the shocks that trade may experience, does the whole of every displaced capital *float* so as to be entirely disposable for some other employment? and even if no fragments were submerged, does it yield the same returns after being used by the State that it did before? undoubtedly not. The manufacturer who makes 10 per cent. on his capital as it stands in his books, would receive from the public only 5 per cent. on such parts of it as he could collect from the wreck: he cannot pour into the funds the value of his machinery, his skill, his credit, his correspondence. If, as is almost always the case both with manufacturers and merchants, a considerable portion of the capital he employed consisted of borrowed money, he must lose the whole of the profit he made by the use of such borrowed money, since the funds yield only that legal interest which he must pay to his private creditor. Traders, therefore, on borrowed capital, and on long credit, cannot find relief in this way; neither can traders on commission, for they also have little or no capital to invest in any manner, and if they lose their commissions, they lose every thing. The funds are more advantageously resorted to by those merchants whose stock is of a more transferable character, and by men of every rank and profession who spend less than their incomes; but all these persons might find other means of bestowing their savings, in the extension of agriculture and trade, at home or in the colonies: the funds intercept them from these productive employments, and turn them to the unproductive and destructive service of war. But the funding system is chiefly supported, as it gratefully repays the obligation, by the moneyed interest: the benefits which

it confers on this interest are indisputable, but it is as indisputable that these benefits are gained at the expence of the country. The immense floating capitals of moneyed men would never have existed, but for the funding system, in such a shape, and in such hands; such a race of men would not have existed; and if *they* should mourn the death of a system, of which they are the children and champions, (and we know

—————" nemo dolorem

" Fingit in hoc casu, ———

" Ploratur lacrymis amissa pecunia veris;")

yet the most eager advocate for the poor laws will hardly insist on the expediency, as a separate and ultimate object of policy, of assessing the country for the purpose of enriching the rich; and defend the interests of loan-contractors and stock-jobbers, as identified with the public prosperity. By "death" of the funding system, I mean an extinction of the national debt effected by the sinking fund, and not one involving the smallest breach of good faith.

But though we talk of money being *invested* in the funds, we must not be imposed on by such an application of the word *investment*, as if the funds were actually a productive source of revenue like agriculture or commerce; or like mines, docks, canals, and banks, belonging to joint-stock companies with transferable shares. Let us hear the Reviewer: "Hence the public funds afford a sort of *entrepot*, a *deposit*, where it is naturally collected in an useful employment, (inasmuch as wars are necessary evils,) ready, at the same time for other services, and capable of being transferred in a moment to fill those blanks which accident may occasion." This passage affords a good example of the truth of the observation, that "Metaphors are fal-

“lacious when used without a sufficient regard to just analogy, and when the qualities of one object are “transferred to another:” \* and an analysis of it will precipitate a considerable quantity of error, which the single word *deposit* holds in solution. Property is invested in the funds in two ways: 1st, when the loan-contractor advances the money to government which is expended in the public service, and for which new stock is created: 2d, when stock already existing is transferred from the seller to the buyer. In the first way the funds afford such a receptacle as the tub of the Danaides afforded; money thus invested is irrecoverably spent, and can never be “transferred to fill those “blanks which accident may occasion.” In the second way there is not the shadow of a “deposit,” for the purchaser of stock places his money at once at the disposal of the seller of stock: neither does the former place his money into, nor the latter withdraw his money from, any public deposit, for the purpose of filling up any vacancy; the transaction is nothing more than the shifting of so much money from one hand to another. The public funds are the record of wealth expended, and not an “entrepot,” or deposit,” wherein it may be lodged, and whence it may be withdrawn, at will. In estimating the existing wealth of the country, the capital of the public debt is a mere nonentity, not a fund whence that wealth can be recruited, and where capital might, as it were, sleep till its services were required; neither is its amount at all affected however many transfers the public creditors may make of their securities.

---

\* See the Observations on Nominalism.



In the following passage the Reviewer presumes, perhaps, still more on the negligence of his reader with respect to the ambiguities of language: "The emergencies of public affairs produce the very men required by their demands, and the very sums of money by which those men may be hired by the State. *The same capitals now continue to employ the same men as during peace.* Formerly they were employed in manufactures and trade; now those channels are obstructed, and the stock is thrown into the public service, together with the men no longer useful in the peaceable arts." If there be no difference between *consumption* and *production*; if labour be equally profitable, whether it be employed in the service of the State, or in that of the merchant and farmer,—whether men be cruising in frigates, or navigating merchantmen; whether they be roused from their beds by the rattling drum and ear-piercing sife, to seek the enemy in tented fields, or by the "cock's shrill clarion," to direct the plough in subduing the stubborn glebe;—then we may admit that "the same capitals now continue to employ the same men as during peace:" but as consumption and production are operations not merely different but opposite, the above passage, when corrected, will stand thus: the same capitals are now speedily consumed by the same men who during peace might have derived a permanent livelihood from them; and contributions are now levied from others to replace the revenues they yielded when employed in the peaceable arts.

Such being the nature of the Funding System, *Miseri quibus intentata nitet!*

**ART. V. A Synopsis of the British Finances, and of the Funding System, during twenty years, from 1793 to 1812.**

Year.	Revenue.	Borrowed.	Total expended.	Charge for Sinking Fund.	Public Service.	Revenue more than Public Service.	Revenue less than Public Service.	Unredeemed, and Repaid.
1793	17,656,418	4,500,000	22,156,418	10,704,646	11,451,772	6,204,616	—	6,951,772
1794	17,170,400	12,907,451	30,077,851	11,467,970	18,609,881	—	1,439,481	5,702,450
1795	17,308,811	42,099,647	59,408,458	18,898,150	45,510,308	—	28,201,497	3,410,661
1796	17,868,454	29,720,727	47,589,181	15,111,203	32,473,978	—	14,615,524	2,747,261
1797	18,737,760	27,649,399	46,387,159	17,193,518	29,193,646	—	10,455,896	1,644,247
1798	20,654,650	18,008,000	38,662,650	18,501,042	20,160,608	504,142	—	2,150,608
1799	30,202,915	12,500,000	42,702,915	20,296,355	22,406,560	7,786,355	—	9,906,590
1800	35,415,096	18,500,000	53,915,096	21,258,305	32,656,791	2,758,305	—	14,156,791
1801	33,896,464	25,500,000	59,396,464	23,184,348	36,212,121	—	2,315,657	10,712,121
1802	35,415,096	31,910,450	67,325,546	24,319,824	42,975,722	—	7,560,626	11,685,872
1803	27,240,213	10,000,000	37,240,213	25,176,856	12,063,357	15,176,856	—	2,063,357
1804	36,858,373	10,000,000	46,858,373	25,910,144	22,948,329	15,910,144	—	12,948,329
1805	46,578,564	20,000,000	66,578,564	26,160,787	40,417,777	6,160,787	—	20,417,777
1806	51,339,045	18,000,000	69,339,045	28,466,146	40,872,899	10,466,146	—	22,672,899
1807	53,982,155	12,200,000	67,182,035	29,129,570	38,129,570	16,852,461	—	25,929,570
1808	60,189,414	12,000,000	72,189,414	29,929,837	42,259,577	17,929,837	—	30,259,577
1809	63,026,563	18,932,100	81,958,663	31,073,402	50,885,261	12,141,302	—	31,958,161
1810	65,227,264	16,311,000	81,538,264	32,043,208	49,495,061	13,732,208	—	33,184,011
1811	69,188,041	24,000,000	93,188,041	33,539,163	59,648,878	9,539,163	—	35,648,878
1812	66,973,208	27,871,325	94,844,533	35,444,036	59,400,497	7,572,711	—	31,529,172
Total—	787,918,784	392,608,099	1,180,526,883	472,764,320	707,762,563	144,744,859	64,588,671	315,154,464
Average.	39,395,939	19,630,404	59,026,344	23,636,216	35,388,122	—	—	15,757,723
The above sum of £392,608,099 was funded for.....£581,850,812								
Contracted before 1793.....536,281,248								
Redeemed,.....819,612,060								
Unredeemed November 1812,.....£31,809,300								
.....£507,504,010								

1. In the sums borrowed for 1795 and 1797 are included two sums amounting to £6,220,000 advanced to the Emperor of Germany, and still distinguished in the public accounts by the name of *The Imperial Loan*.

2. The above table will in part explain why the price of stock was lower in the beginning of the year 1798 than it ever was before or since.

3. It appears that the average loan during the above period of twenty years was about 20 millions, which has occasioned an encumbrance on the revenue of upwards of 24 millions.

4. It appears that, instead of expending a *greater* sum on the *public service* than could be raised by taxation, we have expended a *less* sum by £80,156,221.

5. Suppose that on the 1st January, 1816, there should be a peace establishment of 20 millions; that (the present taxes being kept up) the revenue should be 70 millions; that in the interval three loans of 27 millions each should be raised; and that the sinking fund should not be diverted. The three loans might be funded for £125,000,000; the sinking fund would redeem £68,800,000; making the unredeemed debt, January, 1816, about £644,002,670, which might thus be redeemed in about 14 years. Total payments on account of the debt from the first year of peace, 14 times 50 millions, equal to 700 millions.

6. Suppose that in pursuance of Mr. Vansittart's plan, and in consequence of unprecedented subsidies, &c. the unredeemed debt, January, 1816, should be 819 millions. With a peace establishment of 20 millions, a revenue of 70, and a sinking fund of about 6 millions, this debt might be expunged in about 18 years. Total payments on account of the debt from

A a

the first year of peace, 18 times 50 millions, equal to 900 millions.

7. Suppose that, other things being the same as in the first hypothesis, taxes are taken off equal to the reduction of expenditure; it will take 22 years to redeem the debt, and the payments will be 22 times 40 millions, equal to 880 millions.

8. Suppose that, other things being the same as in the second hypothesis, taxes are taken off equal to the reduction of expenditure; it will take 44 years to redeem the debt, and the payments will be 44 times 36 millions, equal to 1584 millions.

9. Hence the impolicy of taking off a single tax during peace is abundantly evident: and yet nothing is more certain than that some taxes *will be* taken off; and that the next war will occur before the revenue has been liberated in any material degree.

10. The above calculations are made with round numbers, and partly with conjectural data; and it was impossible to make a just allowance for the progressive rise in the price of stock consequent on the operation of the sinking fund. The results, however, are not materially distant from the truth; and they serve to illustrate the comparative effects of those financial measures that must always form so important an object of parliamentary discussion and of national interest.\*

---

\* Written before the first expulsion of Bonaparte.

**ART. VI.** *On the distinction between productive and unproductive labour.*

**T**HE first error on this subject is that of the economists, who maintain that no labour is productive but that which is employed in agriculture: the second is that of the Edinburgh Reviewer of Lord Lauderdale's work on public wealth, who contends that *all* labour, and *all* employments of stock, are equally productive; and that there is no difference between capital and revenue. It will require little more than a statement of these opinions to refute them. It were inexcusable to spend many words upon it.

The writer compares a menial servant to a commodity bought for consumption, and a labourer to a tool bought for working with. Yet he observes: "At any rate there is no such difference as Dr. Smith supposes between the effects of maintaining a multitude of these several kinds of workmen. It is the extravagant quantity, not the peculiar quality of the labour thus paid for, that brings on ruin." (Vol. IV. p. 354.) On the principle of his own illustration there is a difference in the *quality* of both kinds of labour, with reference to which must be regulated the *quantity* of each kind that a man can afford to maintain; and this difference coincides exactly with that between production and consumption, or acquisition and expenditure. Still more explicitly does the Reviewer observe: "In such a complicated system it is clear that *all* labour has the same effect, and *equally* encreases the whole mass of wealth." "And he who holds the labour of soldiers, and sailors, and diplomatic agents to be unproductive, commits precisely the same error as

" he who should maintain the labour of the hedger  
 " unproductive, because he only protects and does not  
 " rear the crop. All those kinds of labour and em-  
 " ployments of stock, are parts of the system, and *all*  
 " *are EQUALLY PRODUCTIVE of wealth.*" (P. 364.) It  
 follows irresistibly that the employment of capital in  
*warlike* operations is as productive a source of gain as  
 the employment of capital in *agricultural* operations;  
 and we have accordingly some vehement objurcation  
 of Dr. Smith for pretending to see much *expence*, and  
*no profit*, in our warlike speculations. " The author  
 " (Dr. Smith) actually remarks how much richer Eng-  
 " land would now be, had she not waged such and such  
 " wars. So might we estimate how many more coats  
 " we might have, had we always gone naked." Let  
 us take his two illustrations in their order, first the  
 " hedger," and then the " coats." It is certain that  
 the direct effect of the labour of the hedger is to en-  
 crease the quantity of the crop, and that his labour thus  
 pays itself and leaves a surplus, as much as that of the  
 plougher or sower. On the other hand the labour of  
 the soldier, sailor (in the Royal navy,) and diploma-  
 tic agent, has no influence whatever, directly or indi-  
 rectly, in the production of any species of wealth. And  
 whatever equivalent in political indemnity or security  
 may result from their labour, they contribute nothing  
 to the fund by which it is supported, which is wholly  
 fed from the sources of productive labour. With res-  
 pect to the " coats," it is admitted that they were  
 purchased, not gratuitously acquired; and that they  
 were so many occasions of diminishing, not of adding  
 to, our riches: if then the objects of war and negoti-  
 ation were in a similar predicament, and were mean-

of expending, not of creating, the wealth of England; how can it be maintained that the labour of soldiers is as "*productive of wealth*" as that of husbandmen? If the Reviewer had turned gymnosophist, or if by some witchcraft his clothes had always remained good and fashionable, we are not to suppose that his tailor's bills would have gone on without stint for the mere pleasure of accumulating coats; unless indeed that very circumstance had been an inducement to order a double quantity, as is reported of the Irishman with respect to the everlasting breeches. No: the money saved by exemption from the necessity of purchasing clothing, would have been appropriated to the procuring of other enjoyments; and, in like manner, the sums saved by the non-waging of such and such wars, would have been available for the purchase of other permanent or perishable objects of utility.

As the Reviewer cannot discriminate between production and consumption, it is very consistent that he should object to the distinction between capital and revenue. "But a difference is established by some, especially by Dr. Smith, between capital and the other parts of stock; capital being, according to them, that part which brings in a revenue. This idea clearly appears by the whole of the illustration given of it, to have arisen from the fundamental error of considering nothing as productive which does not yield a tangible return, and of confounding use with exchange. For may not a man live upon his stock, that is enjoy his capital, *without either diminishing or exchanging any part of it?*"—How may this be? I may feel very happy *simul ac nummos contemplor in arca*, but I cannot "live upon" this species of enjoy-

ment. "In what does the value and the real nature of  
 " stock reserved for immediate consumption differ from  
 " stock that yields, what Dr. Smith calls a revenue or  
 " profit? Merely in this—that the former is wanted  
 " and used itself by the owner; the latter is not want-  
 " ed by him, and therefore is exchanged for something  
 " which he does want."—"According to Dr. Smith  
 " there is some difference between revenue and enjoy-  
 " ment; and that part of a man's property yields him  
 " no profit which is most useful and necessary to him;  
 " by which he can support and enjoy life without the  
 " necessity of any operation of barter." If the fun-  
 " damental error lie with him who considers that to be  
 " productive of wealth, which does *not* yield a tangible  
 " return, it will follow that the identity of capital and  
 " revenue, of the hen and the golden eggs, cannot be  
 " established. But the Reviewer instantly contradicts  
 " himself by admitting that there *is* a difference, which,  
 " says he, consists "merely in this," that a man's re-  
 " venue is the exact measure of his wants, and that he  
 " does not encroach upon his capital, because his capaci-  
 " ty of enjoyment has been already saturated by the ex-  
 " penditure of his revenue! a representation, which, if  
 " it were founded in truth, it would be difficult to recon-  
 " cile with the existence of vice and misery in the world.  
 " It does not appear how the Reviewer would prove that  
 " there is *no* "difference between revenue and enjoy-  
 " ment;" and that revenue yields *profit*, because it  
 " enables a man to "support and enjoy life," *i. e.* is the  
 " source and measure of enjoyment, *i. e.* of *itself*! Re-  
 " venue and enjoyment are the same thing; but revenue  
 " yields profit, because it yields enjoyment! *Ohe, jam*  
*satis est.*



**ART. VII. *On the Nominalism of Berkeley, Hume, Campbell, Burke, and Stewart.***

---

“ Scarce two great scholars in an age, but with bitter invectives they  
 \* fall foul one on the other, and their adherents; Scotists, Thomists, *Reals*,  
 \* *Nominals*, Plato and Aristotle, Galenists and Paracelsians, &c.; it holds  
 \* in all professions.” BURTON.

---

**A**LL the words of a language, except proper names, represent general ideas, or things connected with them. *How* we conceive these ideas is no more wonderful, or incomprehensible, than any other operation of the mind: that we do conceive them is a fact of which we are conscious; and we may pronounce that a system founded on the negation of this fact must be erroneous. Every thing in nature is particular, therefore ideas must refer to particulars, say the nominalists. This conclusion depends on an inadmissible analogy; for though analogy may sometimes supply the defect of, it ought never to be substituted for, real phenomena. The phenomena of mind must be studied with the same unbiassed attention with which we observe those of matter; and it would be equally improper to transfer, by analogy, the laws of the physical to the moral, as of the moral to the physical world. The colour green exists only as a quality of certain objects; it has no separate, independent, existence: but that the abstract idea of green, without reference to any individual object, should exist in the mind, is as simple a fact as that the idea of a green tree should exist in it. Rejecting abstract and general ideas, the nominalists explain the mode in which the signs of such ideas affect the mind

in two ways: 1. General terms excite ideas of particular objects which represent all those comprehended under the term; abstract terms also excite ideas of particular objects of which we attend only to the quality expressed by the term, as the colour of a tree without regard to its other properties: 2. They sometimes answer their purpose without exciting any ideas, like the letters used in Algebra. From the first explanation they have been called *Particularists*, and the errors it involves have been unanswerably exposed by Dr. Reid and Mr. Brown. From the second they may be called *Nihilists*, and as it has not attracted the attention of those two great Conceptualists, I shall venture, under their auspices, to examine it.

BERKELEY. (*Prin. Hum. Know. Introd.*)

"In reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet, to proceed right, it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for."

This is a favourite illustration with Leibnitz and all the nominalists; and if they could shew that in one science signs may be used without attending to the things signified, (a contradictory proposition which they confidently advance) we might readily concede its practicability in all cases. In stating the conditions of an equation it is allowed that we must attend to the values of the several letters: of course we cannot consider the particular number represented by those whose values are required, but they suggest the general idea of number. In the subsequent steps of the operation

it is not requisite that the letters suggest the *particular* quantities they were appointed to stand for, but they are not therefore insignificant; they suggest general ideas of quantity, under certain relations whose signs are carefully attended to, for now the truth depends on the immutable relations of number and quantity, and it is sufficient that the letters suggest ideas of something susceptible of such relations. The result being obtained, it becomes necessary to advert to the *particular* significations originally assigned them. The signs  $+$ ,  $-$ , &c. constantly suggest the ideas of addition, subtraction, &c.: are we then adding nothing to nothing, and subtracting nothing from nothing? That would be absurd. It appears, therefore, that we do conceive abstract general ideas, and that the illustration proves the reverse of what it was intended to prove.

Signs, whether words, or Algebraic characters, that do not suggest particular ideas must be insignificant, according to the system I am considering; so that, in reading or discourse, we may be employed in observing the relations of nonentities! It is true that words may be "used as letters are in Algebra;" but I have endeavoured to shew that when we do not attend to the particular significations of the latter, we do attend to their general significations. In the same manner words must constantly suggest their significations, whether they refer to general or particular ideas. Reasoning consists in observing the relations of objects. In mathematics, the most abstract of all the sciences, the objects of our attention are number and quantity, and their few relations: in all the other departments of knowledge, we consider innumerable objects connected by as many relations, and we cannot advance a step

B b

without apprehending the ideas represented by each word. In this process we find that the general ideas answer to the summons with as much promptitude as the particular; and they are not convertible, but are distinct objects of thought possessing relations peculiar to themselves. The several parties in imaginary law cases are generally distinguished by letters of the alphabet; as in Algebra, we do not attach to these letters ideas of particular men, for we are considering relations common to all men; but we do attach to them abstract ideas of human beings susceptible of all these relations, and not ideas of inferior animals; or of things in the vegetable, or in the mineral, kingdom; or of nonentities destitute of any relations. Even when Aristotle uses letters of the Alphabet to illustrate the different forms of syllogisms, according to the positions of the subject, predicate, and middle term, they must suggest abstract ideas of substance, for we cannot say, All Xs are Ys, if we do not carry our attention beyond the letters.

#### HUME. (*Essays.*)

The way in which Hume says we can reason without annexing "distinct and complete ideas to the terms we make use of," is this: "the custom which we have acquired of attributing certain relations to ideas still follows the words, and makes us immediately perceive the absurdity of that proposition. [Viz. 'in war the weaker have always recourse to conquest.']"

Words, in discourse, have no relations to each other but those of articulate sound, except as they represent ideas, and if these are *not* conceived they can convey no proposition; but, in the above quotation, it is assumed that they have conveyed a proposition, since we

are said to perceive its absurdity; and there can be no proposition, and no absurdity, in mere words. I cannot conceive what is meant by acquiring the custom of attributing the same relations to words that we do to ideas, if it be not that we are accustomed to associate certain ideas with certain words as their signs; and if the apprehension of these ideas "still follows the words," which custom will serve to confirm, and not to relax, how can it *thus* be made out that we understand propositions without annexing "complete and distinct ideas to the terms we make use of," and perceive an incongruity between certain ideas, while we are attending to insignificant sounds? A musician attributes the same relations to certain visible lines that he does to certain sounds, but unless the lines first suggest the sounds, he can no more perceive harmony or discord, than he can perceive tangible and visible qualities in the tones of an organ. Equally impossible is it to perceive truth or falsehood by the use of words, without apprehending the ideas of which they are the signs.

DR. CAMPBELL. (*Phil. of Rhet.*)

Dr. Campbell quotes, adopts, and enlarges on the opinions of Berkeley and Hume, contained in the foregoing passages. "The operations both of the Algebraist and of the Arithmetician are strictly of the nature of demonstration. The one employs as signs the letters of the alphabet, the other certain numerical characters. In neither of these arts is it necessary to form ideas of the quantities and sums signified; in some instances it is impossible, yet the equations and calculations resulting thence are not the less accurate and convincing."

B b 2

Upon these principles a question in algebra or arithmetic may be solved by him who does not know what quantities and sums the several characters signify, and consequently cannot form ideas of them. It is, in truth, impossible for one who knows the meaning of the Arabic numerals, not to form ideas of the sums they denote; but, in order to try whether the conception of these sums be necessary to the success of an arithmetical operation, we must desire a person ignorant of the ideas attached to the signs to tell us the amount of a column of figures: Or, let an Algebraist be asked what was required, and what has been proved, in a particular equation, without giving him a key to the letters: or let him be required to perform an equation in which new signs for addition, division, &c. have been substituted for the usual ones, without acquainting him with their several powers.

The passage quoted from Hume is thus paraphrased:  
 "Almost all the possible applications of the terms (in other words all the acquired relations of the signs) have become customary to him. The consequence is that an unusual application of any term is instantly detected; this detection breeds doubt, and this doubt occasions an immediate recourse to ideas."  
 By the acquired relations of words, contradistinguishing from their intrinsically inherent relations, can only be understood, as has been already contended, the relations of the ideas suggested by them, so that the passage involves a pre-supposition of the existence of that whose non-existence it is intended to illustrate. But suppose this inconsistency removed, and a reader come to a doubt about the application of a word: he does not doubt about its import, for that has not occurred to

his mind, and yet, to determine this doubt, he has recourse to its import; and this again pre-supposes that he has apprehended this import, for he cannot will to examine an idea which is not already in the mind. To have recourse to an idea which is not conceived is to have recourse to we know not what, to will without an object; and to have recourse to or seek what is already present is absurd. The reader doubts; and how is the doubt dispelled? by referring to his own knowledge. He at once doubts and has no doubt; is ignorant and not ignorant about the same thing.

"There are particularly three sorts of writing where we are liable to be imposed on by words without meaning." After having endeavoured to shew how words may be advantageously used independently of their meaning, there was a degree of consistency in saying that we are only *liable* to be imposed on by insignificant words. Lord Bolingbroke who, like other Nominalists, was occasionally a Particularist and Nihilist, (but who has also passages that imply an admission of the whole of the conceptualist doctrine,\* and some that may be referred to a sort of *panoptism*,†) says: "It may seem strange, perhaps, to our first thoughts, that men should talk sense, for it will never seem

---

\* e. g. "I know, and can define the real essence of all triangles; which I name triangularity." The term *man* raises "Some particular idea of *man* which the mind can frame without thinking of Alexander or Henry." We may "collect a *notion* of the general nature of figure."

Works. III. 435 440.

† As when he says that the word *animal* affects the mind in a manner similar to the word *man*, (that is I suppose, we have some idea of *animal*, without thinking of horse, dog, lion, man, &c., which is very true, but quite irreconcilable with other parts of his writings, and with the tenets of the Berkeley School;) "or else several ideas of men, and other animals,

“strange that they should talk nonsense, about some-  
 “thing whereof they have no ideas.” But I apprehend  
 that while men cannot be instructed, neither can they  
 be deceived by words which affirm nothing; and that  
 the imposition that Dr. Campbell refers to, arises not  
 from the non-conception, but from false and inadequate  
 conceptions of the import of words.

“The first is where there is an exuberance of me-  
 “taphor.” That is, words intended to suggest some  
 comparison, and not to be applied according to their  
 direct and proper meaning. The most abundant source  
 of metaphor is the similitude, or analogy, which we  
 discover between the attributes of body and mind. An  
 unhappy man drinks the cup of misery: this phrase  
 implies a comparison between the pains of the body and  
 the pains of the mind; between the bitter pangs of the  
 soul, and the bitter sensations of taste. The greater  
 number of words expressive of moral qualities, objects,  
 and relations, were originally applied to correspondent  
 things in the material world; their secondary appli-  
 cation may be called transitive, but it is not metapho-  
 rical; and they then convey a sense as direct and simple  
 as when used conformably to their primary significati-  
 on. Among such words are three in the above sen-  
 tence: pain, bitter, taste. There is little danger that  
 a man should be imposed on by the above expression,  
 and believe that misery could be gauged by ounces,

---

“rush confusedly into the mind together; that is, so rapidly, that though  
 “they are truly successive, yet this succession is imperceptible.” Works  
 III. 435. On this plan the individuals comprehended in the general term,  
 appear personally as in the Roman comitia, and British House of Lords:  
 on the particularist plan they send a representative, as in many modern  
 assemblies,



pints, or quarts; and there would be no excuse for him if he were: as little excuse would there be, if, on account of this impossibility, he were to quarrel with the expression, and declare it to be absurd. Both these mistakes are, however, sometimes fallen into, even by great writers. Thus, a similitude has been observed, in all ages, between the course of a river, and the course of a traveller; and Poets have endowed the former with life and voluntariness. Human insensibility has been supposed to approach to the insensibility of inert matter; and Poets have assumed that certain objects of human reason and passion, employed by a skilful master, might conquer the inexcitability of beasts, rivers, and mountains.\* Hence the apostrophe of Orators to inanimate objects; hence the wonders of the lyres of Orpheus, Silenus, Musæus, Modred, and Cadwallo: and perhaps Dr. Johnson is the only critic or reader, whose attention recoils with scorn from such tales; and who would attempt to refute such eloquence by proving that father Thames knows nothing about the youths that "cleave his glassy wave," and that Plinlimmon never bowed his head. Equally impertinent with such criticism is Voltaire's attempt to degrade wars for the right of succession to a kingdom, by calling them the wars of the red rose against the white; and equally silly is the satire that directs itself against crowns, mitres, stars, and ribbons.

Metaphors are fallacious when used without a sufficient regard to just analogy; and when the qualities of one object are transferred to another. It is thus that matter has been spiritualized, and mind materialized;

---

\* See Comus, vv. 809—815.

that external bodies have thrown off filmy essences, called ideas; that these ideas have been impressed on the mind; or reflected in its presence-chamber; or vibrated along the nerves; or floated through the undulations of a subtile fluid; that animals have been endowed with reason, and plants with sensation. By the help of this fallacy, Dr. Darwin, and some less daring writers, have been enabled to build most of their paradoxes, and abuse their readers. Instead of confining metaphors to poetry and eloquence, or of using them as aids to the conception of parallel relations, a writer sometimes identifies the natures of two heterogeneous objects, and proceeds in his deduction as if they were altogether homogeneous. Setting out with a few analogies he quite drops the idea of the moral subject he is treating, and substituting for it the material one which furnishes the metaphors, exhausts its various attributes, in defiance of all discoverable relation. In this heedless manner does Lord Shaftesbury proceed, when he furnishes that specimen of nonsense quoted by Dr. Campbell, by drawing a landscape of *the mind*, with "private seats, hollow caverns, wastes and wildernesses." While the poet speaks of graphic poetry, and of poetic colouring, light, and shade; the painter speaks of poetic painting, leaves out of sight the manual dexterity in which his art chiefly consists, and refers its triumphs to the inspiring virtues of Aonian streams. It is thus that Du Fresnoy gives the character of Julio Romano:

"Julius à puero Musarum eductus in antris  
 "Aonias reseravit opes, graphicæque poesi  
 "Quæ non visa prius, sed tantum audita poetis,  
 "Ante, oculos spectanda dedit sacraria Egebi."

Not that I would here wish to prune Du Fresnoy's wing, or blot a single verse from his pages: but when we are told by Lord Orford, in sober prose, of Hogarth's comedies, and of his rivalling Moliere in that department, we really cannot listen without some corrugation of the muscles:—"If catching the manners and follies of an age living as they rise, if general satire on vices and ridicules, familiarized by strokes of nature, and heightened by wit, and the whole animated by proper and just expressions of the passions, be comedy, HOGARTH composed comedies as much as MOLIERE."

For want of just conceptions of things, personification is liable to a similar abuse. Chance, fortune, nature, denote the operation of a series of necessary causes unknown to, or uncontrollable by us; consequently they exclude the ideas of spontaneity and intelligence. They are often personified with advantage: but we fall into gross errors when we say that chance made the world; that fortune possesses an influence in the conduct of human affairs; that nature abhors a vacuum; or that nature is subject to the debilitating effects of age:

7. "Ergone marcescet sulcantibus obaita rugis

"Naturæ facies, et rerum publica mater

"Omniparum contracta uterum sterilest ab ævo Milton.



"The second species of writing wherein we are liable to be imposed on by words without meaning, is that wherein the terms most frequently recurring, denote things which are of a complicated nature, and to which the mind is not sufficiently familiarized. Of these the instances are numberless in every tongue, such as government, church, state, constitution, polity, power, commerce, legislation, juris-

"diction, proportion, symmetry, elegance." Since it has been said, that words may be used without advertising to the things signified, we ought to feel no embarrassment, of however complicated a nature they may be. Since the act of conception may be altogether dispensed with, we cannot, consistently, class its objects according to their degrees of facility. But the difficulty, and liability to error, which are here said to depend on the complexity and unfamiliarity of the ideas signified by words, obviously imply that these ideas *are* suggested; and without this admission, it is impossible to argue on the manner in which words affect the mind. "— verba notionum tesserae sunt. Itaque si "notiones ipsae (id quod basis rei est) confusae sint, "et temere a rebus abstractae; nihil in iis, quae superstruuntur, est firmitudinis."\* The words in the preceding quotation relate to ideas of very complex and abstract subjects, of which men are liable to form imperfect conceptions; the misconception of a few ideas may occasion the ascription of false relations; and these few errors may infect a whole treatise, although the other ideas, with their relations, should have been justly conceived. This will generally be found to be the case, whether we be able, or not, to trace the errors to Lord Bacon's *idola*, *tribus*, *specus*, *fori*, et *theatri*. It is a consequence of inadequate conceptions that the same word does not always convey the same meaning; this discrepancy is frequently overlooked, particularly by framers of systems, who unconsciously shut out, or admit, as much of the import of a word, as may suit their immediate purpose. It is thus that words are not always true exponents of the state

---

\* Nov. Org. aph. 14.

of the mind, as the hands of a watch are of its interior mechanism, but re-act upon the understanding: \* and this re-action has chiefly scope when a new meaning is avowedly given to an old word, but which is not uniformly adhered to; and when the meaning of a term is founded on some supposed analogy, or similitude.

Hobbes has an aphorism, which Lord Bolingbroke praises as just, and happily expressed: "words are the counters of wise men, and the money of fools." It is *not* just: but it supplies a good illustration against the school from which it came. A word is a counter to all men. That is, it has not, like money, an intrinsic value independent of its stamp; it must be "signatum præsente notâ;"† it is a *tesseira*, token, or bank-note. Who, indeed, is it that pretends to give an intrinsic value to words, and to consider them as money? Who is it that would give currency to these bank-notes, without reference to what they represent? Not vulgar fools; but the Nominalists themselves, when they advance the paradoxes of Nihilism!

"The third and last, and I may add, the principal species of composition wherein we are exposed to this illusion by the abuse of words, is that in which the terms employed are very abstract and consequently of very extensive signification." "The more general any name is \* \* \* the more it must have of indistinctness and obscurity. Thus the word lion is more distinctly apprehended than the word beast, beast than animal, animal than being. But there is in what are called abstract subjects a still greater fund of obscurity than that arising from the frequent mention of the most general terms.

---

\* *ibid.* aph. 59. † *Hor. ad Pisones*, v. 59.

" Names must be assigned to those qualities as con-  
 " sidered abstractedly, which never subsist independ-  
 " ently, or by themselves, but which constitute the  
 " generic characters, and the specific differences of  
 " things. And this leads to a manner which is in many  
 " instances remote from the common use of speech,  
 " and therefore must be of more difficult conception."  
 " A very general term is applicable alike to a multi-  
 " tude of individuals, a particular term is applicable  
 " but to a few. When the rightful applications of a  
 " word are extremely numerous they cannot all be so  
 " strongly fixed by habit, but that for greater security  
 " we must perpetually recur in our minds from the  
 " sign to the notion we have of the thing signified;  
 " and for the reasons afore mentioned it is in such in-  
 " stances difficult precisely to ascertain this notion."  
 The examples given of words occurring in this third  
 species of composition belong to a class which, far from  
 being a principal source of illusion by being of difficult  
 conception, are of the easiest conception, and denote  
 the simplest of our ideas. The more extensive a word  
 is in its application, the less comprehensive is it in its  
 signification, and consequently the more easily apprehended,  
 and the better adapted to the common use of  
 speech. Thus being is a more simple idea, and more  
 distinctly apprehended than animal: animal than  
 beast; and beast than lion. Things always exist in a  
 complex state; by analysis we abstract from them our  
 simplest ideas; these we generalize into different com-  
 binations, more complex, but as distinctly apprehend-  
 ed, because we know all the component ideas. I have  
 not so clear a conception of lion as a zoologist, nor of  
 lily as a botanist, but I have as clear a conception of

beast, and flower, as they have. But though the simplest abstract and general ideas be more distinctly apprehended, they do not affect the mind so strongly as particular ideas, and are therefore not so well adapted to the purposes of poetry and eloquence. The reason of this is obvious. We can only sympathise with real existences; and there are no real existences corresponding to man, woman, beast, flower. It is only individual examples of heroism, virtue, or distress, that can strongly excite the feelings of which these qualities are the objects. We should be little moved by an abstract display of all the ingredients of female perfection; but if they be embodied in an imaginary character, we may be very powerfully interested; and if love have for its object a real person, the idea of that person governs every thought, and gives its tone to every feeling.

BURKE. (*Sub. and Beau.*)

The exploded idealist system drove this great man into Nihilism in the early part of his life, and the remainder of it was chiefly spent in the warfare of the senate; (*illa se jactabat in aula:*) for finding that the significations of the greater number of words could not be referred to images or pictures, he concluded that such words did not suggest ideas but performed their office in some mystical manner which he endeavours to explain, but from which, it seems, he could not exclude an implied concession of the very point in dispute.

Words, he says, produce three effects: first, sound; second, a picture or representation of the thing signified; third, the affection of the soul produced by one or by both of the foregoing. "Compounded abstract words (honour, justice, and the like,) produce the

“ first and the last of these effects, but not the second.” Simple abstract words, and those denoting objects of sense, may produce all three; “ but the most general effect even of these words does not arise from their forming pictures of the several things they would represent in the imagination; \* \* \* they operate by having from use the same effect on being mentioned that their original has when it is seen.” “ Such words are in reality but mere sounds which being used on particular occasions, wherein we receive some good or suffer some evil; or see others affected with good or evil; or which we hear applied to other interesting things or events; and being applied in such a variety of cases that we know readily by habit to what things they belong, they produce in the mind whenever they are afterwards mentioned, effects similar to those of their occasions. The sounds being often used without reference to any particular occasion, and carrying still their first impressions, they at last utterly lose their connection with the particular occasions that gave rise to them; yet the sound without any annexed notion continues to operate as before.” As to the second effect here ascribed to words, the formation of an image in the sensorium, I need not produce the arguments by which Dr. Reid has demonstrated its nullity: especially as Mr. Burke does not consider it essential to his system. Of the two other effects, the third depends upon the first; so that it only remains to shew, that the sensation of articulate sound, “ without any annexed notions,” is an “ affection of the soul,” which excludes the supposition of all knowledge, except of the existence of the sensation. This is involved in the very



terms of the proposition: and its converse, *viz.* that sounds "without any annexed notions," are sufficient for the purposes of reasoning, is a glaring contradiction; for since notions, or ideas, are the objects of the mind in reasoning, or thinking, to reason or think without ideas, is to reason or think about nothing, that is, not to reason or think.

Words that are the signs of visible objects, "have" from use the *same effect* on "being mentioned, that" "their original has when it is seen;" that is, conception and perception are the same phenomenon. At this rate, to read of an eruption of Mount Vesuvius, is to see it: to hear of miracles, is to see them: but, if they produce such vivid representations of their originals, how can they be said not to suggest notions of these originals? Such effects are very different from sensations of mere sounds. "We know readily by habit to" "what things they belong;" that is, we apprehend the ideas of which they are the signs, for there is no other means of knowing to what things words refer. At last, however, "the sound, without any annexed notion, "continues to operate," so that habit is made to disserve, instead of strengthen, the association between words and things, the signs and their objects. As the sounds "continue to operate as before," and "we" "know readily to what things they belong," or what ideas they denote, it follows that they operate by means of annexed ideas, whose conception is simultaneous with the sensation excited by the sounds.

To shew that we need not entertain ideas even of visible objects, Mr. Burke puts together a set of geographical phrases relating to a journey, (along the Rhine, &c. &c.) and asks whether the perusal of it has

presented pictures of rivers, mountains, cultivated fields, towns, villages, &c. To which the answer is, that it has suggested conceptions of the general natures of all these objects, without which we could not detect any incongruity in their several relations. Without such general conceptions, we could not perceive the absurdity of such a passage as the following:—After a toilsome march across the Atlantic, Hannibal sat down before Rome, and having made himself master of it, garrisoned it with a body of Laplanders, commanded by Joan of Arc. He then retired to Capua, where his confessor, Bishop Burnet, was married to Nell Gwin; after her divorce from Will Honeycombe. Having embarked at Capua, he sailed across the Alps; chastised the pirates that infested them under the notorious William Penn; and landing at Shrewsbury, took up his winter quarters in the crater of Mount Hecla——. The relations here attributed to places and persons which we never saw, and of which our ideas cannot be images or representations, are inconsistent with our ideas of the general nature of land and water, and with associated ideas of geographical and historical facts.

STEWART. (*Elem. Phil. Hum. Mind.*)

It is not without much surprise that we find a disciple of Dr. Reid's in the ranks of the Nominalists: but though the fault of Professor Stewart's opinions on this subject be not occasioned by the ideal system, it is not idiopathic, but connected with certain misconceptions of mental phenomena.

The doctrine of the Nominalists, according to him, is: "there are no existences in nature corresponding to general terms; and the objects of our attention in all our general speculations are not ideas but words." General ideas are not tangible existences, therefore there are no such ideas; and our attention in

general speculations is confined to the mere sensations of sight or hearing produced by words. This is Nihilism in as much simplicity as could be wished. The mistake seems to arise from not considering that the distinction between the act of the mind in conceiving, and the object conceived, is not real but grammatical. 'I think a thought, is only, I think; and different thoughts, or conceptions, are but different states of the mind in thinking. There are no existences in nature corresponding to the various pains to which the body is subject; the names of these pains denote different affections of the sentient principle. In the same manner there is no real distinction between the act and the object in the voluntary motions of the body; a race, or a dance, has no existence independent of the act of running or dancing. To perceive the sensations of sight, or sound, excited by words, is one act of the mind, and to conceive the ideas they suggest is another: to say therefore that, in reasoning, words and not ideas are the objects of our attention, is to say that one act, viz. the perception of figure or of sound, is another act, viz. the conception of ideas, possessing innumerable relations, essentially different from those of figure and sound.

" Words even when employed without any reference to their particular significations, form an instrument of thought, sufficient for all the purposes of reasoning."—Then a parrot may reason, and amuse itself with general speculations.

It appears by the testimony of all writers that idolaters in every nation pay to images a *relative*, not an *absolute* worship. But the Nihilists afford a singular instance of absolute worship paid to insignificant words;

D d

thus practically conforming to the monstrous doctrine of the hyper-papistical Bellarmine: "Imagines Christi & sanctorum venerandæ sunt non solum per accidens vel improprie, ita ut ipsæ terminent veneratorem ut in se considerantur, & non solum ut vicem gerunt exemplaris." De imagin. sanctor. C. 21. P. 2267.

"There are two ways in which such general truths may be obtained: either by fixing the attention on one individual in such a manner that our reasoning may involve no circumstances but those which are common to the whole genus; or (laying aside entirely the consideration of things) by means of the general terms with which language supplies us:" the former being analogous to the use of diagrams or pictures; the latter to the use of arbitrary symbols or characters: the former being the Particularist; the latter the Nihilist system: and it seems indifferent which operation take place; and that when we consider generals, (of which we can have no conceptions,) we may either consider particulars, or nothing at all.

It is observable that the above passage contains the same blunder which is common to all the Nominalists, and seems inseparable from their system; viz. the presupposing the truth of what the argument is brought to deny: for how shall we be certain that our reasoning involves no circumstances but those which are common to the whole genus, unless we conceive the circumstances which constitute the genus, that is, have an abstract general idea? This idea is the object of our attention; and the diagram and arbitrary character are but different modes of suggesting it. But to set this in as clear a light as ever belonged to de-

monstrated truth, I will quote a few sentences from Mr. Brown. "If we do not admit the existence of general ideas, every expression must be determinate; and the indefinite article will thus be superfluous. A man is intelligible only as signifying a particular man. If a friend inform me, that his watch has been stolen by *somebody*, the expression will suggest to me the idea of John, or Thomas, in the same manner as if he had used either name, and I shall, accordingly, believe the watch to have been stolen by John, or Thomas. To doubt is impossible: for if I believe it to have been stolen, I must believe it to have been stolen by a particular person."

"If I hear, that a number of highwaymen have been apprehended, I must immediately conceive a particular number, as *ten*. If I afterwards hear that *eleven* of the number have made their escape, the reports should seem as inconsistent, as Falstaff's amplification of the men in Kendal Green."

"The nonentity of the abstract sciences is a necessary consequence of the nonentity of general ideas. If the demonstrations of Euclid depend ultimately on the definitions, and postulates, and axioms, these are unintelligible, unless they be understood in a particular sense, and if they be understood particularly, they cannot serve as the foundation of general demonstrations."

"Nor is it only mathematical science that necessarily perishes with general ideas. Reasoning of every kind must share their fate. Propositions, the terms of which are particular, are nugatory: for, if the terms be not identical, as when I say, John is Thomas. They are absurd; and if they be identical, as when

"I say, John is John, a thousand propositions may be strung together without any accession to our knowledge."

"——— When I say, John walks, the words are contradictory or identical: for unless I have an abstract idea of John, I must conceive him as sitting, or lying, or standing, or walking. In the three first cases, the terms of the proposition destroy each other: for it is absurd to say that John sitting walks; and equally absurd to say, as in the last case, that John walking walks: nor can we suppose that the word John excites no idea; for the proposition, which states him to be walking, would then be unintelligible\*."

Perhaps Mr. Brown has not made the most of one of his arguments. If a Nominalist is informed that a number have been tried, the word number must not only suggest a definite number, as *ten*, but a definite number of individuals, as *ten horses*, for he cannot conceive separately what has no separate existence; and if he be afterwards informed that *eleven* of the number have been sentenced to stand in the pillory, the inconsistency must be still greater than in Falstaff's amplification of the men in buckram.

"In all the sciences," says Professor Stewart, "this process of the mind [reasoning] is perfectly analogous to an Algebraical operation; or in other words (when the meaning of our expressions is once fixed by definitions) it may be carried on entirely by the use of signs, without attending during the time of the process to the things signified." It is a contra-

---

\* Obs. on Zoonomia.

diction to say that signs, or things which suggest some other object of attention, need not present any other object of attention; and that that which signifies something, need not signify any thing. Suppose the word blue were fixed by definition to mean yellow, and yellow blue, "With what labour of mind," says Mr. Brown, "should we peruse a treatise on colours in which blue and yellow, red and green, orange and violet, were mutually substituted!" The mind of the Nihilist would not labour under this process: having once fixed by definition the meaning of his expressions, he would carry on his process without a thought of blue or yellow, red or green, ever coming across his mind: the game of cross-purposes would afford no trial of his promptitude of recollection, and he would never incur the penalty of a forfeit.

In *perception*, there is only the mind that perceives and the object perceived, there is no third object, called idea, which is the real object of attention to the mind, as in the ideal system: "Why then should we suppose that in our general speculations there must exist in the mind some object of its thought, when it appears that there is no evidence of the existence of any such object, even when the mind is employed about individuals? Still however it may be urged, that, although in such cases there should be no object of thought in the mind, there must exist something or other, to which its attention is directed. To this difficulty I have no answer to make but by repeating the fact which I have already endeavoured to establish." The first part of this passage proceeds on the supposition, that by an object of thought we mean something really distinct from the act of

thinking, and has been already replied to. But the oddity lies in the second part, which supposes that though we grant that there is no object of thought in the mind; yet we may urge that there must be some object or other: I grant that there is nothing, but I insist that there must be something. To say how we think, is a difficulty quite inexplicable; but to think without an object, i. e. without thinking, is a contradiction.

“ That we cannot conceive universals in a way at all analogous to that in which we conceive an absent object of sense, is granted on both sides. Why then should we employ the same word conception to express two operations of the mind which are essentially different?” You contend for the existence of only *one* of these operations: upon that, issue is joined, and not whether *the two* operations are misarranged under one term. But I know not what Conceptualist has granted that the act or power of the mind which conceives ideas of absent objects of sense, is essentially different from that which conceives ideas to which no sensible objects correspond. They contend only that particular and general ideas are essentially different; essentially different affections of the same faculty, conception. “ As to the manner *how we conceive universals*,” says Dr. Reid, “ I confess my ignorance. I know not how I hear, or see, or remember, and as little do I know how I conceive things that have no existence.” Conception is the mind’s eye, and as it observes what the eye of the body *is not* directed to, so it observes what the eye of the body *cannot be* directed to.

“ When we speak of conceiving, or understanding



“ a general proposition, we mean nothing more than  
 “ that we have a conviction (founded on our previous  
 “ use of the words in which it is expressed) that we  
 “ have it in our power at pleasure to substitute, in-  
 “ stead of the general terms, some one of the indivi-  
 “ duals comprehended under them.” Let us verify  
 this mode of understanding by a few examples. *Queen Elizabeth was a Sovereign*: for the general term *Sovereign* let us substitute some one individual, the first that comes to hand, as *Philip II.* and it is plain that *Queen Elizabeth was Philip II.* If instead of *Philip II.* we substitute *Queen Elizabeth*, the proposition will no longer be general but identical. *Happiness is a substantive*: instead of the general term *substantive*, substitute some one individual comprehended under it, as *misery*, and then, *happiness is misery*. “ The proper study of mankind is man :” instead of the general term *man*, substitute some one individual, and *Pope* will be made to hold out *that individual* as the proper object of study for all mankind.

But even if this substitution did not lead to absurdity, how shall the bare conviction that we are able to make it, constitute understanding? The power to substitute is surely very different from the act of substituting. If I meet with a word that I do not understand, I have a conviction that I can, by consulting a Dictionary, substitute an equivalent, but this conviction throws no light on the subject; it does not give me a glimpse of its meaning.

I have said, at the beginning of these observations, that according to the Nominalist hypothesis, “ abstract terms also excite ideas of particular objects, of which we attend only to the quality expressed

“ by the term.”—Since every general idea connotes abstraction, the proof of the existence of general, also proves the existence of abstract ideas. A very few words, however, will suffice to shew the inconsistency of their account of the manner in which we use abstract terms with their negation of the possibility of abstract conceptions. Professor Stewart says, “ We can reason concerning one quality or property of an object abstracted from the rest, while at the same time we find it impossible to conceive it separately.” If we cannot conceive inflammability separately, the proposition sulphur is inflammable, becomes identical: inflammable sulphur is inflammable sulphur. But when he says “ we can reason concerning one quality or property *abstracted from the rest*,” and “ although, for example, we had never seen but one rose, we might, still have been able to attend to its colours, without thinking of *its other properties*,” the existence of abstract ideas is acknowledged: for whatever is not thought of, is not conceived, is not in the mind, and if the colour alone be thought of, then the abstract idea of colour is conceived.

“ To employ with skill the very delicate instrument [words] which nature has made essentially subservient to general reasoning, and to guard against the errors which result from an injudicious use of it, requires an uncommon capacity of patient attention, and a cautious circumspection in conducting our various intellectual processes, which can only be acquired by early habits of philosophical reflection. To assist and direct us in making this acquisition ought to form the most important branch of a rational logic; a science of far more extensive utility;

“ and of which the principles lie much deeper in the philosophy of the human mind than the trifling art which is commonly dignified with that name.” We have reviewed the manner in which we are said to employ this instrument of general reasoning, and may judge with what success patient attention, cautious circumspection, and early habits of philosophical reflection, have been applied to investigate its nature. It is bad policy to raise high expectations of the value of a promised benefit: *Quid dignum tanto, &c.* The most limited of his suggestions on the subject of rational logic, he says, “ would furnish matter for many volumes.” That something of the nature and principles of this new system must be known to Professor Stewart, we cannot doubt, else how should he judge of its “ extensive utility,” and of the depth from which its principles must be fetched? Many years, however, have passed, and not *one* volume has appeared to justify this very favourable character, and rescue logic from the reproach of being a trifling art. There is reason to suppose that a new coinage of words is contemplated as a principal part of the proposed improvement: and since words and not things are the objects of attention, no wonder that they should talk of a real character, of intrinsic value, that should circulate through the world. “ The failure of Wilkins’s very ingenious attempt,” it is said, “ towards a real character and a philosophical language is not perhaps decisive against such a project.” “ Leibnitz, so far as I know, is the only author who has hitherto conceived the possibility of aiding the powers of invention and of reasoning, by the use of a most convenient instrument of thought; but he has no where explained his ideas on this very

E e

“interesting subject.” “He somewhere speaks of an alphabet of human thoughts which he had been employed in forming” [*qu’il meditoit. Fontenelle’s eloge.*] “and which probably had some relation to his universal language.” Leibnitz, it seems, deserves credit for having conceived such well-sounding possibilities, even though he has nowhere explained his ideas about them: *laudare facilius quam invenire*: but I venture to say that no future Wilkins, or Leibnitz, will succeed in furnishing a new language, or alphabet of human thoughts, (*an alphabet of human thoughts!*) because improved nomenclatures must follow, and not precede, an improved knowledge of things, and such discoveries are the slow growth of time, and of united exertions. This is the rational, feasible improvement that Locke speaks of, B. III. C. II. § 25. where he says “a Dictionary of this sort, containing as it were a Natural History, requires too many hands,” &c. The nomenclatures of Linnæus form an epoch in science, and shew the only way in which scientific language can be improved, *viz.* by improving science.

The Conceptualist is sensible of the advantage derived from the expression of things related in sense by words related in sound, of having families of words corresponding to families of ideas, as it gives new facilities to association, the faculty by which the mind reviews its ideas: but he never can disunite words from ideas, so as to fix his attention exclusively on the former; nor ascribe any value to the most elaborate formation of signs when separated from the things signified. The Nominalist insists on the use of words being essential to general reasoning; but it does not follow that the words should be unaccompanied by

conceptions, or that generalization should be confined to words and refer to no corresponding affections of the mind. That we can reason concerning genera, or classes of individuals, without the use of language, is not maintained by the Conceptualists, and yet Professor Stewart represents it as their only distinguishing tenet! "Whether it be the effect of constitution or of "habit," says Dr. Reid, "I will not take upon me to "determine; but from one or both of these causes, it "happens, that no man can pursue a train of thought "or reasoning without the use of language." Locke, indeed, has a strange observation: "The *signs* we use "are either *ideas* or *words*, wherewith we make either "*mental*, or *verbal* propositions."\* Ideas are not signs, but modes of the thinking principle excited by external or internal causes, and every proposition, whether uttered or not, *is verbal*. He has another passage equally objectionable: "Most men, if not all, in their thinking and reasonings with themselves, make use of "words *instead of ideas*; at least when the subject of "their meditation contains in it complex ideas."†—I apprehend it is the effect of *constitution* that, in cognition, ideas and words are *indissolubly associated*.

It has been observed, that "before men think right "upon any subject, they may have exhausted all the "absurdities which can possibly be said upon it.†" Ingenuity has now said all that it can in defence of Nominalism, and its existence cannot be much longer protracted: men must soon universally return to common sense, and acknowledge that

"Nunquam aliud Natura, aliud Sapiencia dicit."

---

\* B. II. C. 32. S. 19.

† B. IV. C. 5. S. 4.

‡ Murray on the Character of Nations.

ART. VIII. *On Dramatic illusion.*


---

“qui pectus inaniter angit,  
 “Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet,  
 “Ut magus; & modo me Thebis, modo ponit Athenis.” HOR.  
 “And nothing is, but what is not.” MACBETH.

---

THE principal writers on this subject are Dr. Darwin, and Dr. Aikin, who contend for; and Sir Joshua Reynolds, Dr. Johnson, and Mr. Payne Knight, who deny, the existence of dramatic illusion, or of a temporary belief in the reality of the scenes represented on the stage. But the weight of argument and of truth appears to me to preponderate so much in favour of the former, (Dr. Darwin\* having confuted Sir Joshua Reynolds, and Dr. Aikin† having done as much by Dr. Johnson,) that I should have considered the controversy to be extinguished if Mr. Knight‡ had not ranged himself with the *latter*: him therefore I select as my antagonist: but the subject having been thoroughly canvassed by my predecessors, and lying in itself within a very narrow compass, I have but few words to add. There is another writer who, though he has not expressly examined this question, has yet stated the metaphysical principles by which it must be decided with more precision than any other person: I mean Mr. Thomas Brown in his observations on Darwin's *Zoonomia*. Mr. Brown deduces all the phenomena of madness from a circumstance common to all who labour

---

\* *Loves of the Plants.*

† *Transactions of the Manchester Literary Society.*

‡ *Inquiry into the Principles of Taste.*

under that malady: their ideas of imagination are so peculiarly vivid that they refer them to external objects. And this fact he explains by establishing, and elucidating it as a general law of our nature, that such ideas are so referred by *all men when not inconsistent with another more vivid idea*. Thus, in the ordinary state of mind of a sane person, the superior vividness of the ideas of perception prevents him from ascribing his conceptions to external objects: but this is not the case when the mind is highly excited and affected; in reverie, in dreaming, and in madness. The eye of the mind is *then* stronger than the eye of the body, and either does not see what the latter would under other circumstances present to its observation, or combines and associates them with the shapes of its own creation. Every body has felt the predominance of a certain train of ideas, not only over the consciousness of the presence of *incongruous* external objects, but over other ideas that would instantly dispel the illusion if they could only gain admittance.\* When in our closets we weep and sob over the catastrophes of Vivian and Lady Elmwood, it never occurs to us that such persons never existed: for the time nothing can be more real; and there is nothing to distinguish our feelings from sympathy with actual distress. In such situations the question is not whether the scenes be real or imaginary, but whether they hold full and exclusive possession of the mind. And if they have this power without the aid of a single external circumstance; shall it be denied to them when every thing that most attracts the eye and ear harmonizes with their tone and character? If in

---

\* See Winfred's day-dreams in Scott's *Rokeby*.

reading the poem our emotions accompany Belvidera through all her anxieties and sorrows, shall we remain unmoved when Mrs. Siddons identifies herself with the poet's fiction by the exquisite propriety of her looks, voice, and gesture; never over-stepping the modesty of nature, never falling below what the nicest judge, the severest critic, the most fastidious taste could desiderate? And if our tears do flow, shall it be said that we are *then* conscious that the object of this genuine tribute of sympathy is *not* Belvidera but Mrs. Siddons, the happy wife of a husband a stranger to ambition, and conspiracies, and crimes? Could the same scenes, if really transacted before us, excite stronger emotion, or affect us in any manner different from that produced by the dramatic representation of them? In what respect do the feelings of tenderness, admiration, terror, anguish, and pity with which we are then agitated, differ from what we should experience as witnesses of real events? We could not be so moved if there were no illusion, or if there were only half an illusion; the illusion must be complete. It is not therefore pretended that any thing like deception is produced on the drawing up of the curtain, or from the beginning to the end of the tragedy if there should be any incongruity in the representation, or the least want of union between the sentiments expressed, and the looks, tones, and gestures by which they should be accompanied: the illusion must steal upon us with the growing interest of the story, and the successive appeals to our sympathies that are made by a perfect actor or actress. But when our adversaries contend that we retain equal self-possession when, in scenes of the deepest interest pathos, we confess by the most unequivocal demonstra-



tions that we are borne along on the tide of sympathy, the fools of the poet's and the actor's magic; when they assert that even then we sympathize not with persons but with sentiments; or when they advance the wretched explanation that we are affected in consequence of "the reflexion that the evils before us are evils to which we ourselves may be exposed:—we rather lament the possibility than suppose the presence of misery:"—they speak no less in contradiction to experience than to the nature of our moral constitution. The following passage from Mr. Knight may now be left, without further comment, to the reader's judgment. "At the very moment that our tears are flowing for the sorrows of Belvidera or Callista, we know that we are in a theatre in London, and not either at Venice or Genoa; and that the person with whose expressions of grief and tenderness we sympathize, is not the wife of Jaffier or Altamont, but of Mr. Siddons. If there was any deception, so that we did for a moment, suppose the incidents, which excite those expressions, to be real, our feelings would be of a very different, and much less pleasant kind." (P. 266.)

Persons who think themselves liable to suffer similar misfortunes are enumerated by Aristotle\* among those who are likely to compassionate the distresses of others. Persons so circumstanced may possess more sensibility; but their sympathetic sorrow, when once awakened has no more reference to *self*, to their own liability to similar evils, than that of those to whom such evils could not possibly happen. The mother who

---

\* Rhetor. L. II, C. 10.

weeps over her babe when she reflects that death may take it from her, in the indulgence of her melancholy reverie, contemplates the death of her child, not as a possible event, but as one which has actually taken place. She sees herself deprived of the object of her tenderest solicitude and affection. Thus Achilles' vow to revenge the death of his friend brings his own fate so strongly before his mother's view, that she is afflicted as by a present calamity:

"A flood of tears, at this, the Goddess shed;

"Ah then I see thee dying, see the dead!

"When Hector falls, thou dy'st."

As the illusion consists entirely in the ardor with which the spectator enters into the assumed interests and passions of the actors and actresses, it may exist, vanish, and return several times in the course of the representation. So that when Madame de Sevigné says: "*Je fus encore à la comédie: C'étoit Andromaque, qui me fit pleurer plus de six larmes: C'est assez pour une troupe de campagne:*" these six tears testify that for a moment she believed in the reality of the distresses of the provincial Andromache. But we cannot be distressed and incredulous at the same time; we cannot (as Dr. Blair says we *can*) be "in some measure relieved by thinking that the cause of our distress is feigned not real:" if from the unskillfulness of the actor we see through his artifices, if we see an indifferent heart beneath his "damnable faces," we may be amused or vexed, but we cannot sympathize with his ridiculous distress. *Flentibus adflect humani vultus.*

As the spectator in his lucid intervals, as they may be called, or in unimpassioned scenes, is not less convinced of the fictitiousness of the story than the author

himself; so there is no difficulty in supposing the latter, in scenes of another description, to be as deeply affected as any of the audience. Nay more so. That combination of genius and sensibility, that vigor and ardor of imagination which enabled him to give birth to the tragedy, characterize a man most susceptible, and most tenacious of such impressions; and disposed to yield more readily than another to the illusion which perfect acting is calculated to produce. We need not therefore wonder that Voltaire should have wept at the representations of his own tragedies at Ferney, though Dr. Moore considers it so unaccountable.

The illusion of which the actor is susceptible is different. If he has

“Tears in his eyes, distraction in’s aspect

“A broken voice and his whole function suiting

“With forms to his conceit;”

his distress must be original, not sympathetic; he must identify himself with the personage he represents. In the same manner Quintilian advises an advocate to identify himself with his client, and declares that he has often seen players make their exits with faces bathed in real tears. “*Nos illi simus, quos gravia, indigna, tristia passos queramus. Nec agamus rem quasi alienam, sed assumamus parumper illum dolorem. Ita dicemus, quæ in simili nostro casu dicturi essemus. Vidi ego sæpe histriones atque comædos, cum ex aliquo graviore actu personam deposuissent, flentes adhuc egredi.*” (Lib. VI. C. 2.\*)

---

\* In the memoirs and correspondence of Baron de Grimm there is a Dissertation by Diderot, in which he maintains that a great actor ought to be without sensibility. “I insist then that it is sensibility which makes

The attractions and influence over men's affections which the Tragic Muse has possessed in the most civilized ages, presents a problem in the solution of which the dignity and consistency of human nature appeared to be concerned. Those who deny the existence of dramatic illusion, attempt to explain the difficulty of accounting for the eagerness with which men feast their eyes and ears on fictitious scenes of crime and blood,

---

"so many indifferent actors; it is the want of sensibility which makes actors sublime." The main error which misleads Diderot is the supposition that in an actor of sensibility *his own* character would predominate, not that which he represented. But it is notorious that the very reverse obtains. It is the unfeeling actor that is incapable of perfectly assuming the character of him whom he represents, and of sustaining it with the nicest propriety of looks and demeanour. As a graceful and dignified self possession will never desert, in real life, him whom nature and education have habituated to the expression of those rare endowments; so neither will they desert an accomplished actor however deeply he may be penetrated with the feelings ascribed to the character which he personates. "We wish," says Diderot "to see a man even under the greatest agony of mind, preserve the dignity of his character; we would have a woman fall with decency and meekness;" &c. All this you will have in greatest perfection where there is most feeling.

---

"The play'r's profession,  
 "Lies not in trick, or attitude or start,  
 "Nature's true knowledge is the only art,  
 "The strong-felt passion bolts into his face;  
 "The mind untouched, what is it but grimace!  
 "To this one standard make your just appeal,  
 "Here lies the golden secret, learn to FEEL;  
 "Or fool or monarch, happy or distressed,  
 "No actor pleases that is not *possess'd*."  
 "A single look more marks th' internal woe,  
 "Than all the windings of the lengthened oh!  
 "Up to the face the quick sensation flies,  
 "And darts its meaning from the speaking eyes;  
 "Love, transport, madness, anger, scorn, despair,  
 "And all the passions, all the soul is there." LLOYD,

by affirming that while we sympathize with the sentiments of tenderness, generosity, and magnanimity, and enjoy the beauty of the poetry and eloquence, we resist by invincible incredulity the painful impressions that would be made by a belief in the reality of the afflicting passages. But a portion of necessary inconsistency will be found adhering to all these explanations. The substance of Hume's account of the matter, in his essay on Tragedy, is contained in the following extract: "The genius required to paint objects in a  
 "lively manner, the art employed in collecting all the  
 "pathetic circumstances, the judgment displayed in  
 "disposing them: the exercise, I say, of these noble  
 "talents, together with the force of expression and  
 "beauty of oratorical numbers, diffuse the highest satisfaction on the audience, and excite the most delightful movements. By this means the uneasiness  
 "of the melancholy passions is not only overpowered  
 "and effaced by something stronger of an opposite  
 "kind; but the whole impulse of those passions is converted into pleasure, and awells the delight which  
 "eloquence raises in us."\* "An action, represented  
 "in tragedy, may be too bloody and atrocious. It may

M. de Grimm will not subscribe to his friend's proposition that sensibility is positively injurious: he thinks it an indifferent quality, neither favourable nor unfavourable to histrionic genius and success. But when the Baron speaks of Garrick he forgets his theory, and truth forces him to say: "It is easy to disfigure a countenance, that we can readily conceive, but Garrick is a stranger to grimace; all the changes in his countenance arise from the manner in which he is affected internally; he never goes beyond truth; and he is perfect master of that other incomprehensible secret, how to embellish truth without any other assistance than that of passion."

\* Dr. Campbell justly objects to the above passage that it is not very intelligible. Phil. of Rhetoric.

“excite such movements of horror as will not soften into pleasure; and the greatest energy of expression, bestowed on descriptions of that nature, serves only to augment our uneasiness.” Now whatever were the character of the sensations which the objects, circumstances, and passions represented tended to excite, it is evident that these sensations must be strengthened in proportion to the skill, energy, and eloquence employed in the representation. And what difference is there between the combined result in reality and in fiction? Would not the same disposition of pathetic incidents and spontaneous eloquence in real life produce emotions of a similar but stronger kind? And the more perfect the skill and eloquence are, the less adapted are they to become separate objects of our attention, which can only be directed to them by a reflex act of the mind, when withdrawn from contemplating the objects which they were the medium of exhibiting. The corrective powers of numerous verse are acknowledged to be incompetent to *soften into pleasure* the movements of horror excited by actions merely sanguinary and atrocious. The redeeming accompaniments of virtue struggling ineffectually with temptation, or overpowered by misfortune in unsullied majesty, and ardent generosity perplexed amidst deceitful appearances, are necessary ingredients in an interesting and immortal tragedy. The same observations are applicable, without any modification, to real life. Whatever pleases in fiction would please more in reality; and whatever shocks and displeases in reality would disgust in fiction. There can be no separate theory therefore to account for the interest we take in, and the manner in which we are affected by, real and fictitious tragedy.

I return to Mr. Knight, who presents us with the following analysis: "All the distress of dramatic fiction is known and felt at the time of its exhibition to be merely fiction: but the sentiments expressed by it are really expressed; and expressed too with all the truth and energy, which real feelings could inspire; accompanied by all the graces of emphasis, tone, and gesture; which can convey those feelings to the soul of the spectator, with the *full force*, and vivid freshness of real nature. The sympathies therefore which they excite are real and complete; and much more strong and effective than if they were produced by scenes of real distress: for in that case, the sufferings, which we beheld, would excite such a painful degree of sympathy, as would overpower and suppress the pleasant feelings, excited by the noble, tender, or generous sentiments which we heard uttered." (P. 329.) "We all know, from the first drawing up of the curtain, that Othello is to kill his amiable and innocent wife, and afterwards to kill himself: but we know likewise that Othello is an actor, and Desdemona an actress; and that neither are in danger of receiving any hurt: wherefore it is impossible that we should feel any apprehension of such events being to happen, or pity when they do happen. What we do feel, are the sentiments of heroic magnanimity, of warm and generous, but rash and impetuous affection, which the poet has put into the mouth of the one; and those of innocent simplicity, mild resignation, and passive fortitude and fidelity, which he has attributed to the other." (P. 345.) If the actor play his part so well; if his voice, looks, and gestures not only speak "with all the

“ truth and energy which real feelings could inspire,” but actually succeed in conveying his assumed feelings “ to the soul of the spectator with the full force and “ vivid freshness of real nature;” I ask whether all this do not amount to a perfect coincidence between reality and fiction? and whether to say that the “ sympathies” of the spectator with the apparent feelings of the actor “ are real and complete,” do not imply, as unequivocally as language can express, that these sympathies respond to what are at the time believed to be real feelings; and that a consciousness of fiction, or of the true state of things *such as it appears to the unmoved spectator*, has no place in his mind? And is it not equally evident that a belief in the reality of “ the “ noble, tender, or generous sentiments” uttered from the stage, implies a belief in the reality of those circumstances of trial and distress out of which they spring, and with which they are inseparably connected? How can we sympathize with the ardent generosity and impetuous affection of Othello, and not sympathize with the misery into which they enable an exquisite villain, to plunge him? How can we sympathize with the “ mild resignation and passive fortitude” of Desdemona if we did not believe in the reality of her unmerited sufferings? Can our tears flow for Belvidera, or Calista, or Desdemona, (as Mr. Knight acknowledges they do) *without* our feeling “ pity” for the sorrows that cause them? Into what palpable contradictions does this system drive its adherents! It is inaccurate, and from the purpose, to say that if the distress were real, “ the sufferings, which we beheld, would excite “ such a painful degree of sympathy, as would overpower and suppress the pleasant feelings, excited by



“ the noble, tender, or generous sentiments which we “ hear uttered ;” because in this comparison we must be supposed to behold on the stage the *same*, and not a less degree of suffering that we should behold in reality ; so that the sympathy excited in the latter case would not be so painful as to “ overpower and suppress,” &c. but be in exact unison with what we experience in the former. If the real distress were so painful to the spectator as to “ overpower and suppress,” &c. it would not be adapted for dramatic representation ; for, as Dr. Johnson says of the *extrusion* of Gloster’s eyes in Lear, with an inconsistency inevitable by the supporters of *his* side of the question, —it “ must always compel the mind to relieve its distress by incredulity.”

“ Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi.”

In controverting Mr. Burke’s just observation that “ the nearer tragedy approaches the reality, and the “ further it removes us from all idea of fiction, the “ more perfect is its power ;” Mr. Knight says, “ to “ make the comparison between the exhibitions on the “ scaffold, and those on the stage fairly, we must suppose them both to be equally frequent and common ; “ in which case I cannot but hope for the honor of “ human nature, that scenes of mimic distress would “ be more attractive, than those of real suffering.” (P. 317.) To make the comparison fairly we must suppose both to be, not only “ equally frequent and “ common,” but equal in every other circumstance of interest and attraction ; in which case I cannot hesitate to assert, without any apprehension for the honor of human nature, that scenes of mimic distress would be *less* attractive than those of real suffering.

The inference naturally deduced from the extreme care bestowed in dramatic representations, to effect the most complete conformity between its exhibitions and our conceptions of the persons whose names the actors bear, and of the situations in which they are supposed to appear;—namely, that it is intended to facilitate illusion, and consequently implies a belief in the possibility of producing it;—has been pressed on our opponents,\* and ineffectually resisted by them in different ways. Some of them say, with Dr. Blair, the spectator “knows the whole to be an *imitation* only; “but he requires that imitation to be conducted with “skill and verisimilitude. His pleasure, the entertainment which he expects, the interest which he is “to take in the story, all depend on its being so conducted. His imagination, therefore, seeks to aid the “imitation, and to rest on the *probability*; and the “Poet, *who shocks him by improbable circumstances*, and “by awkward unskilful imitation, deprives him of “his pleasure, and leaves him hurt and displeased. “This is the whole mystery of theatrical illusion.” (III. 301.) But Mr. Knight ventures to assert that our impatience of incongruities, and the necessity of avoiding them, proceed from the very consciousness of fiction. “It is from knowing and feeling that the persons, whom we see on the stage, are mere actors and “actresses; and not the personages whose names and “characters they assume, that we cannot suffer the

---

\* According to Mr. Knight, the doctrine of illusion, which was maintained by Aristotle, Horace, and their successors, was “first exploded by “Dr. Johnson; though the Abbé Du Bos had before ventured to dissent “from it; at the same time that he tacitly admitted it in his subsequent “arguments.” (P. 330.) The same may be said of *all* who profess the same creed.

“ same license of fiction in dramatic, as in epic poetry.  
“ As we see no representation of Ajax or Achilles,  
“ while reading or hearing the Iliad, we have no pre-  
“ determined ideas of what their size and strength  
“ might have been; and the mind consequently draws  
“ imaginary portraits of them, proportioned to the  
“ actions which it finds attributed to him: but when  
“ these heroes are brought upon the stage, they are  
“ instantly reduced to the dimensions of the actors,  
“ who personate them; and if they even talk of driving  
“ whole armies before them, or sacking cities by the  
“ strength of their single arm, we immediately feel the  
“ absurdity of it; and the whole becomes farcical and  
“ ridiculous; of which we have a memorable instance  
“ in Dryden’s *Almanzor*.” (P. 269.) Now if we are  
always to discriminate between the actor and the character he personates, why so much anxiety that they should coincide in every respect? Ought we not to perceive an “absurdity,” something “farcical and “ridiculous,” when the actor,—without talking of driving whole armies before him,—only speaks, with all seriousness, of his relationship and transactions with people who died long before he was born, or who never existed at all? Is not Mr. Kemble as guiltless of the blood of Duncan as he is of sacking cities? Has not Mrs. Siddons as little to fear for her husband from the Venetian senate, as from the wrath of Achilles? It is therefore because we wish *not* to know the actor in the most interesting passages, but to lose him in the character he assumes, that we cannot tolerate any inconsistency in scenic performances.\*

---

\* “ Dans l’hypothèse théâtrale, l’acteur est le personnage même qui est

On the principles maintained in this essay, principles coeval with the drama itself, the question of the *unities* is easily settled. As illusion never exists at the beginning of a dramatic entertainment, so a strict observance of the unities would very much obstruct its ever being excited; either by inducing such sacrifices of probability as Dennis reprehends in Addison's *Cato*; or by circumscribing the story within such narrow limits, and producing so much simplicity in the plot and characters, as should greatly diminish its means of engaging the attention and interesting the feelings. In real life the occurrence of incongruous or indifferent things has but a temporary power to disturb our sympathy with the main transactions in which we may happen to participate; the impression of reality, which had been for a moment diverted, recurs with unimpaired influence: but such accidents on the stage are extremely injurious to the end proposed, by indisposing the mind to admit or retain those vivid impressions of fictitious distress which constitute dramatic illusion. What it exhibits, therefore, should not be literally transferred from real life; we should not be presented with a fac simile even of the most affecting incidents. "L'auteur croit," says Mad. De Stael, in her essay on fictions, "que les details minutieux ajoutent a la vraisemblance, et ne voit pas que tout ce qui ralentit l'intéret détruit la seule vérité d'une fiction, l'impression qu'elle produit. Si l'on représentait sur la scene tout ce qui se passe dans une chambre, l'illusion théatrale serait absolument détruite." Let not the eye or ear be shocked by incongruities, whether im-

---

"malheureux, souffrant, tourmenté de telle passion;" &c. Marmontel, *Elem. de Lit.* II. 287.

pntable to the poet or the actor, and their united efforts may succeed in commanding our belief, and swaying our sympathies, though the action should be transferred from Venice to Cyprus, from Thebes to Athens.

ART. IX. *On Perfectibility.*

**T**HE word *perfectibility* is somewhat new-fangled, having been born amidst the agitations of the French Revolution, and therefore still stinks in the nostrils of some people; but the question to which it relates is of higher antiquity than can be defined by literary monuments. From various causes the advocates for the wisdom of our ancestors have generally been more numerous than the advocates for the wisdom of the present and of future generations:

——— *numero plures, virtute & honore minores,*  
*Indocti, stolidique,—*

Pride and envy are gratified by depreciating contemporary rivals, and eagerly drag into light and magnify errors and imperfections which prevent living excellence from becoming the object of that respectful enthusiasm with which we regard that merit which death has canonized—*quod Libitina sacravit*. Dr. Johnson has somewhere compared the different impressions which we receive from an author's writings and from his conversation, to the manner in which we are affected by the different aspects of a city when viewed from a distance, and when seen through all its streets and alleys. From without, it presents a glorious show of domes, and spires, and picturesque masses, and magnificent groupes of buildings, and gilded pinnacles flashing their fires in the pale blue sky. Within, it is obstructed by narrow and intricate passages, and disgraced by the incongruous association of splendid structures and despicable hovels. The same illustration is applicable to the comparison between past and present times. Distance softens or obscures whatever on a near approach would be found to be harsh, mean,

or offensive; and leaves the imagination at liberty to substitute opposite qualities according to its own richness or prodigality. In all these cases the judgment respecting each separate object may be just; its characteristics may be truly delineated as viewed from a particular station; but the conclusions must be erroneous when comparisons are instituted between near and remote objects without duly adverting to the diversity in the position and circumstances of the spectator.

Equally unfavourable to the impartiality of our decisions is that prejudice which reverses the age of the world, representing it as more ancient in proportion as it was younger, and which professes as much reverence for the ancients as if they possessed the accumulated wisdom and experience of the ages that have intervened since they lived. It is this prejudice which Horace and Pope\* found it necessary in their days to combat, and by which they have since both profited.

I do not mean to attack or defend what is extravagant and indefensible in the speculations of Condorcet, Godwin, and Mad. de Stael on this subject. I have no faith in such a progression in the improvement of our moral and physical condition as would lead to the cessation of wars, disease and death. Such prodigies imply a commensurate change in the constitution of the world. The only debatable ground remaining appears to me to be circumscribed within the questions discussed in the *Edinburgh Review*† of Madame De Stael's work on the influence of literature, *viz.* Whether there

---

\* Hor. II. Epist. I. and Pope's imitation of it.

† No. XLI. Art. I.

be not a tendency in the powers of the human mind to decline after attaining a certain degree of improvement? and whether this progressive declension have not already commenced in England? These questions the Reviewer answers in the affirmative; and I shall venture to reply to the arguments by which he supports his opinions.

“The real and radical difficulty,” says the Reviewer, “is to find some pursuit that will permanently interest, some object that will continue to captivate and engross the faculties: and this instead of becoming easier in proportion as our intelligence increases, obviously becomes more difficult. It is knowledge that destroys enthusiasm, and dispels all those prejudices of admiration which people simpler minds with so many idols of enchantment. It is knowledge that distracts by its variety, and satiates by its abundance, and generates by its communication that dark and cold spirit of fastidiousness and derision which revenges on those whom it possesses, the pangs which it inflicts on those on whom it is exerted.” The little truth that may be extracted from this splematic passage is applicable to the progress of some individuals from youth to age, in whatever period of the world they may happen to live, not to the progress of the world from one generation to another. The fastidiousness, and satiety, and death of enthusiasm which overtake the father, have no power to diminish the bounding gaiety, and ardour of purpose, and orient visions, with which the son starts in his career. The knowledge which his predecessors may have collected, however abundant, can oppose no difficulties to his search after objects that



will continue to captivate and engross the faculties; for this knowledge can only become his by the application of his own labour, an application which would never be bestowed if unaccompanied by delight. The enthusiasm that he had attached to prejudices and illusions, he may direct towards temporal and eternal realities capable of occupying his most aspiring thoughts, his most intense longings. In gratifying the desire which impels us in the pursuit of knowledge, strength may fail, and sensibility to pleasure may be chilled by age;\* but no human being can plead the extent of his knowledge as generating satiety, and that dark, cold, and malevolent spirit of fastidiousness and derision which is infinitely more a curse to those whom it possesses than to those on whom it is exerted. These enemies of happiness are not the legitimate offspring of knowledge, but the spurious brood of false philosophy and infidelity, and ungoverned licentiousness.† May we not say with reverence that Omniscience itself is inaccessible to satiety and fastidiousness? and shall men impute to the abundance of *his* knowledge, to the vastness of *his* intelligence, the pain he endures from his *very* ignorance and depravity!

Have those who have been most distinguished by their intellectual superiority borne, from their own experience, a similar testimony with respect to the

---

\* "Non est voluptatum tanta quasi titillatio in senibus. \* \* \* † illa quanti sunt, animum, tanquam emeritis stipendiis libidinis, ambitionis, contentionis, inimicitiarum, cupiditatum omnium, secum esse, secumque, ut dicitur, vivere; si vero habet aliquod tanquam pabulum studii atque doctrinæ, nihil est otiosæ senectutis jucundius." Cic. de Senec. C. 14.

† See the character of *Childe Harold*.

influence of knowledge on the mind? Let us hear Bacon.\* “It were too long to go over the particular remedies which learning doth minister to the mind, sometimes opening the obstructions, sometimes helping digestion, sometimes increasing appetite, sometimes healing the wounds and exulcerations thereof, and the like;”——“We see in all other pleasures there is satiety,”——“but of knowledge there is no satiety.” And the grateful encomium of Madame De Stael: “Study holds out an object which is sure to yield in proportion to our efforts, an object towards which our progress is certain, while the road that leads to it exhibits variety without the dread of vicissitudes, and ensures success that can never be followed by a reverse. Study conducts us through a series of new objects; it supplies the place and effect of events, or furnishes such as are sufficient for thought, and which exercise and arouse it, without any application for foreign aid.”†

With respect to the intellectual character of our posterity, the Reviewer thinks that they will have more knowledge: “but for vigour of understanding, or pleasure in the exercise of it, we must beg leave to demur. The more there is already known, the less there remains to be discovered: and the more time a man is obliged to spend in ascertaining what his predecessors have already established; the less he will have to bestow in adding to its amount. The time however is of less consequence; but the habits of mind that are formed by walking patiently, hum-

---

\* Works, I. 33—5. 4to. ed.

† On the Influence of the Passions, &c. P. 287.

“ bly and passively in the paths that have been traced  
“ by others, are the very habits that disqualify us for  
“ vigorous and independent excursions of our own.  
“ There is a certain degree of knowledge, to be sure,  
“ that is but wholesome aliment to the understanding,  
“ —materials for it to work upon,—or instruments to  
“ facilitate its labours: But a larger quantity is apt  
“ to oppress and encumber it; and as industry which  
“ is excited by the importation of the raw material,  
“ may be extinguished and superseded by the intro-  
“ duction of the finished manufacture, so the minds  
“ which are stimulated to activity by a certain measure  
“ of instruction, may unquestionably be reduced to a  
“ state of passive and languid acquiescence by a more  
“ profuse and redundant supply.”—————“ But  
“ nothing we conceive can be so completely destruc-  
“ tive of all intellectual enterprize, and all force and  
“ originality of thinking as this very process of the  
“ reduction of knowledge to its results, or the multi-  
“ plication of those summary and accessible pieces of  
“ information in which the student is saved the whole  
“ trouble of investigation, and put in possession of the  
“ prize without either the toils or the excitement of  
“ the contest.” The reader has observed the violent  
repugnancy between the above passages. The Re-  
viewer seems determined to shun neither Scylla nor  
Charibdis, but to fall a prey to them both. He repre-  
sents our posterity as trudging patiently, humbly, and  
passively in the track of their predecessors; and at the  
same time as reaching the goal by a short cut without  
either the labour or the enjoyment of the journey:—  
as wasting their lives in ransacking the stores that had  
been bequeathed to them; and at the same time as as-

H h

certaining the amount and value of their inheritance so expeditiously as to be incapable of adding to it from want of the habit of exercising their faculties. The truth is that posterity will make themselves masters of the discoveries of their predecessors at the same expence of time and exertion that the latter bestowed on those of *their* predecessors; a just system may be acquired as soon as a false one; chemistry may be taught as soon as alchymy; astronomy as soon as astrology; the soundest doctrines in metaphysics may be understood sooner than the transcendent mysteries of Kant, or the mazes of ancient speculation in which Harris, Monboddo, and Drummond have lost themselves. But the student can *never*, without inspiration, be "saved the whole trouble of investigation;" and on the supposition of inspiration his knowledge would not be less real, nor would it have any tendency "to oppress and encumber" his mind, or to destroy "all intellectual energy, and all force and originality of thinking." Knowledge is power, not weakness; and to suppose that the mind is passive and inert under the process of receiving it, and less capable of vigorous exertion after being thus enriched than before, is such an error as Arminians fall into when they assert that a man might receive the influence of the holy spirit and yet not be changed. Thus Bishop Pearce\* declares that a person who had been the object of irresistible grace would be "no better after such a change than a mere machine would be: he is all passive, and he can no more be said to be good or holy, than a chest can be said to be rich, because riches are locked up in it."

---

\* Sermons, Vol. II. P. 318.

In both cases a belief is implied that goodness and knowledge could be mechanically infused into the mind, and there remain a dead weight upon it. They both involve the contradiction of representing knowledge and virtue as actually communicated, while the patient remains unconverted, neither wiser nor better than he was before.

It is undeniable that "the more there is already known, the less there remains to be discovered;" and it is no less so that the higher we ascend in a balloon the nearer we approach to the moon. If there were danger of arriving too soon at the summit of the heaven-kissing hill of knowledge, we might think it our duty not to point out to our successors the most accessible places and gentlest slopes, nor to invigorate their spirits and cheer their senses with the fragrance of flowers where the approach had wont to be barred by rugged prominences "shagged with horrid thorn." If the ocean of science could be exhausted we might deprecate the improvident labours of those who have drawn off from it so many fertilising streams.

We are told that, "as industry which is excited by the importation of the raw material, may be extinguished and superseded by the introduction of the finished manufacture, &c."—Now the two facts, the illustrative and the illustrated, are equally false. It is well known that, "the *introduction* of the finished manufacture," can no more be effected without the exchange of an equivalent, than "the *importation* of the raw material;" that the same prudent views govern both transactions, and that the same consequences with respect to wealth and industry result from them. The circumstances of a country some-

times, and in some instances, require the encouragement of that industry which is employed in working up the raw material; and at other times, and in other instances, of that which is employed in preparing an equivalent wherewith to purchase the finished manufacture; the object always being to obtain the greatest possible return for the same quantity of labour. The division of literary labour, and the exchange of its products, are regulated by similar principles. Thus the industry of the Americans is directed to the cultivation of things suited to their soil and climate, for which there is a demand in Europe; and to the preparation of the coarsest and most necessary articles of manufacture. They have also home-spun politics and religion for immediate consumption; but must import the more costly and finished articles in philosophy and literature.

In prosecuting his elegiac strain, the Reviewer observes: "A childish love of novelty may indeed  
 " give a transient popularity to works of mere amuse-  
 " ment; but the age of original genius, and of compre-  
 " hensive and independent reasoning, seems to be  
 " over. Instead of such works as those of Bacon, and  
 " Shakespeare, and Taylor, and Hooker, we have En-  
 " cyclopedias, and geographical compilations, and  
 " country histories, and new editions of black-letter  
 " authors, and *trashy* biographies, and posthumous  
 " letters, and disputations upon prosody, and ravings  
 " about orthodoxy and methodism." — "But as  
 " to any general enlargement of the understanding, or  
 " more preavailing vigour of judgment, we will own  
 " that the tendency seems to be all the other way; and  
 " that we think strong sense, and extended views of

“ human affairs, are more likely to be found, and to  
 “ be listened to at this moment than two or three  
 “ hundred years hereafter. The truth is, we suspect,  
 “ that the vast and enduring products of the virgin  
 “ soil can no longer be reared in that factitious mould  
 “ to which cultivation has since given existence; and  
 “ that its forced and deciduous progeny will go on  
 “ degenerating, till some new deluge shall restore the  
 “ vigour of the glebe by a temporary destruction of  
 “ all its generations.” If the principles by which the  
 Reviewer seeks to establish the reality of a tendency  
 to degeneration be sound, we may subscribe to the  
 truth of the above lamentable reckoning; but if I have  
 succeeded in showing that they are unsound, we may  
 reasonably look for better days, and for opposite re-  
 sults. If we have no poet comparable to Shakespeare,  
 may we not ask whether the same complaint, or the  
 same reproach, might not have been renewed every  
 year since his death? We cannot tell why he alone of  
 all the children of Adam should have been “ dono  
 “ quodam Providentiæ genitus, in quo totas vires suas  
 “ Poesis experiretur:” nor why a particular time  
 and place should have been favoured above all others  
 by the birth of “Nature’s darling.” It was many  
 years before Garrick arose to astonish and enchant the  
 world by his perfect representation of Shakespeare’s  
 conceptions; and even now the Western horizon is red  
 with the descending glory of Siddons. Bacon was  
 one of those men who run before the generation in  
 which they live; but if he could revisit the earth,  
 and were to examine one of those Encyclopedias  
 which are referred to as monuments of our degener-  
 acy, he would probably acknowledge that greater

improvements have been made in almost every department, than he anticipated. He did not live to witness the dawn of Physical science, which now shines with such meridian splendour. It is true that the revision of our laws which he recommended has never yet been undertaken, but I do not therefore despair of its accomplishment, being of opinion that liberal and extended views of human affairs are *more* likely to abound, and to be listened to many years hence than at this moment. Yes, as much as *we* surpass our ancestors in toleration, so much may posterity surpass us! The age of Bacon, and Taylor, and Hooker, delighted in disputations upon prosody, and what he is pleased to call *ravings* about orthodoxy, that is to say, enquiries that give scope to as much learning and genius as it is possible to bring to the task. And as to "new editions of black-letter authors," the Reviewer surely cannot blame us for going back to where he seems to place "the age of original genius," and to refresh ourselves by drinking deep from its wells. But from whatever motives a few black-letter gentlemen may have been dragged into light from the dusty recesses of libraries, whatever be their intrinsic merits, and whether they have come forth in their antique typographical costume, or dressed in Ballantyne's newest fashion, I do not hesitate to claim a preference for the present age with respect to precise, harmonious, and beautiful composition. We have now the inspiration of the Sybil without her contortions; the strength of the oak without its nodosities. The burnishing of the surface has taken nothing from the weight or fineness of the metal.

Forensic eloquence was unknown till a living ora-



*For* tor was called to the bar. The speeches of **ERSKINE** form an era in our literary history; and are no less dear to the patriot by embalming those sublime constitutional doctrines which at one time restored to juries that guardianship of the liberty of the press which had long been usurped by the bench; and at another preserved the ermine of justice from being indelibly stained with innocent blood. Nor let Ireland glory less in the vivid greenness of her shamrock wreath: for who will not acknowledge that there is infinitely more to admire than to be offended with, in the ardent tone, and profusion of metaphor, and daring flights, of **CURRAN**; or in the youthful and undefecated exuberance of **PHILLIPS**? Parliamentary eloquence cannot boast of a much older date. Having only preluded with some brilliant essays towards the close of George II's reign, it did not develope all its powers till the reign of George III. But here I am arrested by a very unexpected pretension on the part of the Reviewer. He claims all who died before the year 1798 as belonging a period unaffected by his reasoning, and exempt from the influence of his degenerating principles: by which means he bars his adversaries from opposing to the names of Bacon, and Taylor, and Hooker, which he is continually rattling in our ears, certain late examples of intellectual excellence, especially Mr. **BURKE**, the effulgence of whose single name would dissipate all the malign vapours and fogs with which he attempts to deform the fair face of moral nature. So that if we say,

" Si meliora dies, ut vina, poemata reddit,

" Scire velim, pretium chartis quotus arrogit annus?

the answer is distinct: every thing anterior to the

above date belongs to the good old times, and every thing posterior bears the stamp of degeneracy. Excludit jurgia finis. These are his words: "And it is true that Addison and Shaftesbury are cold; but the imputation only convinces us the more that she is unacquainted with the writings of Jeremy Taylor; *and that illustrious train of successors which has terminated, we fear, in the person of Burke.*"! By stopping just at the year in which Burke died, he also manages to deprive us of the redeeming charm of Burns' "native wood-notes wild," which sing the joys and sorrows of the sweetest passion of our nature with unrivalled pathos and sincerity. It is some comfort, however, that he leaves us Paley, Horseley, Malthus, Bentham, Davy, Fox, Windham, Sheridan, Erskine, Wellesley, Wellington, Wilberforce, Whitbread, Romilly, Canning, Brougham, Murphy, Aikin, Miss Edgeworth, Byron, Scott, Campbell, Southey, and a few others destined to burn with unquenchable radiance in the canopy of glory with which they cover their age and country; and to proclaim that the "faccitious mould to which cultivation has given birth" can boast more noble and enduring products, of their several kinds, than almost any that have flourished within the last hundred years.

I cannot conclude without adverting to the evils which he prognosticates for the higher and lower ranks of society: the former are to wallow in luxury which renders men selfish, sensual, mercenary, servile; the latter are to be depressed with irremediable pauperism. These opposite consequences of the principle of population are irreconcilable with each other. If it tend to diminish relative wealth, and to increase

the necessity of labour among the lower orders, it must have the same tendency among the higher. The necessity of labour, therefore, even among the aristocracy of the country, affords some protection against the encroachments of luxury; but surer safeguards are found, first, in our civil constitution which holds forth honours and wealth as the reward of talents and virtue, and which subjects the highest individuals to the censorship of an enlightened public; secondly, in the balance of power among the nations of Europe which menaces with inevitable humiliation whatever people shall sink beneath their fellows in point of vigour, of character, and force of intellect. With respect to the lower orders, their future condition cannot be justly appreciated without making due allowance for the effect of the poor laws; a topic to which the Reviewer abstains from making any allusion. It has been demonstrated that these impolitic laws have *created*, and are daily increasing that mass of pauperism which is now gratuitously fed at an annual expence of eight millions; but which it would require a no very, "long-sighted and strong-nerved humanity," gradually to reduce and extinguish. With the extinction of pauperism will be removed that mass of offences to which the Poor Laws give birth, not only by multiplying temptations, but by diminishing the resistance which conscience would oppose to them if not corrupted by their debasing influence. By mitigating the criminal code, in consonance not merely to what is, but to what ought to be, the humanity of modern times, Magistrates will cease to "play fast and loose with the Laws;"\* and Criminals will be reclaimed from their

---

\* Burke's Works, X. 27.

folly, and restored to self-estimation by reforming punishments, not allured to proceed in their career, sometimes by impunity, sometimes by vindictive and degrading punishments, until they are cut off by an apparently capricious infliction of the legal penalty. The extension of education, one of the most conspicuous signs of the times, and fraught with innumerable blessings, will co-operate powerfully with the more direct means which legislation supplies, towards the accomplishment of these noble objects; and save us from the reproach which Sir Thomas Moore throws out against negligent magistrates, *qui malos imitantur præceptores, qui discipulos libentius verberant quam docent.*

Upon the whole we are encouraged and warranted to rest in the assurance that there is no tendency to recede from, but rather to approach, that maximum of attainable human perfection which philanthropy loves to contemplate as the promised land of future generations.

ART. X. *On Definitions of Civil Liberty.*

Ἡμῶν γὰρ τ' ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνυται εὐρύσκα Ζεὺς  
 Ἀνέρος, εὖτ' ἂν μιν κατὰ δόλιον ἡμᾶρ ἔλθῃν.

ΟΔΥΣ., P. 322.

Jove fix'd it certain, that whatever day  
 Makes man a slave, takes half his worth away.

Pope's version, Book xvii. l. 322.

**ALL** those definitions of civil liberty which state it to consist in the excellence of laws, without reference to the form of government, or nature of the constituted authorities from which they have emanated; are morally and metaphysically false, and hostile to the interests, and to the very being of liberty among mankind. By separating government from the people they tend to corrupt both; to repress all social, generous, public-spirited principles, and to deliver men over to the dominion of selfish, sordid, narrow-minded pursuits. The heart and intellect equally suffer in their energy and rectitude from want of the discipline conferred by the exercise of freedom, whether in its calmer deliberations, or more animated contentions. With the diminution of self-respect and of the habit of self-government, our sense of justice, even of what is due to ourselves, is blunted; our reverence for moral obligations in public and private life is lessened: in fine, those incentives to good, and checks to evil are removed, which contribute to the formation of that elevated and consistent character which may entitle a nation to be hailed *lucem orbis terrarum, atque arcem omnium*

*gentium*. If it were reasonable to expect the (relative-ly) best laws from a government disconnected with the people, yet such laws must bear some correspondence in their provisions and sanctions to the inferior condition I have attributed to the people.

In questions respecting the degree of liberty which a particular people might be said to enjoy; or respecting the constitutional mode in which it ought to be secured and regulated, great variety of opinion must naturally be expected. But what shall we say to disquisitions on liberty which suppose the exclusion of its essence, and to definitions which contradict the established, and universally accepted meaning of the term they define? The *first* I shall select is from Sir James Stewart's Political Economy, B. II. C. 13. "By a  
 " people being free, I understand no more than their  
 " being governed by general laws, well known, not  
 " depending upon the arbitrary will of any man, or  
 " set of men, and established so as not to be changed,  
 " but in a regular and uniform way; for reasons which  
 " regard the body of the society, and not through favour or prejudice to particular persons or particular  
 " classes."———"According to this definition of liberty, a people may be found to enjoy freedom under  
 " the most despotic forms of government; and perpetual service itself, where the master's power is  
 " limited according to natural equity, is not altogether  
 " incompatible with liberty in the servant." It is easy to dispose of a paradox enunciated with so much simplicity and explicitness. A nation subject to a despotic government could have no security that its laws should  
 " not depend upon the arbitrary will of any man or  
 " set of men, and be established so as," &c. &c. By

passively submitting to such a government it renounces all pretensions to *freedom*, whatever other advantages it might enjoy: and slavery, or as Sir James calls it, "perpetual service," may be compatible with resignation, with comfort, or any thing that he pleases, but not with *liberty*.

Mr. Dugald Stewart, in his life of Dr. A. Smith, (P. 65.) supplies us with the *second* definition, which is of a more specious and complicated structure.——

"The happiness of mankind depends not on the share which the people possesses, directly or indirectly, in the enactment of laws, but on the equity and expediency of the laws that are enacted."——"The only infallible criterion of the excellence of any constitution is to be found in the detail of its municipal code; and the value which wise men set on political freedom, arises chiefly from the facility it is *supposed* to afford for the introduction of those legislative improvements which the general interests of the community recommend."——"And Smith Quesnai, Turgot, Campomanes, Beccaria, and others have aimed at the improvement of society,—not by delineating plans of new constitutions, but by enlightening the policy of actual legislators." Now, if "wise men" be right in setting a value on political freedom, because it is supposed to afford facilities for legislative improvements; or, whatever wise men may think, if political freedom can exist only among a moral and enlightened people, the gradation of whose ranks, with their several proportions of political influence, corresponds to the distribution of property; if equitable laws can only be expected from those who enjoy an equitable distribution of property and power, and

general diffusion of knowledge; and if a just administration of laws be no less important than the detail of a municipal code;—it will follow, (while human nature retains its present constitution,) that the happiness of mankind *does* depend on the share which the people possesses directly or indirectly in the enactment of laws. If man were a creature of pure intellect, without any sacred thirst for wealth, and honours, and power, or any other maleficent passion or propensity; the means of improving society would be comprised in the instruction of legislators. To see and pursue what is right would then be one and the same thing. No error but what would only require detection to be remedied; no grievance but what would be redressed as soon as complained of; no improvement that would not be transferred to practice as soon as its advantages had been demonstrated in the closet. But as the reverse of all this obtains; as there is a constant tendency in individuals, and in bodies of men, passing under whatever denomination, or by whatever ties held together, to infringe the rights of their neighbours; so it is morally impossible to counteract these tendencies to usurpation, and to secure the happiness of society, otherwise than by such a constitution as shall enable the people, not collectively but representatively, to influence public measures with a weight proportioned to their respective shares of property. It is not merely by delineating plans of new constitutions that so desirable a state of things can be produced. History shows what a variety of propitious circumstances,—how many able heads and honest hearts in a series of generations,—must co-operate towards the consummation of the mighty work; which, when accomplished,



is no less valuable on account of the *means*, or *action*, by which it produces its effects, than on account of the effects themselves. The writers, however, who have aimed at the improvement of society by investigating the principles of political institutions,—Locke, Hume, De Lolme, Burke, Patton,—without attempting to appreciate the benefit derived, or derivable from their labours, have testified that they considered the general weal to depend more on the purity of the *source* of legislation, than on the expediency of the laws which private individuals might recommend for enactment; and that they esteemed it more important to provide a body of legislators likely to be actuated by honest motives, than to enlighten “the policy of *actual* legislators.” They thought that a good political, like a good physical, constitution, afforded a surer pledge for the enjoyment of good health, by the powerful resistance it opposes to errors in regimen, and by its fund of *vis medicatrix*, than all the economical wisdom in the pages of a legion of Smiths and Quesnais. They would have classed those who hold an opposite doctrine with Mr. Grenville, of whom Burke says, that he “thought better of the wisdom and power of human legislation than in truth it deserves.” He conceived, “and *many* conceive along with him, that the flourishing trade of this country was greatly owing to *law* and *institution*, and not so much to *liberty*; for but too many are apt to believe regulation to be commerce, and taxes to be revenue.” Mr. Burke declares that if the people have not a just share “in the enactment of laws,” the laws enacted must *necessarily* be oppressive; whence it follows that to seek to remedy such evils solely by reading lectures on equity

to actual legislators, is a most absurd misapplication of labour. Speaking of the Irish Oligarchy, he says: "Allowing some foundation to the complaint, it is to no purpose that these people allege that their government is a job in its administration. *I am sure it is a job in its CONSTITUTION*; nor is it *possible*, a scheme of policy, which, in total exclusion of the body of the community, confines (with little or no regard to their rank or condition in life) to a certain set of favoured citizens the rights, which formerly belonged to the whole, should not by the operation of the same selfish and narrow principles, teach the persons, who administer in that Government, to prefer their own particular, but well understood private interest to the false and ill calculated private interest of the monopolizing Company they belong to."\* Nay, so far was he from thinking that the measure of a nation's happiness could be ascertained by an inspection of "its municipal code," that he says, "the most favourable laws can do very little towards the happiness of a people, when the disposition of the ruling power is adverse to them. Men do not live upon blotted paper. The favourable or the hostile mind of the ruling power is of far more importance to mankind, for good or evil, than the black letter of any statute."† If it should be said that absolute power *may* combine the most favourable laws with the most favourable disposition towards the governed, I answer, that the exclusion of the people from all share in legislative proceedings, (whatever may be the causes of such exclusion, and whether submitted to with entire resignation, or with some degree of dissatisfaction

---

\* Works, Vol. IX. P. 421.

† Ibid. P. 459.

and impatience,) necessarily implies so much estrangement and want of sympathy, as, when compared with the intimate correspondence of interests and sentiments that obtains under free governments, may be justly described as hostility. It cannot be that we should love strangers as well as our brethren; it cannot be that those who are considered unworthy, or incapable of the discharge of dignified functions should possess the same interest in the affections of the ruling power, as those by whose concurrence that ruling power is constituted, and who may expect themselves to stand on the same elevated platform. A people can no where find but in the forms of a free constitution that nuptial rite which sanctifies their union with their legislature, and affords the strongest hold on its fidelity and affection.

The futility of Mr. Stewart's sole expedient for improving society, namely, by enlightening the policy of actual legislators; is even more egregious than that which is lashed by Mr. Burke in the following passage. "But a Right Honourable Gentleman says he would keep the present government of India in the Court of Directors; and would, to curb them, provide salutary regulations; wonderful! That is, he would appoint the old offenders to correct the old offences; and he would render the vicious and the foolish wise and virtuous by salutary regulations. He would appoint the wolf as guardian of the sheep; but he has invented a curious muzzle, by which this protecting wolf shall not be able to open his jaws above an inch or two at the utmost. Thus his work is finished."\*

---

\* Speech on Mr. Fox's India Bill.

We cannot apply Mr. Stewart's "infallible criterion" of the excellence of any constitution," without being drawn into the most preposterous conclusions. It would lead us to place the best days of the Romans when they groaned under the hideous tyranny of their Emperors, for then only had their municipal code attained its perfection. It would compel us to ascribe an admirable constitution to the French when they lived under the pestilent sway of Bonaparte, for that period gave birth to the unrivalled Code Napoleon. *Quid Nerone pejus? Quid thermis melius Neronianis?* It would warrant our pronouncing the British constitution,—not to be the best the world ever beheld,—but one of the worst; for surely the British municipal code, dispersed as it is through innumerable volumes, and obscured by a barbarous technical language, is one of the least perfect that the perverse ingenuity of ages could have heaped together. We cannot therefore identify the good or evil fortune, the bright or gloomy periods, the happy and glorious, or degraded and miserable seasons in a nation's career, with the character of its municipal code, but with the possession or non-possession of liberty! Of the many examples that history presents to attest this truth, I shall only adduce one. In the beginning of the fifteenth century the city of Novogorod was so eminent by its power, opulence, and population, as to give rise to a proverb, *Quis contra Deos et Magnam Novogardiam?* "Who can resist the Gods and Great Novogorod?" It contained at least 400,000 souls. In this flourishing state, the effect of its political freedom, and republican constitution, it continued until 1477, when it was taken by Ivan Vasilievitch I. and became subject to the great-dukes of

**Russia.** From this time, as if its vital principle had been extinguished, it began to decline; but its more rapid downfall is dated from the year 1570, when 25,000 of its inhabitants fell victims to the vengeance of Ivan Vassilievitch II. This tzar having discovered a secret correspondence between some of the principal inhabitants and Sigismond Augustus, king of Poland, relative to a surrender of the city into his hands, repaired in person to Novogorod, and appointed a court of enquiry, justly denominated the *tribunal of blood*, whose proceedings lasted five weeks, and on each day more than 500 persons perished under its inhuman decrees. At the period of Mr. Coxe's visit, in 1778, it scarcely contained 7000 souls. "Devenue Sujette," says the historian L'Evesque, sub anno 1477, "*elle va chaque jour perdre de son domaine, de sa population, de son commerce, de ses richesses, et, dans moins d'un siècle, à peine sera-t-elle une ville importante: tant le souffle du pouvoir arbitraire est brûlant et destructeur.*" So wasting and destructive is the breath of arbitrary power!

It does not appear that Mr. Stewart wishes to be ranked among those wise men who set some value on political freedom, because it is supposed to afford facilities for the introduction of legislative improvements, since he plainly states that the happiness of mankind does not at all depend on the possession of any degree of political freedom: that is to say, freedom and despotism are intrinsically indifferent, and of equal value. He has some indulgence for the weakness of these wise men; but, for himself, he comes with "the Statute-book doubled down in dogs' ears," and says, This is *my* infallible criterion of the excellence of a

constitution! a criterion that the great Chatham, and the greater Burke, rejected as fallacious and inapplicable. On the other hand, I know not upon what authority he represents Quesnai, Smith, &c. as lending their countenance to his doctrine. The scope and tendency of their writings imply that they maintained a secret or avowed attachment to an opposite system of opinions; and they laboured, though less directly, perhaps not less effectually, to promote an equitable distribution of power, than those who projected plans of new constitutions. They could not expose the errors of actual legislators, and the consequent grievances under which the people laboured, without awakening the public attention, exciting popular feelings, and diffusing a general interest in political questions, which lead directly to the subversion of monopolies, and to the enjoyment of political freedom. Nor have governments shown themselves inattentive, or insensible to the effects of the obtrusive schooling addressed to them; though they have generally been more disposed to punish their masters than to profit by their lessons. Thus, the efforts of Jovellanos to dispel the palpable darkness of Spanish legislators, were rewarded with a dungeon. In the opinion of the benevolent Louis XVI. the *ames citoyennes* of Turgot and Malesherbes unfitted them for the exercise of legislation.\* And Dr. Aikin,† speaking of Beccaria's book, says: "The fame which the Marquis acquired was not, however, unattended with danger. The principles of government indirectly supported in it were hostile to

---

\* Miss Williams' correspondence of Louis XVI.

† General Biography.

“ absolute power, and were charged with being sub-  
“ versive of the legitimate sources of authority. A  
“ storm gathered round him which might have over-  
“ whelmed him, had he not been taken by Court  
“ Firmian (the Austrian Governor of Lombardy) un-  
“ der his immediate protection.”

If, therefore, we could even suppose that the writers in question expected to improve society by instructing actual legislators in their duties, yet it is certain that they have most frequently succeeded by enlightening the people, and by imparting such strength and energy to public opinion, that rights, which never would have been conceded to justice, have been extorted from fear. Or rather, may it not be said, that since the beginning of the world men's rights have never been conceded; they have always been extorted! The force has been more or less direct, more or less near and considerable, but still it has been force, and not a sense of justice, to which the conceding party has yielded. The history of every constitution betrays this humiliating truth. If the Dutch had spoken with the tongues of men and of angels, they could not have convinced Philip II. of the cruelty and folly of his attempting to torture them into Catholicism and slavery. As ineffectually did the Americans, in 1774, petition to obtain what they were afterwards vainly entreated to accept. As ineffectual would have been the prayers of the Irish, in 1779, if they had not been backed by 40,000 bayonets. “ Had  
“ the crown pleased to retain the spirit, with regard to  
“ Ireland,” says Mr. Burke in a letter to a member of the Irish House of Commons, dated January 1, 1780,  
“ which seems to be now all directed to America, we  
“ should have neglected our own immediate defence,

“ and sent over the last man of our militia, to fight  
 “ with the last man of your Volunteers.”

Some of the writers on legislation have not left their opinions on the importance of forms of government to be collected by inference. Mr. Dumont, in his preface to *Traité de législation civile & pénale*, thus guards against its being supposed that Mr. Bentham considered them as having little influence on the happiness of a nation. “ On sera étonné qu’une collection  
 “ si vaste n’offre aucun traité sur la constitution politique, ou la forme du gouvernement. L’auteur  
 “ a-t-il regardé toutes ces formes comme indifférentes,  
 “ ou a-t-il pensé qu’il ne peut y avoir aucune certitude  
 “ dans la théorie des pouvoirs politiques? *Il ne seroit  
 “ guère probable qu’une telle opinion pût exister dans  
 “ l’esprit d’un philosophe Anglois, et je puis dire qu’elle  
 “ n’est point celle de M. Bentham.*” Nevertheless it appears from the rest of the preface that Mr. Bentham greatly overrated the docility of actual legislators.

“ The fundamental regulation,” says Vattel, (B. I. Ch. III.) “ that determines the manner in which the  
 “ public authority is to be executed, is what forms the  
 “ *constitution of the state.*” “ The perfection of a state,  
 “ and its aptitude to fulfil the ends proposed by the  
 “ society, must then depend on the constitution; consequently it is of the greatest moment to a nation  
 “ that forms a political society; and its first and most  
 “ important duty towards itself, is to choose the best  
 “ constitution possible, and that most suitable to its  
 “ circumstances. When it makes this choice, it lays  
 “ the foundation of its preservation, safety, perfection,  
 “ and happiness: it cannot take too much care in  
 “ placing these on a solid basis.”



In fine, those who exclaim,

“ For forms of government let fools contest,

“ What’s ever is best administered is best:”

err in the same manner as those who exclaim,

“ For forms of creeds let graceless zealots fight,

“ His can’t be wrong whose life is in the right.”

Good laws are the good works of legislators; but liberty, like faith, is the only vital principle in which they can originate. And as a church establishment protects religion amidst all the fluctuations of human affairs, and human opinions: so the forms of a free government are as inseparably connected with the interests of liberty, and the temporal happiness of nations.

The *third* definition which I shall consider, is given by De Lolme, a man whom I place in the very first rank of political philosophers: \* “ What then is Liberty? Liberty, I would answer, so far as it is possible for it to exist in a society of beings whose interests are almost perpetually opposed to each other, consists in this, that, *every man, while he respects the persons of others, and allows them quietly to enjoy the produce of their industry, be certain himself likewise to enjoy the produce of his own industry, and that his person be also secure.* But to contribute by one’s suffrage to procure these advantages to the community,—to have a share in establishing that order, that general arrangement of things, by means of which an individual, lost as it were in the croud, is effectually protected,—to lay down the rules to be observed by those who, being invested with a

---

\* “ Quoad longissime potest mens mea respicere spatium præteriti temporis; & pueritiæ memoriam recordari ultimam, inde usque repetens, hunc video mihi principem, & ad suscipiendam, & ad ingrediendam rationem horum stridorum extitisse.” *Cic. pro. Archia.*

“ considerable power, are charged with the defence of  
 “ individuals, and provide that they should never  
 “ transgress them,—these are functions, are acts of  
 “ government, but not constituent parts of Liberty.

“ To express the whole in two words: To concur  
 “ by one’s suffrage in enacting laws, is to enjoy a share,  
 “ whatever it may be, of power : to live in a state  
 “ where the laws are equal for all, and sure to be ex-  
 “ ecuted (whatever may be the means by which these  
 “ advantages are attained) is to be free.” (P. 240.)

As the above passage nearly coincides with that quoted from Sir James Stewart, it is obnoxious to the same objections. Whatever is essential to liberty is comprehended in the complex idea represented by that term; and as to concur by one’s suffrage, directly or indirectly, in the enactment of laws, (implying the enjoyment of a certain degree of power, or the exercise of functions and acts of government,) is of the essence of liberty, such concurrence cannot be excluded from any just definition of the term. It would be a solecism to speak of a *free* people who had no share in the regulation of their own affairs; of *freemen* who had no power by their votes to influence the proceedings of their own legislature. As the above definition is at variance, not so much with particular passages, as with the substance and spirit of his whole work, I shall only extract the concluding sentences. “ When the world  
 “ shall have been again laid waste by conquerors, she  
 “ (England) will continue to show mankind, not only  
 “ the principle that ought to unite them, but what is  
 “ of no less importance, the form under which they  
 “ ought to be united. And the philosopher, when he  
 “ considers the constant fate of civil societies amongst

“ men, and observes the numerous and powerful causes  
 “ which seem as it were unavoidably to conduct them  
 “ all to a state of incurable political slavery, takes  
 “ comfort in seeing that Liberty has at length disclo-  
 “ ed her secret to mankind, and secured an Asylum to  
 “ herself.”

Dr. Paley furnishes the *fourth* definition. (Mor. and Pol. Phil. Vol. II. P. 169.) “ Were it probable that  
 “ the welfare and accommodation of the people would  
 “ be as studiously and as providently consulted in the  
 “ edicts of a despotic prince, as by the resolutions of  
 “ a popular assembly, then would an absolute form of  
 “ government be no less *free* than the purest democra-  
 “ cy. The different degree of care and knowledge of  
 “ the public interest, which may reasonably be expect-  
 “ ed from the different form and composition of the  
 “ legislature, constitutes the distinction, in respect of  
 “ *liberty*, as well between these two extremes, as be-  
 “ tween all the intermediate modifications of civil  
 “ government.” The same error recurs here, the  
 omission of the essence of liberty, spontaneity. How-  
 ever carefully a despotic prince might consult the wel-  
 fare of his people, such a people might be considered  
 the well administered property of a master who rightly  
 understood his own interest, but they could not be said  
 to be free. The exercise of liberty constitutes a prin-  
 cipal part of its enjoyment. The freedom of the sub-  
 jects of a beneficent despot would differ as much from  
 the freedom of a free nation, as the health of a person  
 who lived in a static chair, in the strict observance of  
 a particular regimen, would differ from the health of  
 a votary of Hygeia who delighted in the sports of the  
 field. The Nymph “Sweet Liberty.”

L 1

---

*velut equa trima campis.  
Ludit exultim, metuitque tangi.*

The tranquillity of the one people would proceed from a defect, the irritability of the other from an abundance, of sensorial power. The unanimity of the one would be but another word for apathy and ignorance; the animated contentions of the other, the necessary results of intelligence and sensibility. "The dissensions of a free people are the preventives, and not the indications of radical disorder,—and the noises that make the weak-hearted tremble, are but the natural murmurings of those mighty and mingling currents of public opinion which are destined to fertilize and unite the country; and can never become dangerous till an attempt is made to dam them up, or to disturb their level."\* In the beautiful language of De Lolme: "The governing power being dependent on the nation, is often thwarted, but so long as it continues to deserve the affection of the people, can never be endangered. Like a vigorous tree which stretches its branches far and wide, the slightest breath can put it in motion; but it acquires and exerts at every minute a new degree of force, and resists the winds by the strength and elasticity of its fibres, and the depth of its roots." Like one of those monuments of Druidical superstition, known by the name of *rocking-stones*, the slightest touch can set it in motion; but it would require a very extraordinary power to remove it from its place.

---

\* Edinb. Rev. Vol. XX. P. 343.

ART. XI. *A View of the Theories of Particles, and of some Opinions on Questions of General Grammar, contained in Dr. Lumsden's Persian Grammar; and in Tooke's Diversions of Purley.*

**T**HE doctrines of Harris and Horne Tooke on the subject of particles may be considered as two extremes, between which the system of Dr. Lumsden holds a middle course. The differences which distinguish them have some analogy with those which are most prominent in the "Tale of a Tub." While Harris, with Jack, *protests* against the ascription of any meaning whatever to particles; and while Horne Tooke, with Peter, *transubstantiates* them into verbs and nouns; Dr. Lumsden, with Martin, only ventures to *consubstantiate* their meaning with that of other contiguous words.

Mr. Harris's definition of a particle, that is to say, a preposition, conjunction, or termination,—that it is "a word devoid of all signification; but so formed as to unite two or more significant words, which refuse to coalesce or unite of themselves;"—is indeed too absurd for argumentative refutation. No reasoning can add force to the self-destructive powers of manifest contradictions. For this is what the definition amounts to: Words significant of our ideas may be placed together without conveying any intelligible sense, until the various relations by which they are connected, (which are no less distinctly conceived by the mind, and no less important in the enunciation of its sentiments, than the objects to which they refer,) shall be clearly expressed by the insertion of appropriate, *insignificant* particles!

The distinction between the nonsignificant, consignificant, and adsignificant systems is rather nominal than real. They all agree in representing particles to be separately insignificant, and yet to disclose their own proper significations when used in combination with others. As individuals they signify nothing, and consequently there is *no* difference between one and another; and yet having assumed their proper places in the ranks according to their *different* powers, they perform excellent service! Some conjunctions, says Harris, "have a kind of obscure signification when taken alone; and appear in Grammar like Zoophytes in nature, a kind of middle beings of amphibious character; which, by sharing the attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the whole together." Upon this precious passage Horne Tooke freely indulges his wit (of which he has so much that we could better spare a better writer) against Mr. Harris and his friend Lord Monboddo; and truly they are altogether defenceless against the pelting of the pitiless storm of ridicule that he pours upon them from his text and from his notes. "It would have helped us a little," says he, "if Mr. Harris had here told us what that *middle state* is, between signification and nonsignification! What are the *attributes* of nonsignification! And how signification and nonsignification can be *linked* together!"

Such are the absurdities with which the opinions of the greater part of Horne Tooke's predecessors are chargeable. And what does he substitute in their room? Having rescued particles from so much confusion and misrepresentation, and having asserted their self-significance, what rank does he assign them? He

identifies them with nouns and verbs! Having, by a true or false etymology,\* derived all particles from nouns or verbs, he maintains that they never cease to be nouns or verbs! The wings that he speaks of, avail them little, for, with him, the butterfly is “merely and “simply” the aurelia from which it sprung. Nouns and verbs are the only sorts of words which he acknowledges to be necessary for the communication of our thoughts. “What are called its (the mind’s) operations, are merely the operations of language. A “consideration of ideas, or of the mind, or of things “(relative to the Parts of Speech) will lead us no “farther than to *Nouns*: i. e. the signs of those impressions, or names of ideas. The other part of “speech, the *Verb*, must be accounted for from the “necessary use of it in communication.”† Thus even verbs are unnecessary as signs of ideas; they are only necessary “in communication” (of our ideas!) “The “errors of Grammarians have arisen from supposing “all words to be *immediately* either the signs of things, “or the signs of ideas: whereas in fact many words “are merely *abbreviations* employed for dispatch, and “are the signs of other words. And these are the “artificial wings of Mercury, by means of which the “Argus eyes of Philosophy have been cheated.”‡ i. e. as I understand it, all words which are not nouns or verbs, are the signs of other words which are nouns or verbs. But what is this but saying that they are *immediately* the signs of ideas signified by nouns or verbs? There is nothing intermediate between words and

---

\* Dr. Jamieson has shown that he was mistaken in some of those on which he builds most. See his *Etym. Dictionary*.

† *Div. of Purley*, I. 51.

‡ *Ibid.* I. 27.

ideas. Words which are said to be mediately significant by being the signs of other words, must be at once, and immediately, the signs of the ideas represented by those other words; for to suggest words and to suggest ideas is an identical operation. What are said to be “merely the operations of language,” are simultaneously the operations of the mind. The two are indissolubly associated together. This false distinction seems to correspond with that which he\* makes between the *signification* of words, and the *manner of signification* of words. The necessary words, nouns and verbs, have their “significations;” and all other words which are “merely substitutes of the first sort,”—“abbreviations employed for the sake of dispatch,”—have their “manners of signification.” We have seen that the words which are said to be substitutes for, and the signs of, the necessary parts of speech, are thereby identified with those parts of speech: and if so, where is the “abbreviation?” and where is the difference in the “manner of signification?” If adjectives, adverbs, conjunctions, &c. have each (as he admits) a different manner of signification, then they have each a different signification, and are not substitutes for, nor signs of nouns and verbs. Whatever differs *modo significationis*, must differ *significatione*.

Having thus removed his illusory, and nugatory distinctions, and given to the statement of his scheme the only sense which it will bear, let us look a little more closely at it by examining one or two of its ex-

---

\* And so does Scaliger whom he quotes with approbation. (Vol. II. P. 428.) “Nihil differt concretum ab abstracto, nisi *modo significationis*, non significatione.”



emphatications. The conjunction *but*, says Mr. Locke, "intimates a stop of the mind in the course it was going, before it came to the end of it." *But*, says Mr. Tooke, "is the farthest of any word in the language from *intimating a stop*. On the contrary it always intimates something more, something to follow:"\*—it "only directs something to be added or supplied, in order to make up some deficiency"—being, he thinks, the imperative of the verb *botan*, to boot, to superadd, to supply, &c. And yet he acknowledges that it will always be found "to allay equally the good or the bad precedent; by something more that follows."—Thus:

"*Mess.* Cæsar and he are greater friends than ever.

"*Cleo.* Make thee a fortune from me,

"*Mess.* BUT—YET—Madam,—

"*Cleo.* I do not like BUT—YET.—It does allay

"The good precedent." *Anthony* and *Cleopatra*.

"*Speed.* Item, she hath more hairs than wit, and more faults than hairs; BUT more wealth than faults."

"*Laun.* Stop there. She was mine, and not mine twice or thrice in that article. Rehearse that once more."

"*Am.* Ignuda ella m'aspetta? *Th.* Ignuda; MA.

"*Am.* Oimè, che MA? Tu taci, tu m'uccidi."

*Aminta*, A. II. S. 3.

Here we see that it intimates, not merely the addition of something more, but of something *contrary* to that which went before, and which it "allays:" i. e. it does intimate a stop of the mind in the course it was going.

We shall next take the conjunction *FOR*. Of it he says: "I imagine the word *FOR* (whether denominated *Preposition*, *Conjunction* or *Adverb*) to be a *Noun*,

---

\* Div. of Purley, I, 205.—208.

“ and to have always one and the same single signification, viz. CAUSE, and nothing else. Though Greenwood attributes to it *eighteen*, and S. Johnson *forty-six* different meanings: for which Greenwood cites above *forty*, and Johnson above *two hundred* instances. But with a little attention to their instances, you will easily perceive, that they usually attribute to the *Preposition* the meaning of some other words in the sentence.”

It is true that Dr. Johnson multiplies distinctions of meaning without differences, and is perpetually adducing examples at variance with his definitions, by attributing to a word the meaning of other words in the sentence. The Dictionary of the French Academy has none of these faults. Still it will not follow that the particle FOR is absolutely equivalent to the substantive CAUSE; for if that were the case they might change places (as Lear says of the Justice and the Thief,) and handydandy! which is the particle, which is the substantive?

FOR “is used to denote *Instead of, in the place of;* “ as—I will grind *for* him.” [“i. e. He being the *cause* of my grinding.”] Now who does not see that in this instance, Greenwood has given the true meaning of the particle; and that Horne Tooke’s resolution of it is ridiculous, there being no allusion whatever to a *cause*? Again: “He speaks one word *for* another.” [i. e. Another “word being the *cause* of his speaking “ that word which he speaks.”] This is no less false and ridiculous. It signifies *During*; as—“He was chosen [to some office] *for* life.” [i. e. To continue “ in that office *for* life; or, *for* the continuance of his “ life—The continuance of his life being the *cause* of

the continuance of his office.”] If any person shall be convinced by this lucid resolution that in the above instance *for* signifies *cause*, I shall certainly not contest the point with him. The two following I shall also leave to the decision of common sense. *For* signifies *as if, with resemblance of; as—*

“Forward he flew and pitching on his head.”

“He quiver’d with his feet, and lay *for* dead.”

“[i. e. As if death, or his being dead, had been the cause of his *laying*; or he lay in that *manner*, in which death or being dead is the cause that persons so *lay*.”]——“*FOR ALL. Notwithstanding; as—for all his exact plot, down was he cast from all his greatness.*” [i. e. His “exact plot being, all of it, a cause to expect otherwise; Yet he was cast down.”]

We are told that *THE* is the imperative of the verb *Than*, to take; so that *Take THE book*, must be resolved into *Take TAKE book!*

It was necessary to take this brief view of Horne Tooke’s scheme before we proceeded to Dr. Lumsden’s theory, which is amply developed in the following passage. (Vol. II. P. 32.) “Now the essence of every particle, or that which constitutes the distinction between it and either of the other two parts of speech, appears to me to consist in this; that *nouns* and *verbs* are invariably significant in every proposition, because they are truly significant in their own right; whereas *particles* are not significant in every proposition, because they are not significant in their own right, but only, (as in the case of the plural *s*,) in the right of some one or more words with which they must be therefore invariably connected. And the necessity of this connexion to the significant cha-

M m

“racter of every particle, will furnish the true criterion by which we shall be able to detect on every occasion, the difference between a particle and the corresponding verb or noun.

“To explain by an example. The word *from*, which is now a particle, denotes the same idea signified by the word *beginning*, which is a substantive noun. But the word *from* being a particle, (I speak of its present, not of its part character,) denotes the idea as it exists in a given substantive noun by which it must be therefore, invariably followed. And if that noun be taken away, the meaning of the word *from* will disappear with it; just as the plural sense of the letter *s* disappears when the substantive noun is taken away. For we cannot substitute the word *from*, for the word *beginning*, in the following sentence; “In the *beginning*, God created the heavens and the earth,” (I mean that we cannot say, “in the *from* God created the heavens and the earth,”) and the reason is obvious; namely, because the word *from* does not, in this combination, convey to the mind of an Englishman the idea signified by the word *beginning*; and if not *that* idea, it certainly conveys no other.”

1. Dr. Lumsden seems to admit, with very little qualification, the truth of Horne Tooke's opinions as far as they regard the English language; but I apprehend it would be difficult for him to reconcile what he retains of that system with what he engrafts upon it. If the word *from* denote “the same idea signified by the word *beginning*,” words so perfectly synonymous ought undoubtedly to be interchangeable; and then “in the *from*,” would mean “in the *beginning*,” and

"Brave from principle," would mean "Brave beginning principle."

2. Though *beginning* be equivalent to *from*, for which it may be invariably substituted, *from*, it seems, is not equivalent to *beginning*! If so, why violently thrust the poor particle into combinations repugnant to its nature; and, on its coming lamely out of such an ordeal, pass on it a sentence of *consignificance*? Every particle is to be arbitrarily married to some verb or noun; and however well it perform *its own* functions, yet if it be incapable upon a pinch of sustaining the part of its lordly mate, it is forthwith "detected" to have no significance in its own right, but only faintly to reflect *his* image! This is "the true criterion": by which we are to ascertain which is baron and which is fene, and what are their respective rights! But I maintain that every particle is as self-significant, as competent to suggest the idea of which it is the sign, as any other denomination of words in a language; and that though they may be, for the sake of experiments, employed in situations wherein their powers must lie dormant, and contribute nothing to the sense of a passage, yet *so may nouns and verbs*. If, as is affirmed, these latter are "significant in every proposition," it can only be intended to assert that they retain, and suggest those significations which would be efficient in the enunciation of propositions adapted to their reception; *but this is equally true of particles*, which will be found not to be subject to any conditions from which other words are exempt. In the sentence, "in the *from* God created the heavens and the earth," it is true that none of the meanings inherent in *from* can accord with the import of the rest of the sentence: but

may not its "corresponding noun" *beginning* be in a similar predicament, and produce equal incongruity? as if Hamlet were made to say. "Any thing so overdone is *beginning* the purpose of acting, whose end, both at the first, and now, was, and is, to hold, as 'twere the mirror up to nature;"—Neither can the plurality of meanings which belong to *from* and some other particles, be used as a test to degrade them in point of significance below the level of the other parts of speech; for that circumstance is not peculiar to them, but obtains through every order of words. Every word, according as it affects, and is affected by, its neighbours, discloses, in every situation, that precise sense which it has at all times an inherent aptitude to suggest. It has its potential and its actual meaning.

3. But we are told that the word *from* denotes the idea signified by the word *beginning*, "*as it exists in a given substantive noun by which it must be, therefore, invariably followed.*" And if that noun be taken away, "the meaning of the word *from* will disappear with it; just as the plural sense of the letter *s* disappears when the substantive noun is taken away." As well as I can understand the above definition it seems to transform the particle in question into an attributive nearly equivalent to the participle *beginning*; but if so, why should its meaning disappear with the removal of the following substantive? The meaning here assigned to it ought to remain even if it should stand unaccompanied by any substantive. For instance, the word *good* denotes the idea of goodness as it exists in a given substantive; but if that noun be taken away, the meaning of the word *good* will *not* disappear with it. With respect to the letter *s*, on which considerable

stress is laid, its power of signifying plurality does not necessarily cease when separated from its substantive: it may still be considered in that light, or simply as one of the letters of the alphabet. When the letter *a* stands by itself, of the many meanings which it possesses in different languages, it suggests none in particular, but all indifferently: but this is not peculiar to particles; it is common to nouns and verbs, the letter *a*, for instance, being part of a French and of an Italian verb.

I can, however, by no means admit the justness of the above-quoted definition. On the contrary, it appears unfounded in fact, and unintelligible when applied to *from* in any of its combinations. To take the simplest instance. "He went *from* London to York." What is meant by saying that *from* denotes the idea of *beginning* as it exists in London? The proposition implies the beginning of a journey, but nothing respecting the beginning of London. If it be said that it is the beginning of a journey at London, that is denoted, I answer that this is travelling out of the definition; and instead of proving that *from* and *beginning* are convertible, would only prove that *from* may be replaced by a periphrasis. And it will be found that Horne Tooke and his followers who maintain that *beginning* may be invariably substituted for *from* are compelled to make use, in every instance, of different supplementary words, of a different periphrasis, suggested by their previous knowledge of the force of the displaced particle. I shall only give one more example, but need not stop to try whether the *froms* may be replaced by *beginnings*:

" And pluck the wings *from* painted butterflies,

" To fan the moon-beams *from* his sleeping eyes."

4. The reader will have observed that from the Diversions of Purley, Dr. Lumsden derives his criterion of consiguificance, his disqualifying test, the very Schibboleth of his system; and I shall presently show that he subscribes to *all* its doctrines with *one* qualification, *viz.* that they are fortuitous, not necessary truths. Dr. Lumsden delivers his objection as follows: (Vol. II. P. 400,) "Mr. Tooke has clearly shewn that what has been termed the conjunction *that*, may be resolved into a demonstrative noun in every example that can be adduced. His examples indeed are very numerous, and in my judgment quite satisfactory; but the *resolving principle* is every where the same, and two will therefore suffice here. Example: "I wish you to believe *that* I would not hurt a fly." Resolution: "I would not hurt a fly, I wish you to believe *that*." Example: "Thieves rise by night *that* they may cut men's throats." Resolution: "Thieves may cut men's throats, (for) *that* (purpose) they rise at night," &c.

"Now this is not only ingenious, but in my opinion perfectly just, considered with reference to the English language; and I admit, therefore, that what has been termed the English conjunction *that*, is, in fact, the demonstrative noun (the *article* or *pronoun* Mr. Tooke terms it) used, however, in a conjunctive sense. And the same principle is plainly applicable to several other tongues noticed by Mr. Tooke, who has even shown that the Latin conjunction *ut* (anciently written *uti*) is a corruption of the Greek neuter article *ὅτι* adopted by the Latins for this conjunctive purpose of speech.

"But is it not plain that all this is merely fortuit-



“ous, and not, as Mr. Tooke would have us to believe, “a *necessary* principle of universal Grammar?” (Vol. II. P. 385,) “I shall suppose, for example, that a given etymological truth as the identity of the demonstrative *that*, and the conjunction *that*, has been established by unexceptionable evidence, as well in the English, as in every other tongue. Shall it be therefore maintained that this identity is *necessary* or *immutable* by its own nature?” &c.

Now if the above decision referred to a matter of mere etymology, I should not venture to dispute it; but its error lies in this, that it is passed on a question beyond the cognizance of the etymologist, upon evidence inadmissible and inapplicable, and to the exclusion of that species of evidence, namely, the principles of universal grammar, which would have dictated an opposite judgment. It requires a knowledge of no other language but English to prove that the supposed fortuitous truth is necessarily false, since it affirms identity of things obviously different. If, there be an identity of *meaning* in the conjunction *that* and the demonstrative *that*; if they denote *the same idea*, such identity would obtain in all languages by whatever words they were expressed, however dissimilar in sound and etymology: but if the ideas be indisputably different there can be no identity in any language, though they should be expressed in all languages by the *same word*. It is not the sameness of *sound* in the two words, that Dr. Lumsden so repeatedly admits, for that would be nugatory, but the sameness of *idea*; though in one place he expresses himself with a natural inconsistency, (I do not mean naturally incident to the author, but to the occasion :) “I admit, therefore, that

“ *what has been termed the English conjunction that, is,*  
 “ *in fact, the demonstrative noun, used, however, in a*  
 “ *conjunctive sense!*” \* In another place he speaks more  
 resolutely and plainly: (Vol. II. P. 92.) “ But though  
 “ it may be true that the English conjunction is the  
 “ same word, that is to say, that it denotes *the same*  
 “ *idea*, signified by the English demonstrative noun;  
 “ (and we know that both are represented by the same  
 “ *sound*, namely, by the sound of the word *that*) it is  
 “ nevertheless certain; that the demonstrative and the  
 “ conjunction are wholly unconnected in the Persian  
 “ language.” The possible co-existence of variety  
 and identity of meaning in the same word, is affirmed  
 in another place: (Vol. II. P. 409.) “ It is neverthe-  
 “ less possible that some of the relations expressed by  
 “ the particle *ké*, may have escaped the industry of my  
 “ enquiries; and that others may have been assigned  
 “ to various rules, which ought to be comprised in the  
 “ same rule. Nay, the reader may possibly discover  
 “ some *one sense* of the particle *ké*, which will be ac-  
 “ curately applicable to every example adduced in  
 “ illustration of all the rules.”

It is unnecessary to quote examples from other lan-  
 guages wherein our conjunctive and demonstrative *that*,  
 are expressed by different words which are never con-  
 vertible. In such cases the difference is more palpa-  
 ble; but even in English it is too obvious to require  
 much illustration. In the two examples and their re-  
 solutions, (“ I wish you to believe that I would not  
 “ hurt a fly.” &c.) do the two *thats* express the same  
 idea? Assuredly not. Where then is the identity? In

---

\* Wallis, P. 92. “ Adjectivum respectivum est nihil aliud quam vox  
 “ substantiva adjective posita.”

the above examples the sentences are resolved into two, the first consisting of an independent proposition, ("I would not hurt a fly," &c.) which would stand very awkwardly if it happened not to be founded on truth. For instance, suppose Miss Hardcastle had said to one who was in her secret, "I wish them to believe *that* I am the bar-maid:" would it not have been absurd if she had said, "I am the bar-maid: I wish them to believe *that*?" Example: "The infatuated man laboured incessantly *that* he might accomplish a purpose which was really impracticable." Resolution: "The infatuated man *might* accomplish a purpose which was really impracticable: he laboured incessantly (for) *that* (purpose)." Example: "Suppose *that* I were King of France." Resolution: "I *am*" (we cannot say "I were," there being no antecedent hypothetical particle,) "King of France: suppose *that*." It is evident, therefore, that no resolving process, with all the appliances of typography to boot, can prevail on the two *thats* to abdicate their respective characters as representatives of *different* ideas.

5. As the consideration of the demonstrative *that* has tempted the author to step a moment out of his way for the purpose of branding our definite article with consignificance, it is competent for me, in this place, to interpose for its protection. (Vol. II. P. 400.) "It would be nonsense to say "Give me *the*," for "Give me *the* book;" but we may accurately say "Give me *that*," for "Give me *that* book;" and the fact, I believe, is utterly unaccountable, otherwise than by admitting the consignificance of the word *the*, and the self-significance of the word *that*." The

N n .

meaning of the definite and indefinite article is too accurately known to require the smallest elucidation: it would not be so easy to say what is the exact force of consiguificance as applied to limit the representative power of *the*, or of any other word. We have reason to be well satisfied with our articles, when we consider that, for want of distinctness in that respect in the Greek language, critics have not been able to agree upon the interpretation of ἀπὸ τοῦ ποινῆς. It is true we cannot say "Give me *the*," neither can we say "Give me *my*," for "Give me *my* book," but we can say "Give me *mine*." Now, as *the* is to *that*, so is *my* to *mine*; and therefore even-handed justice should treat them both alike, without any question whether particle or no particle. The Latine idiom will admit of our saying. "This is *my*,"—"Hic *meus* est," "Hæc *mea* sunt." "Non est *meum*, si mugiat Africis" "Malus *procellis*;" but *my* is not, therefore, less self-significant than *meus*. We cannot say "Give me *good*," for "Give me *good* pens, books," &c. but we can say "Give me *good* ones;" yet this implies no impeachment of the rank that *good* holds among words.—

6. Dr. Lumsdem having adduced various examples in which the words *ké* and *ché* are used as *relatives*, I cannot understand upon what principle he dissents from the opinion of the Persian Grammarians, and detrudes them from a station which by his own confession they occupy. I take the facts as they are found by the author, pretending to no personal knowledge whatever of the Persian language. (Vol. II. P. 92.) "For if it be true that "every relative pronoun *unites in itself* the force of a connective, followed by the "antecedent or its pronominal name," it is obvious

“that the absence of all relatives might be easily” [not conveniently] “supplied in a given language, *by employing the necessary connective, followed by the antecedent, or its pronominal name.* This plan has been accordingly adopted in the Persian language; and the word *ké*, which has been termed by Grammarians the “*relative noun*,” is, in truth, a *simple connective*; “belonging as I conceive to the class of *particles*; and not to the class of nouns or pronouns” —and— “corresponding, in point of sense, with the conjunction *that*.” One would suppose from this passage that the antecedent, or its pronominal name, was invariably repeated after *ké*; and if that were the case the non-relative character of the word in question would be established. But we are told (P. 97,) “that the pronominal name of the antecedent must be inserted whenever its omission would be detrimental to the perspicuity of the sentence; and that it ought to be omitted in every other case.” And the instances which are given of its omission prove that *ké* is a genuine *relative*, (no matter whether noun or pronoun,) and that the Persians can dispense with that clumsy alternative which is stated to be the “plan” that they have “adopted.” The examples are, (P. 97,) “God does not send the man *whom* he selects, or calls to himself, to wonder about from door to door.” (P. 404,) “Give sugar to him *who* pelts you with stones.” (P. 409,) “What shall the victim of love do, *who* is not permitted to disclose (or more literally, *who* does not disclose) his grief?”

It is true that *ké* is *also*, and at other times, a *conjunction*, translatable by *that*, *because*, *than*, &c.: as, (P. 404,) “I swear by humanity *that* the empire of the

"world is not worthy *that* it should be purchased at the expence of one drop of blood," &c.

The circumstance of its being (P. 96) "unsusceptible of variation by gender, number, case and person," is of no farther consequence than as it may imply the limitation of its capacity to answer all the purposes of a relative pronoun; and an argument might be thence deduced to show that its uses are not co-extensive with those of the relatives of some other languages: but if the want of inflexion were supposed to be absolutely incompatible with the character of a relative pronoun, such an argument would have no greater force than it would against the English relative *that*, and the whole body of English adjectives. It follows that the power of acting as a relative, or of "uniting in itself the force of a *connective* as well as "of the *prepositive* pronoun," can no more be denied to *ké*, than to the word *that*; which the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, in one of its attempts to reconcile *Horne Tooke's diversions* with common sense, (et cum ratione insanire,) nevertheless does in the following peremptory terms: "Yet the word *that* has undoubtedly in "itself no more the force of the relative pronoun than "*the* or *this*, or any other definitive whatever."

With respect to the two examples given in p. 93. wherein the pronoun is repeated in what would otherwise have been the relative clause, *ké* is plainly a conjunction, not however "corresponding, in point of "sense, with the conjunction *that*," but with *because*, or one of its synonyms. The conjunction *that* precedes the mention of a *final* cause, but never of an *efficient* cause, or of a fact assigned as an efficient motive for conduct. Example: "Learn purity of manners and

“conduct, from that master, who (*that he*) acquired  
 “purity from the Deity himself.” With the use of *that*  
 the passage is nonsense; and can only become intelligible  
 by the substitution of *because* or *for*. “Learn  
 “purity of manners and conduct from that master, for  
 “*he* acquired purity from the Deity himself.” Example:  
 “How can that secret remain concealed, which is  
 “the subject of conversation, or of which they speak,  
 “(or *that of it* they speak) in every company?” In  
 this case the use of *that* does not produce nonsense, but  
 it perverts the meaning intended to be conveyed. It  
 states the publicity of the matter simply as a fact which  
 could not be denied; whereas in the original it is stated  
 as a reason for asserting that the subject could no  
 longer be considered a secret, or as a cause why it could  
 not remain so. It makes *he* answer to the question  
*What?* instead of to the question *Why?* Thus, “How  
 “can that secret remain concealed, (*What secret?*) *that*  
 “it is spoken of in every company?”—“How can that  
 “secret remain concealed, (*Why not?*) *because* it is  
 “spoken of in every company.”

It is true Dr. Johnson represents *that* as possessing  
 occasionally the force of *because*; but the two examples  
 that he adduces refuse to support his position. The  
 first is:

“It is not *that* I love you less,  
 “Than when before your feet I lay;  
 “But to prevent the lad encrease,  
 “Of hopeless love, I keep away.” WALLER.

The second:

“Forgive me *that* I thus your patience wrong.” COWLEY.

The first line of the first example contains a simple as-  
 sertion, negating an inference that might be drawn

from his conduct, and not the specification of any cause.

"It is not (true) *that* I love you less?"

Or, "*That* I love you less, it is not."

If we ascribed to the conjunction the sense of *because*, it would essentially pervert the poet's meaning by admitting the existence of that diminution of love which he expressly denies.

With respect to the second example there is as little room for hesitation. An offence is surely not the *cause*, but the *subject* of the act of forgiving. The cause must be sought for in other considerations; motives adapted to the occasion must be suggested. It is plain therefore that the conjunction in the second, as well as in the first example, denotes *indication*. It indicates the subject to which the preceding verb refers. "Forgive me the offence of wronging your patience." Suppose Dr. Johnson had introduced some such example as the following: "I am glad *that* the price of stocks has risen." The rise of price might be considered as a *proximate cause* of gladness; but it would be more accurate to consider it as the *occasion* or *subject* of that emotion, and to assign the reason or reasons *why* it is so: as, "because I wish to sell out;" "because a friend wishes to sell;" "because it is a sign of improving national credit," &c. In Acts, XXVI. 2. *that* ought to be substituted for *because*. "I think myself happy, King Agrippa, *because* I shall answer for myself this day before thee, touching all the things whereof I am accused of the Jews." No *cause* is here assigned for self-gratulation; St. Paul only states the occasion or subject of such self-gratulation: "I think myself happy, King Agrippa, *that* I shall an-



“ answer for myself this day before thee,” — “ Roi Agrip-  
 “ pa, je m’estime heureux *de ce que* je dois répondre  
 “ aujourd’hui devant toi,” — The cause is assigned in  
 the next verse: “ Especially *because* I know thee to  
 “ be expert in all customs and questions which are  
 “ among the Jews:” — “ Et surtout *parceque* je sai que  
 “ tu as une entière connoissance,” &c. The following  
 example would have answered Dr. Johnson’s purpose  
 better:

“ She lov’d me for the dangers I had pass’d,  
 “ And I lov’d her *that* she did pity them.” OTHELLO.

In this case it is impossible to deny that the conjunc-  
 tion has the force of *because*; but it seems to be used  
 elliptically:

“ And I lov’d her (on this account) *that* she did pity them,  
 Or, “ And I lov’d her (because) *that* she did pity them.”

The possibility of prefixing *because* to *that* without the  
 slightest violation of sense or idiom, affords a strong  
 presumption, if not a conclusive proof, that the latter  
 can represent the former only by means of such an  
 ellipsis. And that there is no violation of idiom, I  
 produce the following example from an excellent au-  
 thority in that respect. Acts, XXIV. 11. “ *Because*  
 “ *that* thou mayest understand that there are yet but  
 “ twelve days since I went up to Jerusalem for to  
 “ worship.” Horne Tooke has observed that the con-  
 junction *that* may be preceded by most of the other  
 conjunctions.\*

In the speech from which the above lines are taken,  
 Othello had to acquit himself of a difficult duty, *name-  
 ly*, to account for the movements of a passion as arbi-

---

\* Div. of Purley I. 273.

trary as the wind which bloweth where it listeth. It is easy for Demetrius to say whether he loves Hermia or Helena; but not so easy for him to assign the cause of his preferring one to the other.\*

7. Dr. Lumsden does not seem more fortunate when he agrees with the Persian Grammarians, in rejecting *is* from the class of verbs, and throwing it into the class of particles, than when he dissents from them in respect to the relative *ké*.

It having been observed that every verb was resolvable into the substantive verb *is* and another attributive; as *loveth* into *is loving*, *walketh* into *is walking*, *sapit* into *sapiens est*; it was justly concluded that the distinguishing attribute, the constituent principle, the essential characteristic of the verb, must be locked up in the word *is*, viz. PREDICATION. "Every other circumstance which the verb includes, such as *attribute*, *mode*, *time*, &c. it may be possible to express by *adjectives*, *participles*, and *adverbs*; but without a *verb* it is impossible to *predicate*, to affirm or deny, any one thing of any other thing. The office of the verb, then, when stript of all accidental circumstances, seems to be merely this, "To join together the

---

\* The *twelfth* meaning that Johnson assigns to the pronoun *THAT*, belongs to the *conjunction*. The differences on which he builds most of these distinctions are not in the pronoun, but in the contiguous words. The second meaning he assigns to the Con. *that*, is "noting a consequence;" but the first example that he subjoins is inapposite:

"*That* he should dare to do me this disgrace!"

"Is fool or coward writ upon my face?"

As in a parallel instance: "*That* it should come to this!"

"But two moths dead!" the conjunction serves to *indicate* the occasion or subject of the speaker's indignation and astonishment.

“ subject and predicate of a proposition.”\* A sentence can no more be complete without a verb, than an arch without a key-stone; and this office may be performed either by the substantive verb separately, (as *is walking*) or by it in union with the attribute (as *walketh*.) Now though the concrete, *walketh*, is undoubtedly a verb, yet to deny that character to *is*, in which the essence of the verb resides, and which is to the verb what oxygen is to the base of an acid, would surely be to violate the plainest rules of reasoning, and to fall into a manifest contradiction.

“ In resolving every verb, (says the *Encyclopædia Britannica*) whether active, passive, or neuter, into “ the substantive *verb* is and another *attributive*, we “ have the honor to agree with *all* the Grammarians” of the Western world. Come we then to hear this unanimous decision controverted by Dr. Lumsden, speaking in his own name, and in that of all the Grammarians of the East. The subject of discussion is the vowel *kusra*, (which was anciently equivalent to *is*) while the letter *noon*, *ust*, and *hust*, hang suspended on its fate. It so happens that the vowel *kusra* is also the sign of the *izafut*, or genitive case; and this fact which is perfectly indifferent and irrelevant, is nevertheless the sole ground on which he claims a right to divest the *kusra* of its verbal character: I do not say the sole ground on which he establishes an argument; for nothing having that semblance is pointed against the elaborate and solid argumentation built up by the Western Grammarians. Nay, he never pretends to deviate from frank assertion, except in the following

---

\* *Encyclop. Brit.* quoted by Dr. L. P. 283.

instance: (Vol. II. P. 295.) "And if a given connective employed to form an *imperfect* combination may be truly a particle, as "a man of wisdom;" "a man of virtue;" &c. I can see no reason why a given connective, employed to form a *perfect* combination, may not be a particle on the same principle. The vowel *kusra* and the letter *noon* are *THEREFORE* particles in my opinion; and if so, there is no truth in the proposition "that every word which predicates must be a verb." Now, if the broad distinction between verbs and particles be removed, I can see no reason why the former should not have the honor of giving their name to the united mass rather than the latter: as the larger river retains its name after its confluence with a smaller. And, indeed, let the words "imperfect" and "perfect," in the above passage, exchange places, and for "particle," read "verb;" and it will follow in a manner, *equally* legitimate and convincing that *of* is a verb, and consequently that there is no truth in the proposition that "a word incapable of predicating cannot be a verb." The reasons "why a given connective employed to form a *perfect* combination may not be a particle," having been fairly stated, it was to be expected that Dr. Lumsden would show their insufficiency, rather than evade the consideration of them by affecting not to see them, and even by denying their existence, as in the following passage, wherein one assertion or assumption follows close upon the heels of another. The *petitio principii* with which it opens, is particularly worthy of attention; (P. 295.) "But that is not necessarily a verb at all, (and is *never* I think a *perfect* verb,) which performs no other office but that of

" simple predication; OTHERWISE the vowel *kusra* in the example, "Zyde is a writer," must be a verb. "But no man who is not wedded to a system, who has not assumed the principle that "every thing which predicates must be a verb," (and this is precisely the point to be proved) will believe that the vowel *kusra* is here a verb. Its character is *plainly that of a particle*; and there is nothing contrary to reason or to common sense in the principle which I have assumed; *namely*, that one particle may be employed to establish the relation existing between the subject and the predicate of a given proposition; as another particle may be employed to establish another relation of a different species; such for example as that expressed by the genitive case."

8. Hitherto we have met with nothing that refutes, or even that impinges on the arguments in favour of *is*. If its character be "plainly that of a particle," it must be so whether represented in Persian by the vowel *kusra*, or by the word *ust*, and ought uniformly to be so considered. Instead of which all the reasoning is directed exclusively upon the *kusra*; and though in the first page of the volume the Persian Grammarians are stated to rank *ust* among particles; yet when the nature of *ust* comes to be unfolded (P. 297 and seq.) we find it invariably characterized as an *imperfect* verb. Such oscillation is never the concomitant of truth. The epithet "*imperfect*" is applied to verbs when used, not to express the sense of their own infinitives, but to connect the subject of the proposition with some other attributive. I would rather designate such verbs by the epithet *simple*, as contra-distinguished from the *concrete* verbs which connote predication together with

an attribute. Thus, in the phrase "God *is*," the verb is concrete, and ascribes *being*, or *existence* to the Deity: in the phrase "God *is* beneficent," it is simple; and the attribute ascribed is, not *being*, but *beneficence*. The attributive connected by *is* with the subject of the proposition, may be omitted, provided it be understood: as, "Is he walking?" "He *is*." And it might be here remarked, by way of argumentum ad hominem; that as in the phrase "Give me *that*," the omission of the substantive ("book,") though it must have been understood, was represented as a sure test of the self-significance of the demonstrative, and consequently of its not being a particle: so the omission of the participle in the above instance ought to stand *is* in equal stead by disqualifying it from being classed with particles.

It appears to Dr. Lumsden (Vol. II. P. 297,) "that there are two species of imperfect verbs;" the first consisting of those already described; "the second" comprising those, commonly termed *auxiliary*, by which we are enabled to modify the sense of a given infinitive, in such a manner as to form, as it were, a tense of the verb to which the auxiliary may happen to be imputed: as "James *can* love;" "James *may* read;" and other examples of the same nature." These two auxiliaries are commonly supposed to form the potential mood of the verbs with which they are in apposition; though they are in fact of the *present indicative* governing the *infinitives* "love" and "read." But they are not *imperfect*, or *simple*, verbs; for they ascribe *their own* significations to the agent "James," not that of the following attributives. The first ascribes the *power* of loving; the second the *liberty* of

reading. The first is used to denote *possibility* with reference to the internal power, skill, aptitude, &c. of the agent or subject of the proposition: the second denotes *possibility* with reference to the occurrence or existence of something contingent. "He *can* play on the violin, for I have heard him: he *may* play on it if he be entreated." "Labour *can* achieve wonders, and therefore it *may* be finished in a year." "In law the King *can* do no wrong; but he *may* do many things morally culpable." Says Hamlet:

"The spirit that I have seen  
 " *May* be a devil: and the devil hath power,  
 " To assume a pleasing shape;—i. e.

for the devil *can* assume a pleasing shape. "You *can*,  
 " not be too provident against what *may* happen."  
*May* also expresses *permission*: —————

"Every unworthy thing  
 " Lives here in heaven, and *may* look on her,  
 " But Romeo *may* not."

The auxiliaries *to have* and *to do*, are *simple* (or *imperfect*) verbs, because they never ascribe the sense of their own infinitives, abstract *possession* and *action*, but that of the verb whose tenses they vary, to the nominative or subject of the proposition. In the phrases "I *have* written," "I *did* write," the act of writing *only* is asserted; nothing respecting *possession* or *action* in the abstract. "The woman said, the Serpent beguiled me, and I *did* eat."

*To do* may be applied as a concrete verb to a specific action considered *abstractedly* as an action or deed. "Which of you have done this?" "Thou canst not say I *did* it." Macbeth.

But has it ever occurred to any Grammarian to re-

present the *auxiliary have* as denoting *possession*, as a man may possess a gold watch? The following extract from the *Encyclopædia Britannica* might be reckoned a tolerable specimen of grave irony, if there were not abundant proof of the author's good faith: "I *have* a gold watch," is, "I *possess* a gold watch." But to annex the same meaning to the word *have*, when used as an *auxiliary* verb, is an idea we believe not common, and which may perhaps be thought whimsical; yet what other meaning *can* be affixed to it? To suppose that words have not each a *radical* and *terminate* signification, is to suppose language incapable of philosophical investigation; and to suppose with Mr. Harris, that there are words entirely *devoid* of signification, is at once to render all enquiries after the principles of Grammar nugatory and ridiculous. We conceive them, that each of the phrases, *γερραφα επισολην scripsi epistolam*, I *HAVE* written a letter, is equivalent to the phrase, "I *possess* at present the *finished action* of writing a letter." "Such an expression may sound *harsh* to the ear, because it is *not in use*: but we often employ expressions, to the *precise* and *proper* meaning of which we do not attend; and if the above be attentively considered, however awkward it may at first appear, nothing will be found in it either improper or absurd." I am not sensible of any *harshness* in the sound of the above phrase; it has not offended my ear: that is to say, it does not possess the finished action of offending my ear: but truly it is the absurdity of its import that I cannot away with. It is the absurdity of asserting the *present possession* of that which, *ex vi termini*, has *no present existence*, that strikes me both



"at first," and after it has been "attentively considered." In vain therefore does the author throw out the epithets "whimsical," "harsh," "awkward," as a lure to the critic: "*Melle soporatum et medicatis frugibus offam objicit*:" his mordacity is nothing blunted. A man may say: "I have the fear of God before my eyes;" "I have an opinion, a fever, an esteem," &c.; as being the subject *now* affected by these things; as being under their *present* influence: but he cannot assert that he *now* possesses, really or metaphorically, what in the same breath he acknowledges to have ceased to exist.

9. The last topic that I shall examine is the nature of *participles*.

It is justly remarked by Dr. Lumsden that it is an error to class the passive participles *loved, known, given, seen, written, &c.* among the active participles of the past tense; though they are so considered, he says, in every English Grammar that he has seen. The active past participle is undoubtedly formed by prefixing the auxiliary *having*: *having loved, having known, having seen, &c.* On turning to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* I find that it has even stumbled upon this error: "After the same manner, *by withdrawing the assertion*,"\* we discover *γραφας* written in *γραφει* wrote; *γραφων* about to write in *γραφει* shall be writing. This is Mr. Harris's doctrine respecting participles; which, in our opinion, is equally elegant, perspicuous, and just." I quote this mistranslation of the past active participle *γραφας* (having written) by

---

\* i. e. The other two constituents of a concrete verb will remain, viz. the attribute and the time: a good definition.

the *passive* participle *written*, as tending to confirm the alleged universality of the mistake. It would indeed have been singular if so deprehensible an error had not been sooner exposed; but I observe that Dr. Beattie has anticipated Dr. Lumsden by distinctly affirming the word "*written*" to be a passive participle. (Dissert. on the theory of language.)

Some passive participles, such as *written*, *built*, *fortified*, &c. denote actions *finished*, and consequently *past*: which others, such as *loved*, *esteemed*, *revered*, &c. denote actions unfinished and still going on. On what principle is this difference to be accounted for? And, is there any rule with respect to *time* applicable to all passive participles? This is the *nodus*; and it is cut by Dr. Lumsden in the following manner.

The actions denoted by the words *loved*, *esteemed*, *hated*, being the exercise of affections of the mind, are in their own nature of indefinite duration. They do not necessarily terminate in the accomplishment of a particular object; the only end which they have in view being the gratification derivable from their existence. (II. 16, 7.) "Accordingly, the termination of such actions is *never* inferred from the passive participle, (because their completion and termination are not by any means synonymous terms;) and must be invariably expressed in positive or implied terms; as when we speak of a friend *formerly* beloved; a foe *formerly* detested; &c. On the other hand, every passive participle, derived from a finite action, does necessarily denote the completion or termination of that action; for as the passive participle has already been defined to be that adjective which is applicable to the true object of a transitive verb, or, in other

“ words to the substantive noun which is exposed to  
 “ the action of the verb; so, if the action be finite by  
 “ its own nature, no substantive noun can be com-  
 “ pletely, though it may be partially, exposed to its  
 “ action, at any period of time preceding that in which  
 “ the action is completely finished or concluded.  
 “ Accordingly a *written letter* means a letter already  
 “ *finished*; and if the participle written be ascribed to  
 “ an unfinished letter, it must be modified by the in-  
 “ troduction of some word significant of that circum-  
 “ stance; as a letter *partly* written; a house *partly*  
 “ built; a town *partly* fortified.”

As this explanation is founded on the nature of ideas  
 common to all languages, it ought to be applicable,  
 not only to all languages that are, or have been,  
 spoken, (for that would be an inadequate test of its  
 solidity,) but to all that ever could be spoken. It is  
 not however applicable to the Greek. In that language  
 it is not true that “the termination of such actions  
 “ (*loved, hated, &c.*) is *never* inferred from the passive  
 “ participle;” nor that “every passive participle, de-  
 “ rived from a finite action, does necessarily denote  
 “ the completion or termination of that action.” We  
 shall see that it is not even applicable to the English.  
 But without referring to a particular tongue, its false-  
 ness may be deduced from the nature of the participle  
 itself. Every concrete verb consists of three ingredi-  
 ents, an *attribute*, *time*, and an *assertion*. If we take  
 away the last, and thus destroy the verb, the union of  
 the two first will constitute the *participle, which may*  
*therefore correspond to all the tenses of the verb.* As the  
 termination of the sentiment of love *may* be expressed  
 by a *tense*: “I *have* loved such a person; he *has been*

“loved by me:” so there is nothing in the nature of a *participle*, though there may be in the structure of a particular language, to render it incapable of indicating the same thing. If the active voice can express the termination of the action with respect to the agent; the passive voice must be competent to express the same thing with respect to the object. And if the active voice of such verbs as to *write*, to *build*, to *fortify*, can express the continuous progressiveness of those actions; the passive voice ought to be able to represent the object of those actions as exposed to their operation during the same period; and if it may be done by tenses it may by participles. How then can it be for a moment pretended that “no substantive noun can be completely, though it may be partially, exposed to its action, at any period of time preceding that in which the action is completely finished or concluded?” “A man is writing a letter.” This may be expressed passively, “The letter is being written,” or “a writing,” or even “writing;” for the idiom will admit that. It would by no means be an equivalent expression to say, “The letter is partly written,” as that would signify that the action of writing was suspended. “This house has been a building these three years.” “The position of the allies is being fortified with all haste.”

Though the defective structure of the English language would therefore give no countenance to the position I am now combating; yet its resources in passive participles are less scanty than might be apprehended: for we have the present and imperfect, *loved*, *feared*, &c. *being written*, *being built*, &c.; and the perfect and pluperfect, *written*, *built*, *having been loved*,

*having been feared, &c. having been written, having been built, &c.*

It remains to be seen how the participles *written, seen, built*, do, after all, imply a reference to *present* time! (Vol. II. P. 17.) "But though every action which is finished is necessarily past; and though many passive participles, such as *written, built, painted, &c.* denote an action already finished; there is much reason to believe, that all these are simple passive participles implying no reference to time; or that all are participles of the *present* tense. For an action which is finished, and consequently *past* in one sense of the term, may yet be considered as *present*, in another sense of the term; and it is perfectly obvious, that many finite actions are so considered in every language; as when we speak of a *surrounded army*; a *blockaded port*; and other similar examples. For the action signified by the verb *to surround*, is completely finished, and consequently past, as soon as an army *surrounded* is completely encompassed; but we continue to affirm in the *present tense of the verb*, that one army *surrounds* another, not only during the whole of that period of time which is employed in the performance or completion of the action signified by the verb *To surround*; but also during the whole of that subsequent period of time, which may elapse after an army is completely surrounded, and before it is enabled to extricate itself.

"It is obvious, therefore, (since it cannot be maintained that the *present* tense of the verb denotes *past* time) that the relative position of the two armies, as well as the action signified by the verb *To surround*,

" is often assigned to past, present, or future time by  
 " the various tenses of that verb; and *on this principle*  
 " [what principle?] it may be affirmed that the pas-  
 " sive participle *surrounded* (if it imply any reference  
 " to time) is a participle of the present tense, imply-  
 " ing a reference to *present time*; since it denotes, in  
 " the preceding example, (namely, *a surrounded army*)  
 " the *presence of that relative position of the two armies,*  
 " to which I have now adverted." Does it so? Then  
 it affords no proof that "an *action* which is finished,  
 " and consequently *past*, in one sense of the term, may  
 " yet be considered as *present*, in another sense." I  
 deny that any action can be so considered. I deny that  
 the present tense of any verb can be applied to an  
*action* which is *past*. I except, of course, the case when  
 an action avowedly past is represented as passing under  
 our eyes, in order to give animation to the narrative.  
 Can the word *built* denote the *action* of building as  
*present*? Can the word *written* denote the *action* of  
 writing as *present*? When we say that "one army  
 " *surrounds* another," do we speak of an action which  
 is *past*? Do we apply it to any period subsequent to  
 the moment in which such action ceases? We do not  
 even employ it "during the whole [nor during any  
 " portion] of that period of time which is employed  
 " in the performance or completion of the action sig-  
 " nified by the verb *To surround*." The verb *To sur-*  
*round* has no such sense as is here intended, nor does  
 any verb in our language possess such a meaning: it  
 must therefore be expressed in some circuitous man-  
 ner. *To surround* signifies to environ, to encompass,  
 to enclose on all sides; so that it is a mere pleonasm  
 to speak of an army being *completely* surrounded.

“ The action signified by the verb *To surround*,” is therefore *not* “ completely finished, and consequently “ past, as soon as an army *surrounded*, is completely “ encompassed.” On the contrary it is only *then* that the word *surround* becomes applicable. We say that “ the sea surrounds an island;” but we cannot say that “ it surrounds a peninsula,” however rapidly it may be encroaching on its isthmus.

“ On the same principle the passive participle *written*, “ (or any other passive participle of the same class) “ may also be considered as a participle of the *present* “ tense; since there is no inconsistency in supposing “ the action signified by the verb *To write*, (any more “ than the action signified by the verb *To surround*) to “ be *present in its effects*, at any given period of time, “ subsequent to that in which the action signified by “ that verb, or, in other words, the act of writing, has “ been completely finished or concluded. In this case, “ a *written paper* means a paper in which the action “ signified by the verb *To write* is present in its effects, “ though the act of writing may have been long ago “ past; and thus, if we must maintain the existence “ of time in the passive participle, I cannot perceive “ any principle on which the past can be accurately “ preferred to the present time.” Having shown that the word *surrounded* does *not* signify an action completely finished or concluded, there remains no argument from analogy to remove, or mitigate, the inconsistency of considering the word *written* to denote the act of writing as present. It denotes the presence of a permanent quality communicated by that act. “ A “ surrounded army,” imports the present existence of the act; “ a written paper,” does not. Of a room

that had been painted many years ago, we may say, "it is painted," with reference to the quality that it still possesses. Of a person that had been killed many years ago, we may say, "he is dead;" but we could not properly say "he is killed," as the circumstance of being killed, or of dying in a particular manner, no longer exists. "He is dead; he *was* killed in such a battle, in such a year." An example of this kind of error occurs I. Cor. V. 7., in the use of a tense unauthorized by the original: "For even Christ our passover is sacrificed for us." "*καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάσχα ἡμῶν ὡς περ ἡμῶν ἐτύθη Χριστός.*" "Car Christ, qui est notre paque, a été sacrifié pour nous." See also I. Cor. XII. 13.

It appears then that the time implied by English passive participles, *divested of auxiliaries*, depends on their several significations. But no inference can thence be drawn to the general nature of participles; no clause can thence be framed for insertion into a code of universal grammar. It is a fact solely referable to the particular structure of the English tongue; for participles ought to be capable of synchronising with all the tenses of the verb.

10. In a long preface, chiefly occupied with a statement of opinions maintained in the body of the work, the author adverts to what he considers desiderata in Grammatical science, and to the prospects of its advancement from an investigation into the structure of the Arabic, Sanscrit, and Chinese languages. To me there appears scarcely any thing to desiderate, and less hope of borrowing an intenser light than what we already possess, from the lamps of Eastern philologists. The structure of these languages is understood; their



grammatical treasures *have been* ransacked; their "barbaric pearl and gold" *have been* poured out at our feet; and what benefit has resulted to Grammatical science? It is possible that literary Mandarins, and Molovees, and Pundits, intercluded from all other studies, mewed up all their lives within the narrow circle of Grammar, may be able to start disputes *de lana caprina*, to moot frivolous logomachies, and to detect infinitely trifling distinctions, such as that respecting a verbal and a nominal sentence given at Vol. II. P. 171. But experience does not warrant our entertaining more important anticipations.

Dr. Lumsden anxiously labours to establish the obvious distinction between Grammar and Etymology; insists with much emphasis on the fact that the same word may be a conjunction and a pronoun, a verb and a substantive; and betrays considerable apprehension lest Horne Tooke's *Diversions* should have extended the pomœrium of Etymology so far as to invest Grammar, and bring the latter under dominion to the former. Such diversions would be no joke. Nay, he ventures to prophecy that it will be in vain that we study Arabic, Sanscrit, and (though last not least) Chinese, if we do not get disenchanted from the spells of the Etymological wizard. By such study (P. 22.) "It is probable that the most important questions of General Grammar may be settled on a basis never to be shaken; an event however desirable, which *I venture to prophecy* is not likely ever to take place until a comparison of several primitive or unmixed languages shall have led us to appreciate the danger of trusting to the arbitrary and fortuitous conclusions of Etymology, for the establishment of those general

" principles of speech which that science, yet in its infancy, will never *perhaps* be able to supply."

11. Among the innumerable studies, states, and pursuits, that actuate mankind, it would be a task no less ungrateful than fruitless to appreciate their respective degrees of importance in the scale of dignity or utility. A liberal mind will acknowledge and applaud the manifestations of talent in a thousand forms. Every display of intellectual power is interesting without regard to the impertinent *cui bono?* It becomes the " sisters of the sacred well" to knit their hands, so as to exclude all contention for precedence.

τέχνη δ' ἑτέρων ἕτεραί,  
Χρὴ δ' ἐν εὐθείαις ὁδῶς,  
Στείχοντα, μάργασθαι θυγῶν.

*Pind. Nem. 1.*

But it is given to some of their favourites to prefer their claims to superior consideration with more propriety, or at least with less offensiveness than to others. If the Poet, for instance, on such a theme, were somewhat loudly to sweep the strings; or if, carried away by a sublime fervor, he were to let loose all the thunder of the lyre; we should listen with sympathy and delight, and yet refuse to give an unqualified assent to his pretensions. Or, if our judgment were surprised in a moment of intoxication, the Orator appealing to Philip sober might easily obtain its reversal. But the Grammarian who is immeasurably removed from the visitations of poetic phrenzy, and no less remote from subservience to practical utility, shall *he* be permitted, like another Fannius,\* to select his own niche in the temple of Fame? Shall *he* slip in a parenthetical as-

---

\* Hor. I. Sat. IV. 21.

assertion of intrinsic pre-eminence, and not be challenged? "We need not wonder," says Dr. Lumsden, P. 7, "that Grammatical science, *though naturally more important than any other*, has been generally the least favoured in England even by men of liberal education." At this rate, Moliere's citizen might have been told, not only that he spoke *prose*, but that he was a tolerable adept in the most important of all the sciences. If we contrast the grammarian with the cultivators of other arts and sciences, he appears a very little thing. If our best Grammarians had prosecuted any other study, we should not have lost much; but if the distinguished men in other departments had addicted themselves exclusively to grammar, the loss would have been incalculable. On that supposition Harvey could not have proved that *blood circulates*, but only that it is a *substantive noun*. The first political economist of the age would have known nothing respecting *population*, but that it is a *substantive noun*. Priestly would have known nothing of *air*, Davy of *alkalis*, Alison of *taste*, Edwards of *necessity*, Bentham of *legislation*, Newton of *light*, nor Butler of *analogy*, but that they are *substantive nouns*. In fine, what could Byron have done with the.—

---

"*votum, timor, ira, voluptas,*  
*"Gaudia, discursus?"*—

He could only have considered them as *substantive nouns*.

From the attention I have bestowed on the preceding discussion it will be evident that I take a considerable interest in such inquiries; and I should not be disposed to object to a reasonable encomium of the importance of the Grammarian's functions, as was formerly objected to the panegyrist of Hercules,—“Does

Q q

“ any one *dispraise* him?” But I cannot see his study placed at the head of all science without special wonder. I know not whether the limits that I assign to Grammar would coincide exactly with those which Dr. Lumsden would prescribe for it: but it is amusing to see to what lengths Horne Tooke carries his pretensions, having once stepped *ultra crepidam*. By means of his etymology and his Grammar he triumphantly establishes the whole system of the Nominalists; he “ discards that imagined operation of the mind which “ has been termed *abstraction*:” he shows that “ they “ are not ideas but merely *terms* which are abstract:” he proves that *right* and *just* being past (passive) participles, therefore “ Every thing that is *ordered* and “ *commanded* is RIGHT and JUST:” he affirms that *truth* “ means simply and merely that which is *trow-  
ed*,” or believed; and “ there is therefore no such “ thing as eternal, immutable, everlasting TRUTH; “ unless mankind, such as they are at present, be also “ eternal, immutable and everlasting:” according to him Locke’s Essay ought to be called “ (what it is “ merely) a *Grammatical* Essay, or a Treatise on “ *Words*, or on *Language*:” in short he maintains that wherever there are *cattivi istorici, politici, legisti, teologi, &c.* it is *perché non sono Grammatici*. With all this he makes as short work as the mouse in the library:

“ A river or a sea,

“ Was to him a dish of tea,

“ And a kingdom bread and butter.”

He never suspected that the Grammarian was to the moral and political philosopher what the writer on Tacticks is to the able Commander; and that the art of Cicero is as superior to the science of Quintilian, as

the art of Cæsar is superior to the science of Vegetius.\* Science is an acquirement of study; art implies the possession of heaven-descended gifts. To some chosen spirits——

*quibus arte benigna*

*Et meliore luto finxit præcordia Titan,*

it is given to combine the exactness of the one with the invention of the other, and “what is most difficult to human frailty,” to be “at the same time sublime and minute.”†

“The first aim of language” he observes “was to communicate our thoughts: the second, to do it with dispatch.” “The difficulties and disputes concerning language have arisen almost entirely from neglecting the consideration of the latter purpose of speech.” We have seen of what stuff his remedy is made. To me it appears that a multitude of disputes have originated in the affectation of system-building, in the pursuit of which the plainest subjects have been perplexed with curious refinements, and groundless distinctions.

---

\* “Pour en revenir à mes tours qu'on me reprochait, je répondis à leur detracteurs: Je connais comme vous les cinq ordres des Grecs, comme les sept ordres de bataille de Végèce. J'aime mieux un ordre à moi dans ces deux genres. Je m'en suis bien trouvé.”

*Mem. du P. Eugene.*

† Burke's character of Alfred.



## POSTSCRIPT.

Since writing the preceding observations I have seen the first volume of Dr. Lumsden's Arabic Grammar, published in 1813, three years after the appearance of his Persian Grammar; and my review of his Grammatical speculations would be incomplete if I omitted to notice the following two or three passages, which I shall extract in the order in which they occur.

Page 259. "Of all the attributes employed in speech, it seems to me that the *verb* is the first in the order of reason: for it must be true that a man is good, before he can merit the appellation of "a good man;" and there can be no such thing as a lover and his mistress, until either *loves* or *is loved* by the other." With respect to the first example, it is observable that there is an acknowledgment of the title of *is* to the rank of a *verb*, which, no doubt, proceeds rather from courtesy than from a sense of the validity of its claims. But the emphasis should be on *good* not on *is*, the former being the predicate of the proposition; and then it will be found that the attribute of goodness must be recognized *before* any assertion of its existence is made. And if we admit that the concrete verb *loves* preceded the substantive *lover*, it will not follow that the attributes "tall," "short," "young," "fair," &c. &c. may not have been predicable of the same person *before* love asserted its power.

Page 262. "A neuter verb predicates the existence of its own infinitive in a given object assumed as the nominative; as when we say of a man that *he is just*; wise; virtuous; &c. And this predication having taken place, the nominative acquires a new

“ character, described by the simple adjective noun :  
 “ as when we speak of a just, wise, or virtuous man,  
 “ &c. It may be inferred therefore that simple ad-  
 “ jectives are to neuter verbs what the active and  
 “ passive participles are to verbs of the transitive  
 “ class; and with this exception it seems to me that  
 “ there is no reasonable distinction between them.  
 “ *For there is no tense of a transitive verb, which might*  
 “ *not possess a corresponding participle active or passive;*  
 “ nor any tense of a neuter verb, which might not  
 “ possess a corresponding simple adjective noun.”  
 We have seen\* that Dr. Lumsden considered the power  
 of active verbs to have passive participles correspond-  
 ing with all their tenses to depend upon their res-  
 pective *significations*; but here we have a general  
 admission that “ there is no tense of a transitive verb,  
 “ which might not have a corresponding participle  
 “ active or *passive*.”

Page 263. “ We derive verbs, for example, not  
 “ only from nouns significant of *actions* performed, as  
 “ beating; building; painting; &c. but also from  
 “ *passions* or mere affections of the mind: as love;  
 “ hatred; or esteem; &c. But the nominative to a  
 “ verb of the first class performs, not suffers, the sense  
 “ of the infinitive: as I beat John; or *inflict* on John  
 “ the action signified by the verb to beat; whereas  
 “ the nominative to a verb of the second class feels or  
 “ suffers the sense of the infinitive: as I love John;  
 “ or *feel* for John the sensation signified by the verb  
 “ *to love*. The epithets *lover* and *beater*, though active  
 “ participles, are not, therefore active participles of

---

\* Vide Supra p. 197 & seq.

“ the same class; just as the verbs *to love* and *to beat*,  
 “ though both transitive are not transitive in the same  
 “ sense. So also we apply indiscriminately the term  
 “ *neuter* to many verbs essentially distinguished by  
 “ their own nature; some being significant of *actions*  
 “ performed; as *to breathe*; *to gamble*; &c. and others  
 “ of *passions*, and *states* or modes of existence: as *to be*  
 “ just; wise; virtuous; angry; &c. the word *angry*  
 “ being obviously derived from the substantive *anger*,  
 “ which (like the substantive *love*) is significant not  
 “ of an *action* performed; but of a *passion* or mere af-  
 “ fection of the mind.” If it were true that the no-  
 minative to such verbs as *to love*, *to hate*, &c. “ suffers  
 “ the sense of the infinitive;” it would follow that  
 they must be classed amongst verbs having a passive  
 signification with an active form of conjugation like  
 the Latin *vapulo*. But there is no foundation for the  
 distinction made between the two classes of transitive  
 verbs. In the phrase “ I love John,” the nominative  
 performs, not suffers, the sense of the infinitive of the  
 verb; and John is as directly, and in the same sense,  
 the object of the active affection, as he is of the action  
 performed in the phrase “ I beat John.” If in the  
 former phrase *I* be the patient, *John* must be the agent,  
 as he must also be in the *equivalent* phrase “ John is  
 “ *loved* by me,” which it would be plainly absurd to  
 affirm. To say that the nominative suffers the sense  
 of the infinitive, because it *feels* the sentiment of love,  
 is to argue from a strange inattention to the meaning  
 of the word “ feels,” which, as here applied to the  
 sentient principle, indicates activity, not passiveness.

It is true that many neuter verbs may be “ essenti-  
 “ ally distinguished by their own nature,” in some



*respects*, but *not* with respect to that circumstance on which their character as neuter verbs depends, which is not the non-significance of action, but the *intransitiveness* of action or energy. In that *essential* circumstance they must necessarily agree.

There is one novelty in Dr. Lumsden's Persian Grammar (Vol. II. Pp. 157—159,) that I ought not to have passed without applause: I mean his vindication of a practice condemned by Dr. Lowth, (in his Grammar P. 131,) but of frequent occurrence in our best writers, of *indirectly* connecting a nominative with its verb by the intervention of a pronoun: as in the following instances:

—————" I did hear him groan :  
 " Ay, and that *tongue* of his, that bade the Romans  
 " Mark him, and write his speeches in their books,  
 " Alas! it cried, Give me some drink, Titinius;  
 " As a sick girl!"——

" And the man said, the *woman* whom thou gavest  
 " to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did  
 " eat." Gen. III. 12.—" And then be fain to club  
 " quotations with men whose learning and belief lies  
 " in marginal stuffings; *who*, when they have, like  
 " good sumpters, laid down their horse-load of citati-  
 " ons, and fathers at your door, with a rhapsody of  
 " who and who were Bishops here and there, you may  
 " take off their pack-saddles, their day's work is done;  
 " and episcopacy as they think stoutly defended."  
 Milton.\* The above sentences cannot be altered with-  
 out detracting from their force and perspicuity; and

---

\* See also the absolution or remission of sins in the Common Prayer: and the first sentence of Burns's Dedication of his poems.

therefore Grammar must expand its principles so as to embrace them as examples of, not as exceptions to, its rules. There can be no glorious offences against sound criticism. "What indeed," says Dr. Lumsden, "can  
 " be more reasonable than it is to state, in the first  
 " place, the subject to which we have occasion to call  
 " the attention of the hearer; "The person of whom  
 " "I had occasion to speak to you the other day,"  
 " and subsequently to get rid of this long sentence by  
 " means of a simple pronoun? "*His* father, who is  
 " "my intimate friend, is desirous to introduce him  
 " "to your notice." "

But not only may the subject of a proposition be thus indirectly connected with the verb: it may stand merely as the antecedent to a pronoun which shall be the *object* of the proposition. Thus:

"But what of that? Your Majesty, and we that  
 " have free souls, it touches *us* not." Hamlet. "Cato,  
 " that stout champion of the laws, we have seen *him*,  
 " a riotous Magistrate," &c. Hooke, III. 401. The  
 first of these forms of construction is common in Persian, in French, and in Chinese; the second is common in Chinese (Marshman's Elements, P. 535;) and I dare say instances of both are to be found in different languages. The following are examples of the second.  
 "S. C. factum ut qui Ligurum post Q. Fulvium, L.  
 " Manlium Coss. hostes non fuissent, ut *eos* C. Licinius, Cn. Sicinius prætores in libertatem restituendos curarent." Liv. XLII. 22. The antecedent to the relative *qui*, (which is understood) is also the antecedent to the pronoun *eos*, and is unconnected with any verb. The first *ut* is connected *indirectly* with *fuissent* by the intervention of *qui*, but does not directly

govern any verb. "Now *the things* which I write  
 "unto you, behold, before God, I lie not." Gal. I.  
 20. "Α δὲ γράφω ὑμῖν, ἰδὲ ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὅτι οὐ ψευδομαι."  
 In both languages the antecedent is without a verb.  
 The French avoids this construction by the insertion  
 of a preposition, : "Or, *dans* les choses que je vous  
 "écris, je proteste devant Dieu, que je ne mens  
 "point." "Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship,  
 "him declare I unto you." Acts, XVII. 23. *i. e.* He,  
 therefore, whom ye ignorantly worship, *him* declare  
 I unto you. "E veramente *questi*, che ci si sono di-  
 "mostri tanto nimici, mai privatamente non gli offen-  
 "demmo:" &c.

*Machian.*

ART. XII. *Vindiciæ Alphabeticæ; or Observations on*  
*" A Dissertation on the Chinese Language. By J.*  
*" Marshman."*

---

"The swarthy daughters of Cadmus may hang  
 " their trophies on high, for when all the pride of the chissel and the  
 " pomp of heraldry yield to the silent touches of Time, a single line, a  
 " half worn-out inscription, remain faithful to their trust." BUNKE.

---

THE Chinese Language is not less deserving of attention, from the singularity of its structure, than from the light it throws on the whole theory of oral and written language. But as a view of this structure, and of all the philological principles connected with it, may be obtained, without committing its Vocabulary to memory, curiosity has been repelled from further enquiry, by a belief that such a task would be more tedious, irksome, and unprofitable than any other that could be imposed or easily imagined. The design of Mr. Marshman's Dissertation is to shew, that much of this aversion and terror has been occasioned by the misrepresentations of those who have considered the object rather in the aggregate, than in detail; whose information concerning it " has borne a stronger resemblance to a sudden but  
 " transient flash of light, which darting on some large  
 " and undescribed object, serves merely to disclose  
 " its size without conveying any distinct idea of its  
 " shape, than to that calm and steady light, which  
 " giving us an opportunity of contemplating an ob-  
 " ject at leisure, enables us to form a just idea of its  
 " proportions, and leads us to the discovery of its na-  
 " ture and qualities:" and "that a cool and thorough

“ investigation of the subject will remove many of  
“ the mistaken ideas entertained respecting it, and  
“ perhaps evince, that though totally different in its  
“ nature, it is little less regular in its formation,  
“ and (were the means of acquiring it equally within  
“ our power,) scarcely more difficult than the Sung-  
“ scrit,\* the Greek, or even the Latin language.”

Mr. Marshman has, undoubtedly, the merit of having given us the most full and accurate account of the subject that has yet appeared; but I must except from his censure of preceding accounts that contained in the admirable work of Mr. Barrow, in which I can find nothing erroneous except his statement of the number of words in the spoken, and of characters in the written language: and especially I must withhold my assent from his philological paradoxes, and shall endeavour to shew that reasoning from his own data will lead to very different conclusions.

As verbal communication preceded written, in the order of human improvement, and is of more frequent and indispensable use, I shall begin by considering the spoken language, the value of which will best be estimated by considering in what degree it unites the advantages of utility and elegance; the former chiefly resulting from copiousness, the latter from harmony. European languages, wherein writing and speaking go hand in hand, have been enriched by the successive labours and contributions of the philosopher, the his-

---

\* In the penultimate page, however, Mr. Marshman avers from experience that a man will be able to do little more than digest the elements of Sungskrit in the same space of time (7 years) that would be sufficient, with proper helps, to bring him thoroughly acquainted with the most considerable Chinese writings.

torian, the grammarian, the artist, &c. but in China writing and speaking have not the same bond of union, and the intellectual riches of the studious, committed to paper, scarcely impart any thing to the spoken language, which has been left to be mouthed by the vulgar, and to accommodate itself to the expression of their scanty ideas. From what other cause could have originated the immense disproportion between the number of audible words, and of visible characters? The former only amount to 846 monosyllables, which however, "by the application of force, length, and rapidity of pronunciation, may be so modified as to form 2178 sounds, easily distinguishable by a Chinese ear; and these by another modification are increased to about 4050." But as the Chinese are careful to mark only those intonations that multiply the original monosyllables to 2178, we may consider that as the real amount of distinguishable sounds, each of them having about 16 significations, which are expressed by 35,000 characters, (in a manner to be afterwards considered,) many of which, also, have several meanings, and some have more than one name;\* but if we divide the number of characters by 846, we shall find that the characters are to the words in the proportion of 41 to 1. And yet, "a very great proportion of words found in the higher Chinese works are seldom or never introduced into conversation, and in the latter a few words are to be found which have no character." Thus "the oral part of the language is more confined perhaps, than that of any other language on earth." But

---

\* See Confucius I. 419,

their words are as deficient in harmony, as in number, since they are all monosyllabic vowel, or nasal sounds; and as the letters *r*, *b*, *g*, and *d*, are unknown to them, we cannot envy them their 36 consonants, "perhaps the most extensive consonantal system which the human intellect has produced." Mr. Marshman, indeed, is not entitled to marvel so much at this amount, as he satisfies us that they *do not*, in fact, possess so many as 36 sounds distinguishable even by a Chinese ear. The characters by which they designate the initial sounds of their words, are divided into nine series; the first five and the eighth series consisting each of four sounds; the sixth and seventh of five each, and the ninth of two; making in all 36:

1. K,	kh,	k,	y or ng.
2. T,	t'h,	t,	n.
3. Ch,	chh,	ch,	n.
4. P,	p'h,	p,	m.
5. F,	fh,	f,	w.
6. Ts,	ts'h,	ts,	s, s.
7. Tch,	tchh,	tch,	tsh, sh.
8. Y or gn,	h,	y,	hh.
9. L,	y.		

But the third sounds of the eight first series, and the fifth of the sixth and seventh, are marked by the same Roman letters, and "it would be difficult" (would it be possible?) for a European ear to distinguish between them. Mr. Marshman "has been able to obtain from no one a satisfactory reason why the first and third characters in these series have nearly, if not *exactly*, the same power;" and he suspects that formerly they may have been distinguishable "*however much they may at present be confounded.*" If then, we

deduct the third sounds of eight of the series, the fifth of the sixth and seventh, and the fourth of the fourth, or fifth series, there will remain 26; and of these, eight are diversified only by adding the aspirate to eight other characters, as k, kh; p, ph; ch, chh; tch, tchh; &c. Thus they have more letters than sounds; as in the 50 letters of the Sungskrit alphabet Mr. Wilkins reckons only 28 simple sounds; whereas in English we have more simple sounds than letters. Mr. Sheridan states the number of the former at 28; Bishop Wilkins at 33; Lindley Murray at 36; and Fulton and Knight's Pronouncing Dictionary, more correctly, I think, at 47. Of these, it is true, only 23 are consonants, but our words do not begin exclusively with consonants, as do the Chinese, with the exception of a few "which appear to begin with a vowel." If it be possible to triple or quadruple 846 monosyllables by means of accent and quantity, to what extent might not our 45,000 English words, containing from one to eight syllables, be increased, by the application of the same means.

The rule which Lindley Murray gives for harmonious composition, that when one word ends with a vowel the subsequent one should begin with a consonant; and *vice versa*; is applicable to all languages, but it could not be attended to by the Chinese. The same writer observes, "Vowels give softness; consonants, strength to the sound of words. The melody of language requires a just proportion of each; and the construction will be hurt, will be rendered either grating or effeminate, by an excess of either. Long words are commonly more agreeable to the ear than monosyllables. They please it by the composition



" or succession of sounds which they present to it;  
 " and accordingly the most harmonious languages  
 " abound most with them." There are some monosyllabic passages in English, that, from their happy disposition of vowels, consonants, and accents, have been admired as extremely harmonious. For instance, in the Song of Solomon, Chap. II. vv. 10—13.; and in Habakkuk, Chap. III. vv. 17, 18. It is to be observed however that unemphatic monosyllables are pronounced as if they were unaccented syllables of the contiguous emphatic words, and joined to them as such. So that the following sentence,

" Censure is the tax a man pays to the public for  
 " being eminent;"

is pronounced as if it were written,

" Cénsure isthetax amanpàys tothepublic forbeing-  
 " éminent."\*

But what voice could harmonise the reading of a work filled with such sounds as these; *tang, nang, chang, tung, t'hung, tsyang, tshyang, syang, chhwaung, khaou, kyaou, kyuh, gnaou, taou, t'haou, tchee, tchhee, tchyaou, syaou, shyaou?*

Before proceeding to the written characters, some notice must be taken of the Grammatical construction of this language. The total absence of inflexions to distinguish case, number, gender, tense, mood, or participle, would challenge the praise of great simplicity,† provided there were a sufficient number of auxiliary words to express all the above relations without ambiguity; but it appears that from a deficiency in this res-

---

\* Walker's Rhetorical Grammar, P. 129.

† Mr. Marshman says, "we pass by nearly the same thing (the want of inflexion) in English verbs *without the least notice.*"

pect, the same word must be taken in a variety of senses according to the import of the context, when probably the variable word may be the most important in the clause. Thus *ex* stands for to, at, from; *chee* for the genitive sign, and also for the third personal pronoun; *khee* is occasionally a personal, a relative, a demonstrative, and a possessive pronoun:—and it is doubted whether the verbs admit of the passive voice, not one instance of it occurring in the first volume of the Works of Confucius!\*

The greater part of the ellipses occurring in the writings of that Author, or rather of his two disciples, seem more chargeable on the language itself, than on his peculiar style; as the most concise English style would never leave it doubtful whether a word were a verb, substantive, or adjective; and if the former, of what person, mood, and tense; if the last, of what case, number, and gender. These are the very elements of syntax, and I do not think it a proof of the precision and “fixed nature” of the language, that in the translation of a thin octavo volume, Mr. Marshman should have been at a loss for the construction in “little more than *twenty* instances.” The nature and the degree of these ambiguities are illustrated by the comparison which Mr. Marshman has made, with much fairness, between his own, and a Latin translation of the Sun-Gnee, published at Paris in 1687. In the first instance of discrepancy which occurs, the English translation has the verb in the *imperative*, the Latin in the *infinitive*, in a sentence containing less than a dozen words: in the next, the English translates that character into a *substantive*, which the Latin makes

---

\* *Dissert.* P. 95,

a *verb* in the second person singular of the present of the subjunctive passive which reverses the sense, thus: "A man without *knowledge*, and yet without envy, is he not the honorable man?"—"Verum si planè contrarium acciderit, et cùm talis et tantus sis, *ab hominibus tamen si ignoreris*," &c. the latter Mr. Marshman thinks preferable, and changes his own into "a man not known." In the next instance, the English has a *verb* in the first person singular of the preterite of the potential or conditional, where the Latin has a *substantive* in the nominative: "the (See) has three hundred sections. He adds (could they be) included in one word, (*I should*) esteem it no evil." By rendering the character *see*, to esteem, "mens omnis et cogitatio," the sentence becomes "the three hundred (sections) of the See, (in) one word (are) included: that is (Be) *the mind* without evil." In the next the English has a *verb* where the Latin has a *substantive*: "Suppress juggling, and legerdemain: these are destructive:" the sense of the Latin is "the devisers (or abettors) of diverse (or delusive arts or) opinions: these are pernicious." In the next, the English has the *past*, where the Latin has the *present* tense interrogatively: "Has Chee filled the Mandarinship?" "O Confuci, quare non geris magistratum?" In the next, the English has the *substantive* "register," where the Latin has the *verb* "to improve." In another instance, the Latin alters (and improves) the sense by supplying a *negative adverb*: "Of things which are complete, speak not; concerning things which are done, advise not." "Peractâ jam re, non est loquendum. Imo quamvis re necdum peractâ, eo tamen loci deductâ ut impe-

"diri jam nequeat, non est adhibenda monitio." In another, the English has an expression equivalent to the *passive participle*, the Latin has one equivalent to the *imperative mood*, of a verb: "By examination, (your learning and ability) can be easily known:" "De hoc uno scilicet nobis laborandum est, tales ut simus, qui mereamur cognosci." More literally, "Seek to be (such that you) can be known." Again, "He wisely preserves (*the people*) from punishment and death. "Servat se ab interitu ac periculis incolumem." In the following instance, the original seems to be without any of those helping words necessary to connect the principal words into some definite meaning, which is thereby left to conjecture: "Chee replied, strength not sufficient! (you are) in the path of virtue, and (do you) leave it?" The turn the Latin gives it, is "(the man with) strength not sufficient, (is he who) being in the midst of the way leaves it." The following seems to have been necessarily treated in the same random way: "Knowledge produces pleasure, clear as water; complete virtue, happiness solid as a mountain." "Æqui verique perspicaces industrii- que homines gaudent aquis: at vero solidæ virtutis

---

\* "J'avois toujours pensé que toute langue a deux parties essentielles qui la constituent, et qui la rendent propre à peindre la pensée: la nomenclature des mots qui en forment le dictionnaire; et la valeur relative des mots, ce qui constitue la phrase et la syntaxe de la langue. La première peut subsister absolument sans la seconde; mais une langue qui n'auroit que la première, n'auroit que des images isolées, sans liaison et sans enchaînement. Chaque mot, à la vérité, peindroit un objet, mais on manqueroit de cet autre mot dont l'absence prive ceux qu'on écrit, les uns à la suite des autres, de cette couleur qui leur donne la vie, en formant de tous ces mots une phrase complète."—*Cours d'instruction d'un Sourd-muet, par M. L'Abbe Sicard, disc. prelim. p. 35.*

“*viri gaudent montibus.*” The character *hung* signifies to begin, to raise, &c. but for want of any auxiliary character to shew the voice, mood, or tense of the verb, the English uses the former in the imperative, “Begin;” the Latin the latter, in the indicative passive, “*erigimur.*” In another instance, the English translates the same character by a substantive, which the Latin translates by a verb: “*the Student who seems not to have made a due progress,*”—“*Sic discere, semper quasi nondum perveneris.*” It is true that several words in English are used as verbs, and as substantives, as love, hope, fear; and that the word *present* may be a verb, a substantive, or an adjective; but is not ambiguity completely excluded by the aid of those connecting words “*qui leur donnent la vie;*” as in the instance quoted by Mr. Marshman,—*to present a book; a handsome present; and the present time?* I shall have occasion again to advert to these ambiguities, when considering the composition of Chinese characters, as compared with etymology and composition in other languages.

There are only two media whereby *all* our ideas may be conveyed to the mind through the eye; the symbolic or hieroglyphic; and the Alphabetic. The first makes use of arbitrary marks, or characters, which are immediately symbolic of ideas; and consequently requires as many characters as there are ideas. The last makes use of arbitrary characters which are only mediately symbolic of ideas, being immediately symbolic of those sounds which are the immediate symbols of ideas; and consequently require no more characters than there are simple sounds.

There is, indeed, another mode by which *many* ideas

may be communicated, namely, picture-writing, or the imitative: but it is plain that this mode can only express those received by the sense of seeing, to the exclusion of all those received by the other senses, and of all that regard the affections of the heart, or the operations of the understanding. Whatever can be reflected in a mirror, or viewed in a camera obscura, it may represent; but if it attempt any thing beyond this, and introduce arbitrary signs conventionally representative of ideas which have no material prototypes, it ceases to be imitative, and becomes symbolic. Pure picture-writing is incapable of circumstantially recording the shortest narrative, or of justly unfolding the simplest piece of reasoning: the best historic paintings do not tell their story to those previously unacquainted with their subjects: how then could picture-writing suffice for the demands of politics, and legislation? Of the writing of the Mexicans, Dr. Robertson says, "it is only in *one instance*, the notation of *numbers*, that we discern any attempt to exhibit ideas which had no corporeal form:" And yet he says they had contrived to represent, a *history of the Empire*, a tribute roll, and a *code* of their *institutions domestic, political, and military*.<sup>\*</sup> Their writing was unintelligible to all but the initiated among themselves; and even the object intended to be represented was seldom to be discovered from the almost total absence of resemblance: but it would greatly illustrate this curious subject, if a translation

---

<sup>\*</sup> And all this, without exhibiting ideas to the understanding!—Their characters, says Dr. Robertson, "represent things, not words. They exhibit images to the eye, *not ideas to the understanding*."—*Hist. of Am.* III. 177—9.

of their history, and code of institutions were published, containing on one page the successive names of the objects delineated in the original, and on the opposite page the same words, together with the intermediate words which were necessary to fill up the ellipses, and render the whole intelligible. We should then be able to judge whether it were possible to write history and politics, *by the delineation of figures representative of nothing but visible objects*. The improvement of this first attempt at writing into the mixed, or pure symbolic, is so easy that it seems unavoidable; and it is probable that the Mexican system would there have finally settled; for, from the alphabet, they would then have been as remote, as when they first began to scrawl the outlines of men and houses. Dr. Robertson, however, sees nothing to stop their progress: "The necessity of improving it must have roused and sharpened invention; and the human mind holding the same course in the new world as in the old, might have advanced by the same successive steps, first, from an actual picture to the plain hieroglyphic; next, to the allegorical symbol; then to the arbitrary character; until, at length, an alphabet of letters was discovered, capable of expressing all the various combinations of sound employed in speech. In the paintings of the Mexicans we accordingly perceive that this progress was begun among them."\* The use of the

---

\* "Their (the Egyptian) hieroglyphics are known to have been intermixed with abbreviated symbols and arbitrary marks; whence they caught the idea of contriving marks, not for things merely but for sounds." Blair's Rhet. I. 168.

The observations in the text are equally applicable to the opinions of

arbitrary character could not lead to the *discovery* of something altogether different in its nature. The improvement of a cottage into a palace, or of a boat into a ship, is a natural progress; but the perfection of the symbolic system would no more conduce to the discovery of the alphabet, than the perfection of the ancient system of the art of war under Julius Cæsar conduced to the discovery of gun-powder; or than the perfection of Grecian eloquence under Demos-

---

Warburton, Fourmont, and Gebelin, whom Robertson and Blair implicitly followed. With respect to them the objections of Mr. Astle (in his *Origin and Progress of Writing*) are good. But how does *he* solve the grand problem? He says: "The articulate sounds of vocal or audible language are resolvable into sentences, words, and syllables; and the analysis of language into *elementary sounds*, seems first to have led to the invention of *symbols*, or marks, for mental conceptions. *This invention must have taken place about the time that men began to reform the barbarous jargon they first spoke, and form a language*; for which purpose the knowledge of elementary sounds was absolutely necessary." (P. 19.) Thus an achievement which Plato, Cicero, and many moderns referred to Divine interposition, Mr. Astle consigns to a savage! The most singular opinion that was ever advanced on this subject is that of Dr. Hey, who says (in his *Lectures in Divinity*) that from hurry and quick writing arbitrary symbols of ideas *degenerated into letters*! The method by which the Chinese have got at their imperfect Alphabet appears to the Quarterly Reviewer of Mr. Marshman to account for the original formation of every Alphabet; but it should be considered that the process which the Chinese used, by splitting their monosyllables into initial and final sounds, must have been inapplicable to polysyllabic languages; and though an operation conducted on similar principles would have effected the purpose, yet we have no evidence respecting the actual occurrence of such an operation. We seem therefore to be as far from the origin of the Alphabet as ever.

Since writing the above I find that Mr. Morrison declares, on his historical evidence, that the Chinese are indebted for the whole contrivance to a Bramin. See Quar. Rev. No. XXX. This accounts for its resemblance to the Sanskrit Alphabet. With respect, therefore, to the inventive process of the Chinese *cadit questio*. There is much more verisimilitude in such an account of its origin, than in supposing it to be indigenous.



thenes conduced to the discovery of the art of printing. It has been a question among philosophers, whether the human faculties were adequate to the discovery of the art of speech, and of alphabetic notation; or whether they were not both immediate gifts from heaven. It may be that men may have discovered them, without the actual interposition of divine aid, but we are totally without evidence to show *how* and *when* the difficulties implied in the analysis of language into its elementary sounds were actually surmounted. A society of men without the knowledge of speech might perfect the pantomimic and the symbolic media of communication, and never suspect that there might exist another medium among another race of men. Between the language of gesticulation, and that of articulate sounds, there is no degree of affinity: neither is there any between symbols of ideas, and symbols of sound. "The human mind holding the same course in the new world as in the old." &c. But there is not one instance in the old world of picture-writing, or of symbolic having been improved into alphabetic, by the labours of successive generations: the Phœnician alphabet never had its origin in symbols of things, but was born in maturity and perfection, and from it most other alphabets have been derived. If "the short duration of the Mexican Monarchy prevented their advancing farther in that long course, which conducts men from the labour of delineating real objects, to the simplicity and ease of alphabetic writing," the same reason cannot be assigned for the little progress of the Chinese, who bear testimony that a nation may remain upwards of two thousand years without

advancing beyond the arbitrary symbol, or character; and it is highly improbable that they will ever *adopt* an alphabet more perfect than the one they have, (for they have characters significant of sound, though they do not use them in writing) for the merit of invention, or of spontaneously *advancing* to such a thing is now out of the question. The permanency of the monosyllabic speech of the Chinese is also a proof that men may be for ever arrested by the difficulty of uniting two or more syllables into one word! even though they have been accustomed to form new significant characters by various combinations of others; and that they may be reduced to supply the deficiency of their complement of audible symbols of ideas, by the manufacture of visible ones. Let philosophy, therefore, be cautious how she throw her net of generalization over different systems of things in the moral or physical world; and how she build upon the foundation of one system with principles deduced from another.

The incurable defect of the symbolic, or hieroglyphic method is, that it imposes an excessive, and unnecessary labour on the memory, by rendering the number of written characters commensurate with the number of words, or perhaps ten times more numerous. This evil increases in proportion to the increase of knowledge, *ad infinitum*, but as the retentive capacity of the memory is limited, the measure of knowledge must also be limited, so as to accommodate itself to the powers of the former. As the existing number of characters affords no provision for the expression of all those new ideas which are generated by the advancement of science, or the refinement of manners; nor for the *proper names* which occur in civil and natural history,

in geography, astronomy, and mythology, new characters must be coined *toties quoties*; the memory urges its way

---

“ with ceaseless pain,  
“ And drags at each remove a length’ning chain.”

It would seem to have been the policy of the author of this system to circumscribe the intellectual wealth of the Chinese, as it is said to have been that of *Lycurgus* to limit the physical riches of the Spartans, by prohibiting the use of the precious metals; and consequently obliging the rich and avaricious to trundle about their iron money in wheel-barrows.\* The bare nomenclature of the Grecian Pantheon would double the number of the Chinese characters, and to answer all the other demands to which I have alluded, it would be necessary to multiply them five or six fold. We obviate these inconveniences by committing words to the custody of the alphabet, as to an inexhaustible bank, upon which we have an unlimited credit, and always receive payment on demand.† And how does Mr. Marshman apologize for the cumbrous load of Chinese characters? why, by the simultaneous sacrifice of their characters, and their knowledge:—“ simile isti

“ Græcus Aristippus, qui servos projicere aurum

“ In mediâ jussit Lybiâ, quia tardius irent

“ Propter onus segnes:”‡

and he satisfactorily proves that they do not possess so great a store of characters as had been ascribed to

---

\* “ Et quia mundum argentum signatum erat, res grave *plaustris* “ quidam convehentes speciosam etiam collationem faciebant.” Livy, IV. 60:

† “ Hic enim usus est literarum ut custodiant voces, et velut depositum reddant legentibus.” Quint. I. 4.

them.\* From the analysis of articulate sound have proceeded the wonderful powers of the alphabet; it being a fact, by no means easily to be discovered, that the almost infinite combinations of articulate sound are formed from a very small number of simple sounds, of a different amount in different languages, and in the English, expressed, with scarcely any inconvenience, by 26 characters. Hence, the visible expressions of our ideas, instead of being commensurate with the number of audible ones, and thus presenting a *new language to be acquired*, are formed from the permutations of these characters, in a way which may be taught a child in a few weeks. My estimate of the comparative merits of the alphabetic and symbolic systems must therefore be very different from that of Mr. Marshman, who "urges claims to superiority" (P. 8) in favour of the latter over the former; and affirms that, with proper means of studying it, the Chinese language "will be found among those which are *most easy of acquisition*." But in order to examine the soundness of the reasoning by which he maintains these positions, it will be proper to follow him throughout his observations.

He begins by quoting from Harris, that every medium through which we exhibit any thing to another's contemplation, must either be an imitation, or a symbol.† This division is erroneous, inasmuch as it is inexhaustive: a picture is an *imitation*, and an arbitrary character is a *symbol*, but a word written with let-

---

\* Dissert. P. 108. 111. "But if the *advantage* be on the side of the Chinese, respecting the *fewness* of the words," &c.

† Harris's *Hermes*, P. 330.

ters, is neither the one nor the other: \* a spoken word is a symbol (of an idea,) but a written word is a *combination of symbols* (of articulate sound.) Losing sight of this distinction, Mr. Marshman classes alphabetic writing under Harris's second division, and denominates it, through his whole work, the *symbolic* medium; and, as the Chinese elementary characters appear to him to be imitations, or pictures, of natural objects, he denominates their's the *imitative* medium. Having quoted Harris, as above, he goes on: "while it follows, " that *words* must necessarily be *arbitrary symbols*, " since the words Mountain, and River, do not exhibit to the mind the least idea of these two objects, " except by arbitrary association; it will also follow, " that it is possible for *characters* intended as *imitations* " of natural objects, (however faint and rude the resemblance may be,) to form the basis of *another* " medium of communicating ideas, totally different, it " is true, from the *symbolic* medium, but perhaps not " less congruous with the nature of things. This at " once describes and *defines* the Chinese characters. " They are this 'other mode' alluded to by Harris; " namely, '*imitations of natural objects*, combined in a " 'variety of forms, in order to exhibit things and " 'ideas,' to the contemplation of others." The error that runs through this passage,—and indeed through the whole book,—is such, that instead of characterising the alphabetic and Chinese modes of writing, it presents this proposition, namely, that a painted imitation is something different from, but not less congruous with the nature of things, than a verbal description

---

\* To a person born deaf and dumb *it is* a symbol.

of an object: instead of comparing one mode of writing with another, it contrasts what is common to all *spoken* languages, with what he thinks peculiar to the Chinese *written* language. The association between the Chinese word *san* and a mountain, or between *yun* and a man, is equally arbitrary with that between our English words and these objects: but the question before us, and as stated by Harris, solely respects written language; and we are told that [spoken] words are *one* mode—[of exhibiting things and ideas to the contemplation of others] and imitations of natural objects are *another*.

I have already given a different division, and denomination to the several modes of writing: (P. 323.) the next question is, are the primary characters that form the basis of the Chinese written language, imitations of natural objects? I answer, (though I think the merit of their system but little affected by it,) that I can discover nothing to warrant such an assertion. The Jesuits started this notion, among other embellishments, and as they supported it by distorted representations of some of the characters, it may have been generally assented to, till Mr. Barrow shewed that their characters neither did contain the faintest imitations of any objects, nor ever had approximated to picture-writing. All the 35,000 characters, are formed from 214 elementary characters, by the union of several of the latter, proceeding from two to seven or eight. These characters consist of one or more strokes, horizontal, perpendicular, and oblique, having no resemblance to any visible objects whatever: it is impossible to guess at the subject of any one of them: they are therefore arbitrary conventional marks, or symbols, of

things and ideas, and consequently the Chinese system of writing is peculiarly the *symbolic*, since the characters immediately represent ideas, whereas the alphabetic characters immediately represent sounds, and mediately ideas. That there might be some foundation for the notion of resemblance, it would be necessary that the 214 primary characters should be intended to represent, however faintly, natural objects; but on looking at the synopsis, we find several ideas that have no separate corporeal forms, as those of qualities, and motions. Mr. Marshman does not shun this part of the case: "*Qualities*, though somewhat more *difficult* of representation, are not wholly omitted, although all among these scarcely amount to thirty; among these will be found, however, such as most obviously strike the senses, as straight, crooked, great, small, dark, white, high, long, or wide," &c. (P. 13.) It is not "difficult," it is impossible to exhibit resemblances of these abstract qualities: in picture-writing emblematic figures might be used, and particular objects in which certain qualities predominated might, conventionally, be understood to signify those qualities; but the Chinese represent them, without the intervention of any allegory, by an assemblage of strokes, which bear as much resemblance to them, as a tune on the organ bears to the beauties of a landscape, or to the taste of a turtle. It is equally impossible to represent actions, which imply motion, by fixed figures; emblems or symbols must necessarily be had recourse to, and it is singular that Mr. Marshman here introduces the word "*symbol*," without seeming to be aware of his promise that they were all *imitations*, a word which never was considered synonymous with *symbol*: "To

“express actions by appropriate symbols would seem  
 “a task still more difficult, [on the contrary it is the  
 only way in which they can be expressed] accordingly  
 “we find, on examining these elements, that this class  
 “is still smaller than the foregoing; a few however  
 “are admitted, which signify the most common acti-  
 “ons of life; such as to see,\* to speak, to use, to  
 “walk,” &c. [and they are expressed by characters—  
 not “appropriate,” but equally arbitrary with spoken  
 words.] “Such then are the ideas represented by these  
 “elements; which as they compose the other charac-  
 “ters may justly be termed the *alphabet* of the Chinese  
 “language, or the *imitative* medium of communicati-  
 “on.” I shall hereafter inquire whether they have  
 any of the properties of an alphabet: but granting that  
 these 214 characters were imitations of so many natural  
 objects, it is evident that when combined to express  
 other ideas, they could be no longer imitative, and  
 consequently that only the one hundred and sixty third  
 part of their characters possessed that quality which  
 gave its name to the system.

Some accessory, or associated recommendations must  
 be disposed of before we proceed to the intrinsic merits  
 of the subject. “One fact, however, strikes us on the  
 “face of the subject; namely, that while the symbolic  
 “method *has given rise* to a Babel of tongues, a diver-  
 “sity of languages which almost baffle enumeration;  
 “the imitative mode *has preserved* a perspicuous uni-  
 “formity, which *has rendered* it intelligible, if report

---

\* “*Mais on savoit ce que c'est que voir; il en faisoit ainsi le signe;*  
 “*il fermoit les yeux, pour point de départ, il les ouvroit; et recevant, par*  
 “*cette operation, les rayons de lumiere, il n'étoit plus dans les tenebres;*  
 “*c'était réellement l'action de voir.*”—*Cours d'instr. P. 319.*



" may be credited, to more than 300 millions of men;  
 " to the numerous population of the vast Empire of  
 " China, and to many Kingdoms beside, from the in-  
 " habitants of Japan to those of Pulo Condore: it  
 " being a *fact* carefully ascertained ' that the Chinese  
 " characters have an equal advantage with the Arabic  
 " numbers, of which the figures convey the same  
 " meaning wherever known.\* Whether this unifor-  
 " mity has arisen from the nature of the imitative  
 " system, or be merely an accidental circumstance, I  
 " shall leave to the decision of others."—(P. 6.) But does  
 not Mr. Marshman begin by deciding that the two  
 systems have produced these different effects? If it  
 were as easy to find *fulcra* in practice, as in speculati-  
 on; Archimedes might have moved the earth,—he  
 might have "struck flat the thick rotundity o' the  
 " world." Another collateral recommendation fol-  
 lows: the Chinese language "aspires to rivalship with  
 " the symbolic or alphabetic medium, adopted by  
 " nearly all other nations, and urges its claim to supe-  
 " riority, not only on the ground of its inherent qua-  
 " lities, but from the fact of its having been adopted  
 " by one third of the globe, for a length of time to be  
 " pleaded by scarcely any other language, as well as  
 " attended in its circulation with circumstances of  
 " internal stability and tranquillity, to which almost  
 " all other nations have been strangers." It might be  
 a sufficient answer to this, that every thing should be  
 estimated solely from "its inherent qualities;" and  
 that if some extraneous circumstances be thrown into  
 one scale, more may easily be heaped into the other:

---

\* Stannton's Embassy, Vol. I. P. 311.

if the populousness, and the internal tranquillity of China, be urged on the one hand; on the other it might be contended that the constituents of human happiness and respectability are independent of extent of territory and population; that the excessive population of China is a great evil, producing such vice and misery as result from the most squalid poverty, and in particular a greater prevalence of infanticide than in any other part of the world; that this population is periodically reduced by desolating famines; that they are a people born to produce and consume the fruits of the earth, ingloriously, but not innocently, for they are polluted by degrading vices, and have corruption universally diffused, and cementing the whole mass; that they are utterly unembued with the feelings of public virtue, of private honour, and of that enthusiastic homage for intellectual, combined with moral excellence, which considers rank and wealth as nothing in comparison; without taste or skill in the fine arts; ignorant of the principles of mechanics; and totally unacquainted with those sciences, to have established whose principles and to extend whose limits, forms the peculiar glory of Europe; and, in fine, that Europe does not acknowledge a single Chinese as worthy to be compared with the least of her sons, in arts, in arms, or in letters. But the question is, have the inherent qualities of the two systems a tendency to produce the effects ascribed to them in the above quotation? Another manner of stating the question may facilitate its solution: Have characters which permanently exhibit a language exactly as it is spoken, a tendency to introduce fluctuation, diversity, and the confusion of Babel? and have characters, which are no more connected with

oral language than the Arabic numerical figures, a tendency to produce a perspicuous and permanent uniformity of speech? Among what people has the alphabet occasioned a diversity, where only one language formerly existed? and into what territory possessing a separate tongue, has the Chinese language spontaneously overflowed? On the contrary, languages are propagated only by conquest and colonization, and have no aptitude, by their intrinsic advantages, to recommend themselves to the adoption of independent nations. The northern hordes that overwhelmed the Roman Empire spoke various tongues, and spreading themselves over extensive regions where many languages prevailed besides Latin, it was not possible that their several dialects could long preserve their primitive condition, or that they could amalgamate into one tongue. They naturally and gradually settled into the present European languages; while the alphabet conformed itself to their respective states, and principally contributed to their improvement, but introduced no confusion where uniformity originally prevailed. The diversity of tongues, therefore, is part of the original constitution of the world, and in no degree imputable to the alphabet. If during the middle ages every separate dialect had had its peculiar hieroglyphics; like the Chinese, should we not yet have in Europe, an equal if not greater variety of languages than the present, more widely different from each other, of infinitely more difficult acquisition, and more barbarous formation? Or, if the northern hordes had found the same set of hieroglyphics in use wherever they settled, can it be supposed that they would have studied to accommodate them to their own language, when they found

U u

it too inert and sedentary a task to learn the arts of alphabetic reading and writing?\*

The hieroglyphics, therefore, would probably have perished with the language to which they belonged. The alphabet survived, because it only contained 25 characters, and was transferable to their own, and to every language, without the labour of studying another, which would have been necessary in borrowing hieroglyphics. There is indeed a just analogy between the 25 Roman letters, and the 10 Arabic figures, for both not only have the same powers wherever known, but have such inherent advantages as have recommended them to the adoption of the most civilized nations in the world: but there is none between the latter and the Chinese characters. Both it is true, convey the same meaning wherever known, but the same may be said of *every language!* Every language conveys the same meaning wherever it is understood; but are the Chinese characters used by any people not of Chinese descent? have they any where superseded alphabetic writing, as the Arabic figures superseded the Roman notation of number? The Arabic figures are only ten in number, and afford the greatest assistance in the science of Arithmetic, and whatever is connected with it; the Chinese characters are 35,000 in number, and would very much retard all the sciences.

Whether a universal language would have been compatible with the diversified condition in which the human race has always existed, or what influence such facility of communication would have had on human affairs, I shall not stop to conjecture: but we have

---

\* See Dr. Robertson's Charles V. Vol. I. Note X.

abundant proofs in ancient and modern history that sameness of language, without the concurrence of other causes, will not enable even a small community to live together in peace and harmony. The internal tranquillity of China should rather be ascribed to the nature of the government, founded on the state of property in land, and on the fertility of that land; to the state of society produced by the same cause, the whole country being partitioned among millions of petty cultivators; and to their geographical position; not to say that such stagnation is unfavourable to the expansion of the best energies of the human mind. But granting that Europe would be benefited by the possession of a common language, I have no hesitation in saying that the present diversity is infinitely preferable to the universal diffusion of such a language as the Chinese. In that case, the spoken language of Europe, if it would not have presented such a beggarly account of paronymous sounds as the Chinese, would yet have continued in undeviating poverty and barbarism; such a change as took place in Latin from the time of the compilation of the laws of the twelve tables to the time of Cicero, or in French and English, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, would have been impracticable without the aid of characters precisely denoting articulate sound. Its poverty would have been further insured by the inability of the memory to absorb more than a certain number of characters, and by the want of progression in any branch of knowledge, occasioned by men's time and courage being wasted in the labour of learning to read and write. What then would this medium of communication have availed them, if they had had nothing to communicate?

If other principles, resulting from the state of society, had tended to counteract this mental atrophy, (as in Asia they prevent the beneficial operation of an alphabet,) still the influence of the language, whether more or less in degree, must have been such in kind, as I have described; and this *sociable* project would have been founded in equally mistaken notions with those, which supposed that the sea was poured around the globe for the purpose of obstructing the intercourse of mankind:

“ Nequicquam Deus abscidit.

“ Prudens oceano dissociabili

“ Terras, si tamen impia

“ Non tangenda rates transiliunt vada.”

It has been already mentioned that the spoken language consists of 846 monosyllabic words, which by means of the four intonations may be increased to 2178. Now it is evident that, with 846 arbitrary marks to denote all the primary words, and 4 others to denote the four intonations, that is with 850 characters they might have represented 2178 sounds, or all their words, and if each of these, according to its position, may be, without confusion, understood in 16 different senses, what need had they to encumber themselves with 35,000 separate characters? But it is very remarkable that the Chinese can express all these sounds with 60 or 70 characters. Of these, 36 (some of whose sounds coincide, P. 4.) are genuine letters; the remainder (exclusive of the four marks of the intonations) are syllabic characters. The former are called *initials*, because only the incipient sound of the name of the character is used, as alpha in the Greek has the power of a; the latter are called *finals*, because they retain all

except the initial sound; thus the initial *t-ung* and the final *k,aou*, by their coalition produce *taou*; *l-oi* and *kw-un* produce *lun*, &c. It is true that by having separate characters to express the different meanings of the same word, there will be less room for ambiguity, but still it is not confessed, at least by Mr. Marshman, that the Chinese can only render intelligible by the ear a part of what they can convey by the eye, as if their language were more adapted to the use of a people born deaf and dumb, than of one enjoying the faculties of speech and hearing. The truth seems to be, that the oral language is *not* co-extensive in meaning and power with the written. Mr. Marshman says "there are many characters, the *names* of which seldom occur in conversation, as is the case with a multitude of words to be found in our more elegant English writers:" (P. 33.) That may be; but, as several characters have more than one meaning, and the *name* of each character answers to sixteen other characters, or has sixteen meanings, is this sixteenth meaning always apprehended in conversation, to the exclusion of the other fifteen; as in English every word in our most elegant writers, may be understood *as readily* in conversation as in their books? There are a multitude of English words that do not occur in ordinary conversation, but they do all occur in lectures and speeches. Is every Chinese character intelligible in a *lecture* or *speech*? In short, can every Chinese book, or manuscript, be read fluently and intelligibly *to an audience*? I suspect not: but *if they can*, I repeat that their thousand symbolic characters ought to be swept away, and replaced by the imperfect alphabet which they possess.

I have already mentioned that the compound Chinese

characters contain from 2 to 7 of the 214 elementary characters, which are arbitrary symbols of ideas, chiefly of visible objects, and consist of from 1 to 17 strokes, horizontal, perpendicular, and oblique, besides the dot or apex; but, in composition, the number of strokes may amount to 52. One of these elementary characters is termed the key of every compound character, because the latter are arranged in the Dictionary in the order of these keys; and all those under one key, are placed according to the number of additional strokes which each contains. Of these keys, some are the indices of a very great number of characters; one, for instance, (*chou*, vegetation) of 1423; another, (*soi*, water,) of 1333; insomuch that 30 of these keys answer to nearly 20,000 characters; while a few have a very small number into whose composition they enter. As the component parts of every compound character are themselves significant characters, it may be supposed that there is some congruity between their several meanings, and some aid afforded in ascertaining the meaning of the compound: and according to Mr. Marshman, the authors of the Chinese language *have* been guided by an attention to such affinity. Without insisting upon his imitative hypothesis, he says: "had " the likeness existed wholly in imagination," [I cannot leave Mr. Marshman even this refuge; the imagination may liken a constellation unto a plough, or a cloud unto a whale or a camel; but did it ever fancy any likeness between them and such ideas as are expressed by abstract nouns, by adjectives, verbs, and conjunctions?] "the principle would have been the " same, namely, that of *uniting two (or more) significant characters in order to express a third idea.* The



" principle would have been the same if two of the  
" English names represented by these elementary characters, (head, heart, &c.) had been united to express a third idea, which is actually the case in  
" horse-man, foot-man, &c." (P. 12.) After such an exemplification of the "principle" which governs their combinations, we must be surprized to find Mr. Marshman dissenting from the opinion of the learned Fourmont, that "the knowledge of the elements is sufficient  
" to enable us to understand the characters of which  
" they form the component parts, and thus in effect to  
" put us in possession of the whole language;" and declaring that, "in the Imperial Dictionary, in which  
" he expected to have found [to find] the meaning of  
" every character deduced from its primitive elements,  
" with the clearness and precision of Hesychius, he  
" found himself *almost constantly* disappointed:" (P. 22.) a disappointment which will appear less wonderful than the expectation that produced it, when it is considered that the permutations of 214 symbols of ideas are to form 35,000; and that it is thus pretended to reduce a whole language to 214 roots. Is it possible to imagine 1330 ideas with which water can have any relation, real, or metaphorical? Or, can 30 words have a legitimate connection in composition with 20,000? How then could Mr. Marshman allow himself to state that the Chinese characters were formed from 214 others, as horse-man, fire-wood, book-case, coffee-mill, &c. are formed from the words of which they are composed. In these *examples*, not only the sound, but the sense is preserved entire: a preposition and the article only being understood, as *a man on a horse*, *wood for the fire*, *a case for books*, &c. but in

the Chinese compounds, the *sound* (which *can* only agree with *one* of the component parts) is very often different from them all, and almost always *the sense*; thus, *chee, nee*, son, daughter, produce *hou*, good; *nee, yaou, sum*, female, imitation, the heart, produce *noo*, anger; *yut, hou, kho*, one, mouth, sword, produce *wak*, some one. We may try how some of them will look with the algebraic notation; thus, fine+mouth=I; to reign+heart=perverse; in+one+heart=rich, honourable; to eat+humble=to nourish; ear+mouth+chief=a sage; man+two=perfect virtue; door+mouth=to ask; a demon+one+mouth+a cultivated field=happiness; three mouths=rank; four mouths+greatness=an instrument; sword+pearl=shall; water+all=much; javelin+eight=shall, should; cavern+white+son=heavy; water+an insignificant addition=to enquire; water+vessel+day=meek, pleasant; cavern+dog+hat=to repeat, to obey, to fill, to reject; a grove+fire=to burn. *This* last is almost the only one in the above list that has the smallest congruity, though even this falls short of our fire-wood. With respect to the rest, if any man will pretend to ascertain the meaning of the aggregate from that of the elements, he is worthy to undertake the solution of the following questions in arithmetic, as proposed by Mr. Joseph Millar: the prices of a pound of tea, and of a pound of tobacco being given, to find the price of a bushel of hops? and, the tonnage, and name of a ship being given, to find the captain's name? There are some instances of agreement, (which was perhaps unavoidable;) but the most utter discord "almost constantly" prevails. From Mr. Marshman's own avowal therefore, the exceptions to his rule outnumber

the examples nearly a thousand to one! I have already quoted Mr. Marshman as denominating the elementary characters, "the alphabet of the Chinese language:" (P. 19.) and as I have now shewn that they neither disclose the sound, nor meaning of the characters into whose composition they enter, it follows that they have no claim to such an appellation.

In other languages, roots are so closely connected in sound and meaning, with their derivatives that they have really the property, which Fourmont ascribes to the Chinese simple characters, of putting you in possession of a certain portion of the language; the more numerous they are, the greater acquisitions will you have made, and the more will your progress be facilitated. But as the Chinese simple characters have *not* the property which Fourmont claims for them, (and which Mr. Marshman as strongly claims in one place, and disclaims in another,) it is a circumstance absolutely indifferent whether they be more or less numerous; by gaining them all you have made no impression upon the remaining (or compound) characters, *each* of which must be separately carried *vi et armis*; and yet Mr. Marshman, again countenancing Fourmont's hypothesis, considers them as partaking of the character of roots, and advantageously contrasts their small number with the large number of the latter in the Greek tongue: "for, not to say that a great part of  
" this, as well as of the languages formed on the sym-  
" bolic [the alphabetic] plan, *may have been* formed  
" rather by chance than by any exact and determinate  
" rule, the elements of the Chinese characters are  
" little more than 200, while the Greek roots amount  
" to more than 3000." (P. 22, 3.) The comparison of

these two facts, and the reflection that the Greek roots claim kindred only with their derivatives, and do not embrace the whole language, should have induced Mr. Marshman, not to apologize for the almost constant incongruity of the compounds, not to qualify, but to suppress the gratuitous "principle" upon which he pretends the language is constructed.

The Latin, to which the modern languages of Europe are so much indebted, is not to be compared with the Greek, nor, I believe, with the Arabic, or Sungskrit, with respect to the abundance of its roots, and of their progeny; but exclusive of the quantity of its derivatives from the Greek, it has an etymology among its own words, which greatly facilitates its study, and conduces to its precision. 1. A multitude of substantives, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs spring from a common source, and express the various modes of being, doing, or suffering, incident to the same idea: as, amor, amare, amator, amanter, amatorie, amatorius, amabilitas; glomus, glomerare, glomerator, glomeratim, glomerarius, glomeratio; &c. 2. The modifications which the main idea undergoes, by the union of the following prepositions is equally luminous; a, ab, ad, ante, cum, (changed to con,) circum, de, ex, extra, in, inter, per, pro, præ, re, (an inseparable particle,) sub, super, trans. 3. It has also its compound words; as, belliger, lethifer, somnificus, noctivagus, usufructus, lucigena, multicolor, libripens, &c. &c. Parallel examples might be given, under these three heads from the English, and other languages of Europe; they have similar confederations of substantives, verbs, &c.; the prepositions perform the same functions, and may all be found in our own tongue; and they have similarly

compounded words. The Chinese language has not these resources. The spoken language cannot, by syllabic additions and terminations, distinguish related verbs, adjectives, &c.; but if it could do so, the written language could not represent these modifications of articulate sound: if, for instance, they had separate characters for love, to love,\* lover, lovely, lovingly, &c. they must all be formed by distinct combinations of the 214 elements, and consequently by the admixture of a number of discordant ideas, which would leave scarcely any connection between them: on the other hand, by having only one character to act in all these different capacities, we have seen what ambiguity and confusion were produced in the simplest sentences, and which cannot justly, I think, be wholly ascribed to the want, or to the suppression of auxiliary characters. If the language had had these resources, Mr. Marshman could never have been in doubt whether one phrase signified "without knowledge," or "not known;" whether another signified "study," or the "student;" whether another signified "I should esteem," or "the mind:" &c. &c.

This logical etymology is particularly valuable in the arts and sciences, whose technical terms express the qualities and relations of the objects they represent with such philosophical precision, as frequently to point out their exact place in the system of things to

---

\* Let it be remembered that, though the different terminations of our English verb scarcely exceed six, while those of the Greek amount to more than 500, and those of the Latin to at least 140, yet it can follow the verbs of these languages through all their changes, and admits of as great a variety of expression in its conjugation as the verbs of any language whatever: The Chinese verb appears to be miserably deficient in this respect.

which they belong: of this the most perfect example is to be found in the new chymical nomenclature. The Chinese have nothing analogous to this: they could not express the ideas of nitre, nitric, nitrous, nitrate, hydro-carbonate, oxy-muriate, &c. without incorporating things the most dissimilar and heterogeneous. A language so defective in its vocabulary, and in its syntax, is very little adapted to argumentative discussion. It may be fit to embalm such effusions as those of Confucius, which are more jejune and childish than perhaps any thing that ever fell into my hands.

There is another resource peculiar to alphabetic writing, which must have considerable value with the lovers of ludicrous composition; I mean the power of representing the peculiarities of provincial pronunciation, and the blunders to which the illiterate are liable in writing and speaking. Of this we have highly entertaining examples in the characters of Sir Hugh Evans, Fluellin, Slender, Dogberry, Sir Pertinax Mac-Sycophant, Sir Archy MacSarcasm; the letters of Winifred Jenkins; and the Irish Characters of Miss Edgeworth.

The transference of words and ideas from a physical to a metaphysical application is, no doubt, common to all languages: to what extent it prevails in the Chinese, and with what degree of metaphorical and analogical propriety it is supported, I have not the means of judging.

There is, nevertheless, one advantage attending the mode of formation of the Chinese characters, which must be conceded to Mr. Marshman, namely, that the moderate number of the simple or elementary, compared with the total amount of the characters, facili-

tates the task of distinguishing their forms; and the meaning of the component parts will assist the memory by means of association, in recollecting the meaning of the whole, for the memory associates contiguous objects, however naturally dissimilar, as may be daily experienced whenever that faculty of the mind is called into exertion. The memory will be necessarily *assisted*, but still it remains true, that it will have to recollect the names and meanings of 35,000 distinct symbolic characters.

Mr. Marshman in vain attempts to lessen the comparative defects of the symbolic medium, by setting before us the complications of the Sungskrit alphabet. —This would be very proper, if the question were whether the Chinese, or the Sungskrit language presented fewer difficulties to the student; but as the defects of the Sungskrit alphabet are by no means essential to the alphabetic method, it is evident that they can no more be introduced into a comparative valuation of the symbolic and alphabetic media, than the practice of a Sangrado can be urged as an objection to the utility and respectability of the medical profession; or than the horrors of the Inquisition can detract from the pure morality of the Christian doctrines. And yet, by considering the defects of the Sungskrit notation of sound, as inherent in the alphabetic system, with an exception, indeed, in favour of the Greek and Roman alphabets, Mr. Marshman puts together a singular jumble of propositions counterbalanced by co-extensive qualifications, which retract and destroy them; and after all he draws such conclusions as could only be warranted if the premises on the one side had remained quite unaffected by the qualifications which himself

admits on the other.\* The policy of this management may be grounded on an expectation, that the effect of the distorted representation of the one system will not be wholly obliterated by the accompanying just one, and that the exaggerated commendations of the other, will not be altogether lost by the subsequent exceptions, (as Bacon advises, *audacter te vendita, semper aliquid hæret*;) the former seem intended for the simple, the latter for the wary, and to procure credit and currency for the whole passage. The Sungskrit alphabet consists of 50 letters, 34 consonantal and 16 vowel and diphthongal characters; but as, in composition, they undergo certain modifications, chiefly by abridgement of their forms, their various combinations become so many distinct characters to the amount of 600; which it is necessary to commit to memory; thus nearly renouncing all the advantages and attributes of an alphabet. According to Mr. Wilkins, indeed, this syllabic notation is attended with less difficulty, because the component letters are generally to be recognized; but whether its intricacies and embarrassments be somewhat more or less, such a system should form a class by itself, under the denomination of *syllabic notation*,† and never be introduced

---

\* If we take some of his propositions divested of their qualifications, a curious result will be produced, namely, that the Chinese is a universal language, intelligible to all the world without any study whatever! 1. The elementary characters are "imitations of natural objects;" (P. 6.)—and 2. From these known imitations all the other characters may be understood, two, or more, of them, being united to form a third idea, as horse and man form horse-man. (P. 17.)

† I would have introduced it as such at page 323, but that *there is a Sungskrit alphabet*, to which the deformity of syllabic notation does not appear necessarily to belong.



into reasonings that respect the alphabetic medium. And yet, will it be believed that Mr. Marshman settles the comparative merits of the alphabetic and symbolic media, by comparing the latter,—not with alphabetic writing,—but with the Sungskrit syllabic notation? “As the formation of the language from these, (the “214 simple characters) rather than from an alphabet of letters, constitutes the specific difference between this and other languages, it may not be improper to compare the two modes of combining elements with each other, in order to see on what side the advantages with respect to acquisition, retention, recollection, &c. really preponderate. If we examine the subject coolly and thoroughly, we shall perhaps find that the difficulty of acquiring *these elements* does not greatly exceed that of acquiring those, which form the basis of the symbolic [alphabetic] medium. For, *although* fifty (including capitals!) are nearly the amount of the characters which are employed in the Latin and the Greek, as well as the more modern languages of Europe, **THIS IS NOT THE CASE WITH THOSE OF INDIA.** The Sungskrit alphabet, from which most of the other Indian alphabets are formed, presents to the view of the learner more than 600 combinations of characters really distinct from each other; namely, the alphabet formed into its due variety of syllables; which, on examination, will appear full as difficult of acquisition as the elements of the Chinese language.” (P. 16.) As well might it be asserted that the science of astronomy has been but little improved since the days of Ptolemy, for although the Newtonian system be infinitely more perfect,—this is not the case.

with those of Tycho Brahe, and Des Cartes. But the above passage scarcely proves any thing even against the Sungskrit alphabet, because the acquisition of its 600 characters unlocks the sounds of the whole language, and would unlock the meaning, also, to any person to whom the language was vernacular; whereas the acquisition of the 214 Chinese elements gives possession but of the 163d part of the language, since they neither disclose the names, nor significations of the other characters. Undoubtedly, the difficulty of acquiring the mere elements, the 214 characters, instead of "not greatly exceeding," ought, one would think, to fall considerably below that of acquiring the 600 Sungskrit combinations of letters, which are said to be so many separate characters. What follows the last quoted passage is equally extraordinary: "Nor is the parallel just indeed, when instituted between the *letters* of European alphabets, and the elementary characters of the Chinese; *these* more properly answer to the *syllables*, of which European languages are composed. And *although* the Roman and Greek alphabets do not, in the manner of the Indian alphabets, admit separate characters to express the different combinations of the letters, as pra, pre, pri, pro; sb, sp, sth, sk, &c. yet these syllables are as really the component and elementary parts of European languages, as the combinations above mentioned, are of the Sungskrit and the other Indian languages." (P. 16.) And in a note at the foot of the same page it is said, "In weighing the elements of one language against another, we ought to take such as are equivalent to each other; in which case the *strokes* will answer to the *letters*,

“ and the *elementary characters* to the *syllables* of which “ English words are composed.” He goes on to state, that the number of syllables in the English language will be found far to exceed that of the Chinese elements, “ and were it needful to commit them to memory, the task would be found little less difficult [why not *more* difficult, as they are far more numerous?] than that of treasuring up in memory the “ Chinese elements.” Thus the advantage would but little preponderate on the side of our alphabet, if we had no alphabet, but had a complicated syllabic notation! and, the symbolic medium is but little inferior to the alphabetic, because, *although* the 25 Roman letters be infinitely more manageable, this is not the case with the 600 Sanskrit characters!

But the above passages contain three specific, and monstrous propositions: 1. that the strokes whereof the Chinese characters are composed, are equivalent to our letters: 2. that syllables are the elements of European languages: 3. that the Chinese elementary characters are equivalent to our syllables. The first objection to the first proposition shall be administered by himself: out of his own mouth he will condemn him. “ These elementary characters enter into the composition of all the characters of the Chinese language; “ not merely as every part of a character must necessarily be an apex, a perpendicular, a horizontal, or “ an oblique stroke; for this would be reducing every “ character to these five [four] strokes, and in reality “ saying nothing;” &c. But to say that every English word is formed from 26 letters, and that an Englishman who knows their powers is master of the whole written language, would be saying the truth. And so easy is

Y y

this acquisition, that Mr. Gibbon says he would have supposed it to be innate, if he had not corrected his knowledge by analogy; they are learned at so tender an age, that ginger-bread, or some saccharine substitute, has power to induce and accompany the insensible acquisition of the treasure.

——— “ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi  
“Doctores, elementa velint ut dicere prima.”

Supposing every English word, one with another, to contain six letters, and neglecting the different degrees of frequency with which they occur in writing, the whole number of 26 will be repeated about 50 times in an octavo page; the alphabet will revolve upwards of 11,000 times in the course of the language, and each letter will have nearly (for the *vowels* have more than one sound) the same power every time it occurs. But each stroke in the elementary characters has a different power, as it is affected by its neighbours, in each of these characters, (as the arms of the French Telegraph have a different power in each shape it takes;) and each elementary character has a different power in every separate combination of which it forms a part; so that each stroke has a different power in every separate character in which it occurs. The strokes, therefore, have no more individual power to express the Chinese written language, than single lines or dots have to express the subject of an engraving executed in either of these manners. They can only be said to be equivalent to the perpendicular, oblique, and curve lines of which our letters are composed, which is “in reality saying [that they are, individually, equal to] nothing.” After all this, perhaps the reader will not be surprized to hear that Mr. Marshman considers it more difficult to recollect our 26 letters, than to dis-

tinguish one Chinese character among 35,000, provided there be more letters in a word, than simple characters in the compound! After comparing the task of recollecting their characters to that of recognizing a multitude of human countenances, and instancing the fable of Cyrus being able to call every soldier by his name, in an army of a hundred thousand men, he says: "were this not the case however, and had the figure of a door, and the ear, in the character *mun*, to hear; no more tendency to suggest the idea of hearing; than the four (characters or) letters h, e, a, r, the component parts of the Chinese word would still have the advantage of being only half the number of characters necessary to be retained in memory, in order to recall the idea expressed by the English word *hear*." (P. 111. It should be 121.) Taken separately the "figures" of a door, and of the ear, are each one among 214; but, when combined, they become one figure among 35,000; so that Mr. Marshman says, that it is more easy for a general to name any one man out of an army of 35,000, than for the master of a family of 26 persons to name any four of them!

The remaining two propositions, respecting syllables, may be conveniently examined at the same time; and here I am at a loss which repugnancy to bring first forward. If syllables were the elements of European languages, it would be necessary to commit them to memory; but Mr. Marshman acknowledges, as we have seen, that there is no such necessity, for he says, if it were necessary, we should find it a very hard task. Nevertheless, he ventures, in the same page, (P. 17.) in the very teeth of this concession, to take it for

granted that such a task is necessary,—that we do store our memories with insignificant syllables, bla, ble, bli, blo, mab, tab, dab, &c. “Nor would it be easy” to prove that the (syllabic) *elements* of the symbolic “[alphabetic] medium of communication, are more” “easily retained in memory than those of the Chinese” “language. Perhaps a Chinese might find it quite as” “difficult to remember the *element bla*, as *yun*, the” “element for man; to preserve in memory the *element*” “*sma*, as to recollect *sau*, the elementary character” “for mountain.” Again he conjures up these Imps, these unreal mockeries:—“than a foreigner who has” “mastered the 400 elementary characters of bla, ble,” “bli, &c. which in reality form the basis of English” “words.” (P. 19.) It cannot be to the difficulty of reading syllables that Mr. Marshman alludes, unless he mean to deny that a knowledge of alphabetic notation enables a man to read every syllable that can exist. If children are made to read insignificant syllables, it is only to teach them the powers of the letters, which however might be done without the use of one of Dyche's syllables bab, tab, &c. by selecting, first monosyllabic sentences, next, dissyllabic, and so on; and by distinguishing the syllabication of polysyllabic words by hyphens, thus, glo-ry, har-me-ny, re-col-lee-tion, (or, if syllabled with reference to orthoepy, rec-ol-lee-tion.) With respect to the first word, for instance, the child does not treasure up in its memory the syllables *har*, *mo*, and *ny*, but only the powers of the letters *h*, *a*, *r*, *m*, *o*, *n*, *y*, producing a significant word, which, as well as every other word in the language, slips insensibly into the memory, during the progress from infancy to manhood. We do not commit

our syllables, to memory, nor do we commence the study of foreign languages by mastering their syllables, because, like the Chinese strokes, they are generally insignificant if taken separately, and we only recognize their effect when combined into words.\* An oblique stroke in one Chinese character, will afford no aid to discover the meaning of another, containing also, an oblique stroke; as the syllable *har*, in *harmony* has no influence in disclosing the meaning of *harvest*, or *harbinger*. Their powers when thus combined we acquire insensibly in our oral language, and when transferred to the written language, they are unlocked,—they speak to us,—by means of 26 symbols of sound. How different is the progress of a Chinese, from the want of equivalents to our letters! He too acquires his oral language insensibly, but, as I have said before,

---

\* There are not a few oversights in the following passage in Dr. Reid's third Essay on the active powers: "But from what cause does it happen that a good *speaker* no sooner conceives what he would express, than the *letters, syllables*, and words, arrange themselves according to "innumerable rules of speech, while he never thinks of these rules!"

§c. 1. A speaker has nothing to do with *letters*, which are the visible signs of sound; and therefore do not arrange themselves even imperceptibly. In *reading*, indeed, their several powers instantaneously occur; inasmuch that 2000 of them may, in the space of one minute, translate to the ear the several *audible* signs with which they are entrusted. 2. Neither do the *syllables* imperceptibly arrange themselves to a speaker, because, being separately insignificant, the memory retains none of them except as conjoined into words; and we think, and speak, not by arranging letters into syllables, and syllables into words, but by arranging words into sentences. 3. Words present themselves in associated trains, and he thinks not of the rules of logic, grammar, and rhetoric, because such a diversion of his thoughts would be incompatible with the continuity of his discourse, and be in fact an abandonment of his purpose. He may even be altogether ignorant of these rules; as a man may walk and run without knowing any of the anatomical and physiological principles on which these actions depend.

he is arrested by the written, as by a *new*, and as it were a dead language. He begins by learning the names and meanings of the 214 simple characters; but he must next learn by what combination of these, the 215th character is formed, with its name and meaning; next, he must acquire the same knowledge respecting the 216th character, and so on till he has possessed himself of all the 35,000. If the syllables that occur in our language amounted to 3 or 4000, and if each of them had a separate character, still the difficulties presented by the Chinese written language to a Chinese, would exceed those presented by ours to us, in the proportion of 35,000, to 3 or 4000.

The error arising from confounding audible symbols, which are equally arbitrary in all languages, with their visible representatives, which are so essentially different in different languages;\* the error arising from contrasting an inseparable attribute of *spoken* language, with what is peculiar to the Chinese *written* language, instead of comparing one method of conveying ideas by the eye with another; again presents itself, immediately after the preceding quotations: "Nor is there any greater aptitude, I will not say in "*bla* and *sma* (for these although actually elements "*[cela vous plait à dire!]* convey no idea) but in the "*words man and mountain* to recall to the mind an "*idea of the object which they represent, than in these "*two Chinese elements, even though the latter should "*be perfectly arbitrary symbols instead of imitations.*" I most willingly subscribe to all this. The whole argument hinges upon this,—that the Chinese characters have the same aptitude to convey ideas to the mind,**

---

\* Supra, P. 331.



that spoken words have; both are equally symbols of ideas, the one transmitted by the eye, the other by the ear; but then, spoken words *may* be acquired insensibly; every oral language is acquired insensibly by the natives of the country where it is spoken; whereas the Chinese characters *cannot* be acquired insensibly, for they are incapable of being spoken: in our books we recognise our spoken language; in the written words "man and mountain," we acknowledge only the "aptitude" of the letters of which they are composed to present to us articulate sounds, the knowledge of which has grown with our growth, and strengthened with our strength: *the Chinese*, in their books, find a dead language, the knowledge of which they must gain by the sweat of their brows. Mr. Marshman acknowledges that we are insensible to the fatigue of acquiring our native tongue; but he says, *if it were not so, if it did not possess an aptitude to communicate itself insensibly, we should have to encounter equal difficulties with the Chinese in learning—their elements.* Hear him! "The difficulties which we therefore overcome in our childhood, before we come even to read English, may in reality be equally great with those encountered relative to the elements of the Chinese language, *although* our infant years, and the care and pains of our preceptors at that tender period, may render us *insensible to the fatigue.*" Notwithstanding this admission, he proceeds, in the next sentence, by supposing that it might be admitted, that the difficulties in the two cases are equally great; "It may perhaps be objected here, that although the difficulty of acquiring the elements

"be in both cases equally great, yet," &c.\* But every member of the above sentence is objectionable. "Before we come *even* to read English;" as if the difficulties were then to increase, whereas they have all been nearly overcome; and the remaining acquisitions are made almost as insensibly as the preceding. "Equally great with those encountered relative to 'the elements of the Chinese:'" the degree of difficulty, and the extent of the acquisition, in the cases of a man learning his native spoken language, and of a Chinese learning his elements, are most unequal. The former finds no difficulty; the latter finds considerable; the former has acquired 20 or 30,000 words; the latter has acquired 214 characters out of 35,000.

Our letters are visible symbols of sound, which will express every articulate sound that can be uttered: we may thus read a book in a language which we do not understand, (as Milton's daughters did to their blind father,) as we may hear a foreigner speak without understanding him. As the understanding receives *the same* words by the ear and by the eye, it cannot know any, admitted by one organ, which it would not know if admitted by the other, and conversely. If a man with whom I am totally unacquainted, enters by the front door of the house, should I have been more likely to know him if he had entered by the back door? But will it be believed that Mr. Marshman makes it an objection to the alphabet, that it does not work a miracle,—that it does not teach us to understand the audible symbols of a foreign language? "It is true

---

\* Extract of a letter from a young English Gentleman on his travels, dated Geneva: "How you would have laughed to have seen them all a 'jabbering French! and even the children that play in the streets talk 'it as fast as sister's governess.'"—*Looker-on*, No. 71.

“ that a child born in England, through his being  
 “ habituated to English conversation from his earliest  
 “ infancy, has generally made a considerable advance  
 “ in the language by the time he has completely mas-  
 “ tered its elementary letters; *and syllables*, which cir-  
 “ cumstance we are apt to overlook, [Indeed!] and to  
 “ ascribe that to a mere knowledge of the elements,  
 “ which is the result of year’s actual acquaintance with  
 “ the language.” [This is more passing strange.  
 That any body should fancy the eye was more cunning  
 than the ear! But I would ask such a person, what  
 becomes of those who never acquire “ a mere know-  
 “ ledge of the elements,” that is, of the alphabet; and  
 whether the Constable Du’Guesclin and Mahomet were  
 mute, because they could not read.] “ *Let us however*  
 “ *observe a foreigner, who is master of the Roman alphab-*  
 “ *et, and therefore able to read any English book.*”  
 What! without going through a course of syllables,  
 bla, ble, mah, cab, &c. &c. “ *Has he not still every thing*  
 “ *to learn?*” Are not several years requisite to bring  
 “ him in any moderate degree acquainted with the  
 “ language?” If we throw this into the form used on  
 preceding occasions, it will stand thus: we highly  
 over-rate the value of the alphabet, because, *although*  
 it is insensibly acquired in childhood, and gives us a  
 command of the written, co-extensive with that which  
 we have of the oral language, yet it does not possess  
 the magic charm of rendering intelligible to us the  
 words of foreign languages. Thus, as Mr. Marshman  
 had before considered, whether the advantages pre-  
 ponderated in favour of the alphabet, or of the Chinese  
 hieroglyphics, by comparing, not the one with the  
 other, but the latter with the distinct notation of com-

Z z

bined letters in Sungskrit; so he now pretends to estimate their relative merits, by balancing the progress which a European makes in a foreign tongue, against that which a Chinese makes in his own! Surely the question should be, whether a European, or a Chinese obtains, with less expence of time and labour, such a command of his native written tongue as enables him to appropriate to his own benefit all its stores of instruction and entertainment, and to exhibit his own thoughts to the contemplation of others? which of them is sooner able "*heroum laudes, et facta parentum—legere?*"

If it be true that a European makes such an acquisition in a few *days*, while a Chinese requires a few *years*, the question is decided. The former may be employed, from the time his faculties will permit him, in acquiring knowledge; the latter is employed in learning his own written language, and finds that so laborious and respectable an achievement that he seldom aspires to further improvement or to smooth and embellish the way for his successors. To the former, language is but an instrument, on the mere possession of which he cannot plume himself; to the latter, the acquisition of the instrument is generally an ultimate object of pursuit. In both cases, too, the value of the acquisition is in proportion to, as it in some degree results from the ease with which it is acquired. There is nothing in the circle of human art or science that the English language does not contain in the greatest perfection: the Chinese contains no art, no science, no eloquence.\* I am far from wishing to ascribe this

---

\* *De non apparentibus, &c.* It is more than a hundred years since Europeans have possessed a key to the Chinese cyphers, and, nothing has

disparity solely to the different natures of the two languages. I am aware of the existence of other radical causes, on which it would be foreign to my present purpose to enlarge; but I contend that the inherent qualities of the two languages have necessarily contributed to widen the distance between the two nations in every constituent of civilization; in every thing wherefrom we can adjudge their respective ranks in the scale of human improvement. Why then should the supererogatory acquirements of the Englishman be considered only as a set off against the necessary duties of the Chinese? But if such a criterion could be admitted, my confidence would be little diminished; for I am of opinion that a European may be able to read and understand *several* languages, sooner than a Chinese can gain the same knowledge of *his own*. In such a task the latter would scarcely have any advantage over a foreigner, and we cannot state the period he would require at less than seven years, which, says Mr. Marshman, would be sufficient, "with proper helps, to bring a man thoroughly acquainted with the most considerable of the Chinese writings." (P. 112.) Now, in seven years, a European may become thoroughly acquainted with the most considerable writings in three or four living languages, exclusive of his own. "Are not several years requisite to bring him in any moderate degree acquainted with the [English] language?" No; one year would be abundantly

---

been produced to disprove the assertion in the text. A specimen of the writings of Confucius (or rather a volume of *Confuciana*) has been exhibited, and as the Chinese enthrone him in the very first seat among their worthies, it is fair to conclude that they possess nothing better. He that would dive for pearls into Chinese lore, will fetch up something that is "*vilius alga*."

sufficient; perhaps six months, or even less. In the case of an Englishman, who is acquainted with Latin, studying French, a few months ought to enable him to read French books with almost as much ease as English. The resources of etymology, formerly touched upon, combine to facilitate his task; nouns are declined, not by inflection, but by articles, like our own; together with a greater number of inflections in the conjugation of verbs, the same auxiliary verbs (to be, and to have,) are used; the idioms of both are closely allied: and both have borrowed largely from the Latin. Thus, a great many words have the same spelling and signification in both languages: a still greater number have a slight difference of termination: there are, besides, a multitude of words from the Latin, whose corresponding terms in English have Saxon roots. Thus there are few audible, and no visible symbols to be acquired. If boys are seven years in acquiring Latin, it is to be ascribed partly to the refinement of its grammar; partly to its being a dead language; but chiefly to the immaturity of their faculties. If Greek, a more difficult language, be undertaken at the end of the seven years, as much progress will be made in two or three years, as in Latin in the preceding seven. On the other hand there are instances of men who could define the term of their application to a foreign language by weeks, instead of months or years. Joseph Scaliger, after looking at the Greek conjugations, began to read Homer, and finished him in twenty-one days.\* Mr. Fox, and doubtless many others, followed

---

\* "Igitur, vix delibatis conjugationibus Græcis, Homerum cum interpretatione arreptum uno et viginti diebus totum didici: poetica vero "dialecti vestigiis insistens grammaticam mihi ipsi formavi;" &c.—*Epistola*, P. 51.

the same plan, and, without much abridging the time they had to devote to other studies, or professional duties, have thus mastered several languages: but in all these instances, the linguist has attached himself to languages possessing an alphabet: even Sir William Jones recoiled from the Chinese symbolic characters.

Mr. Marshman occupies very untenable ground in accounting for the length of time consumed by Chinese students, before they can pass their examinations in reading and writing, when he asserts that the object of their study is, "not the mere acquisition of the language, but of a copious and elegant style. ~~Was~~ this however made the criterion of proficiency in the English language, it might appear as difficult of acquisition as the Chinese. If this be not the case, how is it, that among so many authors as are continually appearing before the public, so few attain to real excellence of style; after having been conversant with the English language for perhaps 20 or 30 years?" (P. 113.) The difficulty of writing a language correctly is great in proportion to the multiplicity and refinement of its grammatical rules. It is this elaborate construction that renders the ability to write good Latin a rare, and good Greek an almost unexampled attainment among moderns; and it is the want of such intricacy that enables the bulk of the people of England to commit fewer faults in speaking or writing than most other nations in Europe. But the Chinese syntax is still more simple than the English. In English there are few, in Chinese there are no inflections; words are connected by juxtaposition and by the use of about 30 auxiliary and prepositive characters, inso-much that the student has actually no grammar to

study. The Chinese therefore is very little detained by what demands the nicest attention, and constitutes the principal difficulty in many other tongues; his labour is bestowed on the vocabulary, not on the syntax; but supposing him to have made himself completely master of both, what farther instruction can be given him whereby he may attain to elegance of stile? Is it not evident that the character of his stile must depend on the fecundity of his mind, and the justness of his taste; upon intellectual endowments to which the utmost assiduity in philological studies can add nothing? To be able to write elegantly and copiously, a man must not only have been favoured by nature, but must have cultivated some branch of knowledge: "*scribendi recte sapere est principium et fons*:" but Mr. Marshman does not represent the Chinese students as applying themselves to any one department in science or literature, "before they can pass their examinations with honour;" he declares that they are only perfecting their acquaintance with their language. Now, a perfect knowledge of a language is a teachable and attainable object; but to require that students should persevere in such a study till they acquire the power of writing copiously and elegantly upon any imaginable subject, would be as reasonable, as to require them to add a cubit to their statures. To be able to "endow his purposes with words," to be able to write correctly as far as a man can concatenate ideas, is all that can be required in any country, without flying in the face of heaven, and all that any rhetorician ever pretended to teach: but, if to suppose that the patient Chinese student is possessed by such Promethean audacity involve an absurdity, it follows that the period



of his probation is employed in the search of an attainable object, namely, the acquisition of his language; an object, which is so far from being attended with equal difficulty to an Englishman, that it scarcely enters at all into the course of his studies. Let us only observe that course. Having familiarized himself with the use of the alphabet, he begins, about eight years of age, to study Latin. This first step is the most striking proof that can be given of the universal conviction, that the knowledge of English is in a manner innate; rather an inheritance than the reward of laborious exertion; and that youthful vigour should be directed to the pursuit of external wealth, rather than allowed to evaporate in the contemplation of what has been already obtained.\* The few who, like Dr. Franklin, have objected to this practice, have more frequently been

---

\* But though our own language costs us no labour, we are always better acquainted with it than with others on which we have bestowed the greatest application. Quintilian, speaking of the docility of children, says: "Id vel hoc argumento patet, quod intra biennium quàm verba rectè formare potuerant, quamvis nullo instante, omnia ferè loquuntur. At novitiis nostris per quot annos sermo Latinus repugnat? Magis scias, si quem jam robustum instituere literis coeperis, non sine causa dici Παιδομαδεις eos qui in sua quidque arte optimè faciant." Lib. I. Cap. 11. Now a Chinese, with respect to a knowledge of *his own* language, can never be Παιδομαδεις! For reasons similar to those in the text Quintilian advised that the Roman youth should begin with the study of the Greek language: "A sermone Græco puerum incipere malo: quia Latinus, qui pluribus in usu est, vel nobis nolentibus se præbet: simul quia disciplinis quoque Græcis prius instituendus est, unde et nostræ fluxerunt." Lib. I. Cap. 1. For similar reasons English children formerly began with French. Trevisa who wrote in the middle of the 14th century, speaking of the instability of the English language, says: "One is by cause that children goon to school, learn to speak first English, and then ben compelled to construe their lessons in French; and that have ben used syn the Normans came into England."

answered by declamations on the merits of the ancient classics, than by an appeal to the superfluous time which the insensible acquisition of English leaves, without any fitter employment for the tender faculties. In the mean time the student has learned to write with the letters employed in chirography; his next step is to become acquainted with Greek; next, to gain some knowledge of the sciences; history, natural and civil; philosophy, natural and moral; and mathematics; and of at least one foreign living language; and thus the course is completed, without any part of it being appropriated exclusively to the acquisition of his native tongue. Whether the student now retire to make, or to enjoy a fortune, into whatever career of life he throw himself, he is fully equipped for the achievement of any thing for which he was ever destined by nature. On the other hand it is acknowledged that the Chinese student is wholly occupied in rendering himself perfectly master of his own tongue; he has nothing to do with foreign literature, with science, or with graceful accomplishments; he has to study no niceties of syntax; by what, then, can he be detained such a length of time, but by the circumstance of his written language being separated from the spoken, and locked up in distinct symbolic characters; by that very system, whose comparative merits Mr. Marshman and myself have so differently appreciated? Reading, to an Englishman, being as easy, or rather being the same thing as listening to a discourse, and writing being the same thing as speaking, with the advantage of allowing more time to collect and digest the thoughts, he *insensibly* acquires such a phraseology as reflects the true image of his ideas. "Ideas and words," says a very animated,

but no less superficial writer, "in the act of composition, are soul and body to each other: you know nothing of them; therefore you can justly remark nothing of them, but in their united state."\* In the productions that are continually issuing from the press, we accordingly behold the intellectual characters of their authors, and not proofs of the degree of diligence with which they have studied the English language. If in one man the spell of genius can instantaneously summon up trains of interesting ideas, beautiful imagery, rich decoration culled from the unbounded reign of fancy, while another slowly solicits the veriest common-places from the recesses of his brain; if one man argues coherently and forcibly, while another rambles from one idea to another without rhyme or reason, the difference of their *styles* results from the original and inherent differences in their mental powers, and not from the one having thoroughly, and the other partially, acquired his mother tongue. If among the multitude of our writers the many possess lower degrees of merit, and the few attain to "real excellence," such as Addison, Bolingbroke, Milton, Pope, Hume, Burke; what is it but saying that nature produces few Addisons, few Bolingbrokes; and perhaps but one Shakes-

---

\* Stockdale's Lectures on English Poets, Vol. II. P. 476.

"Language most shews a man: speak that I may see thee. It springs out of the most retired and inmost parts of us, and is the image of the parent of it, the mind. No glass renders a man's form or likeness so true as his speech."—*Ben Jonson*.

"Language is the express image and picture of human thoughts; and from the picture we may often draw very certain conclusions with regard to the original." Reid's Intellectual Powers, Essay I. Chap. 2.

"Non inseram simulacrum viri copiosi, quæ dixerit referendo: ipaius oratio extat, &c. Livy, XLV. 25.

peare, one Milton, one Burke? As the most perfect knowledge of a language, without a rich vein, will avail nothing in composition, so both conjoined will not constitute him an orator who has not been born one. And yet copiousness and elegance of oratory would furnish as reasonable a criterion of the difficulties attending the acquisition of one's native tongue, as the same qualities in the compositions of the closet. The maxim, *orator fit*, has been, and is constantly refuted by experience. Of a human being it never can be optional to his parent or master "*scamnum faceretne Deum.*" Every man is born with the seeds of all that time and study can develop in him; and though education may favour their growth, it can neither supply the want of original vigour, nor force their expansion, nor direct their course. The literary appetite instinctively seeks that kind of food in the regions of science or fancy, which it is best calculated to convert to the nourishment of the body *literary*; and its taste and success in this occupation are more indicative of the powers originally implanted in its constitution by nature, than of the independent virtues of its food. What readily becomes chyle to one, by another could not be taken, or would remain crude and indigestible.

Having now discussed the whole of Mr. Marshman's defence of the symbolic, and recrimination against the alphabetic medium, his principal postulates may be fairly recapitulated in the form of objections to the alphabet, as follow: The value of the alphabet is highly over-rated, because, 1. It has occasioned the great diversity of languages which exist in Europe and Asia: 2. Written words are symbols, and the difficulty of recollecting their signification is in proportion

to the number of letters which they contain: 3. It does not enable us to understand the audible symbols, the words, of foreign languages: 4. Syllables are the elements of European languages; and in studying them, we must begin by mastering the syllables (bla, ble, bar, bir,) to the amount of several hundred: 5. It is *possible* that it *might have* possessed a separate syllabic notation, like the Sungskrit, which would have presented considerable difficulties: 6. It does not enable us to become copious and elegant authors in prose and verse.

To the Chinese, also, ideas and words are soul and body to each other in the process of cogitation; they think with the words of their oral language; but, *in writing*, they must *translate* the various meanings of their words into the visible symbols of their written language. Thus they encounter the same sort of difficulty that an Englishman does in writing Latin, or any other foreign language, and which he cannot surmount without the labour of several *years*, though he may be able to understand and translate any of these tongues into his own in a few *months*: and this latter degree of skill is all that is necessary or desirable, because it is infinitely easier for the foreigner to meet us half way by learning to translate our tongue into his own, than for us to go the whole way by learning to compose in his. And this is the practice that is commonly observed: every man writes in the dialect of his own country, and it is easily translated into that of any other by natives of those countries. But to a Chinese the power of composing in a language different from that which he speaks is a *necessary* acquisition; and whatever length of time be requisite to enable him to

exhibit a just image of his thoughts, all that time is spent in making the "mere acquisition of the language;" for till he can do this with facility he is incapable of doing what every Englishman can do, who has learned the forms and powers of the letters of the alphabet in print, and in manuscript.

Some periods turned by two of Confucius's disciples, recording detached maxims and apophthegms of that sage, may be considered as a standard of Chinese prose.—"Chee says, at fifteen my desire was towards learning. At thirty my mind was fixed. At fifty I understood the heaven-derived rule. At sixty the ear received every thing with ease. At seventy the desires which proceeded from the heart, transgressed not the law." (P. 82) "Chee says, Yaow, let me teach you (wherein consists) knowledge: having knowledge, to apply it; not having knowledge, to confess your ignorance; *this is (real) knowledge.*" (P. 115) "Chee says, Chham, you know my way to perfection: Chung-chee says, Yes." "Chee going out, his other disciples asked, saying What is this?" Chun-chee said, The Sage's conduct is affection and benevolence ever in operation." (P. 238.) "Choong-koong enquired respecting Chee-song-pak-chee. Chee replied he may do: he is gentle." (P. 238.) "Chee conversed not—about curious arts,—nor brutal strength,—nor insurrection,—nor the deity." (P. 467.) "Chee says, How is virtue far distant? I sought virtue, and that virtue I have attained. See-pai, a mandarine, of Chhum, enquired, Does Cheu-koong understand propriety? Koong-chee replied, He is acquainted with propriety." (P. 490.) "When fasting, the sage chose to dress himself in clean ap-

“ parel. The robe he chose for sleeping exceeded by  
“ one half the length of his body. In religious fast-  
“ ing, the sage changed his diet; he also chose to  
“ change to place of his sitting. Relative to food, he  
“ was not regardless of its goodness. Raw meat he  
“ did not neglect to have cut into fine shreds.” (P. 686.)

It has been said, however, that the flowers of Chinese rhetoric are comprized in the singular combinations that form the compound characters, and are therefore inaudible, and untranslatable: but in the *first* place, the greater part, almost the whole of such associated ideas are perfectly incongruous; and of the few that are not so, how many are there whose relations are so happily selected as to afford any pleasure in the contemplation, especially, as the combination was not effected by the imagination of the writer, but retained in his memory, or hunted for in the *Imperial Dictionary*, and had been used a thousand times before: but, *secondly*, as the meaning of the compound character must instantly strike a Chinese who is an adept in reading, it will be impossible for the mind to pay any attention to the multitude of foreign ideas shut up in each character, when it has to consider the single idea expressed by each compound character, and their connection, so as to understand the propositions they convey. These single ideas will be instantly seized, and all the extraneous ones excluded: as when the following words occur, “sincere, expedient, abundance, “congruous,” they do not present the ideas of “wax, “foot, wave, crane,” to those who are acquainted with their respective derivations. By the application of etymology these four ideas may be discovered, as the various colours of the rain-bow may be discovered

by the use of the prism: but without such application they will be no more perceptible than the prismatic colours in a colourless ray of light. So rapidly does the mind connect the necessary ideas together, that Mr. Burke and others have advanced the paradox, that it understands propositions without even admitting the constituent ideas. The mind, indeed, does not dwell on the meaning of each word; and therefore could not stop to pick up the fantastical images that may be heaped into single Chinese characters. If all the ingredients mentioned by Virgil, as being mixed by the Cyclops in the formation of Jupiter's thunderbolts (*tres imbris torti radios, &c.*) formed the component parts of one compound character signifying thunder or lightning, they would remain dormant, and the sublime passage in the *Georgic* would be lost in a single idea, which might be thrust into a very ordinary or mean sentence. Notwithstanding the grovelling character of Chinese prose, it is really preferable to the accumulated pomp and confusion of Persian metaphor and hyperbole.

In the division of literary labour among European scholars, it will fall to the lot of some to ply the arduous labours of Chinese, and of others to undertake the perhaps still more weary task of *Sanskrit* lore; and it is not unnatural that they should wish to entice others into the same paths by diminishing the difficulties they have encountered, and magnifying the advantages they have gained. It is but justice to Mr. Marshman, however, to say that he abstains from the latter mode of allurements, though he unintentionally gives into the former. He does not say that we may obtain, in Chinese books, "an inexhaustible fund of information



“ and amusement,” “ numerous original treatises on  
“ sciences highly worthy of examination,” “ sublime  
“ and elegant poems,” or “ an endless assemblage of  
“ enchanting allegory and fable.”\* His motive for  
undertaking, and perseverance in prosecuting the  
study of the Chinese language, are equally respectable : but as he has misrepresented several principles  
in the structure of Western and Eastern languages,  
and misunderstood the essential advantages of the  
alphabet, I have endeavoured to rectify the former and  
vindicate the honours of the latter.

---

### POSTSCRIPT.

Subsequent to the first publication of the preceding observations, Dr. Marshman published an enlarged edition of his Dissertation, in a quarto volume, containing upwards of 600 Pages, under the title of “ *Clavis Sinica: Elements of Chinese Grammar, with a preliminary dissertation on the characters and the colloquial medium of the Chinese, and an appendix containing the Ta-Hyok of Confucius, with a translation.*” The Dissertation occupies 185 Pages; the Grammar, 381.

Page 5. Harris' inexhaustive enumeration of the modes of conveying information through the medium of the eye, is again adopted; and we are again told that written words are arbitrary *symbols* (OF IDEAS,) though they are, in truth, *combinations* of arbitrary symbols (OF ARTICULATE SOUND.) The only change

---

\* Preface to Wilkins's *Sanskrit Grammar*, P. X.

it, that Dr. Marshman no longer designates the alphabetic system as "the symbolic," but has restored to it its legitimate appellation. For this change he accounts in the following manner: "In the former edition, the "alphabetic mode of writing was denominated the "symbolic, while the Chinese was termed the imitative. But as all the Chinese characters beside the "elements, must necessarily be symbols as really as "written words, since they signify by compact or "agreement certain ideas, the term "Symbolic," being in a certain degree common to both systems, "seemed unfit to designate either. In this edition, "therefore, both systems are designated by that which "constitutes the basis of each, the Western system "being termed the alphabetic, and the Chinese the "imitative." The term "Symbolic," instead of being "in a certain degree common to both systems," and therefore "unfit to designate either," is not in any degree applicable to the alphabetic system in the same sense in which it is applicable to the Chinese, to which last it had a better right to be appropriated than any other term, not excepting "Imitative." Written words have a direct reference to articulate sound, and an indirect one to ideas: Chinese characters have a direct reference to ideas, and none at all to articulate sound.

Pages 20—25. The Chinese divide their characters into six classes. 1. The *Imitative*, composed of (supposed) representations of visible objects, includes rather more than half the elements, and a few other characters. 2. The *Figurative*, composed of characters whose meanings have been extended by a figurative application. 3. The *Indicative*, composed of

characters whose forms have some reference to their signification, and of a great part of those which are formed by adding merely a stroke or a point to another character. These two classes contain less than 1000 characters. 4. The *Combined*, composed of characters formed by the union of two or more significant characters. 5. The *Inverted*, composed of characters of the former class slightly altered in form, or bearing different names. 6. Termed by the Chinese *Hhyai Shing*, "meaning and sound," composed of characters formed by the union of one denoting the genus or kind, with another denoting the imagined sound of the species or individual signified. The number of characters which belong to the fourth and six classes, is somewhat above 3000.

As the above classes contain less than 5000 characters, they do not account for one sixth of the 30,000 which Dr. Marshman now states as the amount of the language. "How are the rest formed? As they cannot be formed immediately from the elements, are they formed from certain primitive characters like the roots in Greek or the Dhatoos in Sungskrit?"\* "That such primitives really exist as occupy the middle space between the elements and the great mass of the characters, and like the Greek primitives or the Sungskrit Dhatoos, form the bulk of the language by associating to themselves certain of the elements, was long suspected by the writer. This idea was strengthened by his observing in a manuscript Latin-Chinese Dictionary, which classed the characters according to their names, that in numer-

---

\* P. 32, and Seq.

"ous instances, one character was the root of 10 or  
 "12 others, each of which was formed from it by the  
 "addition of a *single element*; thus the addition of the  
 "element for a hand to a primitive, formed one cha-  
 "racter; that being changed for the element denoting  
 "water a fourth. It further appeared that the charac-  
 "ters thus formed from the same primitive by merely  
 "adding one element, generally took the name of the  
 "primitive with some slight variation."—"Exclusive  
 "of the 214 elements, the number of characters from  
 "which *another* is formed, amounts to 3867. From  
 "these by the addition of a single element to each, is  
 "formed the great body of the language, in nearly the  
 "same manner as the great mass of the Greek lan-  
 "guage is formed from about 3500 primitives, and  
 "that of the Sungskrit language, from about 1700  
 "Dhatons or roots. The greatest number of Deriva-  
 "tives which spring from any one of these, is 74, and  
 "the least *one*." "It is however proper to observe  
 "that the term "primitive" is not applied to them on  
 "account of their *origin*, but merely with reference  
 "to their *use*." Deducting 2178 primitives which  
 produce only one or two derivatives each, Dr. Marsh-  
 man reduces their number to 1689.

The primitives are divided into four classes. The  
*first* consists of those characters which are formed from  
 an element by some insignificant addition. The *second*  
 consists of compound characters. The *third* consists of  
 characters formed by the union of *three* elements, of  
 which if one be taken away, the other two have no  
 meaning. The *fourth* consists of *derivatives* from the  
 three foregoing classes, exalted by use to the rank of  
 primitives.

The office of Formatives is so unequally distributed among the elements that 120 of them form only 2640 derivatives; while *three* of them (those for grass, water, and the hand) form above 3700; and 60 of them form no less than 25000, the great mass of the language.

I had formerly occasion to contend against a sort of claim to the office of roots, preferred in favour of the 214 elements, or keys; but since the number of roots has been increased to 1689, it will be obvious that the instances of incongruity have been diminished in the same proportion. Still, when it is considered that three ideas (grass, water, hand,) enter into the composition of more than 3700 characters, we must acknowledge that the Chinese system possesses nothing of that severe precision which connects the Greek, Arabic, and Sungskrit roots with their derivatives.

Page 96. The 36 initial powers, or consonants, which, by deducting identical powers, were formerly reduced to 26, are now reduced to 24, or 21.

Page 109. The 38 final powers are said to consist of 16 vowel sounds, of which 4 compounded with *y*, and 4 with *w*; 7 diphthongal, of which 3 compounded with *y*, and 1 with *w*; and 15 nasal sounds of which 5 compounded with *y*, and 3 united with *w*.

Dr. Marshman enters into a strange inquiry (P. 139.) whether the Chinese *colloquial medium* be derived from the Sungskrit *Alphabetic system*. One alphabet, may be derived from another; but how a *language* can be derived from an *alphabet*, is to me incomprehensible.

Page 139. "It has been already observed that the " Chinese system is not a system of *symbols*, but of " *powers* incorporated in their colloquial medium, " from which if they were separated, no colloquial

B b b 2

“medium would exist.” Does Dr. Marshman mean to say that the characters representing the initials and finals are not *symbols* of their respective *powers*? and that if these characters were removed, the language would cease to exist?

Page 176. It was said in the Dissertation, that the 846 monosyllables might be increased, by the intonations, to at least 2178 distinct sounds. It now appears that the original number of 846 must be reduced, by deducting those which we spell with precisely the same letters, to 629; and that these 629, when varied by the four tones, produces only 1782 sounds; of which 533 are of the first or *even* tone, 508 of the second or *rising* tone, 519 of the third or *grave* tone, and 221 of the fourth or *abrupt* and *quick* tone.

Pages 84, 326, &c. It appears that there are some characters *now* pronounced *irr*, though there is no *r* in the Chinese alphabet.



FINIS.

*The following Table may be an useful accompaniment to  
the *Horæ Romanæ*.*

DATES OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE ROMAN  
CONSTITUTION.

Expulsion of Tarquin, and institution of CON- SULS. (B. C. 508.) Year of Rome,.....	244
First commotions on account of debts,.....	255
First DICTATOR,.....	255
Five TRIBUNES appointed,.....	260
Two PLEBEIAN ÆDILES appointed,.....	260
First demand of an AGRARIAN Law,.....	266
Struggle for COMITIA TRIBUTA, begun by Volcanus,.....	281
Concluded,.....	282
Struggle for the TERENTIAN LAW (to obtain a written code of laws, viz. those of the 12 Fables,) begun,.....	291
Concluded,.....	299
First DECENVIRATE,.....	302
First demand of the CONSULSHIP for <i>Plebeians</i> ,.....	308
Plebeians made <i>eligible</i> to be MILITARY TRI- BUNES,.....	308
First CENSOR,.....	310
Plebeians made <i>eligible</i> to the QUÆSTORSHIP,.....	333
First PLEBEIAN Quæstor,.....	344
First PLEBEIAN Military Tribune,.....	353
Struggle for the LICINIAN LAWS (which threw open the CONSULSHIP to <i>Plebeians</i> ) begun,.....	377
Concluded and First Plebeian Consul elected,.....	386
First PRÆTOR,.....	386
CURULE ÆDILES appointed,.....	388

First PLEBEIAN <i>Censor</i> ,.....	402
First PLEBEIAN <i>Prætor</i> , .....	416
First PLEBEIAN <i>Pontifex Maximus</i> , .....	503
Murder of TIBERIUS GRACCHUS, .....	620
Commotions raised by MARIUS and SYLLA,....	665
PERPETUAL DICTATORSHIP of <i>Sylla</i> ,.....	671
First Triumvirate; i. e. of CRASSUS, POMPEY, and CÆSAR,.....	693
Murder of CÆSAR, .....	709
Second Triumvirate; i. e. of LEPIDUS, ANTONY and OCTAVIUS,.....	710
OCTAVIUS EMPEROR,.....	724



# ERRATUM.

Page 133, line 20. After the words "happiness of society," substitute a *colon*, for the *period*, and add the following:

And doubtless these and other wise purposes were intended by the establishment of that general law which provides that inequality is a necessary concomitant of property wherever it is known, resulting from the variety of human character with respect to prudence, activity, frugality, ignorance, sloth, prodigality; and the accidents of marriage, celibacy, &c.









